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Śāstrārambha

Inquiries into the Preamble in Sanskrit

Edited by Walter Slaje

Preface by Edwin Gerow

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Contents

Editor's Preamble vii

Edwin Gerow
Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος xi

Christopher Minkowski
Why Should We Read the Maṅgala Verses? 1

Piotr Balcerowicz
Some Remarks on the Opening Sections in Jaina Epistemological Treatises 25

J.E.M. Houben
Doxographic Introductions to the Philosophical Systems: Mallavādin and the Grammarians 83

Philipp André Maas
"Descent with Modification": The Opening of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* 97

Johannes Bronkhorst
What was Śaṅkara's Śāstrārambha? 121

Marcus Schmücker
Advaitic Reasoning of Undertaking (*ārambha*) the *Brahmavicāraśāstra* and the Counter-argument in Veṅkaṭanātha's *Śatadūṣaṇī* 131

Silvia D'Intino
Meaningful Mantras. The Introductory Portion of the *Ṛgvedabhāṣya* by Skandasvāmin 149

Gary A. Tubb
Philosophical Beginnings in Sanskrit Treatises on Poetics 171

Giuliano Boccali
The Incipits of Classical Sargabandhas 183

Walter Slaje
'In the Guise of Poetry' – Kalhaṇa Reconsidered 207

Index, compiled by *Andreas Pohlus* 245

Preamble

This is a book about beginnings. Beginning a book on beginnings is a somewhat difficult beginning, *śāstrārambham ārabdhuṃ suduṣkaram*, as it were. Pre-modern Sanskrit writers more often than not begin their works traditionally by paying obeisance (*namaskriyā*), or with blessings (*āśīrvāda*) taking the form of auspicious verses (*maṅgala*), whereupon subject matter (*vastunirdeśa*) and purpose (*prayojana*) are indicated, typically in the sequence just mentioned.

A European tradition of prefacing introductions to scholarly works has also developed. It displays comparable elements – at least to a certain extent – but usually in reverse order.

We habitually commence by first stating subject matter, purpose and background: introductions to a given body of traditional knowledge (*śāstra-* or *bhāṣya-ārambhas*), or to works of literature (*kāvya-ārambha*), frequently contain pithy systematic reflections on the nature, purpose and various other aspects of the respective work to be commenced. Thus they may constitute a promising, if not challenging, research subject as a category of literature in its own right. But neither as regards content nor with regard to the typological point of view have *ārambhas* ever received the scholarly attention they deserve. The present volume contains a collection of 10 articles as the outcome of a topic-related *Śāstrārambha* panel organised by the undersigned at the 13th *World Sanskrit Conference*, held in Edinburgh in July 2006. The resulting papers now assembled here focus on a variety of aspects of prolegomena composed in Sanskrit by examining them in their different systemic and systematic contexts, also by highlighting and investigating features which may be regarded as general characteristics of a Sanskrit 'prolegomenon' in terms of essential elements and structure. Extending beyond *śāstra* in its narrower sense as bodies of (philosophical) knowledge (*darśana*), some of the articles concern themselves with the Sanskrit preamble to different categories such as Vedic exegesis, poetics, poetry and historiography.

Following an inevitable allusion to the hardships which beset them in writing their book, modern occidental authors are wont to close their introductory remarks by expressing their gratitude to all those,

without whose substantial support their work would undoubtedly never have seen the light of publication. This kind of *namaskriyā* is not entirely out of place also in the present case:
Professors JOHN BROCKINGTON and PAUL DUNDAS, the organisers of the Edinburgh *World Sanskrit Conference*, have consented to publish the panel proceedings *hors série*, so to say, in the series *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, whose editor, Professor FLORIAN C. REITER, has been kind enough to accept them on very favourable terms. Panellists and other contributors won for this volume from outside the *Śāstrārambha* panel have managed to submit their papers in an exemplary manner on time and so have – in their joint effort – helped to bring this publication to fruition in good time. Apart from my indebtedness to all of them I am particularly beholden to Professor EDWIN GEROW for – in his own words – "donning his editorial robes again" in favour of selected articles and for honouring this volume by prefacing it. ANDREAS POHLUS has rendered outstanding services to this book with the professional layout and with his painstaking preparation of the index.

As a Western equivalent of the Sanskrit benediction (*maṅgala*), exponents of a secular tradition, with which the philological method is inextricably linked, naturally lack a befitting deity (except, perhaps, for Sarasvatī). And so, instead of failing abysmally in an attempt to compose an ornate invocation, I prefer to express prosaically my modest hope that the present volume will be given a friendly reception and that its readers, in assessing its significance, will take into consideration that this is a first effort to tackle the Sanskrit preamble *per se*. May it therefore be gently acknowledged as what it actually is, only a beginning.

Walter Slaje Halle (Saale), August 2007

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος[1]

Edwin Gerow (Portland)

The following essays illustrate, among their many other qualities, the remarkable range of meanings that may be attributed to the Sanskrit tag *śāstrārambha*, 'beginning of *śāstra*' (and I dare not even translate this last term, for fear of excluding several exciting avenues of enquiry). There are beginnings in time, in place, of form or feeling ("structures" or "occasions"), beginnings that lead to profitable or reasonable conclusions ("problems" or "principles"), beginnings that are ends (in several senses), and beginnings that turn out to be more or less than what they seem to be – or just themselves ("Ding an sich"). All these ambiguities are exploited and examined in the papers that follow this beginning, as we will see.

The Indian scholarly tradition (since this is one "place" these beginnings all share) has established four marks or signs of a good beginning that one should look for in a text purporting to instruct (and this is one of the senses of *śāstra*): that the text should have a clearly defined subject matter (*viṣaya*), that the text itself should pertain profitably to that subject matter (*saṁbandha*), that its audience be one that can reasonably be expected to profit from whatever instruction the text may impart (*adhikārin*), and that its purpose (or the purpose that is implicit in its instruction) be realizable (*prayojana*).[2] We might translate these four qualities of a good beginning into Aristotelian "causes", as those concerning the text's matter, its form, its agent, and its final cause. Absent any one of these, the "thing" — the instruction (a second sense of *śāstra*) – cannot properly be said to exist, and therefore has no beginning, just as a carpenter, if he lacks wood, or the notion of a bed, or his tools, or a client who wishes to sleep,

1 John 1.1. — though the standard King James translation, "In the beginning was the word," somewhat alters the suitability of the invocation.

2 One of the most succinct accounts of this foursome may be found in the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda (ed. M. Hiriyanna [P.O.S. 14], p. 1 [commentary, p. 20; translation, p. 45]).

makes no bed. Of the following papers, Gary Tubb's most explicitly treats of these four *anubandhas*, or "expository marks" (to take the word in its Pāṇinian sense), but only to show how ambiguously they have applied in the Indian learned tradition or *śāstra* (here we meet the term in yet another sense) that has the least claim to "authority" – poetics, the study of literature (*alaṁkāraśāstra*). And so, poeticians have argued about their *prayojana* (which turns out to be any *prayojana* among the usual four), the agent of their craft (is he the poet or the reader, or perhaps even the patron?), their subject matter (what is *kāvya*?), and their own relevance (as evidenced in the inconclusive number of theoretical approaches to the subject that have been adumbrated). Tubb's paper thus elegantly accounts for the evident fluidity of the poetic tradition, taken as a whole, for it was never successful in identifying its own reference points – a weakness finally recognized (oh irony!) as the tradition comes to a close in the "conclusory" work of the last "great" theorist, Jagannātha, who claimed to have imparted to poetics the qualities of a *śāstra*. And what might they then be? It is clear from Tubb's paper that the resolution of ambiguities related to the four "indices" of beginning must in that task – paradoxically – be paramount; furthermore, that Jagannātha, for better or worse, has had the "last word", for his work was so formulated as to "put an end to history" – the "history" of that search for beginnings that Tubb sketches here.[3]

Several of the papers employ the notion of "beginnings" in the resolution of other kinds of problems. Philipp Maas, for instance, surveys discrepant *maṅgala* verses as a means of establishing a proper stemma for manuscripts of an important early commentary on Patañjali's Yogaśāstra, which issue bears on the text of the Yogaśāstra itself, of which the commentary permits a partial reconstruction. Piotr Balcerowicz, similarly, utilizes *maṅgala* verses found at the begin-

3 As a kind of confirmation of Tubb's thesis, I might point to one of my own articles, on the curriculum now in place in one important Sanskrit college, that of Mysore, which suggests that a suitably fundamental rôle is now accorded to the *alaṁkāraśāstra*, in the sense that its teaching constitutes the quasi-entirety of the initial and intermediate levels of instruction, into which such other elements of the other *śāstras* have been integrated as suits the needs of that instruction – enough Pāṇini, for example, as to follow Mallinātha's commentaries. ("Primary Education in Sanskrit: Methods and Goals" [Presidential Address]. *JAOS* 122: 661-90.)

ning of certain philosophical Jaina texts as a means of establishing relations of influence with respect to certain approximately contemporaneous Buddhist texts. Often, such verses imply an audience – Jaina laymen or Jaina saints (or even gods), the elect of believers or the wider universe of nay-sayers – and this last is particularly helpful in reconstructing interconfessional influences.

WALTER SLAJE examines the initial verses of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* with a view ultimately of clarifying the genre to which the text properly belongs – and comes to the insightful conclusion that the traditional notion of *kāvya* itself is a more useful way of appreciating the structure and reception of the text than is the (inevitably) Western notion of "history". And, of course, Kalhaṇa's work isn't a very "good" history, when viewed in that light – as several recent historians have also concluded; SLAJE's analysis serves thus as a useful corrective to the over-zealous use of certain Western cultural "absolutes" in judging Indian achievements.

As a matter of *fact*, the *maṅgala* verse (or verses) – a kind of benediction invoking success in the enterprise about to be undertaken – has come to be the expected "beginning" of any Indian text. But CHRISTOPHER MINKOWSKI, looking at this beginning in a chronological way, establishes that such has not always been the case. He proposes a very plausible etiology for the "invention" of the *maṅgala* verse(s) and situates the beginning of that beginning in the early first millennium A.D. MINKOWSKI adduces such factors as the burgeoning *bhakti* movements and the "personalization" of authorship thereto attendant as possible influences. A most interesting aspect of this essay is its discussion of later attempts (after the *maṅgala* has become canonical) to "supply" them for earlier texts that were not so provided, which include various explanations of "first" words as inherently "auspicious" – such as the *atha* which begins the *Brahmasūtrāṇi*.

GIULIANO BOCCALI rings a variation on this theme, looking now at the evolution of the *maṅgala* verse itself across one genre of Indian composition, "court epics," (Daṇḍin's *sargabandha*) that find their sources in the two great epics. He discovers an increasing stylization in the formulation of the invocation itself, which is lacking (or present in freer variation) in the older examples of the genre, such as

Kālidāsa's two epics. The *maṅgala* itself, in other words, can be made the subject of a history.

Of course, the question of "beginnings" strikes the Western reader as inherently historical, temporal, and this perspective is freely exploited in these essays. JOHANNES BRONKHORST broadens the perspective somewhat by asking a question that evokes an Indian sense of a "beginning", which, naturally, precludes a strictly historical approach: what was, in fact, the "beginning of the *śāstra*" (literally, *śāstrārambha*, in Śaṁkara's own words) that Śaṁkara so cogently commented upon in his famous *Bhāṣya*? In other words, what did Śaṁkara consider the beginning of *his* text? We return, in a sense, to the *atha* mentioned earlier, which is indeed the initial word of the *Brahmasūtrāṇi* as we now have them (*athāto brahmajijñāsā*, VS 1.1.1), which many have taken to imply that (at least in Bādarāyaṇa's view) study of the Vedānta texts presupposed earlier study of materials relating to the *karmakāṇḍa* (viz., the Pūrvamīmāṁsā) – just as the study of the *karmakāṇḍa* presumed a prior study of the Veda itself (*athāto dharmajijñāsā*, PMS 1.1.1). If so, then Śaṁkara's *śāstrārambha* is perhaps inclusive of the entire Mīmāṁsā. Involved is the larger question, of course, of whether these two *sūtra* collections were, before Śaṁkara effectively split them, taken as one larger unity. BRONKHORST argues, against this plausible view, that such "evidence" is untrustworthy and that the question remains open.

The final three papers examine broader aspects of the notion of beginning and exploit other senses than the strictly temporal or local. JAN HOUBEN looks at a certain class of late philosophical texts that attempt to arrange or rationalize the various philosophical systems (or *śāstras*) themselves – that take, in other words, a global view of the Indian scholarly universe – best known through the late Vedāntin work, the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, or "Compendium of all 'perspectives'". An earlier example is a Jaina work, the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, or "Wheel of reasonings composed of twelve spokes", which must be reconstituted through its commentary by Siṁhasūri. But it is the *form* here that permits a beginning, for (in both cases), the arrangement of systems is not that of a compendium, per se, each enjoying a relative autonomy, but is inherent to the systems themselves: in the more obvious case of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, the arrangement follows rigorously from the systems' relative distances from Advaita Vedānta,

and so, taken seriatim, each system constitutes a "beginning" with respect to the system that follows (and corrects) it, until we reach the culmination of all systems, Advaita, which needs no correction. The Jaina work is not different in principle, but the arrangement itself follows from the Jaina doctrine of *syādvāda*, where each system is reduced to a "perspective" that completes the perspective of those systems introduced in tandem with it. The categories of analysis, however, though mostly borrowed from Pāṇinian grammar, do not allow for any overall architectonic: the "spokes" together constitute the wheel, which is a kind of "universe of discourse" that can be seen only when all "perspectives" are specified.

MARCUS SCHMÜCKER adopts a similar "dialogic" model in order to examine the question of the teacher-student dialectic itself, where the "problem" (hence the "beginning" of the teaching) is taken to be the paradoxical absence of a "truth" (in the mind of the student) that is absolutely omni-present (and which need not therefore be "taught"). We engage here a problem of philosophical beginnings that seeks to put into question the existential condition of the student himself, his naive postulate of mental and sensory independence, and must do this by and through means anchored in the student's world of (false) experience. The very ground of the *śāstra*, which seeks to remove the student's aporia, is thus rendered dubious. SCHMÜCKER here discusses the various strategies adopted in philosophical Vedānta to deal with this paradox, most of which repose on the ex cathedra notion of the *vedāntāḥ* (plural) (which are themselves the *śāstrāṇi* par excellence, a fourth sense of the term), namely, the selected, ipso facto authoritative, sayings (*vedavākyāni*) drawn from the timeless Veda that are sufficient to provoke a rupture with the "normal" world. Once the world is seen as merely a "problem," the solution (as in any system of dialectic thought) becomes inescapable.

And finally, SILVIA D'INTINO addresses, in the only contribution devoted to the Veda per se, the issue of whether *mantra*s (phrases drawn from the older *sūkta* compositions and uttered at crucial junctures in the later elaborate sacrifices) have meaning or not, that is, whether an understanding of their meaning was seen as a *precondition* of their effective utterance. The notion of "beginning" here assumes its full philosophical dress of "principle" – for the question amply debated in the ritual tradition itself (here ably summarized

by D'INTINO) has to do with the presuppositions themselves of successful ritual activity: must one understand the Vedic phrase in order for it to be ritually effective, or is its mere pronunciation enough? The answer, of course, is clearly stated in the canonical systems of thought founded on the Veda: an understanding *is* essential. The authoritative accounts of the great Mīmāṁsakas Śabara and Kumārila leave no doubt on the matter, for, of course, the very rationale of Mīmāṁsā itself is at issue.

Returning to the theme of the four *anubandhas*, or indices of a good beginning, with which this Preface began, we might close by suggesting that the same four may present a further way of understanding the relations among the papers presented here. A number of papers examine the *actual* beginning (or what came to be seen as the obligatory beginning) of Indian compositions (a feature they share with Indian performance in general), namely the *maṅgala* verse or *incipit*: here we seem to encounter the *viṣaya*, or material, required of this essay collection, which like any material cause is not necessarily specific to the form it assumes in the present case (MINKOWSKI, BOCCALI, BRONKHORST). That specific form is taken up in at least one paper – TUBB's – whereby the text itself is seen as assuming a shape in response to the needs of composition itself (*saṁbandha*). The understanding of beginnings as tools in the resolution of other kinds of problems is characteristic of a number of papers (MAAS, BALCEROWICZ, SLAJE), and so, places the emphasis on an audience (*adhikārin*) external to the narrow topic of beginnings, or at least an audience the author judges to be interested in other kinds of problems than the form and matter of literature – manuscript editing, history of ideas, theories of genre, for example. Finally, the question of textual purpose (*prayojana*) serves as the focus of organization of a number of papers (HOUBEN, SCHMÜCKER, D'INTINO), which deal with such matters as the *raison d'être* of the text itself, as a self-justifying exercise of uplift or as inherently meaningful, and therefore necessarily effective, expression. In this way, the various papers, in their diversity itself, can be seen as contributing, schematically, to a complete undertaking, which otherwise would be shorn of an essential limb. This is not to say that many other perspectives might not have been taken up and explored under these rubrics, but that the volume itself gives evidence of a thorough exploitation of the possibilities inherent in the enterprise.

If such a rich variety of issues can be evoked by eliciting the ambiguities of a single pregnant phrase, *śāstrārambha*, what might not one accomplish by taking up, perhaps in a second volume, other such "clearly meaningful" terms, such as *siddhānta*?

Edwin Gerow

Editor Emeritus, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*

Why Should We Read the Maṅgala Verses?

Christopher Minkowski (Oxford)

diṅmātaṅgasutuṅgapañcavadanaṃ viśvaikalambodaraṃ
cūḍāratnasahasrabhūdharamahāhāraṃ sunīlāmbaram |
svāntadhvāntaharaṃ kalānidhidharaṃ koṭīnaruksundaraṃ
vārāhopamavāhanaṃ gaṇapatiṃ vande paraṃ śaṅkaram
(Jñānarāja, Siddhāntasundara I.1.1)

I. Preamble – On the Study of the Beginnings of Śāstras

To date, little scholarly attention has been paid to the phenomenon of the *śāstrārambha* - the introduction to a treatise in a Sanskrit learned discipline - either as a literary genre in its own right, or as a conceptual form for organizing a system of knowledge.[1]

Payment of such attention would be rewarded. There are introductions to Sanskrit *śāstra*s that are read even today, both for their literary style and for the summary knowledge of a discipline that they provide; and there are other introductions, less well-known, that deserve to be read in a similar way.

The *śāstrārambha* can be studied for the purposes of intellectual history, for it is in his introduction that a Sanskrit intellectual may identify the distinctive arguments he will make in his work. It is also where he may position himself explicitly in relation to his interlocutors, past and present.[2]

1 I am grateful for the comments and suggestions I have received from audiences for presentations of this material in Edinburgh, Oxford, and Chicago. I would like particularly to thank Dan Arnold, James Benson, Polly O'Hanlon, Walter Slaje, Gary Tubb, and Dominik Wujastyk, for help with particular aspects, and especially Larry McCrea for broad ranging suggestions and assistance.

2 There is also the potential for intellectual history in the comparative mode, since for texts in the learned traditions of other cosmopolitan cultures, such as those communicated in Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Chinese, there was an established genre of introduction (the *prolegomenon*, *praefatio*, *muqaddima* and *xu*, respectively).

The study of the *śāstrārambha* thus presents the possibility of recovering the meaning of an intellectual's action in writing a learned text in Sanskrit. This possibility should be especially attractive to historians of the *śāstra*s, for in general *śāstrī*s and their readers operated in a universe of commentary, on texts received through disciplinary tradition. The approach of the *śāstrī*s, when commenting in mid-text, was necessarily more local, contextual, and reactive.

To realize the possibility of recovery or reconstruction, then, it is rather to the introduction, the *ārambha* of the *śāstra*, that one should turn. But it would not be enough simply to read the text, or at least, not to read it in the usual way. While reading, one would have to ask a somewhat different question. Some additional, second-order awareness of the *śāstrārambha* as a literary genre and conceptual form would be needed. One would like to know the conventions and constraints, the working assumptions and rationales that surrounded the preface of a Sanskrit treatise.

How do beginnings begin? The *maṅgalācaraṇa*

As soon as one has decided to pay attention to the beginnings of texts in this manner, however, a rather more simple-minded question presents itself: how do the beginnings of texts begin? From this simple-minded point of view, the introduction that opens a text is made up of words and sentences, just as the text is. But then, the simpleton feels compelled to wonder, what are the introduction's own opening words like? And what *should* they be like?

Just by virtue of their position as first, it would seem that the beginning words of a text should carry an extra significance; that they should be important, both in their content and in their form; that in this respect texts are like actions, so that proverbs about how to get things done in the world should apply to the composition of texts as well; that "well-begun is half done," for instance, should apply to beginning a *śāstric* text.

The notion that the first words of a learned text should do a special sort of work is not unique to Sanskrit literary culture. It is a feature of the textual cultures of many learned societies. Nevertheless for Sanskrit it is well known to our contemporary community of readers just how a text begins, not only a text belonging to the *śāstra*s, but a Sanskrit text more generally. It begins with a *maṅgalācaraṇa*. Not translating too literally, at least not yet, '*maṅgalācaraṇa*' means the

recitation of an auspicious verse that invokes a deity. That is how Sanskrit texts *should* begin, if they are to begin well; and that is how they *do* begin. This is what all of us learned as students, in order to make our way through the texts, and what all of our students are now learning: Sanskrit texts begin with a *maṅgalācaraṇa*. What could be more straightforward, or more natural? On this point about beginnings there would appear to be no real question.

And yet, occasionally it is worthwhile to reconsider what we take to be the basic facts about our subject, in the interest of disclosing to view any unrecognized, and perhaps unwarranted, assumptions. That a Sanskrit text begins with a *maṅgalācaraṇa* is one of our most basic facts. For that reason, therefore, it is worthy of reconsideration, at least occasionally.

What is inconvenient

If we do look more closely at the phenomenon of the *maṅgalācaraṇa*, we find our basic fact inconvenienced by other facts, from which questions arise. Let us consider three.

1. Their difficulty

First of all, it has to be admitted that *maṅgala* or 'auspicious' verses are sometimes difficult to read, sometimes far more difficult than the texts that they introduce. *Maṅgala* verses can be complex in syntax, obscure in reference, and filled with figures of speech. In a word, they can be fully poetic, in the Sanskrit style. Not all *maṅgala* verses are so difficult. Indeed, some are straightforward enough, but some, on the other hand, are so densely expressed and elaborate as to be *dvi-sandhāna*; that is to say, they have two primary, continuous, and autonomous layers of meaning at once, or more than two. In short, this is poetic work by intention. Even prose works are given a *maṅgalācaraṇa* in verse.

But why? What are the rules, or the conventions of the *maṅgala* as a literary act? How, furthermore, are we as readers to read them – as poetry? as science, like the texts they introduce? or as something else? For that matter, are we in fact the intended readers? To put it another way, how is one to listen in, as a scholar addresses his god? Especially if this god is not the reader's god. The difficulty of read-

ing *maṅgala* verses therefore confronts us with the literary features of something that might not be wholly or properly literary.

2. Skipping over them

That brings us to another inconvenient fact. Since the *maṅgala* verses can sometimes prove to be so difficult, not everyone reads them. This is an awkward point, one that we do not usually like to admit, not even about our students, much less about ourselves.

Should our wayward students have read the *maṅgala* verses? If so, why? Does *not* reading the *maṅgala* verses amount to some sort of violation? If so, what would the penalty be for those who have not read them? That they do not understand what they read? Or that they do not remember? Or that they will not finish? How would any of that be enforced, especially in the Kaliyuga? On the other hand, if there really were such penalties, would it mean that the *maṅgala* verses had been put there to keep some readers out?

Thus the problem of not reading raises the question of what the *maṅgala* verses did, and how. A rationale for the operation of the *maṅgala* was proposed within the Sanskrit scholarly tradition: that they served to facilitate the successful completion of a work, by removing any obstacles that stood in its way.

Indeed, it is easy to say that beginning a text is a form of activity, but it is not so easy to say what sort. Clearly there is an analogy to be made. The literary *maṅgalācaraṇa* is analogous with a ritual action, and with undertaking action in the world. But how does the analogy operate? Or is it, in fact, to be thought of as more than an analogy? '*Maṅgalācaraṇa*' means more literally the performance (*ācaraṇa*) of the auspicious, or of success (*maṅgala*), but in what world does that auspicious performance occur, or the success ensue?

3. The missing ones

That brings us to a third inconvenient fact about the *maṅgala* verses, that not every text in Sanskrit does begin with a *maṅgala* verse. This was noticed long ago, by the *śāstrīs* themselves, who confronted the opposite problem as well, that there were texts furnished with *maṅgala* verses which were nevertheless incomplete.

Some *śāstrīs* attempted theories to account for the operation of the *maṅgalācaraṇa*, but also to account for its absence. Some, for example,

disconnected the *maṅgala* from the text that it opened, and made it a mental activity on the part of the author, whether that activity was recorded in the text or not. But this accounting for the absence of the *maṅgala* opened up the theory of its presence to the danger of inconsistency, in a number of ways, as the *śāstrī*s noticed.

Other scribes and scholars equipped the older texts that they read with *maṅgala*s after the fact, even though the result was that there ceased to be uniformity in what the *maṅgala* for any given text was, or uniformity in what the ideal shape of a *maṅgala* verse should be.

In short, the problem of the missing *maṅgala*s raises questions about the history of the *maṅgalācaraṇa*, questions, in particular, about the history of its use, of the generic form it was expected to take, and of the rationale of operation that its users advanced. In what follows I would like to explore these three aspects of the history of the *maṅgala* verses: the practical, the literary, and the philosophical. The discussion will remain necessarily brief and general.

II. The History of the Śāstric Use of Maṅgala Verses

That the habit of beginning a text with a *maṅgala* verse has a history at all might come as something of a surprise to a specialist in the field, given the general consensus that has been discussed above. Nevertheless, this custom, of composing *maṅgala* verses for *śāstric* texts, did have a beginning, a beginning, furthermore, that occurred in the different *śāstra*s at different times. In what follows, I offer an initial, provisional version of this history.[3]

3 The following history is necessarily approximate. In producing it I should define my terms at least to this extent: by '*maṅgala* verse' I mean a verse composition in which either obeisance (*namaskriyā*, *vandana*, etc.) is made to a deity or a similarly exalted being such as the Buddha or Bodhisattva, or else in which a deity is called upon to bless the reader and the author (*āśīrvāda*). I do not consider mere mention of the subject matter of the text that follows (*vastunirdeśa*) to constitute a *maṅgala* verse. Nor do I consider the prose *namaskāra*s that are found in some texts, such as the Arthaśāstra or Kāmasūtra to be *maṅgala* verses; because they are not versified, and for reasons that will be made clear, are difficult to attribute to the author of the text.

Not early

As a general rule, *maṅgala* verses are not found in the earliest layers of the Brahmanical *śāstras*. Their old, foundational texts, the *sūtras*, which in general can be dated to the last centuries B.C.E. and the first centuries C.E., did not begin with *maṅgala* verses – not the *sūtras* of the older philosophical schools or *darśanas*, and not the *sūtra* of Vyākaraṇa. Nor for that matter did the earlier *sūtras* of the Vedic schools begin with *maṅgals* – not their *śrauta-*, *gṛhya-*, *śulba-* or *dharma-sūtras*.

One might think that this must be by definition, since as a genre the *sūtra* consists in a terse elliptical prose that does not allow for the use of verses. Nevertheless there was no *maṅgala* verse for the Sāṃkhyakārikā either, an older text than the *sūtra* of the school; nor was there one for the Manusmṛti, or for the Arthaśāstra, (or for the Kāmasūtra for that matter). Nor was there a *maṅgala* verse for any of the older ancillary texts of the Vedic tradition – not for the Prātiśākhyas, or for the Nighaṇṭu and Nirukta, or for the Chandaḥsūtra, the metrical work attributed to Piṅgala.[4] Nor is there a *maṅgala* verse for the earliest medical texts, attributed to Caraka or Suśruta, even though these underwent extensive reworking in the first half of the first millennium C.E.

What is more, many of the old, primary commentaries on the *sūtras* had no *maṅgala* verses either. There was no *maṅgala* verse in Patañjali's commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī, in the second century B.C.E., nor in Śabara's fifth century C.E. commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra; nor was there one in Vātsyāyana's fifth century commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, nor in the commentary of 'Vyāsa' on the Yogasūtra.[5] By the sixth and seventh centuries, however, *maṅgala* verses did begin to appear, as in Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṃgraha. And certainly there are *maṅgala* verses at the beginning of Vācaspati Miśra's commentaries on the foundational text-complexes of nearly all of the *darśanas*, produced in the tenth century.

4 The Bṛhaddevatā as received does begin with a *maṅgala* verse, but this text was thoroughly reworked at some point in the middle of the first millennium. Muneo Tokunaga, *The Bṛhaddevatā* (Kyoto: Rinsen, 1997) xli-xlv.

5 See below, and the article of P. Maas in this volume.

Difference among *śāstras*

In fact, the story is more varied than this. The texts of some Sanskrit knowledge systems began to feature introductory *maṅgala* verses long before the texts of other knowledge systems did. There appears to have been a principle of literary conservatism at work, so that *śāstras* with very ancient, authoritative *sūtras* tended to adopt *maṅgalas* rather later. There may also have been some sort of principle of cultural conservatism at work, so that the more central the *śāstra* was in the ongoing life of the Vedas, the later it adopted the use of *maṅgala* verses. Let us take a few *śāstras* as examples, on a scale from least conservative to most, in the terms just described.

Jyotiḥśāstra and Alaṃkāraśāstra

Jyotiḥśāstra, the scientific tradition comprising texts of astronomy, mathematics, and astrology, never produced a *sūtra* text. For that matter, it never arrived at a generally agreed authoritative base text or *mūlagrantha*. Authors writing in this knowledge system produced texts with *maṅgala* verses from early on.[6] Thus Mīnarāja in the fourth century began his Vṛddhayavanajātaka, a work of astrology, with *maṅgala* verses, as did Āryabhaṭa his astronomy text, the Āryabhaṭīya, in the late fifth century. Varāhamihira, the astronomer and astrologer of the sixth century, began all of his works with *maṅgala* verses.

Maṅgala verses are present at the beginnings of the oldest texts of literary theory or Alaṃkāraśāstra as well, although the oldest of these texts, those of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, are relatively late, belonging to the eighth century, as is the received version of Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, which opens with a *maṅgala* verse as well.

Vyākaraṇa

On the other hand, the grammatical tradition adopted the practice much later in its life. As mentioned earlier, there is no *maṅgala* verse for any of the three early foundational texts of the Pāṇinian school:

6 It is interesting in this regard to note that the quasi-Vedic astronomical text, the Jyotiṣavedāṅga, does begin with a *maṅgala* verse, in both its Ṛg- and Yajurvedic recensions. For reasons that are independent of the current investigation, this work is thought to be of an uncertain date, with an older core section belonging perhaps to the second century B.C.E that was supplemented for as much as six centuries thereafter.

the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, the Vārttika of Kātyāyana, and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, the latest of which was probably composed in the second century B.C.E.

There is no *maṅgala* verse for Bhartṛhari's fifth century work of grammatical philosophy, the Vākyapadīya, and there is no *maṅgala* verse for the Kāśikā, a commentary on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī that was produced in the later seventh century. It is only in the sub-commentaries on the Kāśikā composed by Kaiyaṭa and Haradatta, who were active in the eleventh century, that one finds explicit (and multiple) *maṅgala* verses. Indeed, in his opening verses Haradatta paused to wonder why his predecessors in the grammatical discipline had not composed any *maṅgalas* for their own works.[7]

Mīmāṃsā

The use of *maṅgala* verses came equally late to the textual tradition of Mīmāṃsā, the most conservative *śāstra* of all, as the primary defender of the Veda's special authority and special ontology. As has been mentioned above, there was no *maṅgala* verse for the Mīmāṃsāsūtra or for Śabara's commentary. For that matter, there were no *maṅgala* verses in any Mīmāṃsā text throughout the first millennium C.E., with the exception of the *maṅgala* verses at the beginning of the Ślokavārttika, the seventh century work of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.[8] It is only in works of the eleventh century that one finds *maṅgala* verses

7 *iṣṭadevanamaskāraḥ kāryaḥ sa neha kiṃkṛtaḥ* | *vṛttau sūtre tathā bhāṣye vārttike ca tad ucyate* || (7) *manasā vacasā ca karmaṇā kṛta evāyam ihāniveśitaḥ* | *na hi darbhapavitrapāṇitādyaparaṃ maṅgalam atra kīrtyate* || 8 See below for the implications of this explanation. That there were no *maṅgalas* in the early texts of Nyāya up through the Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara was remarked on by Vācaspati in his Tātparyaṭīkā. See also Śrīdhara's discussion of this 'problem' below.

8 The Ślokavārttika is an unusual text that stands, in a certain sense, outside the mainstream of the textual tradition of Mīmāṃsā. It should be noted that Kumārila did not introduce any of his other Mīmāṃsā works with a *maṅgala* verse. Nevertheless the presence of the *maṅgala* verses in the Ślokavārttika is an anomaly that requires further consideration. There is also a *maṅgala* verse at the beginning of the tenth century Tattvabindu of Vācaspati Miśra, who famously commented on the foundational texts of all of the other *darśanas*, and therefore could be said to have imported the practice from one of those other disciplines.

addressed to deities appearing regularly in Mīmāṃsā texts, those of Bhavadeva and Bhavanātha and Pārthasārathi Miśra.[9]

Buddhist *śāstras* and Buddhists writing in the *śāstras*

So much for the most 'orthodox' and conservative traditions of thought, from the *vaidika* point of view. There is another surprise awaiting us when we turn to the *śāstric* texts produced by Buddhist authors, for some authors provided *maṅgala* verses for works in significantly earlier periods. In the second century, Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā did begin with a verse paying homage to the Buddha. Although there was no *maṅgala* verse at the beginning of the third century work of Āryadeva, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in the fifth century did begin with one.[10] In a similar way, Diṅnāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya in the late fifth – early sixth century, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika in the seventh century, Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya in the eighth century, and many later works of Mahāyānist philosophy have verses of this sort.[11] Meanwhile, Amarasiṃha, in the early fifth century, began his Sanskrit lexicographical work with a *maṅgala* verse, as did Candragomin his grammatical work.

This history is admittedly crude. It leaves out the works of Jaina and Tāntrika intellectuals entirely.[12] It also assumes that we have reliable editions of all of the texts involved, which we do not. A more de-

9 Larry McRae, personal communication.

10 It should be noted that the phenomenon is far from uniform in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu's works. Of the works attributed to Asaṅga, the Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtra commentary, the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Śrāvakabhūmi, and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra do not begin with verses of homage or blessing. Meanwhile, the Viṃśatikā, the Triṃśikā, and the Madhyāntavibhāgakārikās attributed to Vasubandhu are also lacking such verses. Perhaps a first approximation might be to say that for a century or two the use of such verses was not taken up by philosophers writing from the Vijñānavāda scholarly position, while it was so taken up by Sautrāntika philosophers.

11 The tipping point to a generally pervasive usage of introductory verses appears to have been the seventh century. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika does have such a verse, but his Hetubindu and Nyāyabindu do not. Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā on Nāgārjuna does have a *maṅgala* verse.

12 Concerning Jaina doctrinal works, it should be noted that the Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda, a Jaina Prakrit work perhaps composed in the eighth century has many, rather florid invocatory verses, as do the same author's Prā-

tailed history should be written, based on a thorough investigation of reliable editions, when they become available, but even the foregoing provisional study reveals the outlines of a history that is sufficient for heuristic purposes.

III. The Response of the Later Tradition to the Absence of Maṅgalas

The use of *maṅgala* verses, it was noted at the outset, had become so widespread in later periods that from the twelfth century onward it came to seem perfectly natural and ordinary to Sanskrit intellectuals that every text should have one. What, then, did they make of the undeniable fact that many of the old, foundational texts in the central disciplines which they studied and commented on had no *maṅgala* verses? This was something that they did notice. The eleventh century grammarian Haradatta, for example, devoted two of his own *maṅgala* verses to remarking on the absence of *maṅgala* verses in the works of his predecessors in the Vyākaraṇaśāstra, as has been mentioned above.[13]

a) Adjustment by Copyists

Broadly speaking, there were three responses to the problem of the 'missing' *maṅgala* verses, as this absence was perceived by later *śāstrīs*. The first was a solution that came through the practical activities of copyists. It must be recalled that the textual world of *śāstric* discourse depended, from the middle of the first millennium onward, on the active production and circulation of manuscripts. Copyists, who ranged in their intellectual training from the most learned of scholars to rather minimally educated scribes, produced and reproduced manuscripts of Sanskrit texts. In that process, some copyists quietly added the *maṅgala* verses that they felt were needed.
Consider for example the beginning of the Yogasūtra commentary attributed to Vyāsa. In some published editions based on the 'Vulgate' text it is furnished with a *maṅgala* verse.[14] The critical edition

bhṛtasaṃgraha and the Samayaprābhṛta, while Umāsvāti's (somewhat later?) Tattvārthādhigamasūtra does not have any *maṅgala* verses.

13 See above, note 7.

14 *yas tyaktvā rūpam ādyam* etc. See above, and the article of MAAS in this volume. See also PASCALE HAAG, "Paratextual Elements in Indian Manuscripts: The Copyists' Invocations and the Incipit of the Kāśikāvṛtti," in eds. PASCALE HAAG

of the text, however, currently under preparation by PHILIPP MAAS, shows that this *maṅgala* verse was originally added only to one regional sub-recension of the text by a copyist, and only in the twelfth century, at the very earliest.

Indeed, the addition of *maṅgala* verses to *śāstric* texts by later hands was a widespread phenomenon, some features of which can be reconstructed from the apparatus of reliable critical editions. It is clear that a variety of different *maṅgala* verses were added by copyists. Some of these *maṅgala* verses were later recopied and became incorporated into the recensions of a text.

Consider again the critical history of the beginning of the Yogasūtra, the edition of which, as established by P. MAAS, is available elsewhere in this volume.[15] There are *maṅgala* verses that are unique to a single manuscript (e.g. Tj^{g2} and My^{t2}). On the other hand, one *maṅgala* verse, the *yas tyaktvā* verse that has already been mentioned, and that was first added to the text by a copyist, was recopied by later scribes, eventually to become part of the Vulgate textual transmission.[16]

When considering scribal activity of this sort, it is necessary to distinguish it from two related textual phenomena: that of scribes putting auspicious phrases at the head of the first leaf of their manuscript, as a regular part of their customary writing practice (e. g.

and VINCENZO VERGIANI, Studies in the Kāśikāvṛtti. The Pratyāhāraprakaraṇa: Critical Edition, Translation and Other Contributions (Firenze: Firenze University Press, forthcoming).

15 See also MAAS 2006: MAAS, PHILIPP ANDRÉ, ed., Samādhipāda, Das erste Kapitel des Pātañjalayogaśāstra zum ersten Mal kritisch ediert = The first chapter of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra for the first time Critically Edited. Aachen: Shaker (Studia Indologia Universitatis Halensis) (Geisteskultur Indiens. Texte und Studien 9).

16 Compare the variety of *maṅgala* verses attached by scribes to the beginning of the Mahābhārata, which can be seen from even a cursory glance at the first two pages of the critical apparatus of the Poona edition of the Ādiparvan. The Mahābhārata appears to have had no *maṅgala* verse in the middle of the first millennium, just as the Rāmāyaṇa did not, but a verse that was copied at the beginning of some manuscripts in the north, (and which had a currency within the Bhāgavata movement) – *nārāyaṇaṃ namaskṛtya* etc. – was accepted into certain strands of transmission of the 'Northern recension', and was also accepted by the BORI-Poona editor. The Mahābhārata is not a *śāstric* text, despite its self-description, but the scribal processes involved are certainly relevant here.

śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ, śrīr astu, śubhaṃ bhavatu, and so on);[17] and that of commentators beginning their own commentaries with *maṅgala* verses, when the commentaries are made to speak first, before the base text, thereby embedding the *mūlagrantha* on which they comment in a textual 'complex' that has a *maṅgala* beginning.

On the role of scribes and practices of writing in the history of *maṅgala* verses, there will be more to say later. The only additional point to make here is that, given the tendency of the later tradition of copyists to wish to add a *maṅgala* verse where there had not been one, it is all the more striking how many early, foundational texts have been preserved without them. This phenomenon of a 'received absence' lends further, circumstantial support to the proposition that *śāstric* texts, which in their current form have no *maṅgala* verses, began their careers of transmission without them.

b) Textual and Literary Conventions Redefined

A second solution to the problem of the missing *maṅgala* verses came through the redefinition of the textual conventions. Commentators of later periods, when confronted with a foundational work in their discipline that lacked a *maṅgala* verse, could retrofit the text with *maṅgala* after the fact, as it were. The chief way to do this was to find in the beginning words of the text a property of auspiciousness. Most typically it would be the very first word in the text that was given this treatment, and usually this word was '*atha*,' the word with which so many of the *sūtras* begin.

As readers of Sanskrit commentaries know, in the earlier *śāstric* discussion of '*atha*' as the first word of a text, most of the effort had been devoted to deciding whether it meant 'and next,' and thereby indicated that the study of the *śāstra* should take place after the study of something else, or whether it meant 'herewith' and thereby set up an independent topic of consideration. From the eighth century on, however, commentators began to indicate that '*atha*' also 'meant' the auspicious, or else that it had an auspicious effect, and hence that it provided a work with a *maṅgala* beginning.

17 Again, there is plenty of evidence of this activity in the apparatus presented by Maas, but note that he refers to these auspicious scribal phrases as "*maṅgalas*." See also his comments on how the '*yas tyaktvā*' *maṅgala* verse made its way into the Yogasūtrabhāṣya text. See also Pascale Haag, "Paratextual Elements."

Thus Śaṅkara, in his commentary on Brahmasūtra I.1.1, argued that '*atha*,' the first word of the first *sūtra*, established *brahman* as an independent topic of study; it did not specify what that study should come after. He conceded, however, that '*atha*' had an auspicious introductory effect simply in virtue of being pronounced, though this was not its meaning in the sentence.[18] The auspicious properties of '*atha*' were not Śaṅkara's main interest, but he was evidently aware of an explanation of '*atha*' that was circulating in the textual tradition surrounding the Brahmasūtra by his time.

Beginning with Vācaspati Miśra, the commentators on Śaṅkara amplified this statement of his, and invoked a traditional verse that attributed a *maṅgala* effect both to '*atha*' and to '*om*' as first words:

> *oṃkāraś cāthaśabdaś ca dvāv etau brahmaṇaḥ purā* | *kaṇṭhaṃ bhittvā viniryātau tasmān māṅgalikāv ubhau* ||[19]

> The sound of '*om*' and the word '*atha*' emerged from the throat of Brahmā long ago; therefore they both confer auspicious effects.

What is most interesting about this discussion in Śaṅkara's commentary, which appears there rather earlier than anywhere else, is that Śaṅkara's own commentary does not in practice make any concession to the need for a *maṅgala* beginning. There is no *maṅgala* verse or even a *maṅgala* word such as '*om*' or '*atha*' at the beginning of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.

Such a studied indifference to the customary need for *maṅgala*, (for so it appeared to later commentators,) occasioned concern already among Śaṅkara's immediate disciples. Padmapāda, in his Pañcapādikā commentary on the first part of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, agreed that one should expect Śaṅkara's work to begin with a *maṅgala* for the usual reasons, viz. that our role models or *śiṣṭa*s began their activities with a *maṅgalācaraṇa*, and furthermore that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* removes obstacles to completing an activity.[20] Śaṅkara, however, he went on, has

18 *arthāntaraprayukta eva hy athaśabdaḥ śrutyā maṅgalaprayojano bhavati.* BSBh I.1.1.

19 Cited in Vācaspati Miśra's Bhāmatī on BSBh I.1.1, and repeated in later commentators passim. The source of the verse in '*smṛti*' is not yet identified, however, and cannot be located in texts that are demonstrably much earlier.

20 *nanu ca granthakaraṇādikāryārambhe kāryānurūpam iṣṭadevatāpūjānamaskāreṇa buddhisannidhāpitāthavṛddhyādiśabdaiḥ dadhyādidarśanena vā kṛtamaṅgalāḥ śiṣ-*

produced the same effect by beginning his work with mention of the internal reality that is a mass of knowingness and entirely devoid of obstructions.[21] Subsequent commentators followed Padmapāda's line of explanation.

Thus the commentators felt the need to explain what they perceived as Śaṅkara boldly dispensing with customary practice.[22] They outfitted his beginning with a *maṅgala* not by seizing on the first word, but by arguing that his opening phrases had the same effect as a *maṅgala* word or verse, through the meaning that they generated in the reader's mind.

Another way of 'retrofitting' the beginning of a text with *maṅgala* lay simply in supposing that the *maṅgalācaraṇa* must exist, albeit relocated to the author's intentions. An example is found in the work of Śrīdhara, the tenth century commentator on the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda.

Śrīdhara, in his discussion of Praśastapāda's *maṅgala* verse and of the phenomenon of *maṅgala* verses generally, conceded what was well known in his day: that the *sūtra*s of two other disciplines, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, had primary commentaries that did not begin with *maṅgala* verses. Śrīdhara's view, however, was that even if we do not find the expression of *maṅgala* verses at the beginning of these commentaries, their authors, Śabara and Vātsyāyana (or Pakṣilasvāmin, as Śrīdhara called him) who were pious persons (*paramāstikau*,) must have made obeisance nevertheless, for we see that even barbarous people begin their undertakings with obeisance to their deity, and it cannot be believed that these two sages did not do so as well.[23]

Compare also the verses of Haradatta, the eleventh century grammarian, which were cited above. Haradatta too had paused to wonder why his predecessors had not made obeisance to their deity at the beginning of their grammatical works. He concluded that they must have performed some variety of auspicious ritual beginning,

tāḥ pravartante. śiṣṭācāraś ca naḥ pramāṇam. prasiddhaṃ ca maṅgalācaraṇasya vighnopaśamanaṃ prayojanam. Pañcapādikā under BSBh I.1.1.

21 *sarvopaplavarahito vijñānaghanaḥ pratyagarthaḥ.* ibid.

22 *ullaṅghya śiṣṭācāram akṛtamaṅgala eva visrabdhaṃ bhāṣyakāraḥ pravavṛte.* ibid.

23 *prekṣāvān mleccho 'pi tāvad gurvārambhe karmaṇi na pravartate yāvad iṣṭāṃ devatāṃ na namasyati. yad imau paramāstikau pakṣilaśabarasvāminau nānutiṣṭhata ity asambhavam idam.* Nyāyakandalī on vs. 1 (GOS 174) p. 6.

by thought, word, and deed, which did not need to be recorded in the text.[24]

This solution to the problem of the missing *maṅgala* verses, through the 'presumption of *maṅgala*,' raises difficulties for understanding the literary and textual nature of the *maṅgala* verses, more on which in the next section. For now it is enough to conclude that later commentators supplemented the inherited texts with *maṅgala* properties through interpretation or re-description of their beginnings after the fact, and that they had a variety of ways for doing so.

There is, then, in the broadest possible sense, an historical development here: Commentators had not always felt the need to supplement texts in this way. Then authors of later periods began their texts with *maṅgala* verses, and sought to outfit the older texts on which they commented with acceptably auspicious beginnings.

c) Theoretical Reflection

A third solution to the problem of the missing *maṅgala*s was achieved through the philosophical re-consideration of the purpose of the *maṅgala*, and the nature of its operation. This philosophical re-consideration was itself a matter of historical development.

As we have already seen, theoretical statements about the purpose and operation of the *maṅgala* verses were rather consistent, though multiple. The purpose of the *maṅgala* verse, earlier commentators would say, was to facilitate the successful completion of the work by removing whatever obstacles might block that completion; to instruct students; and to conform to the immemorial custom of learned predecessors.[25]

A properly philosophical theory of the *maṅgala* verse did not emerge until the use of *maṅgala*s had become widespread, and until, therefore, the 'problem' of the missing *maṅgala*s had become noticeable and pressing. Indeed, leaving aside a few brief remarks in earlier works, it was the mid-fourteenth century logician Gaṅgeśa in his Tattvacintāmaṇi who was the first to devote an entire section to the philosophical problems involved. Gaṅgeśa's views were repeated

24 The verses are cited in note 7.

25 The explanation given by Annaṃ Bhaṭṭa, an early modern author, in the Tarkadīpikā of his Tarkasaṃgraha, is typical: *cikīrṣitasya granthasya nirvighnasamāptyarthaṃ śiṣṭācārānumitaśrutibodhitakartavyatākam iṣṭadevanamaskāralakṣaṇaṃ maṅgalaṃ śiṣyaśikṣārthaṃ* ...

and elaborated, and in the early modern period there was a great upsurge of interest in this topic. Viśvanātha Tarkapañcānana's Kārikāvalī with Muktāvalī commentary devoted consideration to Gaṅgeśa on the problem of beginning with *maṅgala*, and this seventeenth century work gave rise to intense discussion by other Naiyāyikas active in that century.[26]

The logicians had noticed a difficulty with the old formulation of the purpose of the *maṅgala* verses: There were famous works that had *maṅgala* verses but that remained incomplete. Bāṇa's seventh century work of fiction, the Kādambarī, was the example used. Meanwhile there were other works without *maṅgala*s that nevertheless were complete, as for instance Udayana's tenth century text on logic, the Kiraṇāvalī.

The answer, Gaṅgeśa suggested, was that we must suppose that the authors of completed works that had no *maṅgala* must have performed the *maṅgala* verse for that work in a previous life, while the authors of the incomplete works that had a *maṅgala* verse must have faced obstacles too great to overcome for the *maṅgalācaraṇa* that was used. This solution touched off a great deal more discussion, for obvious reasons.

The philosophers therefore raised questions about the status of the obligation to add *maṅgala* verses at the beginning of texts. Was there a Vedic injunction or *vidhi*? If so, how was it known – by inference? by the example of elders (*śiṣṭa*)? from the sacred literature (*śruti*)? These topics led to the central philosophical problems at stake in the period, of action and causation, of intention and Vedic sanction.

In brief, however, Gaṅgeśa's further conclusion, which was followed by many later thinkers, was that the practice of reciting a *maṅgala* verse was something that the author did mentally. It was not really part of the text that it began, but was rather something of a different nature, that was attached at the beginning. The *maṅgala* verses were only written down at the beginning of the text to set a good example for students, and to indicate conformity with the immemorial custom of learned predecessors.

Now, this solution is unsatisfactory for our purposes, among other reasons because the custom turns out not to be immemorially old.

26 For a brief survey of some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors on the problem of *maṅgala*, see V. Varadachari, "A note on the *maṅgalavāda* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school," Adyar Library Bulletin 26 (1962) 28-35.

Indeed, the 'problem' of the missing *maṅgala* verses arose exactly because the custom was not that old. This solution, furthermore, offers no explanation for the conspicuously literary nature of the *maṅgala* verses in later texts. And their intentionally literary nature makes the proposal of detaching the *maṅgala* verses from the literary works that they begin difficult to endorse.

There is a great deal more that should be argued out, but it suffices here to make the historical point: that by the mid-fourteenth century the Sanskritic philosophers had become so accustomed to the practice of beginning texts with *maṅgala* verses that they attempted to solve the 'problem' of their absence (and presence) through considering the causal explanations of how they worked.

It is worth noting that one finds an earlier discussion of the theoretical questions, once again in the work of some Buddhist authors.[27] There the purpose of the verse of veneration was discussed in very nearly the same way: the custom of beginning with homage to the teacher or the chosen deity was the practice of the elders (*śiṣṭācāra*), and conduced to easy completion of the undertaking, by removing the obstacles in its way. Veneration also inspired reverence in the students of the text. What is strikingly different in this discussion, however, is that the causal principle invoked was not one of auspiciousness or good luck, but of meritorious action or *puṇya*. It was the accumulated merit that removed obstacles, not luck or auspiciousness.

IV. The Cultural History of Maṅgala

This difference in the theory of Buddhist *śāstrīs*, who perhaps had been the earliest practitioners of the use of invocatory verses at the beginning of *śāstric* works, leads us to a more basic question, which we have avoided until now: what was *maṅgala*, actually, and how was it thought to work? The answer must surely be that *maṅgala* itself had a history. Given the variety of its uses, practices, and applications across the broad range of South Asian society, that history must be a cultural history. This final section, necessarily speculative, turns to a consideration of that cultural history as it pertains to the *śāstric maṅgala* verses.

27 See for instance Sthiramati's commentary on Vasubandhu's Madhyāntavibhāga, and Yaśomitra on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya.

Suppose, then, that the preliminary findings are borne out, and it turns out to be true that the practice of using *maṅgala* verses to begin *śāstric* texts did indeed begin and change; and that the associated literary conventions of the *maṅgala* had a history as well, as did the indigenous explanatory theories.

From what we have already seen, we could suppose that there were two general stages to this history, the first taking place roughly in the first millennium C.E., in which the practice of using *maṅgala* verses made its way into the universe of *śāstric* discourse from elsewhere; the second taking place roughly in the second millennium, in which the sort of *maṅgala* verse that was composed became increasingly ambitious in literary terms, and individual to its author.

How should we go about explaining these changes? How, that is, should we think about the relationship of the cultural world of the *śāstrīs* to other cultural developments in India over this period? There are, of course, numerous broad cultural developments over this long period that are relevant. I shall mention four.

Rise of the Personal Deity

There is, first of all, the history of the worship of the personal deity, that is of a willing, saving, omnipotent deity. Such deity worship was not a characteristic feature of the old Vedic tradition, nor of the early Buddhist or Jaina movements. It is well known that from the beginning of the Christian era, however, there was a growth in the practical traditions organized around the worship of such personal deities.

Clearly the history of the *maṅgala* verses, which often invoked the author's *iṣṭadevatā*, or deity of choice, was involved in that larger history. It remains to be understood, however, what it would mean to open a *śāstric* text with a *maṅgala* verse that invokes a preferred deity. To what extent is the Sanskrit intellectual who is writing a treatise on Sanskrit grammar, for instance, necessarily writing that grammar as the devotee of a god?

Divination

There is, furthermore, the history of divinatory practices. Divination by omens was in use in India from the first few centuries B.C.E.. It took on progressively more detailed and elaborated forms, some of

which were astrological, in subsequent centuries. Many of these varieties of divination did not assume a model of hard determinism between omen and result, but assumed rather that humans had a scope of autonomy to change or influence the futures indicated by omens or calculations. In particular, one of the Indian specialities in divinatory practice was *muhūrta* or catarchic divination, in which the aim was to discover the propitious moment at which to begin an activity. The concern with *maṅgala* at the beginning of a literary or scientific work would appear to be related to the history of divinatory practices of this sort as well.

Causation Theory

There is another broad cultural history, that of the theory of cause and effect, in both its learned and popular forms. There were many such theories on offer: generalized cosmological principles such as the *karma* theory in its many articulations; specialized theories of the causes and effects of rituals, advanced by Vedic practitioners and ritual specialists of other sorts; theories of causation specific to divinatory signs and indicators, as mentioned; notions of fate and of the inevitability of the structure of time itself; and most of all, different ideas about luck.

Courtly Culture

I mentioned at the outset that from the beginning, *maṅgala* verses were often intentionally literary, and that in the second millennium authors increasingly favoured the ornately poetic, especially in the form of double and even triple meaning verses.[28] There appears to have been an increasingly powerful expectation that a *śāstric* work should begin with *maṅgala* verses that were the individual creation of the author. Clearly the cultural history that is relevant here is that of Indian courtly culture and its consumption of Sanskrit literature,

28 A certain number of authors added the same highly literary *maṅgala* verses to all of their compositions, as a form of signature. See the recent article by ALEXIS SANDERSON on the double-meaning *maṅgala* verses of the early eleventh century author Abhinavagupta – ALEXIS SANDERSON, "A Commentary on the Opening Verses of the Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta," in eds. SADANANDA DAS, ERNST FÜRLINGER, Sāmarasya: Studies in Indian Arts, Philosophy, and Interreligous Dialogue (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2005) 89-148.

which took a distinctive shape in the later first millennium, and gave rise to forms of literary connoisseurship in private settings in the second.[29]

All of these larger histories are relevant, certainly. And yet it is not clear to me how to make any satisfactory headway in tracing out the history of the *maṅgala* verses in relation to such vast historical processes. For the moment, I would like to talk briefly about three rather more limited forms of historical behaviour, where it might in fact be possible to decide something.

Writing and Scribes

The first of these is the history of writing itself, and of the practices of scribes and inscribers. The history of writing in India is related to the appearance of poetry as an independent literary form in the first few centuries C.E..

I have already mentioned how the copyists of manuscripts put their own *maṅgala* words at the beginning, and how the *maṅgala* verses of scribes were sometimes blended with those of the authors' works that they were copying. What should also be mentioned, however, is that the practice of putting some sort of auspicious or *maṅgala* beginning to a written thing is older. In inscriptions in India from the last century B.C.E. onward, scribes would begin with an auspicious word, usually the word for success, '*siddham*.' Later they indicated this word with a simple mark, a curved line opening out on one side. Other auspicious marks and words were used as well.[30]

None of these early inscriptions was composed in Sanskrit; they were, rather, in one of the Prakrit languages. Nor were any of the inscriptions *śāstric*. It was not until the second century that a Sanskrit inscription was put up anywhere in India. Nevertheless the practice of using auspicious words and signs at the beginning of written things was already in use among scribes from earlier. The idea of beginning with *maṅgala* might thus be linked to the technology of writing.

29 Daud Ali, Courtly Culture and Political Life in Early Medieval India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
30 R. Salomon, Indian Epigraphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 67-8.

'Sanskrit Cosmopolis'

The second history is that of the Sanskrit cosmopolis, that is to say, the universe of Sanskrit learned discourse, which took place primarily in the form of *śāstric* literature. This cosmopolis has received recent treatment by SHELDON POLLOCK. The findings for us to consider here are, first, that this cosmopolitan world itself had a beginning, in the first few centuries of the common era; that this was a kind of public space for discussion and debate between intellectuals belonging to different philosophical and intellectual traditions; that the ticket of admission was the ability to write in correct Sanskrit, and to stage arguments in a way that was subject to dispute and verification; and that philosophers in the Buddhist and Jaina movements left off writing in the Prakrit languages and opted to write in Sanskrit in order to participate in this cosmopolitan sphere, which was, in this sense, non-sectarian in its rationale and operation.[31] The history of beginning a *śāstric* work with a *maṅgala* verse was necessarily involved in the history of the *śāstra*s in this cosmopolitan period. Perhaps the use of *maṅgala* verses in Sanskrit texts entered the cosmopolis with some of the later arrivals, who had pre-existing textual practices.

Maṅgala as *Begriffsgeschichte*?

The third history to investigate is the cultural history of *maṅgala* itself. The later commentators whom we discussed above, who retrofitted the older texts of their tradition with *maṅgala*, were right to do so, in a certain sense. There were a number of different notions of *maṅgala* available over the course of this long cultural period. At least three of these are distinguishable, and are captured in Padmapāda's ninth century description of what constituted a customary *maṅgala* beginning, as cited above: paying homage to a deity, fixing an auspicious word like '*atha*' or '*vṛddhi*' in the mind, or gazing at curds or other auspicious substances.[32]

There was, as we have seen, a later notion of *maṅgala* that is tied to the invocation of a deity, or of the Buddha or Bodhisattva, in which the verse of invocation either directly elicits from the willing, agentive god a response of blessing that protects the author as he composes

31 SHELDON POLLOCK, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

32 See the passage cited above in note 20.

his work, or alternatively that puts the author into such a mental state that whatever obstacles might beset him otherwise are dispelled.

There was also a different and older notion of *maṅgala*, that of an inherently auspicious word or sign, such as '*siddham*' – 'success' in the old Prakrit inscriptions, or '*atha*' – 'now then' in the *sūtras*. These were words or signs that were understood to operate in some mechanical fashion to ensure the success of the work by giving it a good start.

Indeed, there is a saying about *maṅgala* that is invoked by the grammarian Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya, as an old and therefore authoritative statement of the principle:

> *maṅgalādīni maṅgalamadhyāni maṅgalāntāni hi śāstrāṇi prathante vīrapuruṣāṇi ca bhavanty āyuṣmatpuruṣāṇi cādhyetāraś ca maṅgalayuktā yathā syur iti*[33]
>
> *Śāstras* that have auspicious beginnings, middles, and ends become famous, make heroes, and promote long life, with the further result that their readers become endowed with auspicious qualities as well.

This old statement of principle is invoked to explain the irregular word order of the first *sūtra* of Pāṇini's grammar, '*vṛddhir ādaic*.' Patañjali argues, no doubt correctly, that '*vṛddhir*,' which in a non-technical sense means growth or prosperity, was put as the first word of the text for the purpose of making a *maṅgala* beginning.

It should be noted that this saying, cited by Patañjali already in the second century B.C.E., was regularly appealed to by later commentators in all of the *śāstras*, in their explanations of why a text needed to begin with a *maṅgala* verse. It should also be recalled, however, that the texts of the grammatical tradition did not begin with *maṅgala* verses until the eleventh century. Patañjali himself invokes the maxim under Pāṇini I.3.1 in a rather dubious way, to explain the auspicious properties of the epenthetic -*v*- in the *sūtra*, '*bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*,' but never to explain the use of a *maṅgala* verse.

Finally, Padmapāda's passage confirms that there were behaviours that promoted ritual auspiciousness, such as gazing at auspicious substances. The world in which these practices operated is relevant

33 Mahābhāṣya on I.3.1 *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* vol 2. p. 174. See also MBh on Vārttika 1 vol. 1, pp. 6-7, and I.1.1. vol. 1, p. 40.

to, but largely external to, the realm of literary practice. Nevertheless the history of these practices itself remains a matter for research: the older *śrauta* forms of Vedic ritual did not begin with *maṅgala* behaviours, at least not defined as such. Although the word '*maṅgala*' is an old word, occurring already in the Ṛgveda, it is an odd word, of uncertain derivation, and of uncertain sense in early usages. The principle of *maṅgala* formed no part of the old Brāhmaṇa literature's explanation of the reasons for ritual action. For the Mīmāṃsā tradition, *maṅgala* was not useful as an explanation of any ritual behaviour; it constituted rather more of a problem for the Mīmāṃsaka explanatory framework.

So far as I have been able to discover, the last serious consideration of *maṅgala* as a social and cultural phenomenon was produced more than twenty years ago, in a collection of essays edited by JOHN CARMAN and FREDERIQUE APFFEL MARGLIN.[34] The burden of that work was to liberate the thinking of religionists, historians and anthropologists of South Asia from the single binary opposition of purity-impurity, which had been proposed by LOUIS DUMONT as the signature underlying dynamic of the structure of Indian society, conceived a-historically. One can see in those essays that the authors, especially APFFEL MARGLIN, were struggling with structuralism itself as a viable anthropological approach, that is, with the very notion of an underlying cultural logic that is based on binary oppositions. Nevertheless, historicism was not on offer as a solution. After that work, the trail went cold. Other, epistemological preoccupations overwhelmed the field for some time.

All of this is to say that we might profit from returning to the history of *maṅgala*. A place to start would be to assume multiplicity in the conception and practice of the 'auspicious' or 'lucky,' and also to assume historical change in that conception and practice. What appears to be called for in the first instance is a more careful study of the cultural history of the terminology of, and ways of using terms for, auspiciousness, luck, and blessing, overlapping terms such as *maṅgala*, *bhadra*, *kalyāṇa*, *puṇya*, *śubha*, and others. Rather than a perennialist history of ideas, why not attempt something more like REINHARD KOSELLECK's *Begriffsgeschichte*, or history of concepts that undergo transformation in periods of cultural transformation, or something

34 *John B. Carman* and FREDERIQUE APFFEL MARGLIN, eds. Purity and Auspiciousness in Indian Society Leiden: Brill, 1985.

like Ian Hacking's studies of the discursive practices of the terms and concepts for probability and chance over the course of the nineteenth century? Or perhaps there is some other historiographical approach that would reach a successful conclusion.

Some Remarks on the Opening Sections in Jaina Epistemological Treatises

Piotr Balcerowicz (*Warsaw*)

1\. Even before Hemacandra (1088-1172) expressed succinctly the notion that auspiciousness was to be conveyed by an incipit, presumably in order to facilitate the composition of his grammatical treatise, the *Śabdânuśāsana*[1], Jaina philosophical and religious works had undergone some important changes as regards their opening sections. These developments can be traced back to the time of the composition of *The Sayings of the Seers* (*Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ*, Skt. *Ṛṣi-bhāṣitāni*), a collection of hymns, aphorisms etc. composed by monks and nuns in the first centuries that followed the emergence of Jainism, which starts with a message directed both to coreligionists and, to some extent, to disbelievers:

> 'He [the Jina whose teaching is contained in these hymns] speaks only what one should heed, [similarly] he propounds only what one should heed, whereby the living being is instantaneously released from all kinds of suffering. There is no higher purity than [his teaching] one should pay heed to.'[2]

1 Whose initial *sūtra* consists of a single word: *arhaṁ* (ŚA 1.1.1).

2 Isibh$_1$ 1: *soyavvam eva vadatī*[a], *soyavvam eva pavadati, jeṇa samayaṁ jīve savva-dukkhāṇa muccati. tamhā soyavvāto paraṁ ṇ'atthi soyaṁ tī*[b] [[a] Isibh$_2$: *vadati*. [b] Isibh$_2$: *ti*.].
In view of the contents of the first section of *Isi-bhāsiyāiṁ* (*Ṛṣi-bhāṣitāni*), where we come across a clear reference to the early Jaina ethical 'teaching of the four restraints' (*cāujjāma-dhamma / cātur-yāma-dharma / cātu-yāma-saṁvara*), this opening passage goes back, despite its prosaic character, to an early stage of the Jaina system. This teaching is well known from oldest strata of the Jaina Canon, e.g. Uttar 23 [837-925] ('The dialogue between Keśin and Indrabhūti Gautama'), Ṭhāṇ 4.1, *sū* 266, p. 103, RP 693 (esp. 'the Story of Paesi'(*Paesi-kahāṇayaṁ*, Skt. *Pradeśi-kathānaka*; (RP 667 [47]-817[84]), see Bollée (2002)). Cf. also Schubring (1942), Schubring (1969: 47-48) and Vinayasagar–Shastri–Sharma (1988: 14-18).

Hemacandra understood the role of the initial *sūtra* to be a concise auspicious *mantra* and felt no need of any additional explanation of his purpose as an author, considering the role of the initial verse obvious, as it transpires from his auto-commentary:

> 'We place this [auspicious] formula *arhaṁ*—which is expressive of the supreme lord, who is the supreme being—at the beginning of the treatise for the sake of auspiciousness.'[3]

In this paper, I shall try to pinpoint common features that opening sections of a number of most important Jaina philosophical treatises display as well as elements peculiar to some of introductory portions, in order to identify a kind of evolution in their formulations and structure over centuries and, finally, to propose a historical explanation to account for a change that, in my opinion, took place after the 6th century.

2.1. The genre of Jaina philosophical writings as they are known to us commences with the oeuvre of 'a collective writer' Kundakundâcārya[4],

3 ŚA-LVṛ 1.1.1 = ŚA-RVṛ 1.1.1: ***arhaṁ*** *ity etad akṣaraṁ paramêśvarasya parameṣṭhino vācakaṁ maṅgalârthaṁ śāstrasyâdau praṇidadhmahe.*

4 Some of the works ascribed to Kundakunda seem indeed to go back to a certain common source (authorship) and the nucleus of each of them was expanded and elaborated in the course of time: *The Quintessence of Sermons* (*Pavayaṇa-sāra / Pravacana-sāra*; PSā), *The Quintessence of The Main Doctrinal Points* (*Samaya-sāra*; SSā), *The Quintessence of The Five Extensive Entities* (*Pañca-tthiya-saṁgaha / Pañcâstikāya-samaya-sāra*, PSSā) and *The Quintessence of Restraint* [*of Passions*] (*Ṇiyama-sāra / Niyama-sāra*; NSā). The very earliest core of these writings may go back to the third century, and that may account for Kundakunda's dating according to some researchers, i.e. 2nd-3rd century: e.g. A. N. UPADHYE (1935: 5), SCHUBRING (1957), SCHUBRING (1966: 36), JOHNSON (1995: 91-97) and SONI (2003). Since most layers of these texts are decidedly later, reaching even perhaps 7th century, that is the reason why a number of scholars assign Kundakunda to a posterior date, e.g. JOHNSON (1995: 95): 'early fifth century or later', DHAKY (1991: 193): 'second half of 8th century', similarly DUNDAS (1997: 507 ff.). Other works ascribed to Kundakunda are distinctly later (probably between 7th and 8th centuries) and different in style, language (later Prakrit and traces of Apabhraṁśa), intellectual framework and character, and it is very unlikely that also these may go back to the same intellectual milieu covered by the name of 'Kundakunda', these include: *The Exposition of Things* (*Aṭṭha-pahūḍa / Artha-prābhṛta*), *The Quintessence of* [*the Three*] *Gems* (*Rayaṇa-sāra / Ratna-sāra*), *Twelve Reflections* (*Bārahâṇuvekkhā / Dvādaśânuprekṣā*) and *The Six Lectures* (pr. *Ṣaṭ-pāhuḍa*, s. *Ṣaṭ-prābhṛta*). I shall use the conventional author name 'Kundakunda' to refer to a nucleus of

the name practically standing for a series of anonymous thinkers who may have flourished over a span of a few centuries between 3rd and 7th/8th centuries. The opening verses of Kundakunda's works which contain earliest textual layers[5] betray some common features. That is evident when we compare his two works, the *Samaya-sāra* and the *Niyama-sāra*, respectively:

> 'Having saluted to all perfected beings, who have attained a firm, immovable and incomparable goal, I will teach this instruction on the main doctrinal points, [once] delivered by the testimonial omniscient[6].'[7]

and

> 'Having paid homage to the Jina [Mahā]vīra, whose nature is endowed with infinite and superior cognition and conation, I will explain the quintessence of restraint as it was [once] preached by both the omniscient [proper] and the testimonial omniscient[8].'[9]

Apart from two different linguistic layers,[10] we can distinguish the following structural elements[11], many of which will reoccur in other *maṅgalâcaraṇas*:

writings that bears certain features that allow us to attribute them a particular philosophical Digambara tradition of the period 3rd-5th century, albeit not to a historical person of Kundakunda.

5 This does not have to mean that the opening verses themselves belong to the earliest textual strata, inasmuch as there is a possibility of them being a later interpolation.

6 'Testimonial omniscient' (*śruta-kevalin*) is someone who is believed to derive his omniscience from, i.e. who knew all the twelve basic Canonical books (*aṅga*) and all the fourteen ancient works (*pūrva*). Another name is therefore *catur-daśa-pūrva-dhara*. The last such person was, according to tradition, Ārya Bhadrabāhu who flourished during the reign of Candragupta Maurya, cf. DHAKY (2004).

7 *vaṁdittu savva-siddhe dhuvam acalam aṇovamaṁ gadiṁ patte* ।
vocchāmi samaya-pāhuḍam iṇamo suya-kevalī-bhaṇiyaṁ ॥ SSā

8 See n. 6.

9 *ṇamiūṇa jiṇaṁ vīraṁ aṇaṁta-vara-ṇāṇa-daṁsaṇa-sahāvaṁ* ।
vocchāmi ṇiyama-sāraṁ kevali-suda-kevalī-bhaṇidaṁ ॥ NSā

10 The forms *suda°* and *°bhaṇidaṁ* point to dialectical differences and do not have to necessarily have any bearing on the historical assessment of the antiquity / relative chronology of both verses.

11 For a complete list of such structural elements see p. 73.

E 1 Salutation as a starting point of the undertaking (*vaṁdittu*, *ṇamiūṇa*).

E 2a The object of salutation, in SSā it being all perfected beings (*savva-siddhe*), a category that includes also the Tīrthaṁkāras, whereas in NSā it being Mahāvīra Vardhamāna (*jiṇaṁ vīraṁ*).

E 2b The mention of the object of salutation contains also a brief description of laudable qualities (SSā: *dhuvam acalam aṇovamaṁ gadiṁ patte*, NSā: *aṇaṁta-vara-ṇāṇa-daṁsaṇa-sahāvaṁ*). The importance of these qualities—that are tantamount to liberation (*mokṣa*), although the latter can be referred to either as a final liberated condition (*dhuvam acalam aṇovamaṁ gadiṁ*) or as constituent hallmarks of the condition (*aṇaṁta-vara-ṇāṇa-daṁsaṇa*)—lies in the fact that these set the goal on the spiritual path for any believer.

E 3 A statement of the design to teach (*vocchāmi*).

E 4 The respective subject matter of the teaching. And, finally,

E 5 The indication of a source of the teaching (*suya-kevalī-bhaṇiyaṁ*, *kevali-suda-kevalī-bhaṇidaṁ*) that forms the doctrinal fundament for a given work.

Here, as in all Jaina literature, the salutation to the Tīrthaṁkāras (E 1) cannot be treated as an entreaty or invocation to supreme beings etc., as it was typical of *maṅgala*s in Vedic tradition, starting with *Ṛgveda* 1.1.1. (*agním ī̀ḷe puróhìtaṁ yajñásyà devám ṛtvíjàm* । *hótāraṁ ratnadhā̀tàmam* ॥), but also in the Hindu *pūjā*, in which the obeisance to a deity was meant both to implore and to invite the deity to attend the sacrifice. Having destroyed all the *karman*, the Tīrthaṁkāras remained aloof from worldly matters and unapproachable to the believers.

The qualities that accompany the goal (E 2b) play an important role inasmuch as they provide an explanation why the person that is an object of laudation (E 2a) should be at all venerated, but also indicate that this is the goal that potentially lies ahead for the believer in a very distant future.

That last element in the list, the explicit reference to a source of the teaching (E 5), seems to be of particular importance, inasmuch as it provides a justification for the doctrine as it is expounded in a given work and, by conferring veracity to it, lends credence to the author's arguments. In other words, the truth that the omniscient one once fathomed remains the cornerstone of the treatise in question. Thereby, the continuity of Tīrthaṁkāra's original message to the world is

safeguarded via the Jaina tradition and, at the same time, an access to the salvific teaching once revealed by the omniscient is provided. Interestingly, the common element in both SSā and NSā is that the author grounds his system in the teaching of 'testimonial omniscient' teachers, and it is only NSā that has a wider claim of relying also on the teaching of a *kevalin* (or *kevalin*s), i.e. the omniscient (here Mahāvīra Vardhamāna) who attained their superiority independently of any instructor[12].

When we consider another early text ascribed to Kundakunda, the *Paṁcatthiya-saṁgaha*, we shall see that the *maṅgala* contains, in addition to all the other above-mentioned elements, at least one more feature:

> '[1] Homage to the Jinas, whose qualities exceed all limitations, who are worshipped by hundreds of Indras, whose sweet and clear words are beneficial to the three worlds [and] who conquered worldly existence. [2] Having bowed with my head [in order to show my respect] to the content (i.e. main doctrinal points) which came forth from the mouth of the mendicant (i.e. the Jina), which releases from the four modes of existence[13] and [brings final] liberation with itself, I will explain these main doctrinal points. Listen!'[14]

The new feature can be formulated as follows:

E 6 The *incipit* verses inform the recipients of the text that not only the author but also divine beings join him in worship of the object of laudation E 2a (*iṁda-sada-vaṁdiyāṇaṁ*), thus providing an example to be emulated by the religious community.

In the verses Kundakunda specifies the object of reverence to be twofold: it is not only the victorious *tīrthaṁ-kāra*s (*jiṇāṇaṁ jida-bhavāṇaṁ*) who are 'living' paragons of the spiritual path to follow, but also it is the contents of their teachings as a wholesome instrument that enables an adept to attain the spiritual goal (*cadu-ggadi-ṇivāraṇaṁ saṇivvāṇaṁ … samayam*).

12 Cf. $TS_{\acute{s}vet}$ 1.3: *tan nisargād adhigamād vā.*—'The correct cognition [arises] through natural development or through instruction.'

13 I.e. hellish beings, animals, humans, divine beings.

14 *iṁda-sada-vaṁdiyāṇaṁ ti-huaṇa-hida-madhura-visada-vakkāṇaṁ* |
aṁtâtīda-guṇāṇam ṇamo jiṇāṇaṁ jida-bhavāṇaṁ || 1 ||
samaṇa-muhuggadamaṭṭhaṁ cadu-ggadi-ṇivāraṇaṁ saṇivvāṇaṁ |
eso paṇamiya sirasā samayam iyaṁ suṇaha vocchāmi || 2 || PSSā

The final goal or purpose of the teaching to be achieved through these two works (E 9, *vide infra*) is not explicitly mentioned in any of them, although it is intimated in the description of the Jina's qualities (E 2b).

Most importantly, in all the above instances the authoritativeness of the source of teaching is not questioned; on the contrary, it is accepted unconditionally.

2.2. An analysis of another of Kundakunda's works, i.e. the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*, betrays—in addition to all the ones already mentioned—some more elements:

> '[1] Here, I render homage to Vardhamāna, the maker of the passage to moral law, who is venerated by the gods and demons, by humans and sovereigns, who has washed away the dirt of the destructive *karman*. [2] And [I render homage to] all the remaining *tīrthaṁ-karas* along with all the perfected beings of pure nature, and to the ascetics whose actions [are regulated by correct] knowledge, conation, conduct, penance and energy. [3] I venerate all of them in their entirety as well as each of them individually, but also [I venerate] current saints [living] in the human region. [4-5] Having paid homage to the saints (sc. liberated souls), the perfected beings as well as to congregation leaders (direct disciples of the Jina), to classes of community instructors and to all monks with no exception, [and] having taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation, I embrace equilibrium whereby one attains liberation.'[15]

Firstly, we see that the object of laudation E 2a is even more elaborate and embraces other groups of venerable living beings, in addition to the Tīrthaṁkāras, in the following sequence: (a) Mahāvīra Var-

15 *esa surâsura-maṇus-iṁda-vaṁdidaṁ dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṁ* ǀ
paṇāmi vaḍḍhamāṇaṁ titthaṁ dhammassa kattāraṁ ǁ 1 ǁ
sese puṇa titthakare sasavva-siddhe visuddha-sabbhāve ǀ
samaṇe ya ṇāṇa-daṁsaṇa-caritta-tava-vīriyâyāre ǁ 2 ǁ
te te savve samagaṁ samagaṁ pattegam eva pattegaṁ ǀ
vaṁdāmi ya vaṭṭaṁte arahaṁte māṇuse khette ǁ 3 ǁ
kiccā arahaṁtāṇaṁ siddhāṇaṁ taha ṇamo gaṇa-harāṇaṁ ǀ
ajjhāvaya-vaggāṇaṁ sāhūṇaṁ cêva ssavvesiṁ ǁ 4 ǁ
tesiṁ visuddha-daṁsaṇa-ṇāṇa-pahāṇâsamaṁ samāsejja ǀ
uvasaṁpayāmi sammaṁ jatto ṇivvāṇa-saṁpattī ǁ 5 ǁ PSā

dhamāna (*vaḍḍhamāṇaṁ titthaṁ*), (b) all the remaining *tīrthaṁ-karas* (*sese* ...*titthakare*), (c) perfected beings (*siddhe, siddhāṇaṁ*), (d) ascetics (*samaṇe*), (e) the saints, viz. liberated souls (*arahaṁte, arahaṁtāṇaṁ*), (f) congregation leaders (*gaṇa-harāṇaṁ*), (g) community instructors (*ajjhāvaya-vaggāṇaṁ*) and (h) monks (*sāhūṇaṁ*).

Interestingly, the register of praiseworthy beings found in Kundakunda's *maṅgala* verses corresponds to the list of *The Eulogy of The Five Supreme Beings* (*Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti*), which forms the first five lines of the *Pañca-namas-kāra-mantra*—traditionally known also under the names *The First Recollection* (*Prathamaṁ smaraṇam*) and the *Śrī-namas-kāra-mantra*, and currently as the *Nokār* Mantra[16], present practically in all Jaina rituals—but also opens the Śvetāmbara *Sūtra on Obligatory Rites* (*Āvassaya-sutta*, ĀvS) as well as the Digambara *Six-Partite Canon* (*Cha-kkhaṁḍâgame* / *Ṣaṭ-khaṇḍâgama*; ṢKhĀ) composed by Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali (c. 200):

> 'Homage to (A) the saints (sc. liberated souls), homage to (B) perfected beings, homage to (C) community instructors, homage to (D) spiritual guides, homage to (E) all the monks in the world.'[17]

That is especially true of verse four, which contains all the five *parameṣṭhins*. A comparison of both passages reveals the following parallelism:[18]

16 On this most basic liturgical formula of the Jainas and contemporary Jaina rituals, see Jaini (1979: 162-164), Laidlaw (1995: 59 ff.), Cort (2001: 61-99, esp. 66 f.).

17 ṢKhĀ 1.1.1 = ĀvS 1: *namo arihaṁtāṇaṁ namo siddhāṇaṁ namo āiriyāṇaṁ* [ĀvS: *āyariyāṇaṁ*] *namo uvajjhāyāṇaṁ namo loe savva-sāhūṇaṁ*. There are numerous works that deal with this eulogy, see e.g. Leumann (1934), Williams (1963: 184-215), Caillat (1965), Balbir (1993), Flügel (1994), Shāntā (1997: 33 ff.). The antiquity of the formula is confirmed by a number of early inscriptions, e.g. by that of king Khāravela (2nd century BCE) in Kaliṅga: *namo arahaṁtāṇaṁ namo savva-siddhāṇaṁ* ..., see Guérinot (1908: 69), after Shāntā (1997: 132).

18 See Amṛtacandra-sūri's gloss in PSā-TPVṛ *ad loc.*, p. 5.2: *athaivam arhat-siddhâcāryôpādhyāya-sarva-sādhūnāṁ praṇati-vandanâbhidhāna-pravṛtta-dvaita-dvāreṇa*... and Jayasena's gloss in PSā-TVṛ *ad loc.*, p. 5.10-11: ***arahaṁtāṇaṁ siddhāṇaṁ taha ṇamo gaṇa-harāṇaṁ ajjhāvaya-vaggāṇaṁ sāhūṇaṁ cêva*** *arhat-siddha-gaṇa-dharôpādhyāya-sādhubhyaś caiva*. Cf. also Śīlāṅka's gloss in ĀyārṬ ad *sū*. 279, p. 322: *upādhyāyaḥ adhyāpakaḥ*. In his commentary called *The Brightness* (*Dhavalā-siddhānta*), Vīrasena (c. 800) implies that the meaning of *āyariyāṇaṁ* of the *Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti* may also refer to those who are conversant with the areas of the fourteen-fold knowledge, i.e. with the *Puvvas* the authorship of which was ascribed to the *gaṇa-dharas*, see DhṬ ad

Pavayaṇa-sāra		*Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti*
*arhant*s (A)	=	(e), including (a) and (b),
*siddha*s (B)	=	(c),
*ācārya*s (C)	=	*gaṇa-dhara*s (f) and (d),
*upādhyāya*s (D)	=	*adhyāpaka*s (g) and (d),
*sādhu*s (E)	=	(h) [and (d)?].

In other words, its appears that the *maṅgala* verses of the *Pavayaṇa-sāra* contain, as a constituent element beside other elements, a reformulation of the most widespread and fundamental eulogistic formula that is basically a component, and usually a starting point, of all ritualistic Jaina practice. Symbolically, therefore the composition — both as the actual production and the act of recitation—of such a philosophical-religious text as the *Pavayaṇa-sāra* may be treated as an activity that has a ritualistic dimension and may correspond to other religious practices such as the six obligatory rites (*āvassaya* / *āvaśyaka*)[19], recommended also for the lay followers, or the *deva-pūja*, *caitya-vandana* etc. in lay practice.

That it is indeed the case, i.e. that a composition of a work was preceded by or performed a function of an obligatory rite in praise of the five supreme beings is confirmed by Hemacandra-sūri in his auto-commentary to the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*:

> 'However, the author of the aphorisms has also expressed auspicious salutation in the form of homage paid to the five supreme beings etc.; [hence], with brevity in view, he does not accommodate (sc. expand) it [here explicitly].'[20]

ṢKhĀ 1.1.1, p. 49.8-9: ***namo āiriyāṇaṁ*** *pañca-vidhaṁ ācāraṁ carati cārayatîty ācāryaḥ catur-daśa-vidyā-sthāna-pāragaḥ ekādaśâṅga-dharaḥ ācārâṅga-dharo vā...*

19 Cf. Shāntā (1997: 699-715), Williams (1963: 184 ff.).

20 PMīV$_1$ 1.1.1 § 4 (p. 2.4): *parameṣṭhi-namas-kārâdikaṁ tu maṅgalaṁ kṛtam api na niveśitaṁ lāghavârthinā sūtra-kāreṇêti.*
Of course, what is meant by *maṅgala* here is a verbal expression of salutation which in itself is conceived of as a ritual, although it does not necessitate any additional performative ritualistic acts. Precisely in such a way is interpreted the *Pañca-namas-kāra-mantra* / *Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti* in a traditional verse that usually accompanies it:
eso pañca-namo-kkāro savva-pāva-ppaṇāsaṇo ı
maṅgalāṇaṁ ca savvesiṁ paḍhamaṁ havai maṅgalaṁ ıı
—'This is the fivefold homage [to the five supreme beings] which destroys all sins, and among all auspicious salutations this is the foremost one.'

In the concluding verse Kundakunda mentions a new element:

E 7 An explicit reference to his own personal practice as a precondition for his own correct understanding: 'having taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation, I embrace equilibrium' (*visuddha-daṁsaṇa-ṇāṇa-pahāṇâsamaṁ samāsejja uvasaṁpayāmi sammaṁ*).

The ascetic way of life (*āsama / āśrama*) is both a direct application of the Jinas' instruction and its essence is a spiritual composure, or inner equilibrium (*sāmya*), that implies the ascetic ideal of complete withdrawal from the world. Clearly, the element of one's own practice is the third gem of the Jaina *ratna-traya*. A precondition for the ascetic way of life, asseverated to be practised by Kundakunda, is religious belief and reliance on the Jinas' teachings.

Further, Kundakunda indicates

E 8 The purpose of his practice and of ascetic attitude which is liberation (*ṇivvāṇa-saṁpattī*). It is believed to result from the ascetic code of life which one adopts following the example of the *tīrthaṁ-kara*s.

In this way, with the elements E 7 and E 8 taken jointly, Kundakunda expresses the triad of gems (*ratna-traya*) as the path that leads to liberation, i.e. exactly the same idea that is expressed, e.g., by Umāsvāmin in the *Tattvârtha-sūtra*: 'The correct cognition, correct conation and correct conduct are the path to liberation.'[21] He also indicates a hierarchy of the three gems: the correct conduct is subordinate to both correct cognition and correct conation, which are treated by Kundakunda as prerequisites for the correct conduct.[22]

The purpose expressed in E 8 complements E 2b, viz. laudable qualities (*dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṁ*) possessed by the object of veneration,

If Satkari Mookerjee and Nathmal Tatia render the passage as 'The author of the aphorisms *has performed the auspicious ceremony of salutation* [italics – P.B.] of the (five exalted beings called) *parameṣṭhins*, but he does not propose to incorporate it in the work for consideration of economy (of labour)' ($PMīV_2$, p. 3 of the translation portion), it is only in the sense of verbal expression of eulogy that the italicised passage of the translation should be understood, not in the sense of some ritual that entails additional acts and that preceded the composition of the work.

21 TS 1.1: *samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ.*

22 There was an ongoing discussion among various Jaina thinkers as to which of the three gems had to be given priority or whether all of them are equally important, cf. Tatia (1951: 147-155).

and thus voices a promise of future liberation, being the ultimate purpose for all the Jainas. The difference between the two lies in the fact that E 8 indicates that one has indeed entered into the path that leads to the final goal. Furthermore, element E 2b, especially when supplemented with E 8, contains a clear reference that for a practitioner, and only for a practitioner, there exists a method to verify the veracity of the teachings of the *tīrthaṁ-karas*: by following the Jinas' instructions one may in the end achieve the same goal. That likelihood that the devotee may attain the promised results confers special authority to the *tīrthaṁ-karas* as spiritual guides in his eyes. This is, however, very different from an approach when one subjects the teaching to independent critical test.

An analysis of the structure of the argument above reveals that there is some serious circularity involved. On the one hand, praiseworthiness of spiritual guides is an immediate corollary of their authority as 'ford-makers' who demonstrate the correct path of conduct: its veracity relies on its applicability and verifiability through practice of what the teacher imparts. On the other hand, one adopts the indicated path precisely because one considers it justified to give credit to the guide's teaching. In other words, whether one enters the practical path depends on one's belief in the authority and truthfulness of the spiritual guides. Clearly, Kundakunda was not a logician or a consistent analytic philosopher and the logical incongruity was not his concern. The problem of circularity would be inconsequential in case one already was a believer who would not question religious tenets. For that reason the inconsistency did not matter because the recipients of the works were Jaina believers. If the addressees were non-believers whom Kundakunda's work was supposed to convince and win, the argument would be unavailing. That explains why Kundakunda's works are, in general, not polemical in character.

To recapitulate, the circularity confirms that the attitude of the author does not contain any encouragement to question the authority of the Jinas, instead he merely urges fellow believers to follow the path uncritically.

3.1. Historically more or less contemporaneous with the nucleus of Kundakunda's writings was Umāsvāmin, the author of the *Tattvârtha-*

sūtra, whose authorship and dating are still debatable.[23] There seems to be no originally preserved introductory section of TS. Depending on the commentary, the *sūtras* are preceded by some *maṅgala* variants, probably composed by the commentators themselves.

In the Śvetāmbara version of Umāsvāmin's work[24] the elaborate *maṅgala* stanzas—probably composed by Umāsvāti[25], the author of the *Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya*—comprise several of the 31 initial summary verses (*sambandha-kārikā*), which state that the author's purpose is to describe the path to liberation (*kā* 31d), of which I shall cite only a sample:

23 There have been a number of various opinions as regards the dating of the *Tattvârtha-sūtra*: around *Vīra Saṁvat* 714-798 (e. c. 135-219 C.E.) according the Digambara *paṭṭāvalī* list of teachers (see J. L. Jaini (1920: „Introduction") and Winternitz (1987: II: 555)); between 1-85 C.E. (S. Dasgupta (1975: I: 171) and S. Ch. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 8); between 150-350 C.E. (J. Bronkhorst (1985: 178)); between 1st and 3rd/4th centuries, but certainly before 5th century (Sukhlal (1974: 24)); between 350-400, but in any case before 550 C.E. (Jacobi (1906: 288-289), Zydenbos (1983: 12)); in 5th century (R. Williams (1963: 1)) or at the end of 5th century (S. Ohira (1982: 137)). However, when we take into consideration the structure of the text, simplicity of lucid Sanskrit, a moderate level of philosophical depth, clear influence of ideas present in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (but not in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*), no reference to later philosophical ideas, we can assign Umāsvāmin's *Tattvârtha-sūtra* to c. 350-400, and Umāsvāti's *Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya* to c. 400-450 (there are strong reasons to believe that the *Bhāṣya* was written by a different person than Umāsvāmin, the author of TS). The upper limit for the *Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya* is the Council of Valabhī (between 450-480; traditionally in *Vīra Saṁvat* 980 or 993, i.e. in 453 or 466 C.E.), presided over by Devarddhi-gaṇin Kṣamā-śramaṇa, where the Śvetāmbara Canon was finally codified (TBh 1.20 reflects an earlier list of the Canonical works).

24 For the Digambara version see § 4.

25 The style of the *sambandha-kārikās* resembles that of the *Bhāṣya*. In addition to that, there are some stylistic devices in the *kārikās* typical of the prose style of the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. the frequent use of gerundives (e.g. *kās* 8, 15, 28, etc.) or ablatives of mode that describe their manner of teaching (e.g. *samāsato vyāsataś ca* in *kā* 28, that are evocative of such phrases as *purastāl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇa* common to the *Bhāṣya*, e.g. TBh 1.1). The subcommentary by Devagupta-sūri and Siddhasena-gaṇin treats the verses as a part of *Bhāṣya*, see TṬ, I: p. 20.15: *sa câyaṁ bhāṣya-kārikābhiḥ prakāśyate*. Cf. also Ohira (1982: 29-30).

'[1] The one who attains [correct] cognition—purified through correct conation—[which amounts to] nothing but indifference achieves a blissful new life, even though it were occasioned by suffering. ... [6] However, such a person—although he has accomplished his [own] goal—instructs others of the highest moral law, having [first] attained [it himself], is indeed most worthy of incessant worship as the best among the best ones. ... [10] Just as the sun illuminates the world merely because it has such a nature, in the same way the maker of the passage (*tīrthaṁ-kara*) engages himself in order to set the passage (*sc.* the path to liberation) in motion, [because it has such a nature]. ... [21] Having become purified with respect to the three instruments [of the body, speech and mind], [I] render homage to this supreme seer, worthy of worship, the venerable victor, whose delusion has disappeared. [22] I will teach this simple work called "On the understanding of reality", which is a compendium, [characterised by a] comprehensive subject matter, of [just] one portion of the teaching of the saints, is beneficial to the disciples. [26] The one who is willing to adopt the teaching of the Jina, the meaning of which [is laid down] in numerous books, will strive to surpass the sun which [conquers] darkness (confusion) with daystar rays. [31] And, in this whole world, there is no other (sc. better) teaching on the wholesome except the path to liberation. Therefore, I will demonstrate the path to liberation, because only it is the highest (sc. most wholesome).'[26]

This lengthy passage contains all the elements of a standard *maṅgala* already mentioned: the act of salutation E 1 (*kā* 21: *parama-ṛṣaye*

26 *samyag-darśana-śuddhaṁ yo jñānaṁ viratim eva câpnoti* ।
duḥkha-nimittam apîdaṁ tena sulabdhaṁ bhavati janma ॥ 1 ॥
yas tu kṛtârtho 'py uttamam avāpya dharmaṁ parebhya upadiśati ।
nityaṁ sa uttamebhyo 'py uttama iti pūjyatama eva ॥ 6 ॥
tat-svābhāvyād eva prakāśayati bhāskaro yathā lokam ।
tīrtha-pravartanāya pravartate tīrtha-kara evam ॥ 10 ॥
kṛtvā tri-karaṇa-śuddhaṁ tasmai parama-ṛṣaye namas-kāram ।
pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīna-mohāya ॥ 21 ॥
tattvârthâdhigamâkhyaṁ bahv-arthaṁ saṅgrahaṁ laghu-grantham ।
vakṣyāmi śiṣya-hitam imam arhad-vacanaika-deśasya ॥ 22 ॥
khadyota-prabhābhiḥ so 'bhibubhūṣec ca bhāskaraṁ mohāt ।
yo 'timahā-granthârthaṁ jina-vacanaṁ sa jighṛkṣeta ॥ 26 ॥
narte ca mokṣa-mārgād dhitôpadeśo 'sti jagati kṛtsne 'smin ।
tasmāt param imam evêti mokṣa-mārgaṁ pravakṣyāmi ॥ 31 ॥ $TS_{śvet}$, p. 1-3

namas-kāraṁ, etc.) and its object E 2a along with his numerous qualities E 2b and a justification why the supreme being is worthy of worship (*kā* 6, *kā* 7ab: *tasmāt arhati pūjām arhann evôttamôttamo loke*, *kā* 8: *tat-pūjanaṁ nyāyyam*, etc.), the design to teach E 3 (*kā* 22: *laghu-granthaṁ vakṣyāmi*, *kā* 31d: *mokṣa-margaṁ pravakṣyāmi*), a very detailed description of the subject matter E 4 (most of the *sambandha-kārikās*), which goes back to *jina-vacana* (*kā* 26, 27, 28) as its source E 5, an allusion that also other beings worship the *tīrthaṁ-karas* (*kā* 7cd, *kā* 27), a reference to Umāsvāti's own personal practice (*kā* 21) as a precondition of his purity of mind and understanding. Finally—which is a historical innovation in Jaina philosophical literature—there is an explicit mention of

E 9 the ultimate final goal (*mokṣa*), or purpose of the teaching, that one is hoped ultimately to achieve through the study of this work, the addressee being the disciples (*kā* 22c: *śiṣya-hitam imam*; *kā* 26; *kās* 28-30).

Umāsvāti makes it explicit that the teaching, the eventual purpose of which is liberation, is meant to uplift both the teacher himself and the disciples on the path to perfection (30cd: *ātmānaṁ ca paraṁ ca*). Such an outspoken formulation of the purpose of the work is indeed a new quality when compared with Kundakunda's works the *incipits* of which belong to a decidedly earlier period.

The *maṅgalâcaraṇa* contains also an explicit mention of a practice of *pūjā* recommended to worship the *tīrthaṁ-karas*, although the treatise is not regarded by Umāsvāti as a performance of a *pūjā* or any other kind of ritual, in contrast to Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra*. Also in contradistinction to the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*, there is no—even indirect—reference to the *Pañca-namas-kāra-mantra* nor to all other supreme beings of the *Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti*, except for the *tīrthaṁ-karas*[27]. That must have been a deliberate choice in view of the extent of the introductory section, which among its 31 verses could easily include an invocation to the remaining Supreme Beings of the *Stuti*.

One more verse that calls for attention is the very first one which demonstrates not only the author's salvific concern which sets liberation as an ultimate aim, that could appeal only to the monastic community, but—in parallel to the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* which sets two

27 The term *arhant* occurs in *kā* 22, but what it means is clearly *jina*, insofar as it occurs in the context of the teaching promulgated the saints (liberated beings), and the phrase *arhad-vacana* must be understood as *jina-vacana*.

goals of human existence[28]—it also caters to lay followers by admitting that a blissful birth (*sulabdhaṁ janma*) is not only commendable in itself but is also given proper consideration by the author of the manual. When compared to earlier texts, that seems to be a departure from their preoccupation with the means of attaining liberation, and may be interpreted as acknowledging the aspirations of and the role played by the lay community. This two-tier ideal will hold valid for centuries to come, up to the present day, as Siddharṣi-gaṇin (10th c.) would explain: 'The [purpose of the treatise] pertinent to the ultimate truth [is] the attainment of [either] prosperity in the afterlife or of ultimate deliverance.'[29] Most interestingly, this mundane goal is mentioned by Umāsvāti first.

3.2. Umāsvāti is maintained by the Śvetāmbara tradition to have composed also *The Treatise on the Delight of Tranquillity* (*Praśama-rati-prakaraṇa*, PRP) in verse, introduced with a separate chapter of 23 *kārikā*s.

Despite the often repeated claim that there is close ideological similarity between PRP and TBh,[30] a closer examination of both introductory sections of PRP and TBh would demonstrate that, at least in the case of the respective *maṅgalâcaraṇa*s of TBh and PRP, there is no irrefutable proof in support of a common authorship. On the contrary, there are some reasons to doubt it. Both introductions differ in general approach and outline: the author of PRP is extremely humble and modest, emphasising throughout his inadequate intellectual potential and weaknesses (see esp. *kā* 2, 5-6, 8-13). We do not really find anything similar to this attitude in TBh, whose author merely declares his purpose. The *maṅgala* of TBh refers to the ultimate goal or reality (*paramârtha*; *kā*s 2, 3), whereas this crucial expression is absent from PRP. The *maṅgala* of PRP does not at all mention the path to liberation (*mokṣa*, *niḥśreyasa*)—which is the gist of TBh (e.g. *kā*s 5, 8, 16, 17, 26, 31a, 31d)—by name as its goal, but instead, it merely speaks of passionlessness (*vairāgya*) along a range of its synonyms (e.g. *kā* 16, 17), as the opposite of desire (*rāga*: *kā* 18, 20-23) and aversion (*dveṣa*: *kā* 19, 20-23), as well as a path to passionlessness (*kā* 7: *virāga-mārga*, kā 15: *virāga-vārtā-hetuḥ*). Even in the context of inner tranquillity

28 VS(C) 1.1.2: *yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ.*—'Moral law is that through which one attains mundane prosperity or ultimate deliverance.'

29 NAV 0.5: *pāramārthikaṁ abhyudaya-niḥśreyasâvāptir iti.*

30 See Yajneshwar S. Shastri's introduction to PRP_2. p. 38.

one would expect a reference to the ultimate goal being liberation. Interestingly, in the *maṅgala* of TBh we have no trace of any synonym of *vairāgya*. Both *maṅgalâcaraṇas* display preference for a different range of expressions to describe 'the teaching of the Jinas', which basically do not overlap: the author of PRP speaks mostly of *jina-śāsana* (*kā* 2), *sarva-jña-śāsana* (*kā* 3) and only once of *jina-vacana* (*kā* 5), whereas the author of TBh speaks generally of *jina-vacana* (23, 25, 26, 27, 28) and *arhad-vacana* (22). The idea of passions (*kaṣāya*), mentioned in PRP a few times, which closely relates to the idea of *karman*, does not occur in TBh at all. Instead, the author of TBh uses rather untypical term *karma-kleśa* (*kā* 2a, 2c). All this would speak against common authorship of both *maṅgalâcaraṇas*. One would expect some overlapping in terminology and expressions in view of the fact that the goals of these two works are related: one cannot separate the issue of *vairāgya* from *mokṣa*. That seemingly obvious link between passionlessness and desire to attain liberation, albeit surprisingly absent in the introductory section of PRP, is noticed by Haribhadra (12th century)[31] commenting on the title of the work[32] and ultimate purpose of the teaching[33]. Furthermore, PRP does display a peculiar stylistic feature which is not found in TBh, viz. the use of *yad-vat* ... *tad-vat* in relative sentences (PRP 13, 14) to express comparison, on par with *yathā* ... *tathā*.

On the other hand, there are at least two features which one could theoretically cite in support of common authorship. First, in both cases the author(s) display(s) an extreme liking for lists and classifications (PRP 18, 19, 20-23 and TBh 19, 21, 22). That is, however, nothing unusual in Jaina literature which abounds in numberings and taxonomies. Another common stylistic feature is the frequent use of gerundives as predicates: TBh 6 (*pūjyatamaḥ*), TBh 8 (*nyāyyam*), TBh 20 (*anabhibhavanīyam*), TBh 28 (*grāhyaṁ, dhāryaṁ, vācyaṁ*), TBh

31 He might be different from Haribhadra-sūri III, the author of *Nemināha-cariya* (1160 CE), see Yajneshwar S. Shastri's introduction to PRP_2. p. 9. He is certainly different from Haribhadra-sūri Virahāṅka (first half of 6th century), the author of the *Pañcâśaka* and *Pañca-vastuka*, and from most prolific of all the Haribhadras, Haribhadra-sūri Yākinī-putra (8th century), the author of the *Anekānta-jaya-patākā*, *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* etc.

32 PRṬ 2, p. 4.11-12: *praśama-ratau kathaṁ nāma sthiro mumukṣur bhavyaḥ syād ity ato vakṣye prakaraṇam.*

33 PRṬ 12, p. 12.7-8: *puṣṭir upacayo jñāna-darśana-cāritrāṇām. tad-upacayāc ca karma-nirjaraṇam, tato mokṣa iti nâsti kaścid doṣaḥ.*

30 (*upadeṣṭavyam*), and PRP 14 (*anuyojyam*), PRP 15 (*cintyam*), PRP 16 (*kāryaḥ*). Again this element is nothing peculiar so as to speak in support of common authorship of TBh and PRP.

As for the structure of the initial verses of PRP, the main elements seem to be contained in the following passages:

> '[1] [All] the twenty-four Jinas, from Ṛṣabha up to the son of Siddhārtha (*sc.* Mahāvīra), [who reached] their final body and know the precepts of moral law, are victorious. [2] Having bowed respectfully before the Jinas, perfected beings, community instructors and spiritual guides as well as before all the monks, I will teach a small portion (lit. 'something') of the Jinas' teaching for the sake of the perseverance [aimed at achieving] the delight derived from tranquillity [as a result of asceticism]. ... [5] A number of manuals of the system that gives rise to tranquillity have been imparted earlier by numerous teachers foremost among the seers (sc. *gaṇa-dharas*) of great insight, who have crossed the ocean of the Jinas' teaching. [6] A few grains were scattered by them, in the form of statements [constituting] the testimony, which were based on [Mahāvīra's] sermons; and thanks to the uninterrupted tradition they [survive] as remains. I have [first] collected [them] like a niggard, [and then]... [7] this [work] the single subject matter of which is the path to detachment has been composed, due to desirability of tranquillity [which detachment gives], by me with [the help of] my own intellectual potential, which is both clouded and limited, albeit stimulated by my devotion to the [testimony of the Jinas].'[34]

Out of the elements characteristic of a *maṅgalâcaraṇa* mentioned so far, the ones that are instantiated here are E 1 up to E 5, E 8 and E

34 *nābheyâdyāḥ siddhārtha-rāja-sūnu-caramāś carama-dehāḥ* |
pañca-nava-daśa ca daśa-vidha-dharma-vidhi-vido jayanti jināḥ || 1 ||
jina-siddhâcāryôpādhyāyān praṇipatya sarva-sadhūṁś ca |
praśama-rati-sthairyârthaṁ vakṣye jina-śāsanāt kiṁcit || 2 || [...]
bahubhir jina-vacanârṇava-pāragataiḥ kavi-vṛṣair mahā-matibhir |
pūrvam anekāḥ prathitāḥ praśama-janana-śāstra-paddhatayaḥ || 5 ||
tābhyo vistṛtāḥ śruta-vāk-pulākikāḥ pravacanâśritāḥ kāścit |
pāramparyād uccheṣikāḥ kṛpaṇakena saṁhṛtya || 6 ||
tad-bhakti-balârpitayā mayâpy avimalâlpayā sva-mati-śaktyā |
praśamêṣṭatayânusṛtā virāga-mārgaikapadikêyam || 7 || PRP

9 (here the immediate purpose being tranquillity, *praśama = vairāgya*, not liberation), whereas the missing elements are two: E 6 and E 7 (the author merely refers to his respectful approach and modesty, but does not mention any element of his monastic career or spiritual practice).

As it was the case with Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra*, unlike the *Tattvârthâdhigama-bhāṣya*, the element E 2a is extended in PRP 2 to comprise all the five supreme beings of the *Pañca-parameṣṭhi-stuti*. That aspect is highlighted by the commentator Haribhadra in his *Ṭīkā* (PRṬ, p. 3.9-17). Two different objects of both eulogies may also speak against the common authorship of both *maṅgala*s.

On a few occasions Umāsvāti mentions other works (esp. PRP 5) in a deferential manner as a source of his work, placing himself in the line of tradition initiated by Mahāvīra and descended to him via Mahāvīra's immediate disciples (*gaṇa-dhara*); thus, like his predecessors, he indicates the source of his teaching (E 5):

> 'The themes[35] which were expounded by the Tīrthaṁkāra (sc. Mahāvīra) and then captured by his immediate [disciples (sc. *gaṇa-dharas*)], found their recapitulation in manifold manner [in various works] that acts only for the sake of spiritual growth.'[36]

For that reason, also PRP is supposed to serve the spiritual growth (*puṣṭi*), which is the purpose of the treatise E 8.

Most importantly, neither in PRP nor in any other work mentioned so far do we find any polemical remark, any reference to logical argument or any justification why the author had undertaken to compose his work that could serve as a justification of his actions also to a non-Jaina. In other words, all the *incipit*s mentioned so far confirm that the recipients of these works were primarily thought to be persons who would question neither the raison d'être of these works nor the religious motivation of their authors. I would take it to mirror the historical context in which these works were composed. That will change with the subsequent commentary on the *Tattvârtha-sūtra*.

35 Haribhadra in PRṬ, p. 12.5, would like to take *bhāvāḥ* in the sense of 'entities' or 'categories': *bhāvāḥ iti jīvâdayaḥ padârthāḥ*.

36 *ye tīrtha-kṛt-praṇītā bhāvās tad-anantaraiś ca parikathitāḥ* ı
teṣāṁ bahuśo 'py anukīrtanaṁ bhavati puṣṭi-karam eva ıı PRP 1.12

4. Another introductory verse alleged to be a part of the *Tattvârtha-sūtra* is found in Digambara sources. It is found in the *Sarvârtha-siddhi*, a commentary by Pūjyapāda Devanandin (first half of the 6th century), for the first time:

> 'I salute to the guide [who reveals] the path to liberation, the conqueror of the mountains of *karman*, the knower of all the categories, for the sake of attaining his qualities.'[37]

There is much evidence to support the thesis that the *kārikā* did not originally belong to TS, even though in a late commentary called the *Tattvârtha-vṛtti* (also known as *Tattvârtha-dīpikā*) on TS, Śrutasāgara-sūri (Vikrama Saṁvat 1552 = 1495 C.E.) takes it to be a part of TS. The author comments on it as if it were a genuine opening verse to TS, and introduces it with words: *bhagavān* (i.e. Umāsvāmin) *api tat praśna-vaśāt "samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritra-lakṣaṇôpalakṣita-san-mārga-samprāpyo mokṣo hitaḥ" iti pratipādayitu-kāma iṣṭa-devatā-viśeṣaṁ namas-karoti*. On the other hand, Akalaṅka—who lived a few centuries earlier—in his commentary *Tattvârtha-vārttika* (RVār) does not mention this verse at all. Furthermore, if the verse were a genuine part of TS, it should also have been preserved as such in Śvetāmbara sources, even as being incorporated there as one of the thirty-one *sambandha-kārikā*s found in $TS_{\text{śvet}}$. In addition to that, since Pūjyapāda Devanandin does not have any other verse to open his commentary, although he closes his work by a colophon of three verses, it would be rather surprising to assume that the above *maṅgala* verse belonged to TS and SSi had no (versified or other) opening at all. One should, therefore, conclude that the author of the verse is Pūjyapāda Devanandin himself.

The verse in Digambara recension contains only some elements typical of a *maṅgalâcaraṇa*: the act of salutation (E 1) along with he reverenced object (E 2a), including his laudable qualities (E 2b), as well as the goal (E 9). There is a potential ambiguity hidden in the phrase 'for the sake of attaining his qualities', i.e. whether we should understand the compound *tad-guṇa-labdhaye* as 'so that one attains Mahāvīra's qualities' or 'so that I attain Mahāvīra's qualities'. For Umāsvāti (see § 3.1), the teaching clearly served both purposes: that of himself and that of his disciples. What is meant here is,

37 *mokṣa-mārgasya netaraṁ bhettāraṁ karma-bhū-bhṛtām* ।
jñātāraṁ viśva-tattvānāṁ vande tad-guṇa-labdhaye ॥ SSi, p. 1

as Pūjyapāda Devanandin states in his commentary (*para-hita-pratipādanaika-kāryam*), that the teaching serves primarily the liberation of the Jina's disciples, among whose rank also the author should be included.

Devanandin's subsequent prose explanation of the context of the *maṅgala* verse is also of much interest:

> 'A certain person capable of attaining liberation, who finds himself in the proximity, endowed with a sense of judgement, who wishes to obtain his own well-being, apt to [demonstrate genuine] argumentation and scriptures, respectfully approached the most eminent instructor (sc. Mahāvīra) among the ascetics, who is honoured as the Venerable One, whose sole [selfless] duty is to teach for the sake of the well-being of others, who was [just] describing the path to liberation [merely] through his own wonderful appearance with voiceless emission of sound (i.e. without any words), as if turned into a statue seated in the assembly of monks (i.e. *samavasaraṇa*) in a certain hermitage, a secluded [and] most pleasing place where beings capable of attaining liberation [practice] austerities. [Then], in compliance with the monastic code of behaviour, he asked [him] as follows: "O Lord, what would be unmistakably [most] wholesome for my self (soul)?" [Mahāvīra] said: "Liberation". The same [person] asked again: "What is the nature of liberation? What is the means to obtain it?"[38] The instructor [Mahāvīra] replied: "Liberation is another state, [different from mundane existence], of the soul, freed from the body, with [all] blemishes of dirt [in the form] of *karman* completely erased, [a state that is characterised by] such inconceivable natural qualities as [perfect] cognition etc. and [is characterised by] happiness free of any affliction [and] supreme.'[39]

38 Interestingly, these two elements correspond to the third and fourth Noble Truths of Buddhism (*duḥkha-nirodhaḥ, duḥkha-nirodha-gāminī pratipad*).

39 SSi § 1, p. 1: *kaścid bhavyaḥ pratyāsanna-niṣṭhaḥ prajñāvān sva-hitam upalipsur vivikte parama-ramye bhavya-sattva-viśrāmâspade kvacid āśrama-pade muni-pariṣan-madhye saṁniṣaṇṇaṁ mūrtam iva mokṣa-mārgam avāg-visargaṁ vapuṣā nirūpayantaṁ yukty-āgama-kuśalaṁ para-hita-pratipādanaika-kāryam ārya-niṣevyaṁ nigranthâcārya-varyam upasadya savinayaṁ paripṛcchati sma. bhagavan, kiṁ nu khalu ātmane hitaṁ syād iti? sa āha mokṣa iti. sa eva punaḥ pratyāha—kiṁ-svarūpo 'sau mokṣaḥ kaś câsya prāpty-upāya iti? ācārya āha—niravaśeṣa-nirākṛta-karma-mala-kalaṅkasyâśarīrasyâtmano 'cintya-svābhāvika-jñānâdi-guṇaṁ avyā-*

The story is a direct reference to a belief, widespread among the Digambaras but not among the Śvetāmbaras, that Mahāvīra after he had destroyed all the *karman* and obtained omniscience remained motionless and taught the mankind by emitting a divine sound (*divya-dhvani*), miraculously understood by his first disciples (*gaṇa-dhara*), while being surrounded by an assembly traditionally called *samavasaraṇa* / *samosaraṇa*[40]. In this way we are made to believe, by implication, that Devanandin's commentary is claimed to be based on the teaching imparted by Mahāvīra to that curious person who had happened to be in his proximity and who had handed it down in a succession of teachers directly to Devanandin. Accordingly, he justifies his right and authority to compose his work by indicating a source of his teaching (E 5): it is the authority of Mahāvīra that directly lends legitimacy to the *Sarvârtha-siddhi*.

Subsequently, Devanandin explains why the idea of liberation should be demonstrated in detail:

> '[§ 2] Since this [state of liberation] is directly imperceptible in an absolute manner, therefore persons in the state of bondage who are orators and who consider themselves ford-makers (sc. spiritual guides) [falsely] conceive of its nature completely differently in an account, based on fallacious argumentation, that does not [even] touch [its nature]. ... In what follows we shall teach its correct nature. [§ 3] These [persons] disagree also as regards the means to attain this [state of liberation]...'[41]

bādha-sukham ātyantikam avasthântaraṁ mokṣa iti. This passage is recounted by Śrutasāgara-sūri in the beginning of the *Tattvârtha-vṛtti*, TV, p. 5-11.

40 Cf. respective informative entries in JSK *divya-dhvani* (JSK, II: 430-433) and *samavasaraṇa* (JSK, IV: 329-334). On *samavasaraṇa* see also Folkert (1993: 147-152, 287-294). An extensive account of such an event in the centre of which is Ṛṣabha is found e.g. in ĀP(J) 22.76-312 (pp. 513-538). A similar event during which Mahāvīra, 'with the divine sound, narrated the meaning of the scripture' is mentioned in ṢKhĀ 1.1.1, *gāthā* 60d (p. 65): *divva-jjhuṇī kahei suttatthaṁ* ‖ .

41 SSi § 2-3, p. 1-2: *tasyâtyanta-parokṣatvāc chadma-sthāḥ pravādinas tīrtha-kara-manyās tasya svarūpam aspṛśantībhir vāgbhir yukty-ābhāsa-nibandhanābhir anyathaiva parikalpayanti ... tasya svarūpam anavadyam uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ. tat-prāpty-upāyaṁ praty api te visaṁvadante ....*

Clearly, difference of opinions is generally regarded as one of the sources of doubt[42], which calls for some kind of elucidation and investigation. The importance of this passage—in which Devanandin also refers to various opinions on the matter of the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Buddhist traditions—lies in the fact that it is for the first time in Jaina philosophical literature, it seems, that additional explanation is offered why liberation, being the ultimate goal, stands in need of closer description, the reason being a variance of opinions and existence of wrong beliefs on the subject.

This innovation marks a shift that reflects the reality of debates with rival schools of philosophy and the author's engagement in such debates. From now on Jaina thinkers will no longer direct their works to Jaina addressees only, but they will, with a polemical vein, expect also rivals to read them. Accordingly we are justified, I believe, in claiming that the *maṅgalâcaraṇa* contains two new elements, although related to each other:

E 10 the context of doubt that urges one to philosophical investigation,

and

E 11a a rationale why the task to write the book is justified in itself, apart from serving the attainment of an ultimate goal (*mokṣa*, E 9).

In this way, the contents of the exposition reveals a new phase Jaina philosophical texts entered: that of openly polemical discussion.

The rationale formulated in such a way reveals predominantly a desire to expel all doubts as regards the true nature and to establish the tenets of Jainism, but it does not express any negative, critical aspiration to refute other doctrines (E 11b, see p. 50).

42 See NBh 1.1.23 (p. 25.18-26): *vipratipatter iti. vyāhatam ekârtha-darśanaṁ vipratipattiḥ, vyāghāto virodho 'saha-bhāva iti. asty ātma ity ekaṁ darśanaṁ, nâsty ātma ity aparam, na ca sadbhāvâsadbhāvau sahaikatra sambhavataḥ. na cânyatara-sādhako hetur upalabhyate. tatra tattvânavadhāraṇaṁ saṁśaya iti.*—'[Doubt arises also] due to difference of opinion. Difference of opinion [means] conflicting views about one and the same thing, [which in turn means] inconsistency, contradiction or impossibility of concurrence, e.g. one view is "The soul exists", and the other is "The soul does not exist". It is impossible [to assert] both existence and non-existence with respect to one [and the same thing]. And the logical reason to prove either [view] is not available. Therefore, the impossibility to determine the truth is doubt.'

5. Interestingly, a remark evoking a picture of similar gathering is found in Siddhasena Divākara's *Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, a work composed prior to Diṅnāga[43]:

> '[1] The teaching of the Jinas, who have attained a condition of unsurpassable happiness [and] are victors over transmigratory birth, is well established, [it occupies] firm position [and] corrects wrong doctrinal points. [2] Just as [there is] someone who is listening to the gathering of the people who convey (sc. the *gaṇa-dhara*s) the expanse of the ultimate truth of the main doctrinal points [but, at the same time, he] is one whose [inert] heart is like a hub [covered] with dirt with respect to the scriptures, to him I will teach the goal. [3] Elementary analysis of the extent of collective and particular [aspects contained] in the sermons of the ford-makers [is divided into] the substance-expressive [viewpoint] as well as the modal viewpoint. The remaining [viewpoints] are [just] variations.'[44]

The technical term *pajjuvāsaṇa* (Skt. *paryupāsana*) in verse 2, setting a visible example for the believers to follow (E 6), denotes the gathering of congregation leaders (*gaṇa-dhara*) who were Mahāvīra's immediate disciples. They, in their turn, attracted their own disciples, a paragon convert being the one mentioned in the verse who is *āgama-malâra-hiyao*, i.e. with his inner essence, pure by nature and endowed with primordial qualities such as cognitive faculties (*upayoga*), innate energy (*vīrya*) etc. (cf. TS 2.4), obstructed by the dirt of karman, in consequence of which it stands in need of clarification of the contents of the scriptures and the human goal.

43 See: Balcerowicz (2000b) and Balcerowicz (2001b: 369). Saṅghavi–Dośi (2000: 13) assign him to the fifth century *Vikrama Saṁvat*, i.e. fourth/fifth century CE, such an early dating does not take into consideration several ideas that occurred first around the fourth/fifth century CE and are present in STP.

44 *siddhaṁ siddha-tthāṇaṁ ṭhāṇam aṇovama-suhaṁ uvagayāṇaṁ* ।
ku-samaya-visāsaṇaṁ sāsaṇaṁ jiṇāṇaṁ bhava-jiṇāṇaṁ ॥ 1 ॥
samaya-paramattha-vitthara-vihāḍa-jaṇa-pajjuvāsaṇa-sayanno ।
āgama-malâra-hiyao jaha hoi tam attham unnesuṁ ॥ 2 ॥
tittha-yara-vayaṇa-saṅgaha-visesa-patthāra-mūla-vāgaraṇī ।
davvaṭṭhio ya pajjava-ṇao ya sesā viyappā siṁ ॥ 3 ॥ STP 1.1-3 (pp. 1, 169, 271)
Comp. also the 'translation' of the verses in Saṅghavi–Dośi (2000: 1 ff.); the very detached character of the paraphrase in English renders the work practically useless.

In a statement of his design to teach (E 3), Siddhasena likens his role to that of the *gaṇa-dharas* and indicates both the subject matter of the teaching (E 4), i.e. the contents of the *Āgamas*, which are at the same time the source of his teaching (E 5). The simile implies that the author is personally engaged in the same spiritual career and practice as the *gaṇa-dharas* (E 7) with the goal to achieve liberation (E 8). Although the act of salutation as such is not explicitly stated, for instance with such expressions as *namaḥ*, *namas-kāram*, *vande* etc., nonetheless it is implied through the context which mentions the object of salutation (E 2a) along with the laudable qualities (E 2b). Although the mention of the laudable qualities of the Jina as an ideal of the spiritual path may also connote the ultimate goal (*mokṣa*) of the teaching (E 9), that goal is separately mentioned in verse 2 (*taṁ atthaṁ unnesuṁ*). However, there is no mention of any additional, non-salvific rationale why the task to write the book has been undertaken (E 11). Further, the condensed *incipit* is polemical in its character inasmuch as, in verse 1, it claims on the one hand the Jina's teaching to be well-founded (*siddhaṁ siddha-ṭṭhāṇaṁ*) and, on the other hand, that it rectifies wrong views (*ku-samaya-visāsaṇaṁ*). The ideas do not assume, however, an argumentative structure of a proof formula (E 14, see below, p. 49). Last but not least, the *incipit* introduces the reader to

E 12 the strictly philosophical content of the work, as a formulation of Jaina dogmatics,

insofar as the theory of viewpoints, that bifurcate into two main headings, consists of an underlying structure of Siddhasena's philosophical enterprise.

6. A Śvetāmbara work of momentous philosophical significance, that can be assigned to the second half of the sixth century (post-Diṅnāgan, pre-Dharmakīrtian), is *The Wheel of Viewpoints which has Twelve Spokes* (*Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra*) of Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa, the opening of which reads as follows:

> 'Jaina teaching pervades [everything], is well-founded, infinite, although with a limit (or: with a final goal), laid down for the sake of incisiveness of thoughts, not for the sake of confoundment; it is a firm support to transcend the profusion of [frag-

mentary] causal explanations of the world[45]; having gone beyond [one-sided] statements, it is governed by speech; it is accessible [to everybody, although] it is not accessible in the case of some [people]; [it is so] powerful. This [Jaina teaching] is victorious because of the reference to substance as well as of the modes[46]. Whatever [teaching] possesses such qualities, it is going to be victorious precisely by way of subduing other teachings. What's more, it is exactly the nature of possessing such qualities that should be demonstrated. What exactly is that [thing] which should be demonstrated? The only [thing] that possesses such qualities is the teaching which constitutes a whole [in the form] of an ocean of knowledge, the parts of which are cognitions (sc. viewpoints (*naya*)) in their entirety, because it rests on the procedure based on the rule[47] [of application] of one statement to entities differentiated by means of rules that are designed to [express] opinions of (sc. viewpoints based on) infinite angles such as the dyad of the reference as substance and the reference as modes (sc. substance-expressive and mode-expressive viewpoints) etc.'[48]

45 Lit. 'spread', 'production' (*pratāna*). In my understanding of this awkward compound I *partly* follow Siṁha-sūri's commentary, NĀA *ad loc.*, p. 4.8-12: *nanv ata eva sthāṇu-puruṣâdi-viṣaya-saṁśaya-viparyayavad nityânityâdy-ekānta-vikalpâtmakatvād* ***vyāmoha****-hetur api, kāla-niyati-svabhāva-puruṣa-daivêśvara-yadṛcchâdy-ekānta-kāraṇa-vikalpa-****jagat-pratāna-visṛti****-darśanād iti. atrôcyate—****na vyatyāsa-dhīrâspada****tvāt. eka-puruṣa-pitṛ-putratvâdivaj* ***jainaṁ*** *hi* ***śāsanaṁ*** *kālâdi-jagat-prabhedaikānta-gatīn* ***vyatyasya*** *vyāvartya paraspara-virodha-nivāraṇena anekāntâtmaka-pratiṣṭhāna-samādhāna-kāraṇam ekāntâneka-vāda-samāhārâtmakaika-pratipattikaṁ para-mata-niṣedhânumodanābhyām eva.*

46 The compound *dravyârtha-paryāyataḥ* is an abbreviation for *dravyârtha-paryāyârthataḥ*. That is the way also Siṁha-sūri understands it, see NĀA *ad loc.*, p. 6.4: *dravyârtha-paryāyârthâśrayaṇaṁ*. What is meant are the two kinds of viewpoints, viz. substance-expressive and mode-expressive viewpoints; cf. Balcerowicz (2003a, esp. 46 ff.) and Balcerowicz (2003b).

47 The term *vidhi* in DNC seems to mean 'a rule of application of a statement', or 'a rule that proscribes a certain statement to express a certain meaning / context', and is close to the meaning of *naya* ('viewpoint'); that is the way also Siṁha-sūri understands the term in NĀA 7.16: *evaṁ-vidha-****vikalpôpakḷpta****-naya-jālôpaṣṭambha°*. However, on the ambiguity of the term *vidhi* in DNC see Wezler (2003) and Houben (2007). Compare the use of *vidhi*, as a precondition for a *pramāṇa*, in Samantabhadra's $SvSt_1$ 11.2 = $SvSt_2$ 52:
vidhir viṣakta-pratiṣedha-rūpaḥ pramāṇam atrânyatarat pradhānam |
guṇo 'paro mukhya-niyāma-hetur nayaḥ sa dṛṣṭānta-samarthanas te ||

48 *vyāpy ekastham anantam antavad api nyastam dhiyāṁ pātave*
vyāmohe na jagat-pratāna-visṛti-vyatyāsa-dhīrâspadam |

This *incipit* is indeed a radical departure from all the previous traditions in the spirit of which strictly religious devotion was expressed at the very outset. In DNC we neither find any terms to expressly verbalise the act of salutation (E 1) as a starting point of the undertaking (such as *namas-kāram*, *namaḥ*, *praṇipatya* etc.) nor several other typical elements of a *maṅgalâcaraṇa* (E 3, E 5, E 6, E 7, E 8, E 9). Notably it contains no indication of a source of the teaching that furnishes Mallavādin's work with authority. What is original in his approach is the conviction that

E 13 the legitimacy of Jaina doctrine lies exclusively in a critical examination of arguments.

It is not any more religious belief and irrational trust in the scriptures and the Jina's words that matters but argument, logical consistency and sound reasoning. That is clearly an innovation when assessed against the background of the whole Jaina tradition that preceded Mallavādin.

In no longer containing a direct praise of the founders of Jainism, as it had become a standard procedure in all the texts before, although there is indeed a hidden, roundabout glorification of the Tīrthaṁkaras as the authors of the eulogised teaching, it betrays Mallavādin's predominantly philosophical, and not religious concern.

Alone the structure of the passage reveals its markedly argumentative and polemical character, which is typical of a proof formula (*prayoga*). Interestingly, the object of salutation (E 2a), i.e. the teaching (*jainaṁ śāsanam*), becomes the subject of the thesis: 'the Jaina teaching is victorious' (**jainaṁ śāsanam jayati*), whereas the extensive description (E 2b) of laudable qualities possessed by the object of salutation plays the role of the logical reason: 'it pervades [everything] ... [it is so] powerful' (*vyāpy* up to *ūrjitaṁ*). In this manner, the *maṅgalâcaraṇa* rests on

E 14 an argumentative structure of a proof formula (*prayoga*).

vācāṁ bhāgam atītya vāg-viniyataṁ gamyaṁ na gamyaṁ kvacij jainaṁ śāsanam ūrjitaṁ jayati tad dravyârtha-paryāyataḥ ॥ *śeṣa-śāsana-nyag-bhāvenaiva jeṣyati tad yad evaṁ-vidham. evaṁ-vidhataiva tu pratipādanīyā. kiṁ eva pratipādyam asti? dravyârtha-paryāyârtha-dvitvâdy-anantânta-vikalpôpakḷpta-vidhi-bheda-padârthaika-vākya-vidhi-vidhānād aśeṣa-jñānâvayavaṁ avabodha-samudrâvayavī-bhūtaṁ śāsanam evaṁ-vidham eva.* DNC, p. 1.12-7.2.

There is an additional description of the methodological approach defining Jaina teaching that warrants the validity of the thesis asserting the victorious nature of the teaching: 'because of the reference to substance as well as to the modes' (**dravyârtha-paryāyârthataḥ*). That is followed by the statement of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*): 'Whatever teaching possesses such qualities, it is going to be victorious precisely by way of subduing other teachings' (*śeṣa-śāsana-nyag-bhāvenaiva jeṣyati tad yad evaṁ-vidham*), i.e. whatever fulfils the demands defined as E 2b is E 2a. Subsequently Mallavādin articulates the subject matter of his work (E 4): 'it is exactly the nature of possessing such qualities that should be demonstrated' (*evaṁ-vidhataiva tu pratipādanīyā*).

In a concealed manner, the introductory passage contains also a rationale (E 11), independent of any potential salvific goal, why Mallavādin undertook the task of composing DNC. In its dialectical structure, the raison d'être is expressed in the form of doubt, which concerns the general nature of a thing[49]: 'What exactly is that [thing] which should be demonstrated?' (*kiṁ eva pratipādyam asti?*). The occurrence of doubt (E 10) naturally prompts one to undertake steps, in the form of some kind of argumentative enquiry[50], to solve it. And that precisely is Mallavādin's task: to examine and define the character of the Jinas' teaching.

The motivation has a two-fold character, both positive (as it was the case already with SSi, see § 4) and negative:

E 11a positive: by examining Mahāvīra's teaching, it aims at establishing his main doctrinal points,

and, which is a novel feature,

E 11b negative: it aims at establishing the Jaina doctrine by refuting, i.e. 'subduing other teachings' (*śeṣa-śāsana-nyag-bhāvenaiva jeṣyati*); for the purpose of refuting rival doctrines, the author

49 A general idea of doubt is described e.g. in NBh 1.1.1 (p. 3.7): *sa câyaṁ kiṁsvid iti vastu-vimarśa-mātram anavadhāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ saṁśayaḥ.*—'"What exactly is this [thing]?"—cognition of such type, which consists in a lack of determination [and] in sheer uncertainty concerning the real thing, is doubt.' Its varieties are discussed in NS/NB 1.1.23.

50 Cf. NBh 1.1.1 (p. 3.3): *tatra nânupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate kiṁ tarhi saṁśayite 'rthe.*—'As for these [categories], argumentative enquiry proceeds neither with respect to an object which has been [directly] apprehended nor with respect to an object which has been [indirectly] ascertained, but with respect to an object which is doubtful.'

is going to examine a victorious teaching (*evaṃ-vidhataiva tu pratipādanīyā*).

A related issue is to what extent Mallavādin's rationale to compose his work (E 11a,b) has reference to another component frequently encountered in Jaina *maṅgalâcaraṇas*, that of the ultimate goal (*mokṣa*) to be achieved through a treatise (E 9). As we can see, the phrase 'although with a limit' (*antavad api*)—or rather, more faithfully to its spirit: 'although the Jinas' teaching is endowed with the means to put an end to the worldly existence'—contains a hidden reference to the salvific character of the Jinas' teaching, and therefore, especially in conjunction with the statement that 'it is exactly the nature of possessing such qualities that should be demonstrated' (*evaṃ-vidhataiva tu pratipādanīyā*), it might be taken to express the eventual purpose of the teaching, which is the ultimate final goal (*mokṣa*), in achieving of which DNC is hoped to be contributive. This is not, however, tantamount to saying the DNC directly aspires to teach the means of attaining the ultimate final goal (E 9). In order to see this fine difference, it would prove perhaps useful to distinguish here two levels of reference: the first order description, typical of earlier texts, being an authoritative account of the Jinas' teaching by portraying its doctrinal points (contents) directly, and the second order description, found in DNC, being a characterisation of its structure and method. The *incipit* contains also a reference to one of philosophically most fundamental tenets of Jainism, that of viewpoints (*naya*), of which only two most basic ones are mentioned, viz. the substantial, or substance-expressive (*dravyârthika*) and the modal, or mode-expressive (*paryāyârthika*), well attested in earlier literature[51]. In this way, Mallavādin mentions the pre-eminent, in his opinion, component of Jaina dogmatics (E 12), being the doctrine of the viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), one of the fundaments of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekânta-vāda*).

51 See for instance in Siddhasena Divākara's work, STP 1.3 (see n. 44), STP 2.1cd: *doṇho vi ṇayāṇa eso paḍekkaṃ attha-pajjāo* ॥ —'This modality of the object [viz. its general and particular aspect] is individually [the contents] for both viewpoints;' STP 3.10ab: *do uṇa ṇayā bahavayā davvaṭṭhiya-pajjavaṭṭiyā niyayā* । —'As a matter of fact, two viewpoints were distinguished by the Lord (the Jina), viz. substantial viewpoint (*dravyārthika*) and modal viewpoint (*paryāyārthika*).'

In addition to that, the element of personal practice (E 7), which we have already encountered with Kundakunda (§ 2.2., p. 33), acquires a new dimension in the above verificative context. For Kundakunda, 'to take up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation' (*visuddha-daṁsaṇa-ṇāṇa-pahāṇâsamaṁ samāsejja*) leads one to a spiritual composure, an important step on the way to liberation. Understood in terms of the monastic practice, it is merely an application of Mahāvīra's teaching. When Mallavādin maintains that Jaina teaching is accessible to everybody (*gamya*), he no longer expresses an aspect of monastic path, but intimates an idea that the genuineness and validity of the teaching can be practically tested by anyone who embarks on it: its practically applicable but also open to everyone to be (positively) verified.

7.1. Before I proceed to discuss potential factors that may have occasioned that change in approach represented by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa, I shall first briefly refer to some of the opening verses of Samantabhadra's works (6th/7th centuries)[52]. The most conspicuous feature of the *incipit*s of his works is a much more pronounced character of an eulogy as such than in all other cases analysed so far, which is due to the *stotra* character of Samantabhadra's works. Nevertheless, the opening verses of at least the *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* contain some elements common with the *Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra*:

> '[1] Such superhuman powers as the adoration [on the part] of divine beings, moving in the sky, fly-whisk service [as a symbol of royal power] etc. are found also in magicians. It is not because of these that you are great in our [eyes]. [2] The divine excellence of the individual form etc., be it internal or external, is something real [found] also in heavenly beings; [however] that [excellence] is found [also] in beings possessed of desire etc. [3] And none of all

52 Depending on relative chronology Samantabhadra is often estimated to have lived around 550 CD, see e.g. Dhaky–Jaina (1998) and Nagin Shah in his 'Foreword' to edition $\bar{A}M_2$. Williams (1963: 19) believes Samantabhadra lived around 450. There is no convincing reason to accept Paul Dundas's claim (2002: 349) pointing to 4th century. There are, however, some serious indications that Samantabhadra may be a contemporary of Dharmakīrti; these are discussed in Balcerowicz (forthcoming: § 3.6. and § 4.2.6.). That issue is going to be dealt with in more detail in a separate paper 'On the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra'.

main doctrinal points [taught] by [various] makers of the passage (sc. religious teachers) possesses authority because they are mutually contradictory. [Therefore] none [of them] could be a [true] preceptor.[53] [4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a complete consummation [of the gradual purification process] is [possible], just like a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes.[54] [5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire etc. [is inferable from visible smoke]—such a proof of the omniscient [Jina]. [6] Only you, being faultless, are such [an omniscient person], whose statements are contradicted neither by reasoning nor by scriptural testimony.[55] There is no contradiction, [because] what is accepted by you [as a tenet of your teaching] is not sublated by what is well-proven. [7] In the case of those who are alien to the nectar of your thought, who are advocates of the absolutist stand in every respect [and] who are consumed by the self-conceit of [their being] authoritative persons, what is accepted by them [only] is sublated by visible facts.'[56]

53 Here, we should construe *nâsti* in accordance with 'the maxim of a crow's eyeball' (*kākākṣi-golaka-nyāya*), i.e. as operating in two statements: (1) *sarveṣām āptatā nâsti*, and (2) *nâsti kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ*. Such is also the way Akalaṅka takes it, see $AṣŚ_2$: *ata eva na kaścit sarvajña ity uktam*.

54 For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

55 That is a feature of a cognitive criterion, cf. NA 1ab: *pramāṇaṁ sva-parâbhāsi jñānaṁ bādha-vivarjitam* |

56 *devâgama-nabho-yāna-cāmarâdi-vibhūtayaḥ* |
māyāviṣv api dṛśyante nâtas tvam asi no mahān || 1 ||
adhyātmaṁ bahir apy eṣa vigrahâdi-mahodayaḥ |
divyaḥ satyo divaukasu apy asti rāgâdimatsu saḥ || 2 ||
tīrtha-kṛt-samayānāṁ ca paraspara-virodhataḥ |
sarveṣām āptatā nâsti kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ || 3 ||
doṣâvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣâsty atiśāyanāt |
kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ || 4 ||
sūkṣmântarita-dūrârthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā |
anumeyatvato 'gny-ādir iti sarva-jña-saṁsthitiḥ || 5 ||
sa tvam evâsi nirdoṣo yukti-śāstrâvirodhi-vāk |
avirodho yad iṣṭaṁ te prasiddhena na bādhyate || 6 ||
tvan-matâmṛta-bāhyānāṁ sarvathaikānta-vādinām |
āptâbhimāna-dagdhānāṁ svêṣṭaṁ dṛṣṭena bādhyate || 7 || ĀMī 1-7

A number of typical *maṅgalâcaraṇa* features are concealed by a poetical form, typical of *bhakti* adoration. Verbalisation of homage constitutes a thoroughgoing framework of the whole *stotra* and it is for that reason that it is hard to distinguish when the opening section ends and the work proper begins. However, it is already in the very first verse with the words *tvam asi no mahān* ('you are great in our [eyes]') that we find both a clear pronouncement of the act of salutation E 1 and indication of the object of salutation E 2a. The passage mentions also various laudable qualities (E 2b) of the *tīrthaṁ-kara*s, although not always unique to them, e.g. 'moving in the sky' (*nabhoyāna*), 'the divine excellence of the individual form etc.' (*vigrahâdi-mahodayaḥ*) etc., as well as refers to 'the adoration [on the part] of divine beings' (*devâgama*) and to 'fly-whisk service' as a symbol of royal power (*cāmara*), two elements of religious practice which set an example for the religious community to follow (E 6). There is also a hint of the subject matter to teach (E 4), explicated in verse 3, which is the description of a true *guru* or authoritative teacher (*āpta*). The same verse also provides the rationale to compose the work (E 11), especially in its negative aspect (E 11b), in view of a general confusion, causing doubt, as regards the definition of an authoritative person as well as in view of a claim of many thinkers to possess such an elevated status. From this follows the author's desire to teach (E 3), although it is not expressed in the first person (e.g. *vakṣyāmi*, *pravakṣyāmi*, *vakṣye*), nor in any other direct way.

Of particular interest are verses 4, 5 and 6, which are constructed as proof formulas (*prayoga*), and even are called as such (*iti sarva-jña-saṁsthitiḥ*), in which they display element E 14 of an argumentative structure. We can easily distinguish the thesis (4: *doṣâvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣâsti*; 5: *sūkṣmântarita-dūrârthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid*; 6: *sa* [= *sarva-jñaḥ*] *tvam evâsi nirdoṣaḥ*), the logical reason (4: *atiśāyanāt*; 5: *anumeyatvataḥ*; 6: *yukti-śāstrâvirodhi-vāk* / *avirodhaḥ*, albeit the latter is not expressed in the Ablative) and either the example (4: *yathā mala-kṣayaḥ*; 5: *yathâgny-ādiḥ*) or something that looks like a statement of the invariable concomitance (6: *yad iṣṭaṁ te prasiddhena na bādhyate*), but which actually is supposed to prove the claim that there is no contradiction between Mahāvīra's statements and all available evidence.

The supposed veracity of and lack of contradiction in Mahāvīra's teaching is contrasted with contradictoriness inherent in and vulnerability of rival thinkers spoken of in verse 7, which also expressly mentions the reason for such fundamental flaws: absolutist or one-sided (simplistic) character (*ekānta*) of their teachings. In this way we have an elaborate polemical reasoning which bifurcates into a line or argumentation (verification) to prove the truthfulness of Jaina doctrine and argumentation to disprove (falsification) of countertheses.

In addition to that, from verse 6 it transpires that the Jina is treated as a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), inasmuch as it possesses main characteristics of a *pramāṇa*, such as faultlessness (*nirdoṣa*), lack of contradictoriness (*yukti-śāstrâvirodhi-vāk*, *avirodha*; cf. n. 55) and lack of sublation (*yad iṣṭaṁ te prasiddhena na bādhyate*). Such characterisation of cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) partly overlaps with probably the first definition of *pramāṇa* formulated in Jaina tradition by Siddhasena Mahāmati in the *Nyāyâvatāra*: 'The cognitive criterion is the cognition revealing itself and something else [different from it, and it is] free from sublation.'[57] Apart from Samantabhadra's direct reference to the absence of sublation in ĀMī 6, which is a defining element of *pramāṇa*, the aspect of cognitive criterion 'revealing itself and something else' (*sva-parâbhāsin*) is clearly accepted by him as a part of definition of *pramāṇa* both in his *Āpta-mīmāṁsā*[58] as well as in the *Svayambhū-stotra*[59]. Further, other passages in Samantabhadra's works confirm that lack of contradictoriness, mentioned in verse 6, is also considered by him a defining feature of a *pramāṇa*[60].

To recapitulate, such an argumentation laid down in verse 6 clearly describes the Jina as a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) par excellence, albeit he is not called the *pramāṇa* explicitly. Samantabhadra implies the idea indirectly in another verse in which he calls the Jina *pramātṛ*:

> 'You are a bona fide cogniser of all reality, you are the teacher of that which is wholesome [who teaches] the ignorant like a mother

57 NA 1ab: *pramāṇaṁ sva-parâbhāsi jñānaṁ bādha-vivarjitam* ı

58 Mī 12c: *bodha-vākyaṁ pramāṇaṁ.*

59 SvSt$_1$ 13.3cd = SvSt$_2$ 63cd: *sva-parâvabhāsakaṁ yathā pramāṇaṁ bhuvi buddhi-lakṣaṇam* ıı

60 ĀMī 36: *pramāṇa-gocarau santau bhedâbhedau ... ekatrâviruddhau*, YA 49ab: *dṛṣṭâgamābhyām aviruddham artha-prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanaṁ te* ı

[a child], you are the guide to people who behold [your] virtues. Now, you are worshipped also by me with devotion.'[61]

The move to treat the Jina as a *pramāṇa* will subsequently be shown to be of historical relevance (see § 8.2.(4)).

Alone the subject matter of the whole undertaking, viz. the examination of who is entitled to be considered a reliable teacher (*āpta*) marks—unlike all Jaina treatises preceding the *Āpta-mīmāṁsā*, with the sole exception of *Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra*—a new trend: the reliability of Jaina teaching and of Jaina Canon, being a pronouncement of *jina-śāsana*, cannot be accepted at its face value and is not merely a matter of unquestioning religious belief. Rather, the truth of *jina-śāsana*, including the authority of the scriptures, has to be accepted only as based on rational inquiry (E 13). Also the authoritative status of such spiritual guides as the *tīrthaṁ-kara*s, *gaṇa-dhāra*s or immediate teachers (*ācārya*) has necessarily to be examined and tested for, e.g., its consistency, its agreement with empirical evidence and the soundness of reasoning.

7.2. These opening verses of the *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* stand in stark contrast to Samantabhadra's other work *Yukty-anuśāsana*, which draws a decidedly more traditional picture of the *maṅgalâcaraṇa*:

> '[1] We are now desirous to make you—you who are prospering[62] on earth by virtue of great fame, who are the victor [and] who have sundered the bondage of the nooses of defects [such as nescience etc.] and [their] repository (sc. *karman*)—the subject matter of this eulogy. [2] After [you, the Jina,] have transcended [the limited] essence [of the world], the eulogy [in your praise] is called the elevation of [your] virtues among the people, because you

61 *sarvasya tattvasya bhavān pramātā mātêva bālasya hitânuśāstā* ı *guṇâvalokasya janasya netā mayâpi bhaktyā pariṇūyate*[a] *'dya* ıı SvSt$_1$ 7.5 = SvSt$_2$ 35
[a] SvSt$_2$ clearly misreads: *pariṇūyase.*

62 It is, of course, a play on the name of Vardhamāna. Interestingly, Vidyānanda takes advantage of the opportunity both to read the name of Vardhamāna as the present participle *vṛddhamāna* ('prospering'), and to read the meaning of 'cognitive criterion' (*pramāṇa* = *māna*) into *varddhamāna*; see YAṬ *ad loc.*, p. 2.2-3: *ṛddhamānam iti pravṛddha-pramāṇatvād ity arthaḥ, ṛddhaṁ pravṛddhaṁ mānaṁ pramāṇaṁ yasya sa eva varddhamāna ity ucyate.*

are the ocean of countless virtues. Being unable to express even an infinitesimal portion [of your virtues], how can we worship you, O Jina?! [3] Nevertheless, although I entertain [some] audacity, I am—as a result of my devotion—your worshipper (sc. I am the author of this eulogy in your praise), with [my] words corresponding to [your] capacity. [For] when the cognisable [task] is accepted, how can people not accomplish [their task (here: the composition of the eulogy),] with their actions, also by dint of their own capacities?'[63]

In the verses which do not contain anything polemical, the author appears much more restrained and humble as well as more religious and devotional, aware of his limitations, including his awareness of his imperfection in literary sphere. These more conventional features, provided they could also supported by additional analysis of the whole text, may point to historical antecedence of *Yukty-anuśāsana*.

8.1. At this stage I should try to propose an hypothesis why, in the sixth century, a set of new features enters the literary practice of framing *maṅgalâcaraṇa*s of Jaina philosophical works, and the focus suddenly shifts from that of primarily enunciating an obeisance in praise of the *tīrthaṁ-kara*s (elements E 1 - E 9) to an argumentation in favour of the validity that assumes a form of a proof formula (E 14), distinctly recognisable in Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa's *Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra* (§ 6) and Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* (§ 7.1.), a tendency that practically overrides the previous practice.

The earlier phase, up to Umāsvāti and early fifth century, can be called the phase of laudation, in which the works do not seem involved in any philosophical discussion with other systems. Jaina authors compose their treatises meant for a Jaina audience, and do not form arguments either to defend their own system or to criticise other systems. That is true for the authors mentioned in that phase, i.e. Kundakunda, Umāsvāmin, Umāsvāti, but also for all the Canoni-

63 *kīrtyā mahatyā bhuvi varddhamānaṁ tvāṁ varddhamānaṁ stuti-gocaratvaṁ* I
ninīṣavaḥ smo vayam adya vīraṁ viśīrṇa-doṣâśaya-pāśa-bandhaṁ II 1 II
yāthâtmyam ullaṅghya guṇôdayâkhyā loke stutir bhūri-guṇôdadhes te I
aṇiṣṭham apy aṁśam aśaknuvanto vaktuṁ jina tvāṁ kim iva stuyāma II 2 II
tathâpi vaiyātyam upetya bhaktyā stotā 'smi te śakty-anurūpa-vākyaḥ I
iṣṭe prameye 'pi yathā-sva-śakti kiṁ nôtsahante puruṣāḥ kriyābhiḥ II 3 II YA 1-3

cal literature. These authors do not generally enter into polemics, do not defend their position, do not refute other systems. If there is any criticism expressed, it is not formulated dialectically, and it is not argued for. The authors appear happy to merely lay down their opinions on various matters and systematise Jaina tenets.

The latter, third phase that takes shape after mid-sixth century, a phase which one could call the phase of argument, represented here by DNC and ĀMī, is characterised by their predominantly critical character that features two elements: polemical approach and argumentative structure. The works aim at overthrowing rival schools and the major part the text contains various arguments *against* adversaries, and only a smaller portion outlines the Jaina tenets. It is only at this stage that the negative, refutational motivation (E 11b) aimed at 'subduing other teachings', the conviction that one's acceptance of the scripture must be based on rational inquiry (E 13) and the formal structure of a proof formula (*prayoga*) (E 14) enter the *maṅgalâcaraṇa*.

The most important shift that occurs at this stage is an imperative to recognise the authority of the Jina's teaching and of Jaina scriptures on rational enquiry and examination of such internal elements of it as its consistency, its agreement with empirical evidence, soundness of arguments and reliability of the author (*āptatva*).[64] Mere belief no longer is sufficient, albeit it still does play an important role in religious practice and determines a reverential attitude towards the founders of Jainism on the part of Jaina authors.

A historical, second phase in this development— that led to the third stage and introduced two other important elements E 11a and E 12 (present also in the subsequent third phase of argument), strongly marked by its polemical vein—is reflected, among others, in works of Pūjyapāda Devanandin's *Sarvârtha-siddhi* (§ 4) and Siddhasena Divākara's *Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* (§ 5), respectively. This stage can be termed the phase of polemics. The authors are aware of the rivalry and ongoing discussion on various philosophical problems, which they do reflect. They do also reproduce a variance of opinions on various points. However, their purpose is not that of refuting a rival school. Instead of extensively arguing in favour of or against any of them by taking recourse to detailed proof formulas and detailed

64 Cf. p. 56.

formal reasoning, they as a rule restrict themselves to merely stating their position and expressing their disagreement with other ideas. It is conspicuous that the character of a given work, either uninvolved or polemical or argumentative, seems to be as a rule reflected in its *maṅgalâcaraṇa*.

8.2. Whereas it is extremely difficult, if at all possible or even meaningful, to indicate particular rival authors or works that could have triggered the polemical response from such authors as Pūjyapāda Devanandin and Siddhasena Divākara during the second phase, the phase of polemics, who simply appear to reflect a prevailing polemical mood in philosophical India of that time, it does seem possible to attribute the new development in the phase of argument to the Buddhist author Diṅnāga.

There can be no doubt, in the first place, that both the Jaina authors flourished after Diṅnāga and were somehow inspired by Diṅnāga or had Diṅnāga in the background as a target of their polemics. The case of DNC, which was for decades practically the only source of extensive fragments of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* preserved in Sanskrit, does not necessitate any additional proof that it was meant to be a response *also* to Diṅnāga.

As for Samantabhadra, since there has not really been done sufficient research on his chronology so far,[65] nor the aim of the present paper is to discuss such chronology in detail, I shall simply refer to just some ideas of Diṅnāga that are beyond doubt reflected in Samantabhadra's works:

(1) The theory of the semantic exclusion (*apoha-vāda*) is either explicitly criticised or alluded to in the following verses (expressions referring to the idea of *anyâpoha* are bolded):

ĀMī 11: *sarvâtmakaṁ tad ekaṁ syād* ***anyâpoha****-vyatikrame* ।
anyatra samavāyena vyapadiśyeta sarvathā ॥

ĀMī 44: ***anyeṣv ananya-śabdo 'yaṁ*** *saṁvṛtir na mṛṣā katham* ।
mukhyârthaḥ saṁvṛtir nâsti vinā mukhyān na saṁvṛtiḥ ॥

ĀMī 112: ***sāmānya-vāg viśeṣe*** *cen na śabdârtho mṛṣā hi sā* ।
abhipreta-viśeṣâpteḥ syāt-kāraḥ satya-lāñchanaḥ ॥

65 One can refer to SIN (1999), albeit the arguments presented are vague and conclusion unclear.

(2) The idea of purely non-conceptual perceptual cognition (*kalpanâpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣam*) is either connoted or disproved in the following verses (respective terms referring to the idea are bolded):

YA 56: *nānā-sad-ekâtma-samāśrayaṁ ced anyatvam adviṣṭam anātmanoḥ kva* ǀ ***vikalpa-śūnyatvam*** *avastunaś cet tasminn ameye kva khalu pramāṇam* ǁ

YA 17: *na śāstṛ-śiṣyâdi-vidhi-vyavasthā vikalpa-buddhir vitathâkhilā cet* ǀ *atattva-tattvâdi-vikalpa-mohe nimajjatāṁ* ***vīta-vikalpa-dhīḥ*** *kā* ǁ

YA 26: *vyatīta-sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvād* ***viśvâbhilāpârtha-vikalpa-śūnyam*** ǀ *kha-puṣpavat syād asad eva tattvaṁ prabuddha-tattvād bhavataḥ pareṣām* ǁ

YA 33: *pratyakṣa-nirdeśavad apy asiddham* ***akalpakaṁ*** *jñāpayituṁ hy aśakyam* ǀ *vinā ca siddher na ca lakṣaṇârtho na tāvaka-dveṣiṇi vīra satyam* ǁ

(3) Diṅnāga's particular understanding of *pramāṇa-phala* that connotes the idea that the result of *pramāṇa* is *pramāṇa* itself[66] is in the background of the verse ĀMī 37:

nityatvaikānta-pakṣe 'pi vikriyā nôpapadyate ǀ
prāg eva kārakâbhāvaḥ ***kva pramāṇaṁ kva tat-phalam*** ǁ

(4) The idea that the Jina is a *pramāṇa* (see p. 55 ff.), as it is enunciated in ĀMī 6 and $SvSt_1$ 7.5 = $SvSt_2$ 35, goes back to the opening verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (see below, § 8.3) in which the Buddha's epithet *pramāṇa-bhūta* functions as the cardinal characteristic, on which all the remaining virtues of the Buddha are based.[67]

8.3. Not only the contents of such works as *Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra* or *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* was, as it transpires from the above verses, provoked at least in part by Diṅnāga's statements but also, to some degree,

66 Both the phrase *pramāṇa-phala* and the idea goes back to e.g. PS_1 1.8cd-10. See e.g. HATTORI (1968: p. 98-100, nn. 1.55-57) and BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xxviii-xxix, § [20]).

67 On the significance of the epithet and its relation to the remaining four see: NAGATOMI (1957: iv-vi), FRANCO (1997: 1-43), JACKSON (1988: 338-339). It is true that Diṅnāga is not the first one to use the epithet with respect to the Buddha, see: SEYFORT RUEGG (1994), JACKSON (1988: 338). It is, however, Diṅnāga who uses the epithet in strictly epistemological context for the first time.

certain features of the style or mode of the opening verses of Jaina works seem to have been inspired by the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.
As it is well known, Diṅnāga commences his seminal treatise with the following statements:

> 'Having paid homage to [the Buddha], who is a cognitive criterion, who seeks the benefit for the world, who is a teacher, the Well-gone [and] a protector, [I shall] compose "the Digest" (sc. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*) [comprised] of my own thoughts scattered [in my other works such as the *Nyāya-mukha*, by collecting them] here [in this digest] into a uniform [system] in order to establish the cognitive criterion.
>
> In this [opening verse] in the beginning of [my] treatise, an eulogy is expressed [in praise] of the venerable [Buddha, treated] as someone **who is a cognitive criterion** by virtue of [his] perfection as both the cause and the result, in order to demonstrate [his] significance. In this [statement], the cause [means his] perfection in disposition of mind and perfection in practice (application). Disposition of mind [means the Buddha's status as someone] **who seeks the benefit for the world**, [whereas] practice (application) [means the Buddha's status as someone] who **is a teacher**, because he teaches the world. Result means [his] perfection in [attaining] his own purpose and the purpose of others. ... **Having paid homage to** the teacher of such qualities, [I shall] compose "**the Digest** on the cognitive criterion" **in order to establish the cognitive criterion**, by collecting **here** [various thoughts] from **my own** works such as the *Nyāya-mukha* etc., with the purpose of refuting rival [theories concerning] the cognitive criterion and with the purpose of indicating [superior] qualities of my own [theory of] the cognitive criterion. [Such is the purpose of my work], because the comprehension of the cognizable rests on the cognitive criterion, whereas there are numerous misconceptions regarding the [cognitive criterion].'[68]

68 *pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine* ।
pramāṇa-siddhyai sva-matāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ ॥ 1 ॥
atra bhagavato hetu-phala-sampattyā ***pramāṇa-bhuta****tvena stotrâbhidhānaṁ prakaraṇâdau gauravôtpādanârtham. tatra hetur āśaya-prayoga-sampat. āśayo* ***jagad-dhitaiṣitā****. prayogo jagac-chasanāc* ***chāstṛ****tvam. phalaṁ sva-parârtha-sampat. ... evaṁ-guṇaṁ śāstaraṁ* ***praṇamya pramāṇa-siddhyai sva****-prakaraṇebhyo nyāya-mukhâdibhya* ***iha*** *samāhṛtya pramāṇa-***samuccayaḥ kariṣyate** *para-pramāṇa-*

The *incipit* of PS opens with the expression (*praṇamya*) of an act of salutation (E 1), followed by the mention of the object of salutation (E 2a) and his laudable qualities (E 2b) as well as by a statement (*kariṣyate*) of the design to teach (E 3) and the mention (*pramāṇa*°) of the subject matter (E 4). The indirect source of the teaching (E 5) is said to be Śākyamuni the teacher (*śāstre sugatāya*), although PS consists of Diṅnāga's own ideas (*sva-matāt*), also scattered in his other works (*viprasṛtād*). There is no explicit mention of religious practice setting an example to be followed by the religious community (E 6) or any reference to Diṅnāga's own personal practice (E 7). Diṅnāga explicitly mentions neither his own practice the purpose of which could be his own liberation (E 8) nor liberation as the final purpose of the teaching to be achieved by the disciples through the study of his work (E 9).

One of two most conspicuous features of the introduction to PS, instead, is the purpose of the work, being the desire to establish the cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa-siddhyai*), independent of the salvific character of the Buddhist doctrine (E 11). This raison d'être comprises two aspects: a positive one, the intention to directly vindicate his own thesis (E 11a), with 'the purpose of indicating [superior] qualities of own [theory of] the cognitive criterion' (*sva-pramāṇa-guṇôd-bhāvanāya*), and a negative one, that of disproving rival teachings (E 11b), with 'the purpose of refuting rival [theories concerning] the cognitive criterion' (*para-pramāṇa-pratiṣedhāya*). Especially the latter, critical aspect (E 11b) is, historically speaking, a novel element.

On the top of that, Diṅnāga discloses also a pivotal premise of his philosophical system (E 12), viz. the dependence of any metaphysical project to establish any kind of ontology primarily on the investigation into epistemology and into foundations of our cognition (*pramāṇâyattā prameya-pratipattiḥ*).

The context in which one develops a desire to embark upon the philosophical project to search for the foundations of our cognition is, according to Diṅnāga, the existence of doubt (E 10) as regards its nature and its valid sources: 'there are numerous misconceptions regarding' the cognitive criterion (*bahavaś câtra vipratipannāḥ*).

The other most conspicuous feature is a pronouncedly argumentative structure (E 14) of the introduction as a whole, noticeable only

pratiṣedhāya sva-pramāṇa-guṇôdbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pramāṇâyattā prameya-pratipattir bahavaś câtra vipratipannāḥ. PS

in the auto-commentatorial prose portion (but absent in the verse), that assumes a form of a proof formula (*prayoga*). The argumentative structure is to serve a purpose, however. As HATTORI (1968: 73, n. 1.1) points out: 'Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to a critical test before they are accepted as valid.'[69] Critical examination of possible arguments in favour of and against the scripture, which can only be achieved rationally (E 14), replaces unfounded belief in the reliability of Buddhist tradition and becomes a preliminary condition to accept the authority of the *buddha-vacana* (E 13).

Indeed, even a cursory comparison with *maṅgala*s of earlier Buddhist works would reveal that their contents was generally restricted to some standard elements such as the act of salutation (E 1), along with the object (E 2a) and a description of his laudable qualities (E 2b) of salutation, followed by a statement of the design to teach (E 3) a respective subject matter (E 4), as it was the case with Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*:

> 'Oṁ! Homage to the Buddha! Having rendered homage to the teacher [who instructs] in accordance with reality, who in every respect causes all blindness be destroyed, who has drawn out the world from the mire of transmigration, I will recite the treatise [called] "A Treasury of the Higher Doctrine".'[70]

Most notably, all five epithets of the Buddha enlisted by Diṅnāga are interpreted by Dharmakīrti as a part of a formal proof to establish the authority of the Buddha.[71] The way Diṅnāga explicates the epithets is not merely a standard manner of semantic or linguistic explanation, but presents a kind of argument in most cases. For instance, the thesis that the Buddha is praised 'as someone who is a cognitive criterion' (*pramāṇa-bhūtatvena*) is substantiated with a

69 On the contents of the verse and Dharmakīrti's interpretation see also BIJLERT (1989: 115 ff.), JACKSON (1988: 338 ff.) and FRANCO (1997: 15 ff.).

70 AKBh: *oṁ namo buddhāya.*
yaḥ sarvathā sarva-hatândha-kāraḥ
saṁsāra-paṅkāj jagad ujjahāra ।
tasmai namas-kṛtya yathârtha-śāstre
śāstraṁ pravakṣyāmy abhidharma-kośam ॥ 1 ॥

71 See NAGATOMI (1957: ii-xi), STEINKELLNER (1982: 7), BIJLERT (1989: 117 ff.), JACKSON (1988: 339-359) and FRANCO (1997: 19 ff.).

reason that it is the case 'by virtue of [his] perfection as both the cause and the result' (*hetu-phala-sampattyāḥ*), although no example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is mentioned. Further, Diṅnāga's own assertion that Buddha possesses the status of being a teacher, precisely *because he teaches the world* (*prayogo jagac-chasanāc chāstṛtvam*) indicates that also, in his own understanding, the introductory verse had, at least in part, an argumentative structure in a formal sense of an inferential proof. In addition, the fact that the Buddha's status as a bona fide teacher materialises in the form of his perfection in practice (*prayoga-sampat*) points to his instructive function which cannot but entail the use of formal arguments (*prayoga*).[72]

HATTORI's contention (see p. 63) that Diṅnāga departs from the tradition of his predecessors in no longer accepting unconditionally the authority of scripture and in postulating instead a critical test for the validity of *buddha-vacana* retains its validity also in the case of Jaina literature. Indeed, prior to ca. 530-540, i.e. the time of the composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, we do not come across any work whose author would present the same critical and investigative attitude as Diṅnāga did. It is only in treatises of such authors as Mallavādin and Samantabhadra, who are known to have already been acquainted with Diṅnāga's works that we encounter precisely the same approach. The similarities between the *maṅgala* of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, on the one hand, and the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* and the *Āpta-mīmāṁsā*, on the other, concern at least three novel elements which we find in the introduction to Diṅnāga's treatise for the first time. They all contain a conviction that:

E 11b The aim of a philosophical work is *also* to refute other teachings, inasmuch as mere positive validation of one's own standpoint is felt to be insufficient.

The need to examine how water-proof one's own system is by exposing it to objections and by, subsequently, refuting the objections may have been prompted by the same line of thought that eventually led Diṅnāga to devise a paradigm of inference based on the idea of both the procedure of verification (i.e. the search for positive instantiations) and the procedure of fal-

72 On the other hand, in the term *prayoga* occurring in the context of the introduction to PS, Jinendrabuddhi sees only the ethical aspect of 'the application of compassion', specially adjusted to the goal, see PSṬ ad loc., p. 9. 12-13: *yasya yatra dayā, sa tayā yathā tasyârtho bhavati tathā prayujyate, yathā mātuḥ putre dayā, sa ca yathā tasyârtho bhavati tathā prayujyate.*

sification (i.e. confirmation that there are no counter-instances), encapsulated in the notion of threefold condition of validity (*trairūpya*) of the logical reason, developed in the second chapter (*anumāna-pariccheda*) of his PS and diagrammed in the *Hetu-cakra-ḍamaru*. Thus, a critical examination has to entail, beside a straightforward justification of a claim by providing positive reasons to accept it, the probing of the assumption for its vulnerability to objections, that in its turn presupposes a room for some kind of their falsifiability.

E 13 The teaching of the religious founder should be submitted to a critical test and the authority of the scripture should be accepted only on the basis of rational examination that proves its validity.

Again, behind the desideratum to expose the teacher and the teaching to a critical test, which Diṅnāga felt the need of, is related to his general epistemological approach to ground his project, being a case of foundationalism,[73] in irreducible existents, after everything else tainted with conceptually constructed ideas is abstracted.

The similarity of structural design lies in the search for knowledge invulnerable to doubt that is grounded in something characterised by infallible self-evidence that no longer can be falsified or rejected. Thus, the phenomenological content of immediate perceptual cognition, on which Diṅnāga's epistemological scheme rests, is eventually accepted only after it has proved itself to acquire certainty,[74] and so equally incontrovertible must the teacher and his teaching be determined in order to be eventually accepted.

E 14 The introduction is given a formal structure of a proof formula (*prayoga*) or, at least, evokes such a structure more or less indirectly.

That is an obvious corollary of two previous elements E 11b and E 13 that posit the context of debate and argumentation.

Irrespective of whether or not Diṅnāga's arguments concerning validity as such can be interpreted as (vulnerable) transcendental arguments or not,[75] all these three elements taken together introduce

73 See Arnold (2005: 13-56).

74 Cf. Hayes (1988: 136).

75 On Diṅnāga's foundationalism see Griffith (1998) and Arnold (2005: 286, n. 7.76).

a new approach of inter-subjective character with respect to the validity of scripture. It is no longer the case that what stands in the background of *incipit*s of philosophical works, which usually reflect certain unspoken presuppositions of their authors, a kind of circular reasoning: in order to accept the truth of claims postulated in a work one has to rely on the validity of the source of the teaching (the authoritative tradition stemming from the Buddha or the Jina), and in order to accept the validity of the teacher, one has to first take the validity of the tradition for granted that informs the faithful believer of the authority of the source.

I do not think the above similarities are a matter of mere coincidence. We have seen (§ 8.2.) that the two Jaina authors in question were acquainted with and stimulated by the ideas expressed in the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. That being the case, it is therefore but natural to assume that the new elements that found their way into the *incipit*s of the *Dvādaśâra-naya-cakra* and the *Āpta-mīmāṁsā* and that overlap with the structural features of the introductory section of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* must have been influenced by the latter.

9.1. The opening lines to Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* influenced, to a certain extent, another Jaina author, namely Akalaṅka. He opens his *Laghīyas-traya* with the following two verses:

> '[1] [I pay] earnest homage to those who are the makers of the passage to moral law, propounders of modal description, from Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra—for the sake of the apprehension of [my] own self. [2] Since personal series of trains (series) of consciousnesses, who are [believed to be] without continuity and momentary—[but] who are by nature, in accordance with truth, neither results nor causes—are undeniably non-existent, then [there is a quandary]: if (*cet*) the Buddha himself exists, by the conviction of himself and others, for the sake of living beings because of compassion, then he would be by nature false notion (i.e. an illusion), just like the permanence [of things]. [Such] a real thing does not possess causal efficacy with regard to this doctrine.'[76]

76 *dharma-tīrtha-karebhyo 'stu syād-vādibhyo namo-namaḥ* |
ṛṣabhâdi-mahāvīrântarebhyaḥ svâtmôpalabdhaye || 1 ||
santāneṣu niranvaya-kṣanika-cittānāṁ asatsv eva cet
tattvâhetu-phalâtmanāṁ sva-para-saṅkalpena buddhaḥ svayam |
sattvârthaṁ vyavatiṣṭhate karuṇayā mithyā-vikalpâtmakaḥ

The first verse contains certain standard elements (E 1, E 2a, E 2b), whereas the second verse formulates a direct criticism of Buddhist claims to the reliability of the Buddha. Akalaṅka points out an inconsistency to which Buddhist doctrine is liable. On the one hand there is the conviction, grounded in Buddhist ontology, that personal series of consciousnesses, believed to absolutely momentary, are fictions as any other reducible whole. That stands in contradiction with a fundamental soteriological belief, on the other hand, that the Buddha appeared in the world being prompted by his compassion. That being the case, both living beings as objects of the Buddha's compassion and the Buddha himself should be considered fictitious. The Buddha, having accepted his ontological claim that the wholes are fictitious, should neither act, being a fictitious whole, nor succumb to compassion with respect to other fictitious wholes.

The expression *tattvâhetu-phalâtmanāṁ* that characterises personal series of consciousnesses (*santāna*) refers to their ficticious status as wholes that are neither results nor causes is clearly a reference to Diṅnāga's claim to the opposite, absolutely central to his project, that the Buddha is someone who is a cognitive criterion *precisely* on account of his 'perfection as *both the cause and the result*' (*bhagavato hetu-phala-sampattyā pramāṇa-bhūtatvena*). By referring to the idea that fictitious wholes can neither be really caused by anything nor cause anything, Akalaṅka wishes to undermine Diṅāga's justification *why* the Buddha is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), and the legitimacy of the Buddha's teaching.

In the opening verses Akalaṅka could not but assault his arch-enemy Dharmakīrti directly as well, beside an attack against the latter's spiritual teacher. He does so by applying Dharmakīrti's concept of causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā*) to Diṅnāga's idea of the Buddha conceived as a pure and reliable cause of the Buddhist teaching, a cause that signifies the Buddha's 'perfection in disposition of mind and perfection in practice (application)' (*hetur āśaya-prayoga-sampat*). Since a whole cannot possess causal efficacy in general, the conclusion is that the Buddha cannot be treated as a cause Buddhist doctrine (*tatra samaye nârtha-kriyā vastunaḥ*).

There is still one more intriguing element in the introductory section of Akalaṅka's work. It is his confession that he undertakes the

syān nityatvavad eva tatra samaye nârtha-kriyā vastunaḥ ॥ 2 ॥ LT

composition of the *Laghīyas-traya* 'for the sake of the apprehension of [his] own self' (*svâtmôpalabdhaye*), which indicates

E 15 the author's primarily personal interest as a motivation to compose his treatise.

Such seemingly selfish motivation is rather a rarity. The commentator Prabhācandra-sūri, in his *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, attempts to mitigate the self-centred undertone of Akalaṅka's statement by a suggestion, contained in the first, rather awkward interpretation[77] of two proposed ones, that *sva°* would have to mean *sakala-janasya*: 'for the sake of all people's knowledge' (*sakala-jana-pratītaye*).[78]

However, the self-interest expressed by the author of a work does have a predecessor in person of Dharmakīrti (vide infra § 10), whose philosophical oeuvre had immense impact on Akalaṅka's ideas[79].

9.2. Before I proceed to discuss one aspect of Dharmakīrti's possible influence on Akalaṅka with respect to the *incipit*, it is worth noting in passing, the opening verse of Akalaṅka's other important work *Tattvârtha-vārttika* presents a brief and standardised version of *maṅgalâcaraṇa*:

> 'Having paid homage to the [Great] Hero (sc. Mahāvīra), the immense abode of omniscience, of extensive auspiciousness, who shook off moral stains, I will teach the commentary on "the Treatise on Reality".'[80]

77 Awkward inasmuch as it leaves *°ātma°* out, instead of the expected *sakala-janâtma-pratītaye* ('for the sake of the apprehension of every person's own self').

78 NKC, p. 4.2-4: ***svâtmôpalabdhaye***. *svasya namas-kartuḥ ātmā nāstikatā-parihārâdi-viśiṣṭaṁ svarūpaṁ, tasya upalabdhaye sakala-jana-pratītaye. athavā svasya namas-kartur ātmano 'nanta-jñānâdi-svarūpasya upalabdhyaye siddhaye "siddhiḥ svâtmôpalabdhiḥ" ity-abhidhānāt.*—'[Akalaṅka] says: **for the sake of the apprehension of** [his] **own self**. Own, i.e. of the homage-payer; self, i.e. intrinsic nature qualified by the avoidance of heresy etc. For the sake of the apprehension of this [own self], i.e. for the sake of all people's knowledge. Or, alternatively: for the sake of the apprehension, i.e. the accomplishment of [his] own self, i.e. the homage-payer's intrinsic nature consisting in infinite cognition etc., on account of the explicit statement: 'accomplishment is the apprehension of one's own nature'.

79 SHAH (1967), BALCEROWICZ (2005).

80 *praṇamya sarva-vijñāna-mahâspadam uru-śriyam* ı
nirdhūta-kalmaṣaṁ vīraṁ vakṣye tattvârtha-vārttikam ıı RVār

The verse lacks all the philosophically advanced and novel elements, some of them introduced by Diṅnāga, which confirms my conjecture that the *Laghīyas-traya* is a later and more mature work of Akalaṅka (as compared to the *Tattvârtha-vārttika*), of polemical character and not aiming primarily at Jaina followers.

10. Irrespective of whether the story that Dharmakīrti placed the two opening verses after he had composed and circulated his *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, and was prompted to do so by his disillusionment with the reception of his work, is true or not[81], the verses do seem to be of some relevance for our discussion on Jaina *maṅgalâcaraṇa*s:

> 'Oṁ! Homage to the Buddha! [1] Homage to the All-Auspicious One who shook off the snare of conceptually constructed ideas and whose forms are profound and illustrious, whose brilliance radiates all round. [2] People, as a rule attached to profane domains, with inadequate sense of judgement, not only are not guided by good counsels at all, but they are even hostile [to them], being enveloped with dirt of malice. Therefore, my intention is not that this [work will bring] benefit to others, but rather my heart, with my determination furthered by continuous study of wholesome manuals, has developed a desire to [compose] it.'[82]

Characteristically there are some standard elements to be taken notice of in the verses, namely obeisance paid by Dharmakīrti to the founder of Buddhism and ideal teacher (E 1, E 2a), description of the Buddha's major virtues owing to which he is worthy of the salutation (E 2b), an indication of a source of inspiration and teaching (E 5) and the author's own personal practice (E 7). However, we find here neither any statement of Dharmakīrti's design to teach (E 3) nor any mention of the subject matter (E 4), nor other elements. In neither containing any reference to Buddhist dogmatics nor being framed in

81 See Stcherbatsky (1930: 35-36) and Gillon–Hayes (1991: 13-16).

82 PV: *oṁ namo buddhāya.*
vidhūta-kalpanā-jāla-gambhīrôdāra-mūrtaye ।
namaḥ samantabhadrāya samanta-spharaṇa-tviṣe ॥ 1 ॥
prāyaḥ prākṛta-saktir apratibala-prajño janaḥ kevalaṁ ।
na anarthy eva subhāṣitaiḥ parigato vidveṣṭy apîrṣyā-malaiḥ ॥
tenâyaṁ na parôpakāra iti naś cintâpi cetaś ciraṁ ।
sūktâbhyāsa-vivardhita-vyasanam ity atrânubaddha-spṛham ॥ 2 ॥

an argumentative structure, the verses do not pursue the polemical vein which one could observe in Diṅnāga's work.

What is most conspicuous here is Dharmakīrti's expression of his bitterness, his criticism of and disillusionment with common people who not only are incapable of understanding the elevated teaching but are even hostile to it. As if against the established practice, Dharmakīrti expressly relinquishes the desire or hope, as primary motivation, to disseminate beneficial ideas for the betterment of the people, and stresses his strictly personal impulse in composing his philosophical work (E 15).

Since one can easily notice how Akalaṅka directly refers to and practically applies Dharmakīrti's idea of causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā*) in the *maṅgala* of his *Laghīyas-traya* (see § 9.1.), there is also reason to belief that also Akalaṅka's departure from Jaina practice of selfless teaching in favour of pursuance of his own goal was influenced by the personal and bitter aspect of Dharmakīrti's statements that opened way to verbalise personal feelings.

11. Unlike in the *Śabdânuśāsana* mentioned in the very beginning of this paper, Hemacandra turns much more verbose in the most important philosophical work *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*. Immediately after two introductory verses in a standard style[83], he enters a brief discussion concerning his motivation to compose a work in *sūtra*-style:

> '§ 1. [Objection:] "If these aphorisms on Jaina doctrine are of your [authorship], then which or of whose [authorship] were [the aphorisms] before you?"—What you've enquired about is a really trivial thing. You could also ask the following: Which or of whose [authorship] were [the aphorisms] on grammar etc. before Pāṇini, Piṅgala, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda and others? These disciplines, which

83 *ananta-darśana-jñāna-vīryânanda-mayâtmane* ।
namo 'rhate kṛpā-kḷpta-dharma-tīrthāya tāyine ॥ 1 ॥
bodhi-bījam upaskartuṁ tattvâbhyāsena dhīmatām ।
jaina-siddhānta-sūtrāṇāṁ sveṣāṁ vṛttir vidhīyate ॥ 2 ॥ PMīV$_1$ 1.1.1 (p. 1)
— '[1] Homage to the saint, whose essence consists of infinite conation, cognition, innate energy and bliss; [homage] to the protector who, out of compassion, created a passage to righteousness. [2] This commentary is composed [by me] on my own aphorisms on Jaina doctrine in order to provide, through rehearsed exertion that concerns truth, the seed of [ultimate] wisdom for the intelligent ones.'

are, as a matter of fact, without beginning, become renewed and updated, with the intention of abridgement or enlargement, and are said to have this or that author. Have you not heard the [saying] that "The world has never been different [than it is today]"? … § 2. [Objection:] "If that is [the case], then why do you not compose a proper study like Akalaṅka or Dharmakīrti? What is the use of this boastful talk that [you compose] authoritative aphorisms?"— Don't say that, because all people have different tastes, so that there is neither public nor royal dictate to restrict the [author's] free will. Therefore this [objection of yours] is irrelevant.'[84]

The very first remark objects to Hemacandra's right to compose a work in *sūtra*-style, reserved basically for authoritative treatises of system founders. In reply, Hemacandra exhibits historical consciousness, rarely found in India, that disciplines of learning and systems of knowledge do develop. Not only is it impossible to ascribe the inception of a system to a particular author, but also ancient authorities esteemed as inventors of a branch of learning must have had their predecessors, even though their names fell into oblivion. Moreover, the process of 'growing ever anew' (*nava-navī-bhāva*) does not have to connote any idea of an eternal discipline of science or learning established for ever, which is only occasionally refreshed and rejuvenated by new authors, albeit it does not really change. The process of advancement and enrichment of our knowledge, which Hemacandra, being a polymath active in a range of fields, must have been intimately conversant with, is implied by the latter element of the phrase *saṅkṣepa-vistara-vivakṣayā*, i.e. by notion of the intention to enlarge an extant system of learning. Whereas it poses no logical or practical difficulty to abridge an existing system of learning into a compendium (which is actually always the case!), even when

84 PMīV$_1$ 1.1.1 (p. 1): § 1. *nanu yadi bhavadīyānîmāni jaina-siddhānta-sūtrāṇi tarhi bhavataḥ pūrvaṁ kāni kimīyāni vā tāny āsann iti? atyalpam idam anvayuṅkthāḥ. pāṇini-piṅgala-kaṇādâkṣapādâdibhyo 'pi pūrvaṁ kāni kimīyāni vā vyākaraṇâdi-sūtrāṇîty etad api paryanuyuṅkṣva. anādaya evaitā vidyāḥ saṅkṣepa-vistara-vivakṣayā nava-navī-bhavanti tat-tat-kartṛkāś côcyante. kiṁ nâśrauṣīḥ "na kadācid anīdṛśaṁ jagat" iti? …*
§ 2. *yady evam—akalaṅka-dharmakīrty-ādivat prakaraṇam eva kiṁ nârabhyate, kim anayā sūtra-kāratvâho-puruṣikayā? maivaṁ vocaḥ, bhinna-rucir hy ayaṁ janaḥ tato nâsya svêcchā-pratibandhe laukikaṁ rājakīyaṁ vā śāsanam astîti yatkiṁcid etat.*

the system is considered permanent and given for ever in an ideal full-fledged form, an expansion of such a system has to logically entail an idea of adding some new elements to the body of knowledge already possessed. Hemacandra's rejoinder to the second objection emphasizes the role of any author's autonomy to freely follow his own taste and choose any style he deems either proper for his project or simply pleasing.

The saying Hemacandra cites ('The world has never been different [than it is today]') could not here mean absolute immutability of processes that take place in the world or changeless nature of knowledge to which nothing can be added. On the contrary, it implies that developments that had occurred long before were parallel to the processes one could observe contemporaneously, including an independent composition of a philosophical work in *sūtra*-style, and it is only due to lapse of collective memory that one can have an impression of their permanence.

Hemacandra's remarks, trivial as they may seem nowadays, reveal noteworthy awareness that one's creativity and innovative contribution is an integral part of tradition. He also demonstrates his independence from the established tradition in which one is expected to conceive his thoughts mostly as commentaries and footnotes to treatises of ancient teachers, the way Akalaṅka or Dharmakīrti did.

12. Incidentally, and most probably not intended by Hemacandra, the joint mention of Akalaṅka or Dharmakīrti as representatives of two contesting traditions substantiates a general point that the style and structure of opening sections of a number of Jaina philosophical works reflected their authors' engagement (or disengagement at an earlier phase for that matter) with philosophical dispute in India and that the persuasive thought of such Buddhist authors as Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti influenced also the manner some Jaina thinkers expressed their salutation to the founders of their religion. In other words, the tradition of *incipit*s grew mature in a concrete historical context of debate and opening sections can occasionally be used as an additional tool to determine the relative chronology of some works.

A list of structural elements of opening sections

E 1	The act of salutation as a starting point of the undertaking.
E 2a	The object of salutation.
E 2b	A catalogue of laudable qualities of the object of salutation.
E 3	A statement of the author's design to teach.
E 4	The respective subject matter of the teaching.
E 5	The indication of a source of the teaching.
E 6	An example of devotion to be followed by the religious community.
E 7	A reference to the author's own personal practice being a precondition for his own correct understanding.
E 8	The purpose of the author's ascetic practice which is liberation.
E 9	Liberation (purpose of the teaching) to be achieved through this work, the addressees being the disciples.
E 10	The context of doubt that urges one to philosophical investigation.
E 11	A rationale (in addition to liberation) why the task to write the book is justified in itself.
E 11a	Positive motivation: establishment of one's own doctrine.
E 11b	Negative motivation: refutation of rival teachings.
E 12	Reference to dogmatics.
E 13	Critical examination of arguments to provide legitimacy to Jaina doctrine.
E 14	An argumentative structure of a proof formula (*prayoga*).
E 15	The author's personal interest as a motivation to compose his treatise.

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PS = Diṅnāga: *Pramāṇa-samuccaya,* Chapter I. (1) See: HATTORI (1968). (2) See: STEINKELLNER (2005).

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Doxographic Introductions to the Philosophical Systems: Mallavādin and the Grammarians

J.E.M. Houben (Paris)

1.1 Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya tells us about former times when students of the Veda agree to learn grammar, apparently a simple form of pre-Pāṇinian grammar, without questioning and without needing an explanation of the purposes, the *prayojanāni*, of grammar (Mahābhāṣya, Paspaśāhnika, cf. JOSHI & ROODBERGEN 1986: 16 and 68, section 44). Otherwise, in accordance with the saying *prayojanam anuddiśya na mando 'pi pravartate*,[1] a statement of the purpose and context of a discipline or a philosophical system will normally be required for anyone who starts to study it. Some kind of introduction to the work and to the field, a brief or long *śāstrārambhaḥ*, referring also to the purpose and context, is hence usually found at the beginning of a treatise – *śāstrārambhaḥ* with *ā-rambhaḥ* from *ā* + *rabh* 'to begin'. However, introductions to philosophical systems or disciplines can also address others than those about to start its study, and it may occur at other places than at the beginning. The Indian world has not only been rich in philosophical schools and systems but also in doxographies, texts devoted to describing a number of schools and systems. A doxographic text like the late 17th century Ṣaḍdarśanīsiddhāntasaṁgraha is a series of introductory overviews of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṁsā (in two versions), Sāṁkhya (in two versions), Advaita Vedānta and Vyākaraṇa. The Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha is an earlier example in which the purpose is apparently not only to introduce a number of systems but also to refute them or at least to show that they have a subordinate position vis-à-vis the author's own system, a type of Vedānta. A much earlier example is Mallavādin's Dvādaśāra-Nayacakra (DN), the "Wheel with twelve modes of consideration as spokes,[2]" and the commentary on this text, the

1 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārttika*, sambandhākṣepaparihāra, vs. 55ab.

2 An analysis that is probably closer to how the compound was understood by author and public is: "Viewpoint wheel (*naya-cakra*) of twelve spokes (*dvādaśa-ara*)."

Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī by Siṁhasūri. The numerous references to schools and positions which are often not always identifiable, and the frequently virtually untranslatable sometimes almost Heideggerian philosophical argumentation that has recourse to Sanskrit etymologization, make Siṁhasūri's work very difficult; and this applies even more to Mallavādin's work that is not directly transmitted but is to be reconstructed on the basis of the commentary. The text is, however, of great value for our knowledge of early developments in Indian philosophy.

1.2 With the help of a formula, a key, the DN introduces in its own way the different systems that are one by one discussed. This formula, this key, is therefore a kind of handle to grasp and to come to grips with the system each time under discussion, it is *śāstrārambhaḥ* for these systems – *śāstrārambhaḥ* with *ā-rambhaḥ* from *ā* + *rabh* 'to take hold of'. The key is explained by the author Mallavādin at the beginning,[3] so that it also forms a *śāstrārambhaḥ* in the classical sense of 'introduction to a treatise'. The traditional Jaina scheme of the seven Nayas plays a role in the DN, but the more visible structure of the DN is determined by a new scheme of twelve basic modes of consideration each of which corresponds to one or more philosophical positions actually defended by ancient or contemporaneous authors known to Mallavādin. A hypothetical proponent of a subsequent basic viewpoint will first criticize the preceding viewpoint before establishing his own position. In the next one of the twelve Aras or 'spokes' he will be criticized by another proponent who then establishes his own position, etc. In this dialogic structure, grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), and statements formulated by grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇāḥ*), pop up quite regularly throughout the book.

1.3 Grammar is important in the DN in several ways. (1) First of all, as already proposed by ERICH FRAUWALLNER in 1966, the two terms that are crucial in the scheme of twelve basic viewpoints, namely *vidhi* and *niyama*, are to be understood according to their use in grammar.[4] Recently, doubts have been expressed in this regard (WEZLER 2002) to which we will return below. (2) Second, a "grammatical" style of

3 At that place Siṁhasūri's commentary is unfortunately not sufficiently explicit so that Mallavādin's text cannot be fully reconstructed.

4 FRAUWALLNER 1966: 3 note 1: "It should be noted that the terminology applied here corresponds to the terminology of grammar."

reasoning is discernible throughout the work. (3) More specifically, to each Ara, that is, to each category of philosophical positions, a specific view on word and sentence meaning is attributed, usually illustrated with a citation of a verse from Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya. (4) The grammarians, represented mainly by Pāṇini and Patañjali, also occupy specific positions in Mallavādin's scheme; they are the positive proponents of their own view in the fifth Ara, devoted to *vidhi-niyama*. (5) The position of Bhartṛhari and his teacher (and the position of Diṅnāga) are discussed in the eighth Ara, devoted to *niyama* of *vidhi-niyama*.

2.1 Regarding the two terms *vidhi* and *niyama* that are crucial in Mallavādin's a *śāstrārambha* key, ALBRECHT WEZLER (2002) expresses his dissatisfaction with the correspondences of terms given by Frauwallner, and tries to formulate detailed paraphrases for Mallavādin's *vidhi* and *niyama*. WEZLER wants to consider *vidhi* and *niyama* as *expressions*, not as *terms*. The questions asked by WEZLER are profound and pertinent, but in my view he finally confuses the explanations of Siṁhasūri in the beginning of the first chapter, with the words *vidhi* and *niyama* to which the explanations are applied. Whatever the explanations of Siṁhasūri and whatever the interpretations of WEZLER, these words do function as specific, central terms throughout the work of Mallavādin and equally in Siṁhasūri's commentary. It is unfortunate that a few crucial words at the beginning of Mallavādin's work (DN 10) cannot be reconstructed on the basis of the immediate comments of Siṁhasūri. However, there are more occasions where Siṁhasūri employs, glosses, and plays with the terms *vidhi* and *niyama*, and it may be expected that a systematic study of these passages, together with the observed applications, will allow a more precise determination of the value to be accepted for the terms *vidhi* and *niyama*. The time is not yet ripe for such a comprehensive study of the use of the two terms in the entire work, precisely because the identity of each of the positions discussed in Mallavādin's abstract and technical terminology (apart from the terms *vidhi* and *niyama*) still remains too often unclear. Therefore, I refer here just to a single example: at the end of chapter three, in Mallavādin's terminology (DN 10) devoted to *vidher vidhi-niyamaḥ*, the following passage is found (*sandhi* and punctuation as in the edition, DN 333.1-3):

ayaṁ vidher ubhayabhāk | *vidhir vyākhyāto lokavad anapavādapravṛttiḥ, tasya utsargāt sa vidhīyate, sarvasarvātmakatvād*[5] *nirapavādaḥ pravartata eva* | *niyamaḥ sannidhiprayojyasator apravṛtteḥ tayor asatsattvāt.*

It cannot be analysed here how this passage refers back to the preceding discussion in the chapter and how it evokes aspects of Jaina doctrine, but regarding the terms under discussion the following correspondences clearly emerge—for *vidhi*: *anapavāda*, *utsarga*; for *niyama*: *apavāda*—which show their intended affinity with grammar.

2.2 General observations on Mallavādin's scheme (*bhaṅga*) are found in the introductions, c.q. foreword, to the three volumes of the DN edition, Frauwallner (1966), Muni Jambuvijaya (1976), and de Jong (1988), as well as in the *prākkathana*s to these volumes by Muni Jambuvijaya. More specific investigations are found in Dixit 1971 and in Wezler 2002. Mallavādin's scheme can be represented as follows:

(1) *vidhi* – and next
(2) *vidhi* applied to *vidhi*,
(3) *vidhi-niyama* applied to *vidhi*,
(4) *niyama* applied to *vidhi*;

(5) *vidhi-niyama* – and next
(6) *vidhi* applied to *vidhi-niyama*,
(7) *vidhi-niyama* applied to *vidhi-niyama*,
(8) *niyama* applied to *vidhi-niyama*;

(9) *niyama* – and next
(10) *vidhi* applied to *niyama*,
(11) *vidhi-niyama* applied to *niyama*,
(12) *niyama* applied to *niyama*;

2.3 The correspondence with the traditional *naya*s or 'viewpoints' is problematic, as pointed out by Dixit (1971: 92, 121); on the basis of Dixit's overview and the three introductions mentioned above, the following provisory scheme can be set up:

1. *Vyavahāra-naya*: 01. (a) the *laukika*-view or perspective of the common man, not specialist in or adherent of any of the sciences or philosophical systems; (b) Mīmāṁsā;

5 The term *sarvasarvātmakatva* (see also e.g. Ara IV (B)) may be part of the technical terminology of Mallavādin rather than an identifiable view with a history of its own as Wezler has proposed (1981 and 1982); it is in any way one of the many major problems for the interpretation of the DN.

2. *Saṅgraha-naya*:	02. five monistic doctrines centered on *puruṣa*, *niyati*, *kāla*, *svabhāva*, *bhāva*; 03. two dualistic doctrines: *prakṛti-puruṣa* and God and the world; 04. equal efficacy of *puruṣārtha* and *karma*;
3. *Naigama-naya*:	05. dualism of *dravya* and *kriyā*: the grammarians (esp. Patañjali); 06. the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the six *padārtha*s;
4. *Ṛjusūtra-naya*:	07. the Jaina doctine of Syādvāda (DIXIT); old Vaiśeṣika works not extant nowadays are criticized at length (JAMBUVIJAYA); the view on word meaning corresponding to this Ara is *anyāpoha* (!); the sentence meaning is *pratibhā*;
5. *Śabda-naya*:	08. doctrine of *śabdanaya*; 09. doctrine of *avaktavyavāda*;
6. *Samabhirūḍha-naya*:	10. aggregate devoid of an underlying substance;
7. *Evaṁbhūta-naya*:	11. doctrine of *kṣaṇikavāda*; 12. doctrine of *śūnyavāda* and *vijñānavāda*.

If this scheme is appropriate, the first six Aras of Mallavādin's DN deal with three *dravyāstikanaya*s, whereas the last six chapters deal with four *paryāyāstikanaya*s.

3.1 As pointed out, at the present stage of our understanding of the DN, this scheme representing Mallavādin's *śāstrārambha* key, has to be provisory. In order to test it and to give it more 'body' I propose to show below (sections 3.2 and 3.3) how it works with regard to the grammarians, and especially with regard to the VP of Bhartṛhari. The latter is cited not only to illustrate the eighth Ara, but also frequently elsewhere throughout the DN. While many other works cited by Mallavādin and his commentator are unknown, Bhartṛhari's VP is now relatively well-known, thanks to editions and translations which have come forth in the last few decades, so that we have a good chance of understanding what the verse meant in its original context – and hence what it may mean in the specific context of the DN in which it is quoted.

3.2 The twelve Aras of Mallavādin's DN: how do the grammarians and Bhartṛhari appear in them? (Notes regarding references to the grammarians and Bhartṛhari in Siṁhasūri's commentary are given in a smaller font-size.)

Ara I. *vidhi*, the simple affirmation of things, is central in the first Ara or 'spoke' of the wheel of viewpoints. It is the mode of consideration of the *laukikāḥ*, but also of Mīmāṁsā.

Siṁhasūri relativizes the importance of argumentation (*anumāna*) among the *pramāṇas* and cites (*tathānye 'pi*) Bhartṛhari, VP 1.34 (DN 36.4-5) *yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ* ı *abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate* ıı
The common sense point of view is introduced and next defended against the (possible) attacks from the side of various philosophical positions, such as that of Diṅnāga and other Buddhists, Sāṁkhyas, and the Vaiśeṣikas. In order to illustrate Mallavādin's statement that *vijñānamātrakam idaṁ tribhuvanam*, Siṁhasūri cites ... Bhartṛhari, VP 3.7.41 (DN 105.22-23) *dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ* ı *antaḥkaraṇatattvasya bhāgā bahir iva sthitāḥ* ıı [Rau, Iyer: 41d *bahir avasthitāḥ*].

Towards the end of this Ara: corresponding to the *vidhi*-mode of consideration are the following views on word and sentence meaning:
(A) The meaning or object of a word is *ajñāta* 'unknown'; to illustrate this, Mallavādin cites VP 2.119 (DN 114.2-3) *asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam* ı *apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu* ıı
This verse affirms the existence of the meaning or object of a word, even if this meaning or object is something unknown, as in the case of *apūrva*[6] and *devatā* 'deity'.
(B) The meaning of a sentence (and the sentence itself[7]) is "all the words."

In connection with this Siṁhasūri cites (a) the Mīmāṁsā definition of a sentence, Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 2.1.46 (DN 114.16-17) *arthaikatvād ekaṁ vākyaṁ sākāṅkṣaṁ ced vibhāge syāt*; and (b) the enumeration of sentence definitions in VP 2.1-2 (DN 114.18-21) *ākhyātaśabdaḥ saṅghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavartinī* ı *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṁhṛtiḥ* ıı *padam ādyaṁ pṛthak sarvaṁ padaṁ sāpekṣam ity api* ı *vākyaṁ prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāyadarśinām* ıı

Ara II. *vidher vidhiḥ*, affirmation of affirmation.
Because of problems in the *vidhi*-mode of consideration, a positive principle is searched that should underlie all things accepted as real in the first Ara.

6 *Apūrva* is the unprecedented factor arising from the performance of a ritual; Mīmāṁsā-theory postulates this factor in order to bridge the gap between the performance of the ritual and its prescribed, visible or invisible result.

7 Siṁhasūri explains *sarvāṇi padāni vākyāya vākyārthaḥ* "all words are for the sentence the sentence meaning" (DN 114.15-16); perhaps this should explain why Mallavādin speaks of *vākyārthaḥ* and gives a definition of the sentence (not directly of the sentence meaning). The problem is more explicitly addressed at the end of the second Ara, DN 244.5-6: *vākyaṁ ca vākyārthaś ca vākyārthaḥ* ... .

Siṁhasūri cites by way of illustration VP 2.315-316 (DN 127.14) that lists the factors that determine the meaning of a word.

Accepting that the thing (*bhāvaḥ* or *dravyaḥ*) can be analysed as *bhavatīti bhāvaḥ*, the author asks: *ko bhavati* (DN 175.2)? First answer: it is the *puruṣa* 'soul'; this is next criticized and rejected; instead, *niyati* 'fate' is now regarded as the *kartrī* or agent of *bhavati*. Next, *kāla* 'time' is proposed as agent (DN 205ff), after that *svabhāva* (DN 219ff); finally, a non-dual *bhāva* (DN 230) is presented as the underlying cause.

At the beginning of the section that criticizes *svabhāvavāda* and that establishes *bhāvavāda*, Siṁhasūri cites VP 1.1 (DN 230.17-18) *anādinidhanaṁ brahma śabdatattvaṁ yad akṣaram | vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ*, as one among many *kāraṇa-vādas* "positions that speak of a cause (of all things)."

A sentence very similar to a sentence in the Vṛtti on VP 1.1 (VPVṛtti I:5.1f *na cāsyordhvam* ...) occurs in the section devoted to *bhāvavāda* (DN 239.1-2); in this section we also find verses that occur in the Vṛtti on VP 1.1 (VPVṛtti I:13.5f) (DN 241.4-11).

Towards the end, Siṁhasūri speaks of mono-causal theories, such as the acceptance of the affirmation view (in the form of) *śabdabrahma*: *śabda-brahma-vidhi-vidhi-naya-grahādy-eka-kāraṇa-vādāḥ* (DN 242.18).

Corresponding to this mode of consideration are the following views on word and sentence meaning:

(A) Word meaning is not *ajñāta* 'unknown' because, according to this second mode of consideration (or only according to *bhāvavāda*?), everything is one, and if whatever element is known, everything is known; instead the word meaning is *avikalpa* 'without conceptualisation'; in this context VP 2.233 is cited: *śāstreṣu prakriyābhedair avidyaivopavarṇyate | anāgamavikalpā tu svayaṁ vidyopavartate* ||

In this context, Siṁhasūri cites (with *tathā cānyaḥ*: contrasting example?) the following well-known verse attributed to Diṅnāga but so far not traced[8] (DN 243.8-9): *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ | teṣāṁ atyantasaṁbandho nārthāñ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api* ||

(B) The sentence and its meaning, according to this mode of consideration, is *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ* (VP 2.1c), "a single, indivisible linguistic unit" (DN 243.9).

Siṁhasūri cites again VP 2.1-2 (DN 244.7-10) that enumerates various sentence definitions (see above, under Ara I, (B)), including this one.

8 Helārāja cites the first two *pādas* in his commentary on VP 3.3.54; cf. Houben 1995: 393, note 834.

Ara III. *vidhi-niyama* of *vidhi.*
There is not a simple subject of *bhavati*, but there is affirmation-plus-restriction; Sāṁkhya is presented (in a version that explains the world without invoking a God), next an *īśvaravāda* (that gives an important role to God).
Corresponding to this mode of consideration:
(A) Word meaning is not *avikalpa* but *sādṛśyasāmānya.*
(B) The sentence is *pṛthak sarvapadam.*
VP 2.1-2 is briefly cited in the commentary (DN 333.25-26).

Ara IV. *niyama* of *vidhi.*
The simple affirmation of things remains valid, but there is no subject of becoming. Many untraced citations.
Corresponding to this mode of consideration:
(A) *etasmiṁś ca naye dravyam eva śabdārtho nityaṁ sarvātmakaṁ.* Mallavādin illustrates this with the citation of a curious statement (DN 373.6-7): *pṛthivīdhātau kiṁ satyam* ǀ *vikalpaḥ* ǀ *vikalpe kiṁ satyam* ǀ *jñānam* ǀ *jñāne kiṁ satyam* ǀ *oṁ tad brahma.* This statement is also found in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā.[9]
(B) *vākyārtho 'pi ca pṛthak sarvaṁ padam, sarvasarvātmakatvāt.*

Ara V. *vidhi-niyama.*
The grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇāḥ*). However, no mention is made of Bhartṛhari. Instead, there are citations from Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, from the Dhātupāṭha, and from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.
Marginally we find that Siṁhasūri illustrates some point with VP 3.7.2 (DN 393.20-21).
The following views on word and sentence meaning correspond to this mode of consideration:
(A) *padārtho dravya-kriye.*
(B) *vākyam ākhyātaśabdaḥ* (cf. VP 2.1a cited above).

Ara VI. *vidhi* of *vidhi-niyama.*
A position of Vaiśeṣika-character is defended. Citations from the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra are given in the commentary.

9 The Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā first gives an introductory statement which is missing in DN (MBhD 1: 22.19): *nityaḥ pṛthivīdhātuḥ.* After this it has (MBhD 1: 22.20-21): *pṛthivīdhātau kiṁ satyam* ǀ *vikalpaḥ* ǀ *vikalpe kiṁ satyam* ǀ *jñānam* ǀ *jñāne kiṁ satyam* ǀ *om* ǀ *atha tad brahma* (the *atha* of the last phrase is missing in DN).

The following views on word and sentence meaning correspond to this mode of consideration:
(A) *jātiḥ śabdārthaḥ.*
(B) *antyaṁ ca padaṁ vākyārthaḥ.*

Siṁhasūri cites VP 1.86 (DN 450.5-6) to explain how the last word can be the meaning of the sentence.

Ara VII. *vidhi-niyama* of *vidhi-niyama.*
Now lost Vaiśeṣika-works (Vākya, Bhāṣya-ṭīkā, Kaṭandī) are referred to (e.g. DN 516.4 *vākyakāra*, 517 *bhāṣyakāra*, *prāśastamata*) and criticized at length; it seems that the speaker represents the Jaina position of *syādvāda*. To this mode of consideration:
(A) The corresponding word meaning is ... *anyāpoha* (for which Diṅnāga became famous);
In the immedialy preceding commentary, Siṁhasūri cites again (*yathoktam*) *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ* ... (as at the end of the second Ara, there as contrasting statement, DN 243.8-9)
(B) The sentence meaning is *pratibhā*: the theory for which Bhartṛhari became famous, also accepted by Diṅnāga (cf. HATTORI 1980).

Ara VIII. *niyama* of *vidhi-niyama.*
Refutation of previous view which implied that *bhāva* and *abhāva* are on the same level.
Siṁhasūri refers to VP 1.159 (DN 558.14-15).
According to DIXIT 1971: 118, this Ara represents the Jainas' *śabdanaya*. The importance of grammar is emphasized, citation of unknown verse in praise of grammar and VP 1.13 (DN 579.8-9).
Siṁhasūri's explanation of VP 1.13 is quite different from, and, strikingly, more robust, straightforward and convincing than, the ancient Vṛtti on VP 1.13.[10]

Śabdārtha is said to be *abhijalpa*, citation of VP 2.128-130 (DN 580.3-581.4); of VP 2.131 (DN 582.1-2). Mallavādin, otherwise rarely giving names, mentions Bhartṛhari, and makes a distinction between his view and the view of his master Vasurāta (DN 581.6-8). Again, a view on word meaning is illustrated with the citation of VP 2.127ab (DN 604.5). In a long final section, Diṅnāga's view that the word mean-

10 For Siṁhasūri an interpretation in accordance with the Vṛtti was apparently not at all necessary; this casts doubts on the alleged *svopajña*-status of the Vṛtti (cf. BRONKHORST 1988, AKLUJKAR 1993, HOUBEN 1999b) in the eyes of this very early author. I hope to deal with the pertinent passages elsewhere in more detail.

ing is *anyāpoha* is discussed and refuted; it is referred to with untraced citations and the citation of kārikā 5.28ab of Pramāṇa-Samuccaya (DN 613.6) and a word from kārikā 5.2 of Pramāṇa-Samuccaya (DN 661.1). VP 3.5.4 is cited to illustrate a point in the discussion (DN 622.6-7). VP 2.233 (cf. above under Ara II) is cited again (DN 669.8-9), according to Siṁhasūri in order to express a point in accordance with the upholder of *anyāpoha*. Again, there are citations from Pramāṇa-Samuccaya-Vṛtti (e.g. DN 680, 683-686, 688, 691, 699, 707, 722), and of Pramāṇa-Samuccaya 3.13 (DN 693.3-4), 2.18 (DN 702.5), 3.14 (DN 720.4-5). Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra 9.1.18 is referred to (DN 701.1). In the latter part of the discussion VP 2.315-316 are cited (DN 716.4-7), and VP 3.14.8 (DN 731.5-6).
To this mode of consideration:
(A) The corresponding word meaning is *saṅghāta* 'conglomerate'.
(B) The sentence is a collection of words with undetermined sequence.

Ara IX. *niyama*.
The relationship between the general (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) is studied and found to be *avaktavya* 'inexpressible' (DN 760.4-6). The following views on word and sentence meaning correspond to this mode of consideration:
(A) The meaning of a word is *abhijalpa*, VP 2.127cd, 128 (DN 761.2-4) are cited to illustrate this view;
(B) *vākya* is *saṅghāta*.
Siṁhasūri adds that the sentence meaning is *avaktavya*; he cites VP 2.15 (761.12-13) with reference to the view that is *not* accepted here.

Ara X. *vidhi* of *niyama*.
Things are conglomerations of qualities, devoid of an abiding substance (Dixit 1971: 119). De Jong (DN vol 3 p. 1) recognizes the Sautrāntika-argument against Sarvāstivāda. On p. 777.24-25 we find an illustrative citation of VP 2.238 *upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānāṁ* ... .
Corresponding to this mode of consideration are the following views on word and sentence meaning:
(A) *śabdārthas tu paryayo 'nekatā guṇaḥ*.
(B) *pṛthak padāni vākyārthaḥ*.

Ara XI. *vidhi-niyama* of *niyama*.
Represents the momentariness of all things. Things get destroyed "by themselves," simply because they once have come into being.
The following views on word and sentence meaning correspond to this mode of consideration:
(A) Because the reality is momentary but the object (meaning of a word) continues beyond this, word meaning must be *buddhistha* 'residing in the mind'. Mallavādin cites VP 2.132 (DN 804.1-2) that refers to a word meaning whose domain is the mind but that has a link with the outer object.
(B) *santānavṛttaś ca kramo vākyārthaḥ.*

Ara XII. *niyama* of *niyama*.
Refutation of the preceding mode of consideration, next:
śūnyavāda or the theory of the insubstantiality of all things; a thing exists only in consciousness.
Bhartṛhari is cited incidentally in the commentary (VP 1.13, DN 815.7-8; and VP 3.7.41, DN 22-23).
The following views on word and sentence meaning correspond to this mode of consideration:

(A) Word meaning is here of the nature of consciousness (*vijñānam*), nothing but a conceptualization (*kalpanamātram eva*).
(B) The meaning of a sentence is *buddhyanusaṁhṛtiḥ* (one of the views explicitly mentioned in VP 2.1-2).

3.3 The work concludes with two "epilogues."
(1) In the section devoted to *dvādaśāntara* the transition is made from the twelfth mode of consideration back to the first view of *vidhi* or the straightforward affirmation of things, and thus to a new round of the wheel.
(2) In the section called *cakratumba* or "nave of the wheel" the Jaina view is presented as the central position that is the all-round basis of all views that are one-sided and rejectable when considered in isolation.

4. We thus see that in Mallavādin's doxographic work the Dvādaśāra-Nayacakra a formula or key is used at the beginning. This introduces the entire work, it summarizes the basic structure of the work, and throughout the work it will function as a tool to grasp the main

features of the various philosophical positions (as Mallavādin saw them) as they are one by one presented, defended and rejected. This key can therefore be regarded as a *śāstrārambha* in different senses of the word, as explained in sections 1.1-2. Although Mallavādin's DN appeared in a usable edition with abundant scholarly notes, identifications of quotations where possible etc. by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA between 1966 and 1988, the text has been very little studied because of the high degree of difficulty of its matter. This in spite of its evidently great importance for the study of the early development of the classical systems of Indian philosophy. It is hoped that through the present small study of its relation with the grammarians in general and with Bhartṛhari in particular a better grasp can be obtained both of the systematic structure underlying the work of Mallavādin and of the way his scholarly mind applied this structure to the philosophical schools with which he was familiar. The challenge which this work obviously presents to a modern philosophical mind is to see whether the systematic structure can be applied to later Indian and perhaps even non-Indian philosophical systems as well, whether the wheel of viewpoints as it was revolving in Mallavādin's dynamic vision can be seen to have continued to revolve to the present day.

Before this is possible a much better grasp of his work in Mallavādin's own time and context is needed – to begin with perhaps in the form of in-depth philological studies of each Ara: which identifiable views are defended and which are rejected – for which we have to take into account that authors we now categorize together (for instance, Bhartṛhari and the grammarians) were not categorized together by him, and theories which he grouped together, such as the Jaina Syādvāda and the theory of *anyāpoha*, are not considered to be theoretically near or corresponding in our modern eyes.

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"Descent with Modification": The Opening of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*[*]

Philipp André Maas (*Bonn*)

When we set out to work on a *śāstra*-text we usually take a printed book, most probably one published in India at the end of the 19th or at the beginning of the 20th century, and start reading. In most cases the text is legible without major problems and our comprehension is facilitated and guided by *daṇḍa*s, paragraphs, and a numeration of sections. A philologically trained reader will, of course, keep a sceptical attitude towards the wording even while reading a printed text. She (or he) will reckon on the possibility that the version contains minor mistakes like printing errors or misplaced *daṇḍa*s. By and large, however, the reader in his endeavour to understand the text will accept the authority of the printed version. This philological strategy is, of course, fully justified. It avoids the risk of constructing a text that reflects the preferences of a modern redactor instead of keeping to a historically "correct" version. The question, however, to which degree a printed version is historically correct, or in other words whether or not it conveys the words chosen by the author of the text, or at least a version that goes back to an early stage of transmission, usually does not bother us too much as long as we do not find obvious faults in what we read.

When I first studied the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (*PYŚ*), i.e. the *Yogasūtra* together with the so called *Yogabhāṣya*, I happened to stumble on such a fault, and my subsequent research in the history of the transmission of this text has seriously diminished my trust in the reliability of editions printed without recourse to a wide range of mss. from different parts of the Indian subcontinent. If the results of my studies in the history of the transmission of this text should in any way be representative for *śāstra*-texts in general, we are justified to suspect any edition which is based on a small number of paper-mss.

* I would like to thank Susanne Kammüller, M.A. for taking a close look at my English.

written in Devanāgarī of possibly transmitting only a rather young redaction of its text.

It goes without saying that I have no intention to diminish the early editors' extraordinary contributions to Indology as an academic discipline. In case of the *PYŚ*, editors like Kāśīnātha Śāstrī Āgāśe in 1904 and the even more famous Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar[1] in 1917 prepared excellent editions, judged by the conditions under which they had to work. We may just recall that in their time the reproduction of manuscripts was extremely expensive and time consuming, that travelling in India took even more time than it does today, and that all data had to be processed by hand. At that time, it was simply impossible for a single person to base an edition on a large variety of witnesses from different parts of the Indian subcontinent. As the situation has changed, we are in the fortunate position to transform, as it were, technical progress into deeper knowledge of textual history.

When, while still a student, I read the *PYŚ* for the first time and with the help of a commentary, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa* (*YVi*), I soon realized that the *YVi* commented upon a version of the text that quite frequently seemed to be older than the versions transmitted by the printed editions available to me. Not much later I found out that my allegedly new finding had been the subject of an article published by Wezler more than ten years before,[2] and that since its publication some philological progress had been made. Kengo Harimoto, a doctoral student of W. Halbfass, had started to prepare a critical edition of the *YVi* using two more mss. than had been available for the first edition.[3] Harimoto submitted the new edition as his doctoral thesis to the University of Pennsylvania in 1999, one year after I had started—at the suggestion of Prof. Dr. Albrecht Wezler from Hamburg University—to prepare a critical edition of the first chapter of the *PYŚ*. As the basis for my edition I used a reconstruction of the version commented upon in the *YVi*. Moreover, I collected 21 printed editions and as many mss. as I could obtain. At the end I had 25 textual witnesses at my disposal, written in Devanāgarī and in 7 local scripts. As my search in the beginning was not very well

1 Published under the title *The Yogasûtras of Patañjali with the Scholium of Vyâsa and the Commentary of Vâchaspatimiśra*. For the role of Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar in early Indology cf. Halbfass (1990), p. 260.

2 Wezler (1983).

3 The first complete edition of the *YVi* was published in Madras (1957) under the title *Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*.

mapped-out, this group of mss. may not be entirely representative for the transmission as a whole, for example, I have not been able to acquire a single Orīya-ms., nor could I get hold of any ms. from Rajasthān. I am nevertheless quite confident that I have collected a group of witnesses which represent at least the main lines of transmission, because the regions of origin of the mss. cover the main parts of the Indian subcontinent, starting from Kashmir in the North-West to Bengal in the East, and from Mahārāṣṭra southwards to Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

In order to justify my lack of trust in the reliability of most printed editions and to provide some information which will be useful for understanding my following discussion of different versions of the opening section of the *PYŚ*, I would like to sum up the results of my investigations into the history of the transmission of this text. I shall give, as it were, a supplement to my paper entitled "On the Written Transmission of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*", which I read at the 12th World Sanskrit Conference in Helsinki, Finland, three years ago.[4] In this paper I established the main lines of transmission of the *PYŚ* by a discussion of a number of indicative errors which are exclusively transmitted by witnesses belonging to one or the other line of transmission. As the whole textual tradition is—more or less—heavily affected by contamination, lower textual criticism is not able to establish the history of the transmission with absolute certainty. On the other hand, the influence of contamination was not strong enough to make stemmatical considerations altogether impossible.

4 To be published as Maas (2007); cf. also Maas (2006) pp. 165-170.



Illustration 1: Tentative stemma of the transmission of the *PYŚ*. Continuous lines show direct dependence, broken lines indicate contamination. The vertical distance from the youngest common ancestor of all witnesses to its descendants is not in proportion to the age of the witnesses.[5]

This tentative stemma[6] shows that the transmission is split into two main branches, both going back to one single hyparchetype, respectively. The hyparchetype α is the youngest common ancestor of all witnesses transmitting the vulgate. By and large, all printed editions transmit this version with only a limited number of variant readings. Most of the mss. transmitting the vulgate are written in Devanāgarī script on paper. As the transmission in this branch is heavily affected by contamination, I am at present not able to establish a more detailed stemma with any degree of certainty.

On the other side, we find the hyparchetype β, which is the youngest common ancestor of all mss. transmitting what I would like to call the Southern Version. I have introduced this designation because all witnesses transmitting this version have their origin in South India. The hyparchetype β was the starting point for a split of this branch into three sub-branches. On the left, the inferred witness

5 The stemma is reproduced from Maas (2006), p. lxxiii.
6 Cf. Maas (2006), pp. lxxii-lxxiii.

g is the common ancestor of three Grantha-mss., one from Madras, today's Chennai, and two from Thanjavur (Tanjore). The branch in the middle leads to the common ancestor of two Telugu-mss., one from Mysore and the other one from Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum). Finally we find at the right-hand side the inferred witness *Y*, the youngest common ancestor of the *YVi*'s basic text, of a Grantha-ms. from Pondicherry, and of a Malayālam-ms. from Thiruvananthapuram. Nearly all mss. that stem from the hyparchetype β are written on palm leaf, with the only exception of the paper-ms. M^{g}.

In order to supplement this tentative stemma, which was mainly derived from indicative errors, I have prepared a statistical table based on the whole amount of 2588 variant readings found in 22 complete witnesses and 3 fragments.

	Pv^{n2}	K^{n1}	K^{n3}	K^{M}	P^{n}	B^{s}	K^{n2}	T^{n}	My^{t2}	Pv^{n1}	My^{N}	Pv^{n3}	B^{n1}	My^{t1}	Pv^{n4}	B^{n2}	K^{b}	B^{t}	M^{g}	Tj^{g1}	Tj^{g2}	Tv^{t}	Pc^{g}	My^{t3}	Tv^{y}	YVi	
Pv^{n2}	*	92	92	91	95	89	89	89	88	88	90	88	86	83	88	82	82	75	78	77	76	74	69	69	63	58	82
K^{n1}	92	*	92	91	90	88	88	87	88	88	88	88	86	82	82	81	82	75	77	76	75	73	68	68	63	57	81
K^{n3}	92	92	*	91	90	89	89	88	89	88	87	88	86	82	83	81	83	75	77	77	75	73	68	68	63	58	81
K^{M}	91	91	91	*	89	88	89	87	87	87	86	87	85	82	82	80	81	75	77	76	74	73	68	68	62	57	81
P^{n}	95	90	90	89	*	87	87	87	87	85	88	87	85	82	86	80	80	74	77	76	74	72	67	68	62	57	80
B^{s}	89	88	89	88	87	*	87	84	85	89	84	85	84	80	80	79	79	72	76	75	73	72	66	67	62	57	79
K^{n2}	89	88	89	89	87	87	*	87	86	86	84	88	84	80	81	80	80	75	76	75	73	72	66	67	62	56	79
T^{n}	89	87	88	87	87	84	87	*	84	*	85	85	82	83	78	78	77	72	79	77	75	72	64	49	61	54	78
My^{t2}	88	88	89	87	87	85	86	84	*	84	84	84	82	79	80	78	78	74	75	74	72	71	65	66	61	56	78
Pv^{n1}	88	88	88	87	85	89	86	*	84	*	82	*	84	73	80	78	79	74	71	71	71	69	64	64	64	65	78
My^{N}	90	88	87	86	88	84	84	85	84	82	*	83	82	79	81	78	78	71	74	74	72	70	64	65	60	55	78
Pv^{n3}	88	88	88	87	87	85	88	85	84	*	83	*	83	82	79	78	78	73	75	75	72	71	66	56	62	52	78
B^{n1}	86	86	86	85	85	84	84	82	82	84	82	83	*	78	78	77	77	71	74	73	71	69	65	64	60	55	77
My^{t1}	83	82	82	82	82	80	80	83	79	73	79	82	78	*	75	74	74	68	71	71	69	67	63	63	59	52	74
Pv^{n4}	88	82	83	82	86	80	81	78	80	80	81	79	78	75	*	74	74	68	71	70	69	67	61	63	57	53	74
B^{n2}	82	81	81	80	80	79	80	78	78	78	78	78	77	74	74	*	72	67	70	70	68	67	61	62	57	52	73
K^{b}	82	82	83	81	80	79	80	77	78	79	78	78	77	74	74	72	*	67	70	70	68	67	62	63	58	52	73
B^{t}	75	75	75	75	74	72	75	72	74	74	71	73	71	68	68	67	67	*	64	64	62	61	55	56	52	47	67
M^{g}	78	77	77	77	77	76	76	79	75	71	74	75	74	71	71	70	70	64	*	81	78	67	67	61	61	56	72
Tj^{g1}	77	76	77	76	76	75	75	77	74	71	74	75	73	71	70	70	70	64	81	*	77	68	66	63	61	55	72
Tj^{g2}	76	75	75	74	74	73	73	75	72	71	72	72	71	69	69	68	68	62	78	77	*	66	64	60	58	52	70
Tv^{t}	74	73	73	73	72	72	72	72	71	69	70	71	69	67	67	67	67	61	67	68	66	*	61	64	57	51	68
Pc^{g}	69	68	68	68	67	66	66	64	65	64	64	66	65	63	61	61	62	55	67	66	64	61	*	58	56	49	63
My^{t3}	69	68	68	68	68	67	67	49	66	64	65	56	64	63	63	62	63	56	61	63	60	64	58	*	51	50	62
Tv^{y}	63	63	63	62	62	62	62	69	61	64	60	62	60	59	57	57	58	52	61	61	58	57	56	51	*	49	60
YVi	58	57	58	57	57	57	56	54	56	65	55	52	55	52	53	52	52	47	56	55	52	51	49	50	49	*	54
s. r.	1	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	6	8	6	9	9	11	11	16	7	7	10	14	18	18	23	27	
	82	81	81	81	80	79	79	78	78	78	78	78	77	74	74	73	73	67	72	72	70	68	63	62	59	54	

Table 1: Statistical table[7] showing the amount of common readings for each pair of witnesses in a rounded percentage

7 West (1973), p. 38 f.—to my knowledge—was the first to recommend the preparation of a numerical table showing the amount of common readings for each pair of witnesses in order to establish the group membership of textual witnesses while dealing with open recensions.

The table shows the number of common readings for each pair of witnesses converted into a percentage. I applied the following procedure to arrive at the results given in the table: The critical edition records variants in a completely positive apparatus. Each entry of the apparatus lists the whole number of 22 sigla for all complete witnesses and the sigla of fragments as far as they transmit the text. Accordingly, if a word of the main text, for example the conjunct *ca*, is transmitted with a variant, say the disjunct *vā*, the textual witnesses listed in the apparatus are divided into two groups. The Classical Text Editor (CTE), i.e. the computer software I used, provides the possibility not only to search for any combination of sigla, but also to count their exact incidence. It is therefore possible to count the number of readings that each witness has in common with any of the other witnesses and to convert these numbers into percentages. The rounded percentages are given at the intersections of the lines and columns. The CTE also provides the option to count single readings. The last but first line shows the percentage of single readings for each witness.

The grey parts of the table indicate groups of witnesses that show a significantly high number of shared readings. The level of significance is the result of a fixed calculation. In the last but second line, as well as in the last but second column, the average percentage of common readings for every witness is recorded. The average is—quite obviously—calculated by first adding the percentage of common readings for every witness and then dividing the sum by the number of witnesses. The average percentage for Tj^{g1}, for example, is 72%, for Tj^{g2} it is also 72%, and the average of common readings for K^{n3} is 81%. That two witnesses are members of the same group is established by the fact that the percentage of readings they have in common is higher than one would expect from the sum of both average amounts of readings divided by 2, viz. the average amount of both averages. The calculation leading to the establishment of a group-membership is as follows: We add the average percentage of common readings for two witnesses and divide the sum by 2. The result is compared with the percentage of common readings recorded at the intersection of the respective line and column. If the amount recorded at the intersection is higher than the result of the preceding calculation both witnesses belong to the same group. If the amount is lower they do not. Here again an example will be useful. As we have seen, the average amount of common readings for Tj^{g1} as well

as for Tj^{g2} is 72%. The sum of both percentages divided by two is equally 72%. This result is lower than the percentage of common readings shared by Tj^{g1} and Tj^{g2}, which is 77%. In consequence, both witnesses are members of a common group. The opposite is true for the relationship of Tj^{g1} and B^{n2}. The sum of the average percentage of common readings for these two witnesses is 73% + 72% = 145%, 145 divided by 2 is 72.5. As the percentage of common readings of Tj^{g1} and B^{n2}—i.e. 70—is lower than the result of the preceding calculation, these two witnesses do not belong to a common group.

At the upper left side of the table, standing out in dark grey, the statistic shows a large and homogeneous group of witnesses that comprises all mss. transmitting the vulgate-version. It is highly probable that all these witnesses go back to a common ancestor, which can be identified with the hyparchetype α in the tentative stemma. The vulgate-group comprises all Devanāgarī-mss., three mss. in Telugu-script, and one ms. in Maithilī-, Old Bengalī-, Śāradā- and Nandināgarī script each. All witnesses except K^{b} are paper-mss. With only a few exceptions, the percentage of single readings transmitted by the members of this group is much lower than the percentage of single readings outside this group. Two of these exceptions are easily explainable. Ba^{t} is the only witness that transmits the *YBh* without the *YS*. It has therefore a rather large number of omissions as single variants. A very similar case is Pv^{n4}, which transmits short citations from Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvavaiśaradī* (*TVś*) embedded into the running text of the *PYŚ*. These citations, of course, increase the number of single readings.

Besides the vulgate-group, the table in its dark grey part on the right hand side shows a group consisting of three Grantha-mss. Each member of the Grantha-group shares a significant percentage of readings with one or more mss. from the vulgate-group, presumably due to the contamination of an early common ancestor of these three witnesses.

On the whole, however, the table provides only limited information about the group membership of mss. and is therefore no very powerful tool to enhance our knowledge of the stemmatical relations. The reason for this weakness lies in the incoherence of the textual tradition itself. On the one hand, we have a majority of witnesses showing a large number of common readings that are exclusive to this very group, i.e. the vulgate group. On the other hand, we have a minority of witnesses that share exclusively a smaller amount

of readings, i.e. the southern group. Moreover, outside the Grantha-group all southern witnesses transmit a huge amount of single variants, which, of course, decreases the number of common readings. In the table, the majority of readings shared by the vulgate therefore frequently overshadows the smaller number of readings shared by these witnesses.

If, however, the number of variant readings used for a statistical investigation is reduced by applying some strictly defined criteria, the picture becomes clearer.

	M^g	*Tj*^g2	*Tj*^g1	*Tv*^t	*My*^t3	*Pc*^g	*Tv*^y	*YVi*	Ø
M^g	*	**70**	**67**	38	33	**49**	39	37	48
Tj^g2	**70**	*	**66**	41	39	45	34	33	47
Tj^g1	**67**	**66**	*	39	39	43	36	31	46
Tv^t	38	41	39	*	**66**	37	38	32	42
My^t3	33	39	39	**66**	*	37	35	32	40
Pc^g	**49**	45	43	37	37	*	**47**	**41**	43
Tv^y	39	34	36	38	35	**47**	*	**53**	40
YVi	37	33	31	32	32	**41**	**53**	*	37

Table 2

The above table[8] was prepared on the basis of all instances in which at least two witnesses of the southern group read against all other witnesses of this group. Only those cases in which the transmission within the southern group is split have been included. The number of relevant readings varies for each witness because single readings are left completely out of consideration.

The resulting table clearly shows three groups that correspond neatly to the three sub-branches of the southern transmission shown in the tentative stemma. We can see the group of three Grantha-mss. in the grey coloured part at the left hand side of the table. The grey part in the middle contains the two Telugu-mss., while in the grey part on the right we see the basic text of the *YVi* together with a Malayālam- and a Grantha-ms.

8 The table is a slightly modified version of the table published in Maas (2006), p. lxxi.

Within the group of three Grantha-mss, *M*^{g} and *Tj*^{g2} share more common readings with each other than with *Tj*^{g1}. Therefore it is likely that *M*^{g} and *Tj*^{g2} go back to one common ancestor (*g'*) which was not an ancestor of *Tj*^{g1}. The descent of all three mss. from one single ancestor (*g*) would be the reason why all mss. statistically belong to one single group. That *Tv*^{t} and *My*^{t3} have one single common ancestor (*t*) can also be established from the huge amount of readings shared by these two witnesses. These statistical findings are by and large in harmony with the results of the investigation of variant readings.[9]

With regard to the remaining group, however, we face partly contradictory findings. *Pc*^{g} statistically belongs to two groups simultaneously, viz. the Grantha-group and the group including the basic text of the *YVi*. This finding presumably has to be explained as the result of contamination. Probably the scribe of *Pc*^{g} (or the scribe of one of its ancestors) compared his exemplar with an early Grantha version of the *PYŚ* and at several points decided to copy this version instead of keeping to the text of his main exemplar.[10] In consequence, *Pc*^{g} shares more readings with members of the Grantha-group than its main exemplar did, and the amount of common readings which *Pc*^{g} shares with the *YVi*'s basic text and *Tv*^{y} is lower than it would have been if *Pc*^{g} was not contaminated.

Due to the very nature of statistical tables, the information provided with regard to the stemmatical relationship of the witnesses is still limited. A mere table is incapable of providing information on the relationship of the youngest common ancestors of each group.

A very promising alternative method for the estimation of a text's history of transmission, known as cladistics, has been developed in the field of evolutionary biology. In the course of the "Textual Criticism Challenge 1991" initiated by Peter Robinson, editor of the Old Norse narrative sequence *Svipdagsmál*, cladistic analysis of variant readings has impressively been demonstrated to be useful for the reconstruction of manuscript histories by Robert O'Hara, an evolutionary biologist from Harvard University.[11] Cladistics, in short, is a

9 Cf. Maas (2006), p. lxxii.

10 There are a number of instances in which all Grantha-mss. share "errors" against the rest of the transmission; cf. 25.3 *niratiśayaḥ*, 30.4 *sahaite* , 36.7 *ca*, 46.3 *nirvitarkaḥ*, 47.4 *jāyate*, 50.3 *tasmān* in Maas 2006.

11 Cf.—also for the following exposition of the cladistic method—Robinson – O'Hara (1996). Available as a web-version from http://rjohara.net/cv/1996-rhc (link checked on September 25, 2006).

method applied by systematic biologists to create evolutionary trees of species. Through the long course of reproduction and divergence in the evolutionary past, the multitude of species has come into existence by means of "descent with modification" (CH. DARWIN). The aim of the cladistic method is to reconstruct this process, which is, of course, only inferable but not observable. Cladistics start with the determination of differences between species (so-called characters), which allows classification into two or more groups and inference of the evolutional process. Characters may be derived from differences between species in size, colour, behaviour, external anatomy, molecular makeup, etc. In a second step, the "polarity" of the characters has to be determined, i.e., it has to be decided which of two characters, e.g., possession of vertebras or not, represents the ancestral state and which one is the evolutionarily derived one. Subsequently the distribution of characters becomes subject to a numerical calculation resulting in the formation of an ancestral tree. This tree should account for the distribution of characters in the species under investigation. If the number of characters as well as the number of species is high, and if the distribution of the characters turns out to be partly contradictory because not all characters are evolutionarily derived, but some go back to a convergence of development, the number of trees that have to be evaluated can become extremely high. At this point, a number of different computer programs offer help. These programs, which are in wide use in the systematics community, typically search through the range of possible trees and determine the minimum number of changes of state that could have occurred in each tree, i.e. the software determines which tree or trees provide the shortest connection between the common ancestor and the individual species. The tree with the fewest intermediate nodes between the earliest ancestor and the species under examination is taken to be the best estimate of the true evolutionary history.

The similarity of tasks in evolutionary biology and stemmatics is obvious. Stemmatics, too, are concerned with the reconstruction of historical facts from "characters," i.e., variant readings, which are introduced into the text during its history of transmission. It should, nevertheless be clearly understood that although the application of numerical cladistic techniques on textual traditions very quickly provides estimates of manuscript histories, it is not the philosopher's stone of textual criticism. There are a number of limitations regarding its successful application. The premise of cladistics that one (and

only one) new species may develop from exactly one parental species is problematic for stemmatics (as it is for systematic biology). A single ms. may have been copied more than once, and there is a real chance that more than one of these copies have survived. This limitation should not detract from the great value of the cladistic approach to manuscript studies. Numerical cladistic analysis is valuable because it helps scholars to find their way through the jungle of variant readings, and traditional editorial scrutiny of variants will relatively easily uncover the kind of errors just described in the analysis.

Two additional sources of errors are more difficult to cope with: manuscript contamination and the possibility that identical mistakes may affect different branches of the transmission independently and coincidentally (parallelism). If the number of variant readings is high, it may seem reasonable to belief that a relative small number of readings caused by contamination or parallelism would be outnumbered by the huge amount of genetically derived readings and thus become statistically irrelevant. The cladistic analysis of variant readings of the *Svipdagsmál* shows, however, that this assumption is unfounded.[12]

The potential of the cladistic analysis of variants for the reconstruction of the histories of transmission in Sanskrit manuscript traditions has not yet been finally determined.[13] In order to improve the results of their initial analysis, ROBINSON & O'HARA suggest to add "certain initial assumptions" concerning the polarity of variant readings. On the other hand, both authors are well aware of the danger of circularity that may arise from the manipulation of data, "because it is possible to adjust the data put in the program to such an extent that whatever result one desires can be made to come out."[14]

A method which integrates the basic methods of textual criticism as formulated by PAUL MAAS (1958) and others with the use of cladistic software was suggested by the Dutch philologist SALEMANS (2000), who worked on the Middle Dutch play *Lanseloet van Denemerken*. SALEMANS argues convincingly for the development of strict criteria which variant readings have to match in order to be considered genealogically meaningful. Although he has developed his criteria

12 Cf. ROBINSON – O'HARA (1996), p. 129 f.

13 First steps to investigate the transmission of the *Mahābhārata*'s Dyutaparvan with the help of cladistic software were made in PHILLIPS-RODRIGUEZ (2004/2005).

14 ROBINSON – O'HARA (1996), p. 129.

with a view to a metrical text in Middle Dutch, much of his thought seems to be applicable or at least adjustable to Sanskrit *śāstra*-texts as well. I hope to get the opportunity to apply a modified version of SALEMANS's method to the investigation into the history of the transmission not only of the *PYŚ*, but also to the history of the transmission of the *Carakasaṃhitā*. The material, consisting of a collation of 42 mss. for more than half of *Vimānasthāna* 8, is readily available.[15]

15 SALEMANS (2000), p. 300 f. presents a list of steps to be followed in order to prepare an early stage of a stemma—a "chain" of textual witnesses which in a follow-up step can be transformed into a fully-fledged stemma. In order to provide a starting point for the development of a similar methodology in Sanskrit philology his list deserves to be cited in full, as far as the proposed steps and advices are applicable to Sanskrit prose texts:

"1. Find competitive textual differences or variants in equivalent positions in the text versions.
   a. Generally the variants must be single words. …
   b. If the difference does not concern an addition or deletion of one or more complete words, continue with step 1c. If the difference does concern an addition or deletion of one or more complete words and if this addition or deletion shows up in two or more texts, take the following advices into consideration …:
      - If the addition or omission does not consist of a small and/or common (predictable!) word(s), and is in a type-2 environment (… [cf. point 2]), continue with step 6. Otherwise, go (again) to step 1. Notice that the word class of the interpolated or vanished word is not important. …
   c. If the difference consists of a difference in word order … I warn that this variance may not provide trustworthy information; therefore, begin again with step 1 (and check later on whether the word order variants are in agreement with the developed tree). …
   e. If all the variants in the text versions have been studied, continue with step 7.
2. The variants must be in *type-2 position*: the variants must be two clearly different competitive words (spelling differences are unimportant) and each variant must occur in at least two text versions. … If there are three or more variants, do not use them, but continue with step 1. …
3. The variants must be in a grammatically and syntactically adequate environment. … If this condition fails, go back to step 1. …
4. Determine the word classes of the variants.
   a. … both variants must be substantive nouns or main verbs or, possibly, adjectives. In other words, … , variants cannot be adverbs, articles, auxiliaries, conjunctions, prepositions, pronouns, etc. …
   c. If the word classes are not substantives, main verbs or adjectives, … go to step 1. …
   e. If the variants concern common, frequently used, very predictable substantives, adjectives or verbs (beware: a precise definition is not avail-

The Opening Passage of the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*:[16]

atha yogānuśāsanam (YS I.1).

Maṅgala: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ B^{n} K^{M} K^{n3} P^{n}; śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ॥ oṃ K^{n2} Pv^{n4}; oṃ namo bhagavate śeṣāhaye $B^{ś}$; śrīvedavyāsabhāṣyaṃ B^{t}; oṃ namo gaṇeśāya K^{b}; om M^{g}; oṃ namaḥ paramātmane My^{N}; *(r astu) +śrīr astu+ My^{t1}; śrīmate rāmānujāya namaḥ

akutojanuṣā bhāvi bhāṣayā yasya poṣayā ।
astu me (va)stu medhāyai kaṃdharopari(s)aiṃdhavaṃ ॥ [*metre*: Anuṣṭubh. *Meaning unclear*]
yog<y>abhāṣyaṃ ॥ pataṃjalisūtrasya My^{t2}; ****ya gurupādukāyai namaḥ My^{t3}; śrīgurubhyo namaḥ ॥ ॥ śrīgopālāya namaḥ ॥ śrīḥ ॥ ॥ śrīḥ ॥ Pv^{n2}; śriyai namaḥ oṃ Pv^{n3};

"śāstrāṇy adhītya medhāvī abhyasya ca punaḥ punaḥ ।
[paramaṃ] brahma vijñāya ulkāvat tāny athotsṛjet ॥
oṃkāraratham āruhya viṣṇuṃ kṛtvātha sārathim ।
bu{bra}sma{hma}lokapadānveṣi{ṣī}rudrārādhanat{tat}paraḥ ॥
tāvad rathena gantavyaṃ yāvad rathapathasthitim{[?] tiḥ} ।
sthā{[?] sthi}tvā rathapathasthānaṃ ratham utsṛjya gacchati ॥
mātraliṃgapadaṃ tyaktvā śabdavyañjanavarjjitam ।
asvareṇa makāreṇa padaṃ sūkṣmaṃ hi [gacchati] ॥" [*Amṛtanāda Upaniṣad* 1-4; *metre*: Anuṣṭubh]
śrīmatkalyāṇaśāṃbaparameśvarāya namaḥ । śrīmatde{da}kṣī{kṣi}ṇāmūrttaye namaḥ ॥ śrīgurucaraṇāravindābhyā<ṃ>n namaḥ ॥

able yet!), and it is imaginable that they can be filled in or interchanged by copyists easily, it is likely that these variants are parallelistic. ... Then, go to step 1.

5. Study the difference between the two variants ... Go to step 1, if the difference between the variants:
   a. is orthographical ... ;
   b. or consists of a 'trivial' difference in vowels; if the difference consists of a difference in vowels, but both variants concern two clearly different words, the difference is not trivial;
   c. or consists of a difference in flexion, gender, number (singular or plural), tense or affix(es);
   d. or consists of a difference in word boundaries.
   Furthermore, go to step 1 if (both variants or) one variant:
   e. is not a good, normal word, ... or something illogical; ...
6. Add the (type-2) variation formula to a 'list of formulas', ... Go back to step 1.
7. Build a chain from the 'list of formulas' ... with a software package like PAUP ..."

16 Reproduced from Maas (2006), p. 1-2. Note that by mistake in Maas (2006) the witness My^{t2} is noted as transmitting the *maṅgala*-stanza *yas tyaktvā* ...

vivektā cittahaṃso me cijjaḍakṣīranīrayoḥ ।
nārāyaṇendrayogīndrapādapadme virājate ॥ [*metre*: Anuṣṭubh]

maṃgalāya jagatāṃ hiraṇmaye tanvate sadasi tāṇḍavaṃ sadā ।
viśvajanmadhṛtibhaṃgahetave kurmmahe nama idaṃ kaparddine ॥ [*metre*: Rathoddhatā] Tj^{g2}; namaḥ śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ । patañjalaye namaḥ । Tv^{y}

atha yogānuśāsanam] S (-My^{t3} Pc^{g} Tv^{t}) My^{t2} Pv^{n3} Pv^{n4}; *om.* B^{t}; ********* Pc^{g}; ******(sanaṃ) Tv^{t};

yas tyaktvā rūpam ādyaṃ prabhavati jagato 'nekadhānugrahāya
prakṣīṇakleśarāśir viṣamaviṣadharo 'nekavaktraḥ subhogī ।
sarvajñānaprasūtir bhujagaparikaraḥ prītaye yasya nityaṃ
devo 'hīśaḥ sa vo 'vyāt sitavimalatanur yogado yogayuktaḥ ॥ [*metre*: Sragdharā]

atha yogānuśāsanam V (-B^{t} My^{t2} Pv^{n3} Pv^{n4}) My^{t3} (*v.l.*: Pāda *a* rūpam...Pāda *d* sa] rū**...*** My^{t3a} ◊ prabhavati] bhapravati P^{n} (*ac*) ◊ 'nekadhānugrahāya] ***dhānugrahāya B^{n1}; 'nekadhātugrahāya K^{n2}. Pāda *b* prakṣīṇa-] prakṣeṇa B^{S} ◊ -rāśir] rāśi K^{n1} ◊ subhogī] sabhogī My^{t1} Pāda *c* sarva-] ** K^{b} ◊ -prasūtir] (pra)sūtir K^{n1} ◊ bhujaga-] bhu(jaga) K^{b} ◊ -parikaraḥ] parikaraḥra My^{t1} ◊ yasya] ya(sya) K^{b} nityaṃ] nityā My^{t3b} Pāda *d* 'hīśaḥ] dhīśaḥ K^{b} ◊ vo] no B^{s} ◊ -vimala-] vimaka K^{n2} ◊ -tanur] tanu B^{n2}; tanu* My^{t3b}; tanu+r+ My^{t3a} ◊ yogado] *** My^{t3b} ◊ yogayuktaḥ] +yo+gayuktaḥ K^{n1}; yoga(<*>+*+)ktaḥ My^{N}; yogayuktaḥ ॥ 1 ॥ My^{N} P^{n} T^{n}; ॥ 1 ॥ śrī rāmāya namaḥ ॥ ॥ yogasūtrabhāṣyaprāraṃbho 'yam । śrīmahāgaṇapataye namaḥ Pv^{n2}; ॥ ॥ 1 ॥

bhavati trisūtrabaṃdhaḥ pataṃjaleḥ prathitam idaṃ bhogin{*read* yogena [?] *instead of* bhogin} । citraṃ prabaṃdhabhedho{do} viśatāṃ tvadvitatasūtreṣu ॥ 2 ॥ [*metre*: Āryā. *Meaning unclear*] My^{t1}. atha] oṃ atha My^{t2})
yogānuśāsanam] Σ (-B^{t} My^{t3a} Tv^{y}) *YVi*; y****** My^{t3a}; yogānuśā(sana)m Tv^{y}; † B^{t}

When we turn now to the transmission of the opening section of the *PYŚ* in its critically edited version (see above), the first impression might appear rather discouraging. We find *sūtra* I.1 *atha yogānuśāsanam* edited as the main text and nearly one page of variant readings consisting of different *maṅgala*s and opening stanzas (*ārambhaśloka*). With a rough outline of the transmission in mind, however, the picture becomes clearer.

Within the southern group there are two witnesses which neither transmit a *maṅgala* nor an *ārambhaśloka*, i.e. Tj^{g1} and the basic text of the *YVi*. The absence of any text belonging to the *PYŚ* proper before the word *atha* in the basic text of the *YVi* can be established beyond doubt. On the one hand, the *YVi* provides a full citation of the first *sūtra* starting with *atha* as the first prose part of the work; on the other hand it comments upon the word *atha* with *athetyādipātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇam ārabhyate* (Harimoto 1999, 143.2): "I begin the commentary (*vivaraṇa*) upon the authoritative teaching of yoga going back to Patañjali, which starts with [the word] *atha*".

The findings in the remaining southern witnesses are quite diverse. Due to damages of the writing material, the beginning of the text is illegible in Pc^{g} and in Tv^{t}. The broken portion of the palm leaf in Tv^{t}, however, has exactly the size one would expect if *atha yogānuśāsanam* was the opening phrase in this witness, too. In Pc^{g}, on the other hand, the missing part is slightly bigger. It seems to have contained two *akṣara*s more than just *atha yogānuśāsanam*. A possible candidate for additional text consisting of two *akṣara*s is the *praṇava*, the syllable *oṃ*, written with a final *hālantacihna*. This is exactly the opening of the text as found in M^{g}.

The remaining three witnesses of the southern group contain more text. Tv^{y} starts with two *maṅgala*s, one addressing Gaṇeśa, the other Patañjali, the alleged author of the work which is introduced. In Tj^{g2}, which is stemmatically closely related to the Grantha-mss. M^{g} and Tj^{g1}, we find a unique and comprehensive opening section. At the beginning there are four stanzas which correspond to the beginning of the *Amṛtanāda Upaniṣad*.[17] These stanzas contain a short outline of a path to salvation leading from the study of authoritative teachings (*śāstra*) to an ultra-fine (*sūkṣma*) state called the "*brahma*-world". Immediately following there are two *maṅgala*s addressing the supreme Lord as *kalyāṇaśaṃba* and *dakṣiṇāmūrti*, and a third *maṅgala* is devoted to the lotus feet of the *guru*s. Afterwards, Tj^{g2} has two *ārambhaśloka*s, the last of which again expresses worship to Śiva.

The last remaining witness of the southern group, My^{t3}, has a partly illegible *maṅgala* dedicated to the foot or sandal of the *guru* (*gurupādukā*), followed by the same opening stanza which is found in nearly all witnesses belonging to the vulgate group.

The application of lower textual criticism to these findings with a view to reconstructing the hyparchetype β leads to the result that this early witness most probably neither contained a *maṅgala* nor an opening stanza. The fact that we find *atha* as the first word in three witnesses, each of which belonging to one of the three branches derived from the hyparchetype β, establishes this reading as deriving from the youngest common ancestor of all three mss., i.e. the hyparchetype β—as long as we have no indication that the common reading is caused by contamination or by independent parallel textual changes. The fact that My^{t3} has the same *ārambhaśloka* as the majority

17 Cf. the edition by Tukārāma Tātyā (1895), folios 226b6-227a2.

of witnesses belonging to the vulgate group can easily be explained as the result of contamination.

When we turn to the vulgate group, the variety of different *maṅgalas* is too great to discuss the readings of each witness separately. Out of the 16 mss. transmitting the beginning of the text, seven have *maṅgalas* to Gaṇeśa that differ from each other only with regard to the use of the syllable *oṃ* and with regard to the use of the honorific prefix *śrī*. The remaining witnesses have a *maṅgala* to the snake Ananta, to the highest self (*paramātman*), i.e. the supreme Lord, to the goddess Śrī and to Rāmānuja, the famous philosopher of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Concerning the transmitted opening stanzas, the vulgate group is quite uniform. All but three mss. have the following stanza in the *Sragdharā* metre right before the word *atha*:

> *yas tyaktvā rūpam ādyaṃ prabhavati jagato 'nekadhānugrahāya*
> *prakṣīṇakleśarāśir viṣamaviṣadharo 'nekavaktraḥ subhogī* ǀ
> *sarvajñānaprasūtir bhujagaparikaraḥ prītaye yasya nityaṃ*
> *devo 'hīśaḥ sa vo 'vyāt sitavimalatanur yogado yogayuktaḥ* ǁ

> "May he, who, having abandoned his primal form, exercises his power to show kindness to the world in many ways—he with the beautiful hood and many mouths, possessed of deadly poison and yet abolishing the mass of hindrances—he the source of all knowledge, and whose girdle of attendant snakes produces continual pleasure, —may he, the divine Lord of Serpents, protect you, with his stainless body—he, the giver of concentration (*yoga*), and himself concentrated in concentration" (Woods (1914), p. 3).

The application of lower textual criticism already makes it almost certain that this stanza did not originally belong to the *PYŚ*. It did probably not even belong to the youngest common ancestor of all vulgate witnesses, as three members of this group, i.e. Pv^{n3}, Pv^{n4}, and My^{t2}, agree with the archetype β in not transmitting this stanza. This finding is supplemented upon by external evidence. Neither the *YVi* nor Vācaspatimiśra's *TVś* show a trace of the stanza in their basic text. It is only Vijñānabhikṣu in his *Yogavārttika* who attests the existence of this *ārambhaśloka* as a part of his basic text in the second half of the 16th century.[18] These findings limit the time frame in which the stanza

18 *YVā ad PYŚ* I.1 as ed. by Rukmani (1981), p. 21.1-2: *nirvighnagranthasamāptaye yogapravartakam anantam īśvaraṃ smaran śiṣyāṇāṃ śāstragrahaṇānuṣṭhānādāv*

could have been added to the *PYŚ* to the beginning of the 11th until the beginning of the 16th century. The geographical region where the addition took place was clearly not South India. With the help of additional external evidence—to which Prof. Dr. ASHOK AKLUJKAR from the University of British Columbia kindly drew my attention—it is possible to cut down further on the time span as well as the geographical area in which the addition took place. The stanza is found right behind the heading *atha mahābhāṣyaṃ likhyate* in the commentary (*ṭīkā*) of a certain Śaṅkara on Puruṣottamadeva's *Prāṇapaṇita*, which in turn is a commentary on the *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* by Patañjali, the grammarian.[19] Maṇikaṇṭha, who comments upon Śaṅkara's *ṭīkā*, clearly states that the stanza was composed by Śaṅkara.[20] If this matches the truth, the region of the stanza's composition possibly was Bengal, as Puruṣottamadeva was a Bengali grammarian. The *terminus a quo* for the composition must be some time after Puruṣottamadeva, who lived in the first half of 12th century AD.[21]

How can we explain the diversity of *maṅgala*s and *ārambhaśloka*s that have found entrance into the transmission of the *PYŚ*? A possible answer has to do with the role of both text-constituents. *Maṅgala*s as well as *ārambhaśloka*s are well known to be used in order to magically secure the success of an enterprise.[22] With regard to the transmission of a text, two kinds of enterprises are important: (1.) the author's enterprise of composing, and (2) the scribes' enterprise of copying the text. *Maṅgala*s therefore can either be added to a text by an author or they are of scribal editorial origin. The chance of a scribal addition to become a fixed part of the text increases if it is well integrated into the world of the text's ideas. This is obviously the case with the *ārambhaśloka* starting with *yas tyaktvā*. We find a number of ideas connected with the deity Ananta that correspond to the theology outlined in *PYŚ* I.23 ff., as for example the idea that the supreme

apy apratibandhaṃ tatra{read *tata*} *eva prārthayate* ı *yas tyaktveti* ı
For the completion of his work without obstacles he (= Vedavyāsa) remembers the founder of Yoga, Ananta, the supreme Lord. He moreover requests from him that the disciples might not be obstructed in their [theoretical] understanding of the authoritative teaching (*śāstra*), in their practice, and so on, [by saying] "*yas tyaktvā*".

19 Cf. BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA (1946), Appendix I.

20 BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA (1946), Appendix II: *srīmahādevaḥ śaṅkaranāmakabrāhmaṇarūpeṇāvatīryya … maṅgalam ācarati—yas tyaktvety adi* ı (lines 13 ff.).

21 DASH (1991), p. 67.

22 Cf. footnote no. 18.

lord bestows knowledge, and that he is free from taints (*kleśa*). Moreover, the stanza reflects the legendary account that Patañjali is not only the author of the *Yogasūtra* but also an incarnation of the snake Ananta.

The existence of the stanza is not only in accordance with the legend of Patañjali's divine nature,[23] but also with a second presumably legendary account, viz. the separate authorship of the *YS* and of the *YBh*. According to this widespread view, Patañjali was the author of the *YS*, while Vyāsa or Vedavyāsa was the author of the *YBh*. As it seems unlikely that an author alludes to his own divine nature in an *ārambhaśloka*, the stanza is usually not attributed to Patañjali himself but to Vyāsa. The acceptance of this ascription, however, leads to an additional problem. If the commentator was the author of this stanza, one would expect him to place his *maṅgala* right at the beginning of his own work, i.e. immediately before the comments upon the first *sūtra*, and not before the *sūtra* itself. Admittedly, the four closely related printed editions *C1a*[E], *C1b*[E], *J1*[E], and *V2*[E] read *YS* I.1 and the stanza *yas tyaktvā* ... in an order inverted in comparison with the rest of the transmission. This, however, does not point to the originality of this version, but rather to the appreciation of the problem by one (or more) editor(s).

To my knowledge, the oldest source that clearly confirms the account of a different authorship for *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* is Mādhava Vidyāraṇya in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* from the 14th century, who possible lived not too long after the legend of Patañjali's divine nature had started to spread.[24]

The considerable influence of Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* on early Western presentations of Indian philosophy is well known.[25] The impact of these early expositions, however, on more recent histories of Indian philosophies has not yet been sufficiently studied. The degree of Mādhava's (indirect) influence on what we consider as knowledge of the history of Indian philosophy remains to be determined.

23 The oldest source known to me that clearly states the identity of Patañjali and the divine snake Ananta is the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* by a pseudo Śaṅkara, who according to Halbfass is "difficult to date but in any case ... [has] written after the first millennium" (1990), p. 350. Cf. Maas (2006), p. xv.

24 For a discussion of the authorship question cf. Maas (2006), p. xii-xvii.

25 Cf. Halbfass (1990), p. 350.

Abbreviations, Sigla, Symbols and Works Consulted

a) Abbreviations and Sigla

B^{n} common variant reading of B^{n1}, and B^{n2}.

B^{n1} microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Devanāgarī script on paper. "Central Library", Baroda. Acc. No.: 1108.

B^{n2} microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* written in Devanāgarī script on paper. "Central Library", Baroda. Acc. No.: 341.

$B^{ś}$ microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Śāradā script on paper. "Central Library", Baroda. Acc. No.: 1831.

B^{t} microfilm pictures of the *YBh* (without the *YS*) in Telugu script on paper. "Central Library", Baroda. Acc. No.: 7238.

$C1a^{E}$ *Patanjala Darshana of the Aphorisms of Theistic Philosophy. With the Commentary of Maharshi Veda Vyasa. And the Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra. Ed. ... by ...* Jibananda Vidyasagara ... Calcutta: Satya Press, 1874.

$C1b^{E}$ *Patanjala Darshana of the System of Yoga Philosophy by Maharshi Kapila. With the Commentary of Vyasa and the Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra.* 3. ed. [of the ed. 1903 (?), 2. ed. 1908 (?)]. *Ed. ... by ...* Jibananda Vidyasagara ... Calcutta: Bachaspatya Press, 1940.

$J1^{E}$ *The Aphorisms of Patanjali. With the Commentaries of Vyas, Vachaspati, and Bhoja, and Bhasha Translation. Fasculus 1. Ed. by* Munishwar Sharma ... Jagraon, Agra: Rajput Anglo Oriental Press, [1899][4] (M. K. Series 3).

K^{b} NGMPP microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Old Bengali script on palm leaf, from the "National Archives", Kathmandu. Ms. No.: 5-2672. Reel No.: B 40/2.

K^{M} NGMPP microfilm pictures of the *TVś* in Maithilī script with the *PYŚ* in the middle of the folios, from the "National Archives", Kathmandu. Ms. No.: M/457. Reel No.: M 97/4.

K^{n} common variant reading of K^{n1}, K^{n2}, and K^{n3}.

K^{n1} NGMPP microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Devanāgarī script on paper, from the "National Archives", Kathmandu. Ms. No.: 61. Reel No.: A 61/11.

K^{n2} NGMPP microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Devanāgarī script on paper, from the "National Archives", Kathmandu. Ms. No.: 1-1337. Reel No.: A 62-32.

K^{n3} NGMPP microfilm pictures of the *PYŚ* in Devanāgarī script on paper, from the "National Archives", Kathmandu. Ms. No.: 5-2669. Reel No.: A 62/27.

M^{g} digital images of the *PYŚ* in Grantha script on paper, from the "Adyar Library", Chennai (Madras). Shelf No.: PM 1420.

ms(s). manuscripts(s).

My^{N} digital images of the *TVś* with the *PYŚ* in the middle of the folios written in Nandināgarī script on paper. "Oriental Research Institute", Mysore. Shelf No.: C 1981/b.

My^{t1} digital images of the *PYŚ* in Telugu script on paper. "Oriental Research Institute", Mysore. Shelf No.: C 2004/2.

My^{t2}	digital images of the *YBh* (with the *YS* in the middle of the folios) in Telugu script on paper. "Oriental Research Institute", Mysore. Shelf No.: C 3214/2.
My^{t3}	digital images of the *PYŚ* in Telugu script on palm leaf. "Oriental Research Institute", Mysore. Shelf No.: P 1560/5.
My^{t3a}	fragment of folio 1 in My^{t3}.
My^{t3b}	substitute leaf for the fragment of folio 1 in My^{t3}.
om.	omits.
p	common variant reading of My^{N}, P^{n}, Pv^{n2}, and Pv^{n4}.
pc	variant reading of a ms. after its correction.
Pc^{g}	digital images of a palm leaf ms. containing the *PYŚ* in Grantha script from the library of the "École française d'Extrême-Orient, Centre de Pondichéry", Pondicherry. Shelf No.: 287.
P^{n}	digital images of the *PYŚ* in Devanāgarī script on paper. "Jaykar Library", University of Poona. Shelf No.: 2742.
Pv^{n}	common variant reading of Pv^{n2}, Pv^{n3}, and Pv^{n4}.
Pv^{n2}	digital images of a paper-ms. containing the *TVś* (with the *PYŚ* in the middle of the folios) in Devanāgarī script from the Library of the "University of Pennsylvania", Philadelphia. No. of receipt: 1923.
Pv^{n3}	digital images of a paper-ms. containing the *TVś* (with the *PYŚ* in the middle of the folios) in Devanāgarī script, from the Library of the "University of Pennsylvania", Philadelphia. No. of receipt: 1924.
Pv^{n4}	digital images of a paper-ms. containing the *PYŚ* (with citations from the *TVś* included in the running text) in Devanāgarī script, from the Library of the "University of Pennsylvania", Philadelphia. No. of receipt: 1930.
S	common variant reading of all witnesses transmitting the Southern Version (i.e. M^{g}, My^{t3}, Pc^{g}, Tj^{g1}, Tj^{g2}, Tv^{t}, Tv^{y} and *YVi*).
s. r.	single variant reading.
T^{n}	microfilm images of a paper-ms. in Devanāgarī of the *TVś* containing the *PYŚ* in the middle of the folios, from the "Trivipustakālaya", Kathmandu, photographed by the NGMPP. Ms. No.: T.81. Reel No.: T 6/5.
Tj^{g}	common variant reading of Tj^{g1} and Tj^{g2}.
Tj^{g1}	microfilm images of the *PYŚ* in Grantha on palm leaf, from the "Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī Mahāl Library", Thanjavur. Serial No.: 6703 (in Subrahmanya Sastri 1931).
Tj^{g2}	microfilm images of the *PYŚ* in Grantha on palm leaf, from the "Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī Mahāl Library", Thanjavur. Serial No.: 6702 (in Subrahmanya Sastri 1931).
TVś	*Tattvavaiśāradī* by Vacaspatimiśra.
Tv^{t}	digital images of the *PYŚ* on palm leaf in Telugu script, from the library of the "Oriental Research Institute", Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum). Shelf No.: 11837A.
Tv^{y}	digital images of the *PYŚ* on palm leaf in Malayālam script, from the library of the "Oriental Research Institute", Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum). Shelf No.: 622.

V	common variant reading of all mss. transmitting the vulgate (i.e. B^{n1}, B^{n2}, $B^{ś}$, B^{t}, K^{b}, K^{M}, K^{n1}, K^{n2}, K^{n3}, My^{N}, My^{t1}, My^{t2}, P^{n}, Pv^{n2}, Pv^{n3}, Pv^{n4} and T^{n}).
V2^{E}	*Pātañjalayogadarśanam. Vācaspatimiśraviracita-Tattvavaiśāradī-Vijñānabhikṣukṛta-Yogavārtikavibhūṣita-Vyāsabhāṣyasametam. …* Śrī[-]NĀRĀYAṆAMIŚREṆA *ṭippaṇīpariśiṣṭādibhiḥ saha sampāditam.* Vārāṇasī: Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśan, (1971).
v.l.	variant reading (*varia lectio*).
YBh	*Yogabhāṣya.*
YS	*Yogasūtra.*
YVā	RUKMANI, T. S.: *Yogavārttikā of Vijñānabhikṣu.*
YVi	*Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa* crit. ed. by KENGO HARIMOTO.

b) Symbols

Σ	all mss. except those mentioned.
]	within a critical apparatus, a square bracket marks the end of a citation of main text.
◊	separating symbol for lemmas referring to different words in the same line of main text.
†	textual witnesses preceded by a dagger are not available for the passage under discussion.
*	illegible *akṣara* or part of an *akṣara*.
( )	text in round brackets cannot be deciphered with certainty.
{ }	braces are used to mark a deviation of the immediately preceding *akṣara*.[26] The *akṣara* has to be replaced by the text in braces. Example: "sadviṣaye{ya K^{b} (*ac*)} <ye>ṇaika K^{b}" takes the place of "sadviṣaya<ye>ṇaika K^{b} (*ac*); sadviṣaye<ye>ṇaika K^{b} (*pc*)". If no textual witness is mentioned, the text in braces gives my correction of the preceding *akṣara*.
< >	text in pointed brackets is deleted in the respective ms.
+ +	text between two plus signs was added in the margin of the folio or elsewhere.
...	three dots mark an omission of text for the purpose of abbreviation. They are only used in cases where the omitted text can easily be guessed.
०	transliteration of the sign for omission in Devanāgarī script.

c) Works Consulted

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26 Text in brackets refers to an initial vowel, a consonant (or conjunct consonants) with vowel (including a following *visarga* or *anusvāra*) or a single consonant at the end of a word. If the reference is not limited to the preceding *akṣara* the extension is mentioned.

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What was Śaṅkara's Śāstrārambha?*

Johannes Bronkhorst (Lausanne)

Śaṅkara, in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, refers a few times to the beginning of his Śāstra, using the expressions *śāstrārambha* and *śāstrapramukha*. There has been controversy about the meaning of these expressions. This controversy concerns the question, "Which was the beginning of Śaṅkara's Śāstra?" But another question looms behind it, viz., "Which was Śaṅkara's Śāstra?"

Recall that Śaṅkara presents his philosophy as a form of Mīmāṃsā. He calls it Vedāntamīmāṃsā (never Uttaramīmāṃsā). Śaṅkara was, of course, acquainted with the other kind of Mīmāṃsā, i.e. ritual Mīmāṃsā, which is sometimes called Pūrvamīmāṃsā (though not by Śaṅkara). This raises the question whether he looked upon the two Mīmāṃsās as being together one Śāstra or two. Śaṅkara's position on this issue is not immediately clear from his writings. Scholars have therefore tried to draw conclusions from the few passages that refer to the beginning of his Śāstra. If Śaṅkara, when using the expression "beginning of the Śāstra", turns out to refer to texts of ritual Mīmāṃsā, the conclusion will be justified that the two Mīmāṃsās together, in Śaṅkara's opinion, were but one Śāstra.

Śaṅkara uses the expression *śāstrapramukha* in the following passage, which is part of his comments on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53 (*eka ātmanaḥ śarīre bhāvāt*):[1]

> *nanu śāstrapramukha eva prathame pāde śāstraphalopabhogayogyasya dehavyatiriktasyātmano 'stitvam uktam* । *satyam uktaṃ bhāṣyakṛtā* । *na tu tatrātmāstitve sūtram asti* । *iha tu svayam eva sūtrakṛtā tadastitvam ākṣepapuraḥsaraṃ pratiṣṭhāpitam* । *ita eva cākṛṣyācāryeṇa śabarasvāminā*

* This article is essentially an extract of the portions dealing with *śāstrārambha* and *śāstrapramukha* in a longer article, "Vedānta as Mīmāṃsā" (2007), published in a volume of the proceedings of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference, Helsinki 2003.

1 BSūBhā on *sūtra* 3.3.53 (ed. J. L. Shastri p. 764 l.9 - p. 765 l.1); cp. Parpola, 1981: 153.

pramāṇalakṣaṇe varṇitam | *ata eva ca bhagavatopavarṣeṇa prathame tantre ātmāstitvābhidhānaprasaktau śārīrake vakṣyāma ity uddhāraḥ kṛtaḥ* |

[Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda? [Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the Bhāṣya. But there (i.e., at the beginning of the Śāstra) there is no *sūtra* about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in Brahmasūtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the author of the Sūtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, Ācārya Śabarasvāmin has described [the existence of the self] in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavarṣa in the first Tantra, when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented himself with saying: 'We shall explain this in the Śārīraka'.

HERMANN JACOBI (1911: 18 [576]) concluded from this passage that "at Śabarasvāmin's time the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā still formed *one* philosophical system, while after Kumārila and Śaṅkara they were practically two mutually exclusive philosophies". Is this conclusion justified? It depends on the precise meaning of several terms used in this passage. What, to begin with, is meant by the expression "at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda" (*śāstrapramukha eva prathame pāde*). Is it the same as "in the first Tantra" (*prathame tantre*), later on in the passage? Since "the first Tantra" is explicitly contrasted with and therefore differentiated from "the Śārīraka" — the Śārīraka being no doubt Upavarṣa's planned (or executed) commentary on the Brahmasūtra —, it seems safe to conclude that "the first Tantra" is the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (or Upavarṣa's commentary on it).[2] Many interpreters identify "the very beginning of the Śāstra" with

2 Cf. KANE, HistDh 5(2), p. 1160: "Śaṅkarācārya refers to the extant Pūrvamīmāṃsā as Dvādaśalakṣaṇī in his bhāṣya on Vedāntasūtra III.3.26, as 'Prathamatantra' in bhāṣya on V.S. III.3.25, III.3.53 and III.4.27, as Prathamakāṇḍa in bhāṣya on V.S. III.3.1, III.3.33, III.3.44, III.3.50, as Pramāṇalakṣaṇa in bhāṣya on V.S. [2.1.1 and] III.4.42." Similarly KANE, 1960: 120.

Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5.[3] But is this correct? Why should our short passage refer to one and the same discussion in three different ways: (i) "at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda", (ii) "in [the section] dealing with the means of valid cognition" and (iii) "in the first Tantra"?

We have to find out what Śaṅkara meant by "the beginning of the Śāstra". Related to this is the question whether Śaṅkara looked upon Mīmāṃsāsūtra and Brahmasūtra as together constituting one Śāstra, or as two different Śāstras. JACOBI, followed by PARPOLA (1981), invoked this passage to prove that the two together were originally one Śāstra, but their proof may be, at least in part, circular: The two disciplines were originally one because Śaṅkara refers to the Mīmāṃsāsūtra as "the beginning of the Śāstra", and "the beginning of the Śāstra" must refer to the Mīmāṃsāsūtra because the two disciplines were originally one. How do we get out of this circular argument?

There is another passage in Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya which may throw light on his understanding of his own Śāstra. It occurs under *sūtra* 1.1.4 and contains the expression *śāstrārambha*:[4]

> *evaṃ ca sati "athāto brahmajijñāsā" iti tadviṣayaḥ pṛthakśāstrārambha upapadyate* | *pratipattividhiparatve hi "athāto dharmajijñāsā" ity evārabdhatvān na pṛthakśāstraṃ ārabhyeta* | *ārabhyamāṇaṃ caivam ārabhyate: "athātaḥ pariśiṣṭadharmajijñāsā" iti, "athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayor jijñāsā" itivat* | *brahmātmaikyāvagatis tv apratijñāteti tadartho yuktaḥ śāstrārambhaḥ "athāto brahmajijñāsā" iti* |
>
> Such being the case, it is proper to begin a separate Śāstra with the words "Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma" (Brahmasūtra 1.1.1) because it deals with that. For in case [this Śāstra] were to deal with injunctions that one has to know [Brahma], no separate Śāstra could be begun, because [the Śāstra of injunctions (viz. the Mīmāṃsāsūtra)] has already begun with the words "Then therefore the enquiry into Dharma" (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.1). Something that has already begun would begin like this "Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining Dharma", just like "Then therefore the enquiry into the purpose of the sacrifice and into the purpose

3 E.g. DEUSSEN, 1887: 624; THIBAUT, 1890/1896: II: 268; GAMBHIRANANDA, 1972: 740; HIRIYANNA, 1925: 231; KANE, 1960: 120; KANE, HistDh 5(2), p. 1160; PARPOLA, 1981: 153; RAMACHANDRUDU, 1989: 234-235; BOUY, 2000: 23 n. 92; GOVINDĀNANDA and ĀNANDAGIRI on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53.

4 BSūBhā on *sūtra* 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. SHASTRI p. 98 l. 3-7).

of man" (which is a *sūtra* (4.1.1) that introduces a chapter of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra). But because knowledge of the identity of Brahma and *ātman* has not been stated (in the Mīmāṃsā), the beginning of a [new] Śāstra in the form "Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma" in order to convey that [knowledge] is appropriate.

As the translation shows, this passage lends itself easily to an interpretation in which the Brahmasūtra belongs to a separate Śāstra (*pṛthakśāstra*), different from ritual Mīmāṃsā.

There is more. According to Śaṅkara in his comments on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53 which we studied above, "the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra has [already] been stated at the very beginning of the Śāstra, in the first Pāda". The very first Pāda of Śabara's Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra does indeed contain a long passage dealing with the existence of the self (edited in FRAUWALLNER, 1968: p. 50 l. 5 - p. 60 l. 23; translated pp. 51-61). This self is, as a matter of fact, stated to be different from the body, but the passage says nothing about its being "capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra". The first Pāda of Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya, on the other hand, repeatedly deals with these issues. As a short example we can take the following statement from Śaṅkara's comments on Brahmasūtra 1.1.4:[5]

> *"aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ" iti priyāpriyasparśanapratiṣedhāc codanālakṣaṇadharmakāryatvaṃ mokṣākhyasyāśarīratvasya pratiṣidhyata iti gamyate*
> From the denial of being affected by joy and sorrow expressed in the statement "Joy and sorrow do not affect the one without body" (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.12.1) we understand that the state of being without body, called liberation, is denied to be the effect of Dharma characterised as injunction.

The "one without body" is the self. The present passage tells us that this self, which is without body, is capable of enjoying the fruit of the Śāstra, viz. liberation.

As an example of a short passage dealing with the existence of the self we can quote from Śaṅkara's comments on Brahmasūtra 1.1.1:[6]

5 BSūBhā on *sūtra* 1.1.4 (ed. J.L. SHASTRI p. 72 l. 1-3).
6 BSūBhā on *sūtra* 1.1.1 (ed. J.L. SHASTRI p. 43 l. 1-2).

> *sarvo hy ātmāstitvaṃ pratyeti, na nāham asmīti | yadi hi nātmāstitva-prasiddhiḥ syāt sarvo loko nāham asmīti pratīyāt |*
> For everyone is conscious of the existence of (his) self, and never thinks 'I am not'. If the existence of the self were not known, every one would think 'I am not'. (tr. THIBAUT, 1890|1896: I: 14)

There are therefore good reasons to interpret the passage from Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya on *sūtra* 3.3.53 cited above in the following manner:

> [Objection:] Has the existence of a self that is different from the body and capable of enjoying the fruits of the Śāstra not [already] been stated at the very beginning of the [present] Śāstra, in the first Pāda [of the Brahmasūtra and its Bhāṣya]?
> [Answer:] That is true; it has been stated by the author of the [Brahmasūtra-]Bhāṣya (i.e., by Śaṅkara himself).[7] But there (i.e., at the beginning of the Brahmasūtra) there is no *sūtra* about the existence of a self. Here (i.e., in Brahmasūtra 3.3.53), on the other hand, the existence of the [self] has been established, after an initial objection, by the author of the Sūtra himself. And having taken it from here itself, Ācārya Śabarasvāmin has described [the existence of the self] in [the section of the Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya] dealing with the means of valid cognition. Therefore also the revered Upavarṣa in the first Tantra (i.e. in his commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra), when he had to discuss the existence of the self, contented himself with saying: 'We shall explain this in the Śārīraka'.

This way of understanding Śaṅkara's reference to the first Pāda agrees with the way in which he refers to the first, second and third Adhyāyas. Wherever in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya he refers to Adhyāyas, they are Adhyāyas of his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya (or of the Brahma-

7 The use of the third person to refer to one's own work finds a parallel, e.g., in Maṇḍana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi (e.g. p. 75 l. 4: *vakṣyati*; p. 23 l. 17: *āha*), and is particularly common where an author has himself composed a commentary on his own work. Compare in this context Medhātithi's remark under Manu 1.4 (I p. 7 l. 28-29): *prāyeṇa granthakārāḥ svamataṃ parāpadeśena bruvate: 'atrāha' 'atra pariharanti' iti* "it is a well known fact that in most cases the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons, making use of such expression as 'in this connection *he says*' or '*they* meet this argument thus', and so forth" (tr. JHA, III p. 20, modified). Nowhere else in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya does Śaṅkara mention an 'author of the Bhāṣya' (*bhāṣyakṛt*; see MAHADEVAN, 1971&1973: II: 723).

sūtra), numbered according to the position they have in his own work. Śaṅkara refers to the "first Adhyāya" at the very beginning of the second Adhyāya of his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya; here there can be no doubt that it concerns the first Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra (Bhāṣya), not of ritual Mīmāṃsā. Similarly, the "second Adhyāya" referred to at the very beginning of the third Adhyāya and under Brahmasūtra 2.1.1 clearly refers to Śaṅkara's own second chapter (or to that chapter of the Brahmasūtra). The same applies to the "third Adhyāya" referred to at the beginning of chapter four and under Brahmasūtra 3.1.1.[8]

A few words remain to be said about Śabara. The above passage shows that, in Śaṅkara's opinion, Śabara took a topic, or a passage, which belonged under Brahmasūtra 3.3.53 and placed it in his Mīmāṃsā Bhāṣya. The passage does not say what exactly he took, nor does it state that he took it from his own commentary on the Brahmasūtra. Śaṅkara's testimony loses most of its value in the light of ERICH FRAUWALLNER's (1968) analysis of Śabara's Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.1-5. It is this portion of Śabara's Bhāṣya that contains a discussion of the self in a section dealing with the means of valid cognition, as noted by Śaṅkara. However, both the discussion of the self and the section on means of valid cognition in which it finds itself belong to the so-called Vṛttikāra-grantha. That is to say, they belong to a portion which Śabara explicitly cites from another author, whom he calls the Vṛttikāra. No one, not even Śaṅkara, claims that the Vṛttikāra-grantha as a whole was taken from a commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53; the fact that the Vṛttikāra-grantha comments several Mīmāṃsāsūtras excludes this as a possibility. Within the Vṛttikāra-grantha the section on the existence of the self is an insertion (FRAUWALLNER, 1968: 109-110). This implies that if someone has taken this section from a commentary on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53, it was not Śabara, but the Vṛttikāra. It is therefore excluded that Śaṅkara still knew a commentary by Śabara on the Brahmasūtra which presumably contained the passage which is now part of the Vṛttikāra-grantha. Stated differently, it is open to question whether Śaṅkara knew more about Śabara than we do.

8 The fact that Bhāskara on *sūtra* 1.1.1 (ed. DVIVEDIN p. 6 l. 19-20) uses "in the first Pāda" where Śaṅkara says "in the first Tantra" (*ata evopavarṣācāryeṇoktaṃ prathamapāde ātmavādaṃ tu śārīrake vakṣyāma iti*) suggests that he already misinterpreted Śaṅkara.

This may not be all that surprising. Even Kumārila, who commented upon Śabara's Bhāṣya itself and is commonly regarded as having lived before Śaṅkara (PANDE, 1994: 46-47), did no longer know the extent of the Vṛttikāra-grantha (JACOBI, 1911: 15 (573) f.).[9] Śaṅkara's incorrect attribution of the discussion of the self to Śabara is therefore understandable. His claim to know where this passage came from, on the other hand, is no more reliable than this incorrect attribution.

Since FRAUWALLNER's analysis may not be generally known, I cite here the most relevant passage (1968: 109-110):

> Der ganze Vṛttikāragranthaḥ ist, im großen gesehen, folgendermaßen aufgebaut. Nach der Besprechung der Erkenntnismittel ergreift ein Gegner das Wort und bringt eine Reihe von Gründen gegen die Glaubwürdigkeit des Veda vor. Die späteren Kommentatoren nennen diesen Abschnitt Citrākṣepavādaḥ, weil der Gegner von der vedischen Vorschrift *"citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ"* ausgeht. Die Antwort lautet zunächst im Anschluß an das Sūtram 5, daß der Veda glaubwürdig ist wegen der Naturgegebenheit der Verknüpfung von Wort und Gegenstand. Das wird weit ausholend besprochen: Wesen des Wortes, Gegenstand des Wortes, Wesen der Verknüpfung und ihre Naturgegebenheit. Dann wird nochmal auf die Angriffe des Gegners im Citrākṣepaḥ zurückgegriffen und sie werden der Reihe nach widerlegt. Damit ist die ganze Auseinandersetzung abgeschlossen.
>
> In die abschließende Zurückweisung des Citrākṣepaḥ ist nun eine lange Erörterung über das Vorhandensein einer Seele eingefügt. Daß es sich dabei um einen sekundären Einschub handelt, zeigt schon das grobe Missverhältnis im Umfang dieses Einschubs gegenüber dem ganzen Abschnitt. Die ganze übrige Widerlegung des Citrākṣepaḥ umfaßt nur 16 Zeilen, der Einschub 133 Zeilen. Ebenso kraß ist die Äußerlichkeit der Einfügung. Auf diese lange Abschweifung folgt plötzlich ganz unvermittelt noch eine kurze Erwiderung auf einen der Einwände im Citrākṣepaḥ, so daß der Leser zunächst erstaunt fragt, wovon denn eigentlich die Rede ist.

9 YOSHIMIZU (2006) shows that Kumārila subsequently changed his mind about the extent of the Vṛttikāra-grantha.

This analysis clearly shows that the portion on the soul is an insertion into the Vṛttikāragrantha, and not into Śabara's commentary. Śaṅkara obviously had it wrong.[10]

There is less reason to be sceptical with regard to Śaṅkara's statement about Upavarṣa. There is no reason to doubt that Śaṅkara knew a commentary by Upavarṣa on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra in which its author stated: "We shall explain [the existence of the self] in the Śārīraka". What does this prove?

It seems plausible to conclude from this that Upavarṣa commented, or intended to comment, on both the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Brahmasūtra. Does this mean that he "seems to have treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work" (Nakamura, 1983: 398 n. 4, referring to Belvalkar)? This is far from certain. We know that another author, Maṇḍana Miśra, wrote treatises both on Mīmāṃsā and on Vedānta around the time of Śaṅkara, and yet it cannot be maintained that he treated the two sets of aphorisms as one connected work. Not much later Vācaspati Miśra commented upon works belonging to a variety of schools of thought. The fact, therefore, that Upavarṣa commented (or wanted to comment) upon the classical texts of two schools of thought does not, in and by itself, prove that he looked upon these as fundamentally the same, or upon their classical texts as really being parts of one single text. Indeed, the very circumstance that he speaks in this connection of "the Śārīraka" suggests that he did not look upon that work as simply a later part of the same commentary. And the fact that Śaṅkara speaks about Upavarṣa's 'first Tantra' without further specification while referring to his commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra may simply suggest that Śaṅkara did not know Upavarṣa's commentary on the Brahmasūtra.

The analysis of Śaṅkara's statements does not, therefore, provide us with reliable evidence that would allow to conclude that until Śaṅkara, and more particularly at the time of Upavarṣa and Śabara, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Brahmasūtra were looked upon as parts of one single work. Even less do these statements prove that the two systems of thought that find expression in those texts were believed to be in reality just one system of thought. Śaṅkara's *śāstrārambha*

10 Regarding Śaṅkara's date, see Slaje, 2006 fn. 1 (just before 700 C.E.). Slaje (fn. 61) also gives a survey of opinions as to Śabara's date, which does not however take into consideration that Śabara was not yet known to Bhartṛhari (Bronkhorst, 1989), so that it is highly unlikely that Śabara lived before the fifth century C.E.

was the beginning of the Brahmasūtra with commentary, and his Śāstra was the Vedāntamīmāṃsā, not some hypothetical Mīmāṃsā that covered both Pūrva- and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā.

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Abbreviations

BSūBhā	Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara
KANE, HistDh	KANE, PANDURANG VAMAN: History of Dharmaśāstra, second edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 5 vols., 1968-1977

Advaitic Reasoning of Undertaking (*ārambha*) the *Brahmavicāraśāstra* and the Counter-argument in Veṅkaṭanātha's *Śatadūṣaṇī**

Marcus Schmücker (*Vienna*)

In every religious tradition the teaching of authoritative, sacred scripture requires a situation in which it can be taught, portrayed or relayed to a person who is entitled to preserve and to sustain what is believed in such a tradition to be the highest Principle. This situation, even if it deals with such a Principle, is time-dependent and attached to a certain place. It stands in contrast to its absoluteness, because it requires a teacher and a pupil who are finite beings and who must talk about a timeless Principle. But how can one agree upon the fact that one is to teach about the highest Principle in human language? The teaching of such a Principle in a concrete didactical situation refers not only to the difficult relation between a metaphysical principle and its communication in a specific language, but also to the question: How can the concrete beginning of teaching about what is believed to be the highest Being conform to the Principle itself that is thought to be independent of time, i.e. without any particular beginning, and independent of any certain place?

That these questions not only involve philosophical or theological discussions, but are also of soteriological relevance, can be illustrated in Indian religious traditions on the concept of *śāstrārambha*, 'beginning/undertaking of sacred teaching', especially in traditions like the ones of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta and of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. If the term *śāstrārambha* is used in these two vedāntic traditions, it refers not only to the literal words by which the *śāstra*, i.e. the Brahmasūtra, starts, but becomes an important point in their considerations dealing with the question: How is the concrete begin-

* I would like to thank Professor Edwin Gerow for correcting my English and for his many valuable suggestions; I feel particularly grateful to him for his last-minute help.

ning (*ārambha*) of the *śāstra* possible, in relation to the absolute Principle therein taught, and how can release (*mokṣa*) be achieved for a person desirous of it (*mumukṣu*)?

To outline in which context the term *śāstrārambha* became relevant and in which manner it refers to the question of the relation between the beginning and the releasing insight, I have first (I) to explain how the first Brahmasūtra is interpreted in both Schools of Vedānta and then to describe their considerations regarding that beginning. According to Śaṅkara and his followers (Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, Vimuktātman) the beginning of the *śāstra* has to be explained by the concept of ignorance (*avidyā*) (II). Although such a concept is plausibly justified, it implies difficulties and is criticisable. Such criticism was achieved in earliest times by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic School, but was later elaborated by Veṅkaṭanātha in his Śatadūṣaṇī, to which I will refer at the end (III).

I.

Since the beginning of the *śāstra* can only be reasonable if it leads a person to the awareness of *brahman*, both main exponents of the Vedānta traditions, i.e. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, not only have to discuss whether both or only one single Mīmāṃsā can provide the beginning of the instruction, they also have to address the problem of which presuppositions govern the pupil in the two traditions as he begins to study the Veda. Thus, the first Brahmasūtra 1.1.1: *athāto brahmajijñāsā*: "And hence then the desire to know *brahman*", has led especially by the word 'then' (*atha*) to the controversial question, whether the desire to know *brahman* arises immediately after the knowledge of (ritualistic) actions, or arrives before the knowledge of ritual actions? The first view is represented by Rāmānuja. He regards the two Mīmāṃsās, the Pūrvā and Uttarā Mīmāṃsā, as one *śāstra* and refers to their unity with the term *śāstraikya/aikaśāstrya*[1]. For him, the study of the Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā, understood as the knowledge of religious duties, precedes the knowledge of *brahman*, the Uttarā Mīmāṃsā. However, by taking the Veda as one corpus, the connection between Pūrvā and Uttarā Mīmāṃsā contrasts with the second view, i.e. the opinion of Śaṅkara and his followers, who ne-

1 For the interpretation of Rāmānuja's concept of *śāstraikya/aikaśāstrya* compare Marlewicz 2007: 75-88.

glect the study of ritual acts/duties described in the Karmakāṇḍa of the Veda.

One reason for Śaṅkara's strict distinction between *brahman* and *dharma* is indicated by his different concepts of *brahman*, to which I will turn now. According to Śaṅkara and his School's doctrine, *brahman* is considered under the terms of ChU 6.2.1 the ultimate Being 'without a second' (*advitīya*). This is the context in which the reluctance to presuppose any knowledge of *dharma* can be understood; that presupposition, for Śaṅkara, gives way to emphasis on the four pre-requisite means (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*). Śaṅkara replaces the pupil's study of *dharma* with these prerequisites. These necessary means are: the distinction between permanent and impermanent entities (*nityānityavastuviveka*), non-attachment to the enjoyment of objects in this world and the yonder world (*ihāmutrārthabhogavirāga*), perfection in the six means towards tranquility, restraint etc. (*śamadamādisādhanasampad*), as well as a desire for liberation (*mumukṣutva*).[2] For Śaṅkara these conditions suffice for the investigation of *brahman* and he argues that one may successfully inquire into *brahman* regardless of previously knowing *dharma* or not.[3]

In contrast to the knowledge of *dharma*, which depends on ritual action (*anuṣṭhāna*) and promises welfare/bliss (*abhyudaya*), *brahman* exists independently of carrying out any ritual action (*anuṣṭhānāntarāpekṣa*, BSūbh 80,2). The teaching of the *brahmacodanā* does not involve an agent's (*kartṛ*) having to carry out an injunction, but simply awakens the person and leads him to the summum bonum (*niḥśreyasa*), i.e. the awareness of *brahman* (*avabodha*). Thus Śaṅkara distinguishes the meaning of the injunction dealing with *brahman* from the injunction characterized by *dharma* in the following words:

> BSūbh 69,3-70,2: *iha tu bhūtaṃ brahma jijñāsyaṃ nityatvān na puruṣavyāpāratantram.* [...] *brahmacodanā tu puruṣam avabodhayaty eva kevalam; avabodhasya codanājanyatvān na puruṣo 'vabodhe niyujyate.*

Here in contrast [to the ritual Mīmāṃsā] the real *brahman* that is desired to be known does not depend on human activity, because it exists permanently. [...] The injunction dealing with *brahman* merely makes a person aware of it; the person is not directed to such an

2 Compare Marlewicz 2007: 79.
3 Compare BSūbh 73,1-2.

awareness [by any religious act], because such an awareness is not caused by any injunction.

But applying the concept of *śāstrārambha* in this context one can ask: In which manner is it possible to undertake the Brahmasūtra, if the aim/goal, i.e. *brahman*, has to be assumed as already existing, different from any empirical object to which one can refer in the world or different from an aim that can be reached by ritual activity? Under which presuppositions can the *śāstra* for gaining such knowledge be undertaken? And for what purpose can one undertake the *śāstra* if the desired *brahman* itself has no beginning in space and time? How the teachings of the *śāstra* can set a concrete beginning, but refer to a principle that is without any qualification (*nirviśeṣa*), without parts/aspects (*niraṃśa*), mere being or only pure consciousness/awareness? How can one start the investigation about a principle that, further, according to Śaṅkara's and his followers, is self-proved (*svayaṃsiddha*), fully known (*jñāta*), permanently existing, not to be cognized as distinct from any other entity? Thus, if something should be learnt about the nature of *brahman*, the beginning of the *śāstra*, which implies a certain spatial and temporal situation, controverts the view of *brahman* as a principle devoid of any characteristics that could be described or taught in a concrete situation by a teacher.

For the tradition of the Śaṅkara School, the central term 'having no second' (*advaita*) points to the difficulty of correlating the teaching of *brahman*, itself devoid of relation to any concrete situation. Especially for the followers of Śaṅkara's teachings this difficulty became more and more acute and was solved with the help of the doctrine of non-real ignorance (*avidyā*): Everything different from the highest Being such as for instance, an agent (*kartṛ*) or even the above-mentioned basic knowledge of difference between what exists permanent and impermanent, according to Śaṅkara's explanation, can be understood only as a result of non-real ignorance (*avidyā*).[4] But even if non-real ignorance of this sort is supposed, the next question arises and

4 Compare also BSūbh 40,3-4: *tam etam avidyākhyam ātmānātmanor itaretarādhyāsaṃ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā laukikāḥ pravṛttāḥ, sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhipratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi.* Because of this aforementioned reciprocal superimposition of the self and the non-self, which is denoted as 'ignorance', all empirical usages of the world [relating to] valid knowledge and their objects take place, and all the sacred teachings having as their content prescription, prohibition and release.

must be answered: How can ignorance (*avidyā*) and the concept of *śāstra* be related, and in what way can the initiation (*ārambha*) of the teaching be explained with the help of *avidyā?*

Trying to maintain the consistency of the monistic doctrine of *brahman*, Śaṅkara and his followers' accept ignorance as a principle which provides not only for the *śāstra*'s being undertaken, but as a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) itself; for them this solves the problem of how a person can be taught about a principle that already exists, but—because of the existence of ignorance—is still unknown to that person. Thus, ignorance (*avidyā*) serves its purpose, not only as explaining how an ignorant person becomes desirous of knowing *brahman*, but also insofar as it explains the *śāstra*'s capacity to remove everything that can prevent the liberating insight. But isn't it contradictory to affirm that undertaking a *śāstra* that deals with the self-evident *brahman* can be explained only by recourse to non-real ignorance (*avidyā*)?

II.

Against the background of these metaphysical premises, it seems only possible to explain the undertaking of the *śāstra*, i.e. the instruction of the (first) Brahmasūtra, with the help of ignorance (*avidyā*). According to Śaṅkara, knowledge in respect of the highest Principle can only be supposed to begin in ignorance. Also the *śāstra*, being a valid means of cognition for becoming aware of *brahman*, does not exceed what is characterized by *avidyā* (*avidyāvad viṣayatvaṃ nātivartate*, BSūbh 50,2). It serves its purpose as long as ignorance of *brahman* is not removed completely. Any sacred teaching that exists *before* self-awareness is realized cannot but be characterized by ignorance (*avidyā*), which Śaṅkara defines as 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*).[5] It is 'beginningless' (*anādi*), 'endless' (*ananta*), 'natural' (*naisargika*), 'having the nature of illusory cognition' (*mithyāpratyayarūpa*), 'causes agency, percipience' (*kartṛtvabhoktṛtvapravartaka*) and can be 'experienced by every person' (*sarvalokapratyakṣa*).

Against this background it becomes clear that the *śāstra* has to be undertaken for the removal of any kind of false apprehension caused by ignorance. It fulfills its aim insofar as the false concept of the self

5 See the definition of *adhyāsa* in BSūbh 50,1: *adhyāso nāma atasmiṃs tadbuddhir ity avocāma*, and the following definitions of the *adhyāsa* in BSūbh 52,1-2.

is removed by undertaking the *śāstra*. By summarizing his introduction to the first Brahmasūtra Śaṅkara stipulates for which purpose the *śāstra*—in this case he uses the expression 'every Vedānta' (*sarve vedāntā*)—has to be undertaken, and he clearly explains that the liberating insight can only be known if any other cause of evil—i.e. (various forms of) ignorance—be removed. At the end of his introduction to the first Brahmasūtra he says:

> BSūbh 45,3-4: *asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya, ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante yathā cāyam arthaḥ sarveṣāṃ vedāntānāṃ tathā vayam asyāṃ śārīrakamīmāṃsāyāṃ pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ.*
>
> All Vedāntas are undertaken for the removal of this cause of evil, [and] in order to obtain knowledge of the oneness of the self; and we shall show in this Śārīrakamīmāṃsā in which way this is the purpose of all Vedāntas.

Even if it is unremarkable that Śaṅkara wrote an introduction to the first Sūtra, in this context it is worth mentioning that he is—in contrast to Rāmānuja—an exception in giving such a detailed one, by which he presents his basic concept of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) that perhaps could have been included in his commentary to the first Brahmasūtra as well. When he expresses his own views in his detailed introduction, in which precedes the authoritative text of the first Brahmasūtra, he not only gives a reason for undertaking the first Brahmasūtra, but justifies this step with his own doctrine of ignorance (*avidyā*). Thus, in exemplifying the meaning of non-real ignorance by writing an introduction, which precedes likewise the first Sūtra, he legitimizes his own undertaking of a commentary to the Brahmasūtras.

But how are Śaṅkara's introductory sentences interpreted after him? It is his closest pupil Padmapāda who refers to the concluding passage of Śaṅkara in his Pañcapādikā and relates that passage to the concept of *śāstra*. How does he explain and connect the beginning of the *śāstra* with the concept of *avidyā* against the background of Śaṅkara's introduction? He brings Śaṅkara's beginning and ending words of the introduction together with the terms defining the concept of *śāstra* and introduces (for the first time?) the 'main topic' (*viṣaya*) and 'aim' (*prayojana*) of the *śāstra* in this context. He picks up the words of his teacher in the following way:

PañcP 7,1-4: ***yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayor*** [BSūbh 6,1] *ityādy* ***aham idaṃ mamedam iti naisargiko 'yaṃ lokavyavahāra*** [BSūbh 17,1] *ityantaṃ bhāṣyam,* ***asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāyātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyanta*** [BSūbh 45,3-4] *ity anena bhāṣyeṇa paryavasyac; chāstrasya viṣayaḥ prayojanaṃ cārthāt prathamasūtreṇa sūtrite iti pratipādayati.*

The commentary beginning with the words: "Of the two objects of concepts of Thou and I", and ending with the words: "There is this natural empirical usage like I am this and this is mine", culminates with the comment: "It is for the removal of this cause of evil [and] in order to obtain knowledge of the oneness of the self, that all Vedāntas are commenced". It expounds that the main topic (*viṣaya*) and the aim (*prayojana*) have been taught properly in the first Sūtra.

Also for Padmapāda it is evident that the *śāstra* has to be undertaken for the removal of ignorance and for the right knowledge of *brahman*. In the following quotation an opponent mentions *viṣaya* and *prayojana* of the *śāstra* and criticizes Śaṅkara's first introductory sentence. Having explained the *śāstra*'s aim (*prayojana*) with the words "removing ignorance" and its main topic (*viṣaya*) with the words "knowing the identity between self and *brahman*", he questions Śaṅkara's most important explanation of the concept of superimposition (*adhyāsa*):

PañcP p. 9,1-10,1: *atrāha yady evam etāvad evāstu bhāṣyam* ***asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāyātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante*** [BSūbh 45,3-4] *iti. tatrā****narthahetoḥ prahāṇāya iti*** *prayojananirdeśaḥ.* ***ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye*** *iti viṣayapradarśanam. kim anena* ***yuṣmadasmad*** [BSūbh 6,1] *ityādinā****haṃ manuṣya iti dehendriyādiṣv ahaṃ mamedam*** [BSūbh 45,3-4] *ity abhimānātmakasya lokavyavahārasyāvidyānimittatvapradarśanapareṇabhāṣyeṇa?*

Here he says: If this is the case then the commentary should be so far in the words: "All Vedāntas are undertaken for the removal of this cause of evil, [and] in order to obtain knowledge of the oneness of the self". In reference to this sentence, the word: "for the removal of the cause of evil" denote the aim. The main topic is explained by the words: "In order to obtain knowledge of the oneness of the self". [But] what purpose is served by the commentary

beginning with the words: "You and Me", having as its main object the teaching that ignorance is the cause of the common worldly usage, whereby one says erroneously: "This is 'I' and this is 'Mine' in reference to body, senses etc., or if one says (in reference to the self) 'I'm mortal'"?

The opponent's question about the use of the superimposition gives Padmapāda an occasion to explain how aim and main topic, i.e. removing ignorance and obtaining the right knowledge, can be related. The fact of everybody's false identification, which is empirically verifiable, is the very presupposition that can be removed by the right knowledge of *brahman*. If nothing can be misapprehended, the desire for the releasing insight is useless. Thus, the superimposition put into question offers Padmapāda the opportunity that awareness of *brahman* is the only possibility for removing ignorance. Only what is caused by ignorance and not caused by any other entity (*vastukṛtam*) can be removed. In this way the relation (*saṃbandha*) between aim and main topic is established:

> PañcP 10,1-11,4: *ucyate – brahmajñānaṃ hi sūtritam anarthahetunibarhaṇam, anarthaś ca pramātṛtāpramukhaṃ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvam. tad yadi vastukṛtaṃ na jñānena nibarhaṇīyam, yato jñānam ajñānasyaiva nivartakam. tad yadi kartṛtvabhoktṛtvam ajñānahetukaṃ syāt, tato brahmajñānaṃ anarthahetunibarhaṇaṃ sūcayatāvidyāhetukaṃ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvaṃ pradarśitaṃ bhavati.*
>
> It is answered: The knowledge of *brahman* that is explained in the Sūtra destroys indeed the cause of evil [i.e. *avidyā*], and the evil consists of agency and percipience, which presupposes being a cogniser. If (agency and percipience) are caused by an object, then they cannot possibly be destroyed by right knowledge, because right knowledge removes only ignorance. If [on the contrary] agency and percipience were caused by ignorance, then he who demonstrates that knowledge of *brahman* dispels the cause of evil, also indicates that agency and percipience are caused by ignorance.

Even if Padmapāda does not mention the term 'undertaking of the *śāstra*' (*śāstrārambha*), it means in this context to provide the liberating awareness by the right knowledge and to destroy what is caused by ignorance. But how is the concept of *śāstra* after Padmapāda further elaborated and brought together with the question of its under-

taking (*ārambha*)? And how is its undertaking related to the desired result?

It is Prakāśātman who uses the compound *śāstrārambha* in the Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, his commentary on the above quoted passages of the Pañcapādikā, and explains the problem of the *śāstra*s beginning by referring to Śaṅkara's key-concept of superimposition. How Padmapāda's view is further explained becomes clear if one looks at the way Prakāśātman discusses Padmapāda's words. He points out how Śaṅkara's passages provided with Padmapāda's remarks can be understood in reference to the concept of *śāstrārambha*. Having quoted Padmapāda's words literally[6], he finishes with the sentence whereby Padmapāda defines 'main topic' and 'aim' of the *śāstra* and explains that both are connected with people's natural use of superimposition (*adhyāsa*):

> PañPV 15,10-11: *tatra* ***naisargiko 'yaṃ lokavyavahāra ityantaṃ bhāṣyam*** [PañP 7,2] *iti granthaḥ* ***śāstrasya viṣayaṃ prayojanaṃ ca pratipādayatīty*** [PañP 7,4] *uttareṇa sambadhyate.*

> In this case, the text: "The commentary ending with the words: 'The natural [superimposition] is directly experienced by the entire world',", is connected with the following (sentence): "The (commentary) teaches main topic and aim of the *śāstra*".

In the next passage Prakāśātman relates superimposition (*adhyāsa*) to the *śāstra*'s undertaking and clarifies Padmapāda's words. Even if aim and main topic of the *śāstra* are not realized beforehand, nevertheless the undertaking of the *śāstra* involves the certainty of reaching the desired aim, just as tilling a field is done with the certainty of yielding fruits afterwards. But also Prakāśātman's explanations make evident that without presupposing the superimposition, aim and main topic of the *śāstra* for which it is undertaken do not make any sense and cannot be established:

> PañPV 16,1-17,3: *nanu kathaṃ bhāṣyadvayam eva viṣayaprayojane pratipādayati? śāstrārambhanimittaviṣayaprayojanasiddhihetor adhyās-*

6 Compare PañcPV 15,6-10 = PañcP 7,1-8,3: *yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayor ityādi ahaṃ idaṃ mamedaṃ iti naisargiko 'yaṃ lokavyavahāra ityantaṃ bhāṣyaṃ asyānarthahetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante ity anena bhāṣyeṇa paryavasyat śāstrasya viṣayaḥ prayojanaṃ cārthāt prathamasūtreṇa sūtrite iti pratipādayatīti.*

asyopasthāpakatvād iti brūmaḥ. [...]. *tathā hi – etat śāstram ārambhaṇīyam, saṃbhāvitaviṣayaprayojanatvāt kṛṣyādyārambhavat. śāstraṃ ca saṃbhāvitaviṣayaprayojanam avidyātmakabandhapratyanīkatvāt, jāgradbodhavat, iti.*

If one objects: Why now do two commentaries explain main topic and aim [of the *śāstra*]? We answer: Because (it is done) in order to establish superimposition, which is the cause of success (implied in both) the main topic and the purpose (of the teaching) and which provokes the initiation of the teaching. [...] This means: This *śāstra* can be undertaken, because it has a suitable aim and main topic, like the undertaking of cultivating the soil etc. And the *śāstra* has a suitable aim and main topic, because it counters the bondage consisting in ignorance, like right knowledge in a waking state [counters/removes wrong knowledge].

Although the discussion of undertaking the *śāstra* continues in both commentaries, Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā[7] and Prakāśātman's Vivaraṇa[8], and involves more detail than I can address here, I would like to draw attention to how advaitic teachings of ignorance, even if plausible in reference to their own development, involve logical problems of argumentation, or rather problems of establishing the liberating insight, *brahman* itself. The contradiction I have already pointed out consists in the fact that without supposing a second principle the concept of *śāstra* cannot be explained. The *śāstra* enables release, because it serves to destroy ignorance, but paradoxically its undertaking relies on ignorance again. Thus the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) has two functions that seem contradictory: on the one hand it is the reason for bondage (*bandha*) and on the other it also is the cause for removing the bondage by undertaking the *śāstra* as well. One can also say in reference to the *śāstra* itself: its undertaking is caused and removed by one and the same principle. But what can provide evidence of *brahman* itself if ignorance is completely removed?

Nevertheless the doctrine of *avidyā* was further developed in both School's of Śaṅkara (Vivaraṇa school, Bhāmatī school). The view that the *śāstra* can only start by presupposing ignorance (*avidyā*) and the teaching that the awareness of *brahman* can only be realized if such a non-real principle previously exists were accepted by later advaitins

7 Compare the IV. Varṇaka of the PañcP.
8 Compare PañPV 18ff.

as well. This can be exemplified by a passage from Vimuktātman's Iṣṭasiddhi. According to him, the *śāstra* describes how the Self's ignorance of *brahman* can be destroyed. But undertaking it is reasonable only on the assumption of Māyā/*avidyā*. If the 'existence' of Māyā/*avidyā* is not presupposed, even the right knowledge of *brahman* for which the *śāstra* is undertaken is not possible; consequently, there is no release by removing ignorance.

Also in the following quotation the teachings of the *śāstra* is meaningful only if awareness of the Self (*ātman*) can be derived by scriptural knowledge that destroys wrong knowledge. As long as the beginning of the *śāstra* does not bring forward a 'dynamic process' of sublating wrong and obtaining right knowledge, the *ātman*, although permanently self-illuminated (*sadātmaprakāśam*) cannot be revealed.

By the following two alternative explanations Vimuktātman makes clear how knowledge derived from the *śāstra* takes part in the process of liberating insight:

> IS 374,12-375,3: *yathā vājñānopādānam apy ātmajñānaṃ ghaṭādijñānavan nāsamyagjñānaṃ, kiṃ tu śrautasatyātmameyaṃ paramārthasamyagjñānam eva tadajñānaṃ ca hanti; tad vā meyaṃ svamānaphalakārūḍhaṃ, na tu svata eva sadātmaprakāśam api, anyathā* ***śāstrānarambhaprasaṅgāt.*** *evam uditaśrautajñāna evātmā svājñānanivṛttir iti niravadyam.*
>
> Or (the explanation might be): just as the knowledge of the Self, even if it is caused by ignorance, is not an incorrect knowledge like the knowledge of the pot etc., it is, on the contrary correct knowledge itself (*eva*) of the highest truth having as its knowable content the scriptural known Self and it destroys wrong knowledge regarding that (the Self); or (another explanation might be): that same (Self), as knowable content (*meya*), has been projected upon the mirror of its own (faculty of) cognition (*māna*), and is not in and to itself luminous[9]—because otherwise the deleterious

9 The knowledge of the self arrives at the result, i.e. the destruction of ignorance, by the help of the means of valid cognition for the *ātman*. For a better understanding of the compound *svamānaphalakārūḍhaṃ*, compare IS 375,3-4: *vāyvārūḍha ivāgnis tṛṇādikaṃ mānārūḍha ātmā svājñānaṃ dahati. taddahaṃs tadutthatvān mānam api dagdhvā nirindhana ivāgniḥ prasanna ātmaikalo 'vatiṣṭhate.* I translated the passage in Schmücker 2001: 45 and fn. 69 as follows: „Wie das auf dem Wind reitende Feuer, das sich mithilfe des Windes ausbreitet, das Gras verbrennt, so verbrennt der auf dem Erkenntnismittel reitende [d.h. der sich des Erkenntnismittels bedienende] Ātman sein eigenes Nicht-

consequence would ensue that the *śāstra* would not to be undertaken. Thus (the view) is faultless that holds that the Self is (also) the suppression of its own ignorance.

The context in which Vimuktātman mentions the term *śāstrārambha* makes clear—perhaps more than Padmapāda's or Prakāśātman's own words—that a soteriological meaning is implied. Although the aforesaid question of the relation between a concrete beginning and a Principle beyond space and time plays an important role, the following problematic question also is crucial: How can undertaking the *śāstra* be connected to the insight that liberates so that the authoritative scripture entails the desired aim, which is beyond empirical evidence?

Even if for the person desirous of liberation, the *brahman* already exists as a postulate, the advaitin's view that the *śāstra* begins with the help of ignorance strives to relate the destruction of ignorance (*avidyānivṛtti*) to the absolute *brahman*. Therefore the problem of how the *śāstra* that is undertaken can reach its aim comes to a head with the question: How are the destruction of ignorance and immediate awareness (*anubhava/anubhūti*) related? If the question cannot be solved, the advaitin must reply to the objection that undertaking the *śāstra* cannot bring forth the desired aim.

III.

Before I refer to Veṅkaṭanātha's objection regarding the advaitin's view of undertaking the *śāstra*, I want to address a quotation from his Nyāyasiddhāñjana in which he subjects the advaitin's concept of teaching the unknowable *brahman* to a *reductio ad absurdum*. Referring to Vimuktātman's definition of immediate awareness (*anubhūti*) mentioned in the opening verse of the Iṣṭasiddhi (1.1) he objects that such a *brahman* must be completely unknown and that no person could be absolutely ignorant of *brahman* before the *śāstra* is undertaken. Even teaching would be impossible: if a teacher is convinced of the non-dual *brahman* he is nevertheless able to teach and accepts

wissen. Dieses (Nichtwissen) verbrennend, bleibt der Ātman zurück in seiner [ursprünglichen] Reinheit, wie Feuer ohne Brennholz, nachdem er auch das Erkenntnismittel verbrannt hat, weil [auch dies] aus [dem Nichtwissen] hervorgeht."

anything (such as a student) other than *brahman*; but if he is not convinced, he is not a teacher and his teaching would be useless and misleading. The passage in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana runs as follows:

> NySiddh 311,1-5.: *anubhūtir avedyā anubhūtitvād iti cen, na, anubhūtir avedyeti vacanaṃ bodhakaṃ na vā. ādye tenaiva vedyatvaṃ no cet kiṃ kva vidhīyate. brahmaṇaś cātyantāvedyatve, athāto brahmajijñāsā, brahmavid āpnoti param, ātmā vā are draṣṭavya ityādivyākopaś copadeśaś ca niṣprayojanaḥ, upadeṣṭuś cādvaitaniścayāniścayayoḥ kasmai kiṃ upadeśyam? na hy unmattā mithyatvena nirṇītebhyaḥ pratibimbādibhya upadiśanti.*
>
> [If one objects:] Immediate awareness [i.e. *brahman*] cannot be known, because it is immediate awareness, [we answer:] this is not the case: Does the statement that awareness cannot be known make any sense or not? In the former case it is known through the very statement; if not, what is affirmed, and where? And if *brahman* were totally unknowable, it would be in opposition to the following passages: "And hence then the desire to know *brahman*" [BS 1.1.1], "The knower of *brahman* attains the Highest" [TaiU 2.1.1] "The Self, my dear, is to be known" [BĀU 2.4.5] etc., and teaching would be purposeless. And to whom does the teacher give his instruction, if he is certain of the non-duality [of *brahman*], and what does he teach, if he is not certain of non-duality? Not even madmen offer teaching to reflections (such as those in a mirror) that are judged to be unreal.

The problem posed by the opposition of *brahman* and a non-real second principle, i.e. ignorance, for which the advaitin must find a solution, recurs again in the above mentioned problem of the relation between the destruction of ignorance (*avidyānivṛtti*) and *brahman* itself. How can the advaitin argue for the view outlined for instance by Vimuktātman that the *ātman/brahman* is identical with the destruction of ignorance of itself (*svājñānanivṛtti*)? Not only the possibility of liberation (*mokṣa*), but also the concept of *śāstrārambha* depends on this question. How can one accept that the beginning of the *śāstra* has achieved its end, if there is no evidence for it? And if the complete destruction of ignorance cannot be proved, for what purpose has the *śāstra* been undertaken? According to the advaitin's position, recommending that the *śāstra* be begun is reasonable only if by the liberating awareness *brahman* remains alone as the High-

est Principle without a second. But as long as ignorance exists, the *śāstra*'s aim cannot be reached. For that for the sake of whose removal the *śāstra* was undertaken, namely ignorance, cannot again be taken to prove that the *śāstra*'s aim will be fulfilled. Thus, if nobody and nothing can prove that the awareness of *brahman* is realized, the advaitin's position can no longer hold to the concept of teaching.

The following passage of the 18th Vāda of the Śatadūṣaṇī (ŚDū 105,20-29) makes the difficulties of the advaitin's argumentation more clear. Against each of the following objections of the advaitin, Veṅkaṭanātha can demonstrate that no argument suffices to prove a relation between the timeless liberated *brahman* (*nityamukta*) and the destruction of the ignorance (*avidyānivṛtti*) predicated of it: if effects of ignorance such as bondage (*bandha*), or anything that consists of ignorance, such as the internal sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*), are related in any way to *brahman* or to final liberation, the argument of the advaitin fails: either the beginningless ignorance is like *brahman*, or *brahman* itself is still connected with ignorance; in both cases the advaitin cannot argue for liberation (*mukti*). Therefore, Veṅkaṭanātha can exclude the following possibilities given by the advaitin to prove that only *brahman* can become aware of the destruction of its own ignorance (*avidyānivṛtti*): **(1)** neither can it be said that brahman is aware of beginningless ignorance (*anādyavidyā*), nor is final liberation identical with the destruction of ignorance (ŚDū 105,20-22); **(2)** nor is direct seeing of ignorance by the Highest identical with bondage (ŚDū 105,22-24); **(3)** nor does ignorance have the form of bondage (*bandha*) if it is related to the Highest (ŚDū 105,24-25); **(4)** nor can ignorance be proved by *brahman* as having the nature of the individual 'I'-maker (*ahaṃkāra*) (ŚDū 105,25-27); **(5)** nor can the awareness of ignorance be claimed as awareness of something false, because otherwise the undertaking of the *śāstra* for removing false knowledge of *brahman* would be futile (ŚDū 105,27-29).

> ŚDū 105,20-22: *yad ucyate – nityamuktam brahmaiva svagatānādyavidyām anubhavatīti, katham idam upapadyate? bandha[na]syānādyavidyā tatkāryānubhavātmakatvān mokṣasya ca tannivṛttirūpatvāt. nityamuktasya bandhaś cen nityamuktir na saṃbhaved bandhasyāpi ca nityatvād bandhābhāve tv amuktatā.*

> **(1)** If one objects that *brahman* itself, which is eternally liberated, is aware of the beginningless ignorance, which is related to [*brahman*], [we ask:] How is this possible? Because [it would follow] that

bondage has the nature of an awareness of beginningless ignorance and its effects, and liberation has the form of its destruction. [This is explained by the following verse:] If bondage exists for the permanently liberated (*brahman*), no permanent liberation is possible; and if on the contrary bondage does not exist, no liberation [takes place], because [otherwise] also bondage would be permanently existing.

ŚDū 105,22-24: *nanu bhavanmate 'py ajñānam asty eva tac ca sarvajñenānubhūyate sa ca nityamukta iti ko viśeṣa iti cen na, parājñānādidarśanasya bandharūpatvānabhyupagamāt.*

(2) If one objects: Also in your opinion, ignorance does exist and the omniscient [*brahman*] is aware of it and is eternally released; therefore, what is the difference? [We answer:] It is not the case, because [you cannot] accept direct seeing of ignorance of the Highest as having the form of bondage.

ŚDū 105,24-25: *brahmājñānam eva paragatam brahmaṇānubhūyata iti cen na, tathāpi paragatatvād eva tasya bandharūpatvaprasaṅgābhāvāt.*

(3) If one objects that *brahman* is aware only of the ignorance of *brahman*, which is related to the Highest, [we answer:] no, because even so it does not follow that ignorance has the form of bondage, because it is in fact related to the Highest.

ŚDū 105,25-27: *tarhy asmākam apy ahaṃkārāparaparyāyāntaḥkaraṇagatam ajñānaṃ bhavatu tac ca saṃvidadhīnasiddhitvāt tadātmakabrahmaṇānubhūyata iti ko doṣa iti cen na, suṣuptimaraṇamūrcchādyahaṃkāravilayadaśāyām ajñānānubhavabhaṅgaprasaṅgāt, na hi tadānīṃ nirāśrayājñānasthitisaṃbhavaḥ, niradhiṣṭhānabhramānujñānaprasaṅgāt, brahmāśrayatve tu svagatājñānānubhavāvaśyambhāvaḥ.*

(4) Then let even for us ignorance be related to the internal sense, which is another term for the individual 'I'-maker (*ahaṃkāra*); this (ignorance) is perceived by *brahman* having the nature of the (individual 'I'-maker), because it is established as depending on awareness – what is the defect [for such an argument]? [Answer:] This is not the case, because it would result in the refutation of the awareness of ignorance in the state of delusion of the 'I' like [it exists for example] in deep sleep, death or fainting etc.; because it is

not possible at that time that ignorance remains without a base; because it would result in accepting an error without support [i.e., the correct knowledge]. But if on the contrary *brahman* is the support, it is necessary to accept ignorance as related to it.

ŚDū 105,27-29: *bhavatv ajñānānubhavaḥ, sa tu mithyābhūtānubhava iti na nityamuktatvavirodha iti cen na, mithyābhūtasyaiva tasya bandhatayopapādanāt. anyathā tannivṛttyarthaṃ* ***śāstrārambhānupapattiprasaṅgāt.***

(5) [Objection:] Then let experience of ignorance be the case, but this is awareness of something false; therefore no contradiction occurs with respect the state of being permanently liberated. [Answer:] No, because this false [awareness] has been explained in terms of bondage, because otherwise [if it hadn't been so explained] there would be no purpose served in undertaking the *śāstra* in order to remove [ignorance].

What Veṅkaṭanātha points out here in his polemical discussion is the problem that the advaitin cannot, consistently with his metaphysical premises, postulate a complete awareness of *brahman*. As far as the question of undertaking the *śāstra* is concerned, this means, for the advaitin, that if ignorance can still be experienced the undertaking of the *śāstra* for removing the cause of bondage is futile and hence the beginning of teaching a person about what is believed to be the highest Being cannot lead to the liberating awareness (*brahmānubhava*).

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PañPV = see PañcP

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ŚDū = Veṅkaṭanātha: *Adhikaraṇasārāvalī Śatadūṣaṇī ca*. Ed. by ŚRĪKĀÑCĪ PRATIVĀDIBHAYAṄKARAḤ AṆṆAṄGARĀCHĀRYAḤ. Madras: Śrīmadvedāntadeśikagranthamālā 1940.

Meaningful Mantras. The Introductory Portion of the *Ṛgvedabhāṣya* by Skandasvāmin*

Silvia D'Intino (Paris)

The *Skandasvāmibhāṣya* (SkBh) on the *Ṛksaṃhitā,* which dates from the 7th century CE,[1] is the first known "classical" commentary on the Ṛgvedic hymns, the first extant commentary known to us which offers a continuous exegesis of the *sūkta*s stanza by stanza, each stanza being followed by the *padapāṭha* text and by a word for word explanation including quotations and references to parallel passages.[2] The author came from Valabhī or Vallabhī, the capital of Saurāṣṭra—in

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1 The date of Skandasvāmin is a controversial matter among scholars. The only reliable datum is the date of the commentary on the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* composed by Harisvāmin—who affirms to be a disciple of Skandasvāmin —in 3740 of the Kali Era, which corresponds to 638/639 CE. Cf. S. ŚĀSTRĪ 1929; SHASTRI 1933; KUNHAN RAJA 1935. SARUP (1929, Introd.: 29; 1937), criticised by KUNHAN RAJA (1936), pushes back this date by a century. A *Ṛgvedavyākhyā* by a Mādhava kept in the Adyar Library and edited by KUNHAN RAJA (1939[1937]) on the basis of a single manuscript (containing the glosses *ad* RV I 1.1 up to I 61.16) has been supposed to be prior to the SkBh because of the references by Skandasvāmin to an *Anukramaṇī* attributed to the same Mādhava. KUNHAN RAJA (1931, 1936, 1939) thus infers that the *Ṛgvedavyākhyā* is the first Ṛgvedic commentary known to us. This hypothesis has been rejected by VENKATASUBBIAH (1936a: 202), who observes that the quotations from the mentioned Mādhava are attested only in one recension of the SkBh and could have been inserted in the text by a later copyist. He suggests a different approach to the question and proposes a later date (cf. *infra*, n. 41).

2 KUNHAN RAJA observes a main difference in the word for word explanation given by Skandasvāmin and by Sāyaṇa: "The commentary of both Skandasvāmin and Udgītha are executed on the same plan. The *Bhāṣya* is very elaborate, and is somewhat similar to Sāyaṇabhāṣya. There is one difference, Sāyaṇa takes the words in their prose order. But in Skandasvāmin and

modern days Gujarat—, at the time of the Maitraka kings (475-775 CE). His father, Bhartṛdhruva, is identified with the king Dhruvasena II (620-640 CE), and Valabhī was at that time a flourishing learning centre.[3] Beside the *Ṛgvedabhāṣya*, the name of Skandasvāmin is mostly associated to the *Nirukta*, as a commentary on Yāska's work is ascribed to him.[4]

The SkBh we have at our disposal is fragmentary; the portions we know include an almost complete commentary on the first *maṇḍala* (RV I 1.1 – I 56.1; I 62.1 – I 121.15) and the exegesis of the hymns RV V 57.1 – V 61.19 and VI 29.1 – VI 75.6.[5] The first two *adhyāya*s of the first *aṣṭaka* (RV I 1-32) have been transmitted in two recensions, known as "longer" and "shorter", published respectively in Trivandrum and in Madras.[6] Despite these two printed editions, and the critical edition included in the Ṛgveda edited by Vishva Bandhu for the Vishveshvaranand Research Institute (VVRI), the commentary has not yet been thoroughly studied, however, even though its originality and authority have been emphasised by the editors and recognised by Vedic scholars. As Renou observes:

> Plus court que Sāyaṇa, Skandasvāmin est plus précis, plus topique, moins encombré d'étymologies et de gloses inutiles; il relève évidemment de tra-

Udgītha, the order of the words in the *Ṛk* is preserved. This latter is the case in Yāska and Mādhava also". Kunhan Raja 1930: 250.

3 The most important document about Valabhī and Saurāṣṭra at the age of Skandasvāmin is the account of Hiuen Tsang's travels throughout India (629-645 CE.).

4 Skandasvāmin's authorship of the *Niruktabhāṣya* has been contested. Sarup, who edited the fragmented text (1928-1931-1934), thinks that it is the work of a single author, Maheśvara, who commented a lost *Niruktabhāṣya* by Skandasvāmin. This could explain the title *Niruktabhāṣyaṭīkā* found in the colophons. Cf. Sarup 1928: Introduction.

5 Yet, the author refers to his own commentary on the last *maṇḍala* of the *Saṃhitā*. Cf. SkBh *ad* RV I 72.2. In Kunhan Raja's opinion (1935, Preface: xiv-xv), this could be an allusion to the Udgītha's commentary, cf. infra, n.8.

6 The "shorter" recension is not a summary of the "longer" one. The Trivandrum edition was begun by Sāmbāśiva Śāstrī, who published a first volume in 1929 and a second one in 1935. The work was completed by Ravi Varmā with a third volume, published in 1942. This edition is based on three manuscripts: two out of these belong to the same version; the third is considered a less genuine one, and it has been used essentially for restoring the doubtful or damaged passages. The same manuscript was followed by Kunhan Raja for the Madras edition, published in two volumes (1935 and 1947). For a detailed description of the manuscripts, see the VVRI edition, vol. I: xiii-xvi.

ditions indépendantes; il connaît nombre d'*itihāsa* dont on n'a pas trace par ailleurs. Son attitude est également plus critique que celle de Sāyaṇa; il lui arrive de rejeter les vues de Yāska et de Śākalya.[7]

A critical study of this commentary will help to fill a gap of several centuries in our knowledge of *Ṛgveda* exegesis and reception, practically unknown prior to the age of Sāyaṇa, in the 14th century.[8] However, Sāyaṇa followed in the wake of a well-established tradition. He mentions other commentators in his *Bhāṣya*, and Skandasvāmin was known to him.[9] The famous *Upodghāta* of the *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* (SāBh) is also inscribed in a specific tradition. It consists of a long philosophical exposition full of references, and it includes important elements to understand the intellectual context of the author. In this way, the introductions play a major role in the history of Vedic commentary, and tend to constitute an autonomous literary genre.

The introductory portion of the SkBh is well preserved, with small variants, in both recensions; it is inserted in the gloss ad RV I 1.1 in the longer recension (T), after a *maṅgala*-verse,[10] while it appears at the very beginning of the commentary in the shorter one (M). The text starts with a pragmatic stanza, announcing the reason why the *bhāṣya* has been composed:

7 Renou 1936: 327. Renou recognises the value of the SkBh inside the indigenous tradition. However, from the point of view of European philology, the general appraisal of this text is somewhat negative: "Toutefois, pour une utilisation «européenne» du *Ṛgveda*, il [Skandasvāmin] ne nous met guère en meilleure posture que Sāyaṇa: ce sont les mêmes types de gloses approximatives et inconsistantes, dont on ne saurait, prises à la lettre, tirer une traduction qui tienne debout". Renou 1936: 327-328.

8 Two other commentaries on the *Ṛgveda* composed before the *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* (SāBh) are recorded in the VVRI edition: the *Udgīthabhāṣya*—on some portions of the Xth *maṇḍala*—, which is considered as the result of a collective work, prolonging the SkBh and a lost work by a commentator named Nārāyaṇa; then, the complete exegesis composed by Veṅkata, better known as Mādhava or Veṅkatamādhava.

9 Cf. SāBh *ad* RV I 88.5 and V 12.3.

10 *vighneśa! vidhi-mārtaṇḍa-candrendropendra-vandita! | namo gaṇapate! tubhyaṃ brahmaṇāṃ brahmaṇaspate!* "O [Ganeśa] Remover of obstacles! O Vidhi [Brahmā], Mārtaṇḍa, Candra, Indra, and the extolled One [Viṣṇu] who goes along with Indra! Honour (to you), o Gaṇapati! To you, o Brahmaṇaspati, (Master) of the formulas!"

mantrāṇām avaboddhavyo yato 'rtho 'ṅgatvasiddhaye | ṛgvedasyārthabodhārtham ato bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate ||[11]

Since the meaning of the *mantra*s has to be known in order to obtain their state of being limbs (*aṅga*s) [of the ritual action], a commentary will be thus composed for the understanding of the meaning of the *Ṛgveda.*

A *bhāṣya*, to prolong the argument of Skandasvāmin, always involves an *arthavacanā*, a 'discourse on meaning'. And this is precisely the topic of the Vedic *bhāṣya*'s introduction: the nature of the *mantra*s, their meaning and function, and ultimately the relation between text and rite. Let us first observe that the commentator focuses his attention on the *mantra*s and not on the *sūkta*s, the entire hymns. Nor is the term *mantra* here to be taken as a synonym of *ṛc*, the Vedic stanza,[12] because the sense of this term is a natural consequence of the peculiar perspective adopted by Skandasvāmin, that of the ritual performance. The *mantra*s are thus considered to be the essential units of the text, and even its ultimate form, as "limbs" (*aṅga*s) of the ritual action (*karman*) (see *infra*). Through this assertion, Skandasvāmin can be considered not only as the initiator of the Ṛgvedic classical commentary, but indeed the first exponent of the ritualistic exegesis, a branch of Vedic interpretation which encountered great fortune and a continuous tradition, of which Sāyaṇa represents the crowning achievement.[13] Nevertheless, this first conclusion has to be adjusted. We will see that it is rather a first impression.

11 The VVRI edition follows essentially the Trivandrum edition (T). However, the Madras edition (M) includes the indication of the quoted passages and some critical emendations. M has a *lectio facilior* in pāda c: *ṛgvedasyāvabodhārtham ato bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate.*

12 As it is the case in the *Nirukta.* Cf. Nir. VII 1-3.

13 "The ritualistic interpretations occupy a predominant position not only in the commentaries of Sāyaṇa, Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara on the Yajurveda as expected but also in the commentaries of Skandasvāmin, Udgītha, Veṅkaṭamādhava and Sāyaṇa on the RV, and also in the commentaries on the SV and the AV. The dominant tradition of ritual application of Vedic Mantras and the tremendous influence exercised by the ritualistic texts like the Brāhmaṇas, Kalpa-Sūtras and Paddhatis on the Vedic students seem to account for the preponderance of ritualistic interpretation of the Vedas. Therefore the ancient Indian commentators attempting the ritualistic interpretation of the Vedas refer in the first place to those passages of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kalpa-Sūtras which prescribe the ritual application of the hymn or the verse concerned, and then they try to interpret it in accordance with its ritual application". Gopal 1983: 30.

In order to articulate the notion of *aṅgatva*, Skandasvāmin resorts to the following *mantra* classification:

te mantrāḥ pañcaprakārāḥ—praiṣāḥ karaṇāḥ kriyamāṇānuvādinaḥ śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatāḥ japānuvacanādigatā iti ।

The *mantras* are of five sorts: directions, actions, descriptions of the action, (*mantras*) containing recitations or song of praise and the likes, (*mantras*) containing silent recitations and the likes.

This classification provides an original typology of the *mantras*. Perhaps Skandasvāmin initiated a School of Vedic interpretation[14]. Another Vedic exegete, probably a disciple of Skandasvāmin,[15] the Mādhava who composed a commentary on the *Sāmaveda*, mentions at the beginning of his *bhāṣya* thirty-six kinds of *mantras*, "of which five have been explained by Skandasvāmin".[16] The same Mādhava also quotes the SkBh saying the following:

ete sarve prayogakāle svārthān pratipādayantaḥ karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante, noccāraṇamātreṇa ।

All these [*mantras*], in making their own meanings appear, at the time of the performance realise their condition of limbs of the ritual action, and not by mere utterance.[17]

14 About Skandasvāmin as the leader of a School of Vedic interpretation—a School more related to the *Nirukta* and the 'etymological' interpretation, than to the ritualistic exegesis—see KUNHAN RAJA (1933; 1936: 265).

15 Cf. KUNHAN RAJA 1941: Introduction.

16 *ṣaṭtriṃśat-prakārā mantrāḥ* । *praiṣāḥ karaṇāḥ kriyamāṇanuvādinaḥ stotraśastrāgatāḥ japānuvacanagatāś ca* । *ete pañcaprakārā ṛgvyākhyāyāṃ bhavanti* । *anye sāmavyākhyāyām ucyante. Sāmaveda-Mādhavabhāṣya* I 1.1—KUNHAN RAJA 1941: 1. This point is already evoked in KUNHAN RAJA 1936: 265. The Mādhava referred to here is obviously not the author of the *Ṛgvedavyākhyā* mentioned *supra* (n. 1). He is also different from Veṅkaṭamādhava—whose commentary on the *Ṛgveda* dated from the 12th century, and who is mentioned in the SāBh (*ad* RV X 86.1)—, and from Mādhavabhaṭṭa, son of Veṅkaṭārya, who composed a *Ṛgvedānukramaṇī* (KUNHAN RAJA 1932) and a *Ṛgarthadīpikā* (SARUP 1939). Cf. also KUNHAN RAJA 1933a. "[...] Then there are at least four Mādhavas who have written Vedic commentaries, one on the Sāmaveda and three on the Ṛgveda. It has been suggested that there is one more, the grand father of Mādhavabhaṭṭa, son of Veṅkaṭārya [to whom a *Nāmānukramaṇī* is attributed]". KUNHAN RAJA 1935: xv. On the relative chronology of these commentators, see also VENKATASUBBIAH 1936.

17 *Sāmaveda-Mādhavabhāṣya* I 1.1—KUNHAN RAJA 1941: 4.

The *mantras* being perceived as limbs of the ritual action, their *karmāṅgatva* reveals itself only during the performance. At the same moment, we know their meaning and 'raison d'être' (*svārtha),* which thus partakes of the performance as well.
(It is here to be noted that there is something remarkable, peculiar to the Sanskrit language and decisive for the history of Indian philosophy, in the proximity between the notions of 'meaning'—including 'object (signified by a term)', 'cause' up to 'raison d'être'—and that of 'aim', 'goal', both involved in the term *artha*. This proximity prepares the way for the fundamental intuition about meaning as a realisation, an achievement of a (hidden) sense, which is at the centre of Indian speculations on language. It is precisely within the Mīmāṃsā system, in Śabara's work, that the reflection on the *mantra* turns the theory of meaning toward a new direction).[18]

We recognise here the context and the background of Skandasvāmin's work: the author is taking a position in the vast debate about the meaningful or meaningless nature of the *mantras*. The debate is recorded in the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, and particularly within the *mantrādhikaraṇa* of the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ŚāBh) (*ad Jaiminsūtras* I 2.31 *sq*.). Skandasvāmin responds indirectly to the argument of Śabara, who thus presented the question in his *Bhāṣya*:

> The question which now arises is—Are *mantras* intended to convey any meaning?—or are they not intended to be expressive of any meaning?—That is to say—Do they help the sacrifice by expressing some meaning, or by mere utterance?[19]

18 On this delicate question, which is impossible to deal with in this article, Biardeau observes: "[...] Nous dirions simplement que le geste fait qu'il y a une action unique sur deux plans simultanés, celui du mouvement corporel et celui de la représentation qu'on en a; mais le mantra, dans la problématique de Śabara, ne peut pas exprimer cela comme un objet unique; il ne peut se comporter comme une unité signifiante. C'est pourquoi la notion de but est substituée à celle d'objet: le mantra sert le rite dans la mesure même où il énonce ses composantes. Solution qui pourrait paraître philosophiquement désespérée si, par ailleurs, elle n'était enracinée dans le sentiment d'une certaine efficacité de la parole. Śabara substitue subrepticement cette dernière à l'expressivité du langage". Biardeau 1964: 202-203.

19 *athedānīṃ kiṃ vivakṣitavacanā mantrā utāvivakṣitavacanāḥ? kim arthaprakāśanena yāgasyopakurvanti, utoccāraṇamātreṇeti* [...] ŚāBh I 2.31; transl. Jha 1933, vol. 1: 74.

All the introductory portion of the Skbh is a comment on the two facets of this enquiry. In the ŚāBh the opponent (*pūrvapakṣin*) defends the idea that the mere utterance of the *mantras* is only required for the sacrifice—it has a ritual purpose—, because only the simple utterance of the *mantras* has something to do with *dharma*, while the *mantras* cannot be regarded as conveying any meaning.[20] Having replied to each of the opponent's objections, the conclusive *siddhānta* view states that the purpose of the entire Veda is the *knowing* of *dharma*. This last term never appears in the introductory portion of the SkBh: the relation between the *mantra* and its meaning follows an intrinsic law and does not resort to an ulterior principle.[21] One can only experience it during the performance, in a sort of re-cognition (recollection and re-presentation), as we will see. The classification of *mantras* given by Skandasvāmin in the preamble of his *Ṛgbhāṣya* relies precisely on his theory of meaning.

The examples given to illustrate the five types of *mantras* are referred to in connection to their ritual application, and show that Skandasvāmin intends the *Ṛgveda* in a large sense, the *Ṛksaṃhitā*—from where the examples are mostly taken—with the *Khilas*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Āraṇyakas* of the *Ṛgveda*. Moreover, the selected *mantras* shed light on the relation between the words and the ritual action, which is presented, so to say, in its distinctive tenses and moods.

1. *praiṣās tāvad 'daivyā śamitāra ārabhadhvam' iti*

The *praiṣa* (*mantras*), as for instance: "O divine slayers make ready" [AiB II 6.1].

Pronounced at the beginning of a ritual action, the *praiṣa* introduces it and is addressed by the speaker to someone else. We must also note that in the given example the *praiṣa* is addressed to the men

20 A list of objections is here formulated. Jha thus summarises the debate: "Before the use of the *Mantras* is discussed, the preliminary question to be discussed is—are the *Mantras* intended to convey any meaning? or are they merely recited verbally, without any reference to any meaning?—The idea underlying the discussion is that if the *Mantras* are not meant to convey any sense, then they cannot help in the knowledge of *Dharma*; and this would vitiate the *Siddhānta* doctrine that the purpose served by the entire Veda is to help us to know *Dharma*" (Jha 1933, vol. 1: 76).

21 On *dharma* and its relation with *mantras* in Mīmāṃsā literature, see Jha 1942: ch. xix-xx. On *dharma-artha* relation, see also Clooney 1990: 139-161.

who are going to slaughter the sacrificial victim. But in this way the *hotṛ* instructs, at the same time, the divine priests.[22] While it is the human officiating priests who are about to perform the action of killing the victim, the divine priests are also invited to perform the act.

2. *karaṇāḥ 'idam aham arvāvasoḥ sadane sīdāmi' iti*

The *karaṇa* (*mantra*s) [as for instance]: "Here I sit down on the seat of Arvāvasu" [KauB. 6.13].

With this *karaṇamantra* the *brahman* priest announces an action he is on the point of performing himself. The action starts with the enunciation of the *mantra*. By referring to Arvāvasu, the officiating priest transforms his own seat into a divine one, as "Arvāvasu is the Brahman of the gods".[23]

3. *kriyamāṇānuvādinaḥ 'yuvā suvāsā' iti*

The *kriyamāṇānuvādin*-(*mantra*s) [as for instance]: "Young, well dressed (post)" [RV III 8.4].

This *mantra* is recited by the *hotṛ* at the conclusion of the ceremony of anointing the sacrificial post, which is worshipped as a form of Agni.[24] Here again, a double level of the text has to be taken into account. Yet, what is more relevant for Skandasvāmin's *mantra* classification, the *kriyamāṇānuvādin-mantra* goes along with the action and works as a comment on it.

The first three types of *mantra*s thus exemplify different temporal correlation between the action and the words to be pronounced. They mark respectively the introduction (*praiṣa*), the beginning (*karaṇa*), and the progress (*kriyamāṇānuvādin*) of a ritual action. The two following given examples are somewhat different.

22 This *mantra* is also called the *Adhrigupraiṣamantra*, the *mantra* by which the Adhrigu – a divine *śamitṛ* already mentioned in the *Ṛksaṃhitā*—is ordered to kill the victim. Haug (vol. II: 85) points out the parallel passage in ĀśvŚS 3.3. See also Keith 1920:138. A complete list of parallel references in Mylius (1994: 128). About the meaning and function of *praiṣa*s in Vedic ritual, see Minkowski 1991.

23 See the concerned passage in Keith 1920: 381.

24 The quoted stanza is: *yúvā suvā́sāḥ párivīta sá u śreyān bhavati jā́yamānaḥ* | *tám dhī́rāsaḥ kaváya ún nayanti svādhyò mánasā devayántaḥ* ||: "Jugendlich, schön gekleidet, umgürtet ist er hergekommen. (Neu) geboren wird er noch schöner. Ihn richten die weisen Seher empor, Gutes sinnend, im Herzen gottverlangend". Transl. Geldner, vol. I: 345-346. About the ritual use of this *mantra*, see AiB II 1.2.

4) *śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatā 'ā tvā rathaṃ yathodaye', 'brahma jajñānaṃ' iti*

The *śastrābhiṣṭavanādigata* (*mantras*) [are for instance]: "As a chariot (we lead) you" [RV VIII. 68.1]; "*brahman* born (in olden days)" [AiB I 19.1].

The first example of a *mantra* including recitations or song of praises is the *incipit* of a *ṛc* in praise of Indra.[25] In the other instance, the term *brahman* is a name for Bṛhaspati, at least in the context of the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*.[26] There is no action to be performed in association with the given *mantras*, no action except the recitation of the *mantra* itself. Indeed, the recitation is the ritual action here concerned. The term *śastrābhiṣṭavana* refers both to the *śastras* (prosodic recitations) and the *stotras* (chanted recitations).[27]

Another range of *mantras* is that of silent/muttered recitation, which corresponds to the last category pointed out by Skandasvamin:

5) *japānuvacanādigatāḥ 'tad adya vācaḥ prathamaṃ masīya', 'āpo revatīḥ' iti*

The *japānuvacanādigata* (*mantras*) [are for instance]: "This beginning of speech now I shall utter [...]" [RV X 53. 4]; "O wealthy waters [...]" [RV X 30. 12].

Two Ṛgvedic stanzas are the given examples of silent *mantras*. One is drawn from a group of three hymns devoted to Agni in the form of a dialogue (RV X 51-53); the quoted verse is imagined in the mouth of Agni, with whom, while murmuring this verse, the *hotṛ* is

25 The entire stanza is: *ā́ tvā ráthaṃ yáthotáye sumnā́ya vartayāmasi । tuvikūrmím ṛtīṣáham índra śáviṣṭha sátpate* ॥: "Wie einen Wagen fahren wir dich her zum Beistand, zur Gunst, den Tatenreichen, den Besteher der Angriffe, du mächtigster Indra, rechtmäßiger Herr!" Transl. Geldner, vol. II: 391.

26 According to Skandasvāmin's definition, the *śastrābhiṣṭavanādigata-mantras* must refer to a divinity by the mention of his quality (cf. *infra*). "The Hotar begins with "*brahma jajñānaṃ prathamam* (Vāj.S. 13, 5; Aśval.Ś. 4, 6). In this *mantra Brahma* is Bṛhaspati (the teacher of the gods); by means of *Brahma* (i.e. the Brahmans) the Hotar thus cures the Pravargya man (the mystical personage called "sacrifice" which has been torn to pieces by the gods)". Haug 1863, vol. 2: 43. Cf. Keith 1920: 121. The quoted stanza is recorded in RVKh III 22, 1 (Scheftelowitz, 1966: 106). See parallel passages in AV IV 1.1; SV I 321 (referred to in M); KauB VIII 4. The text is also the *incipit* of the *Brahmajajñanam* hymn (RVKh III 22.1-4), which is recited by the *hotṛ* priest during the Pravargya ritual. See Houben 1991: 3, 115.

27 Note that this traditional interpretation of the term appears in Mādhava's preface to his *Sāmavedabhāṣya*—recorded *supra* (n. 15).

identified.[28] The other stanza does not refer to the worldly waters, but to divine ones.[29]

The five different categories of *mantras* thus articulate the relation between the *mantra* and the rite. But this formal, technical approach describes only some aspects of that relation. It explains *when* and *how* a *mantra* has to be employed. It does not yet say why. Actually, Skandavāmin's categorization of the *mantras* responds to a deeper interrogation on their nature. Each of the given examples illustrates the double level of the text: it is both human and divine, or rather it is both actual and remote. In the next portion of his introduction, Skandavāmin comes back to his general purpose to show that the *mantra* is substantially a *practice of memory.*

> *kuta etat* | *ye tāvat praiṣāḥ karaṇāḥ kriyamāṇānuvadinas teṣāṃ yo 'rthas tasya karmaṇo 'ṅgabhūtatvād aṅgabhūtasya cāsmṛtasyānuṣṭhātum aśakyatvāt smaraṇasya karaṇāpekṣitatvāt praiṣādibhiś ca kartuṃ śakyatvāt* |
>
> How is this possible? Because for the *praiṣa-, karaṇa-, kriyamāṇānuvadin-mantras*, their meaning is (evidently) a limb of the ritual action. And it is impossible to accomplish a limb that has been forgotten, as the action depends on the memory, and that can be obtained by the *praiṣa* and the other *mantras*.

Skandasvāmin explains that no ritual act can be accomplished without memory of it, because it is impossible for a forgotten ritual act to produce an effect. And the *mantra*, according to him, constitutes the very fabric of the memory of the ritual action. Skandasvāmin thus contradicts the ritualist stating that he who knows the ritual gesture does not need to understand the meaning of the *mantras*—it would be like putting on a shoe when a shoe is already on the foot.[30] In

28 The entire stanza is: *tád adyá vācáḥ prathamáṃ masīya yénāsurāñ abhí devā́ ásāma* | *ū́rjāda utá yajñiyāso, páñca janā máma hotrám juṣadhvaṃ* || (Agni): "Als Anfang meiner Rede will ich heute das erdenken, wodurch wir Götter die Asura's überwinden können. Ihr Speiseesser und ihr Opferwürdigen, ihr fünf Völker, sollt an meinem Hotṛ-Amt Wohlgefallen haben!" Transl. GELDNER, vol. III: 215.

29 The entire stanza is: *ā́po revatīḥ kṣáyathā hí vásvaḥ krátuṃ ca bhadrám bibhṛthā́mṛ́taṃ ca* | *rāyáś ca sthá svapatyásya pátnīḥ sárasvatī tád gṛṇaté váyo dhāt* || "Ihr reichen Wasser, da ihr über das Gut schaltet und guten Rat und den Lebensbalsam bringt, und da ihr die Herrinnen des Schatzes an gutem Nachwuchs seid, so soll Sarasvatī dem Sänger solche Kraft bringen". Transl. GELDNER, vol. III: 177.

30 ŚāBh I 2.33: *yathā sopānakte pāde dvitīyām upānaham aśakyatvān nopādatte.*

contrast, Skandasvāmin argues that the *mantra* contains the memory, and, because of it, the sense of the ritual act. From a concrete point of view, if the officiating priest has forgotten which ritual gesture to perform, the *mantra* helps him to remember it. But this depending of the *karaṇa* on the *smaraṇa* (*smaraṇasya karaṇāpekṣitatva*) has a deeper import: the *mantras* allow the ritual act to be accomplished through the memory they activate during the ritual action. In this mediation resides their *aṅgatva*. While it may be obvious in relation to the first three types of *mantra*—the *praiṣa-*, the *karaṇa-*, the *kriyamāṇānuvadin-mantras*—, which are involved in the action, Skandasvāmin affirms that the same model is also valid for the praises of the gods:

> *ye tu śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatās teṣāṃ yo 'rthaḥ, sa yady api karmaṇo nāṅgabhūtaḥ, tathāpi te tam eva pratipādayantaḥ karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante* । *noccāraṇa-mātreṇa* ।
>
> But in the case of the (*mantras*) containing recitations or songs of praise and the likes, even if their meaning is not (evidently) a limb of the ritual action, they nevertheless in expressing that meaning become limbs of the ritual action. And not by mere recitation.

An analogous memorial association is involved in this kind of *mantra*, from which comes their being limbs of the sacrificial performance. Given that the quality (*guṇa*) exists only inasmuch as there is someone who possesses it (*guṇin*), that the quality and the possessor of it cannot be disassociated, the *mantras* serve to assure the link between the recited words and the deity to whom they are addressed. The *mantra* thus awakens, by means of memory, the link between the epithet and the entire intellectual construct of the divinity thus described:

> *stutir hi śastram abhiṣṭavanaṃ ca* । *guṇaiś ca guṇinaḥ sambandhitāpratipādanaṃ stutir ity ucyate, na tad akṣaroccaraṇamātram* । *na hi grahaṇārtham abhyāsārthaṃ vā stutyarthany apy ṛgakṣarāṇi ślokākṣarāṇi voccārayan loke stautīty ucyate* । *ataḥ śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatā api svārtham eva pratipādayantaḥ* । *karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante, noccāraṇamātreṇa* । *evam eṣāṃ caturvidhānāṃ mantrāṇām artha-pratyāyanena karmāṅgabhāvād anavabuddhāc ca mantrāt tadarthasya pratyetum aśakyatvād boddhavya eṣām arthaḥ* ।
>
> For the *śastra* and the *abhiṣṭavana* (recitation of praise and song of praise) constitute (forms of) praise (*stuti*): "The *stuti* resides in the association of the qualities with the bearer of the qualities". There is not just recitation of syllables here. For people in day to day life don't say that a man is praising when he recites the syllables of a *śloka* or of a *ṛc* for some purpose other than praising, that is, for learning them or for practising them. And therefore, even in

the case of *śastra*, *abhiṣṭavana* and the likes, in expressing their own meaning they attain the status of being limbs of the ritual action, and not by mere recitation. Therefore, since through explaining their meaning the *mantras* of these four types are limbs of the rite, and because it is not possible to know the meaning of a *mantra* that has not been understood, their meaning has to be known.

Skandasvāmin has in mind the discussion on the nature of the praise (*stuti*) recorded in the ŚāBh.[31] The meaning of the *mantra* cannot be ignored, because it is precisely the association with the meaning—namely the deity to whom the *mantra* is addressed—that makes the difference between the realisation of a *mantra* and the mere repetition of a given verse.

In relation to the fifth type of *mantra*, the silent recitation, the refusal to commit the essence of the *mantra* to its sound materials, and the defence of the meaningfulness of the *mantra* are even more marked:

ye 'pi japānuvacanādigatās teṣāṃ yady api japinānuvādinā vā dhānākṣaroccāraṇa-mātraṃ coditaṃ nārthapratyāyanaṃ, tathāpi 'yo ha vāviditārṣeyac-chando-daivata-brāhmaṇena mantreṇa yājayati vādhyāpayati vā sthāṇuṃ varcchati gartaṃ vāpad-yata [*i.e. vāpadyate*]*' iti ādyārṣeyabrāhmaṇe śruter avidita-daivatyasya mantrasya karmaṇy aṅgabhāvābhāvād ajñāyamānārthasya ca mantrasya daivatasya veditum aśakyatvāj japānuvacanādigatānām api boddhavya evārthaḥ* ।

But as (for) the *japānuvacanādigata* (*mantras*), although what is required from the *japin* and the *anuvādin* is the mere recitation of their syllables, and not the explanation of their meaning, nevertheless it is said: "the one who acts as a *ṛtvij* or teaches by a *mantra* or a *brāhmaṇa* whose *ṛṣi*, *chandas*, *devatā* are not known (to him) is actually banging his head on a post or falling down in a well" [ĀB I, 1]. Because there are passages like this (about posts and wells) in the *Ārṣeya-Brāhmaṇa* which show that a *mantra* whose deity is not known lacks the property of being a limb of the ritual action, and because it is impossible to know the deity of a *mantra* whose meaning is not understood, therefore the meaning even of *japa*- and *anuvacana*-(*mantras*) needs to be known.

31 Cf. ŚāBh II 1.5.13-14, where the intimate association between the qualities and the deity to whom they are attributed explains the relation between the praise and the ritual act. A memorial association between the *mantras* and the ritual act is already mentioned by Jaimini, and in the *mantrādhikaraṇa* of the ŚāBh. But the memory is here a way of recalling the action to be performed and has more an instrumental than a semantic import. See Jha 1942: 179-189. And this is because of the relation between the *mantra* conception and the theory of speech peculiar to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. See Taber 1989.

Skandasvāmin thus looks at the meaning as the indestructible core of the *mantra*: the more the action—here the recitation—is interiorised, the more the meaning has to be known.

Later on, the meaningful *mantra* is a vague souvenir. In the *Upodghāta* of his *Ṛgbhāṣya*, Sāyaṇa has forgotten Skandasvāmin's argument. He comes back to Jaimini and Śabara's general definition of the *mantra*, thus depriving the *mantra* of its own law, its intrinsic autonomy:

> It is a good definition to say that whatever the sacrificing priest calls a *mantra* is such. This denomination alone[,] it is which indicates that texts used in directing the ritual action and others are *mantras* [...] Since the *mantras* are so various in kind, except denomination there is no common quality which will serve for a definition".[32]

Along with this illustrative—and somewhat tautological—definition of the *mantra*, Sāyaṇa still defends the values of the *artha* by recalling not only Jaimini, but also Yāska commenting on the *jñānasūkta* (RV X 71. 4). And he includes the *Mīmāṃsā* in the stock of knowledge—grammar and the other *Vedāṅgas*—necessary to understand the Veda.[33] Nevertheless, the reference to a traditional School of interpretation is inserted in the *Upodghāta* for the sake of consistency and completeness of exposition more than to prove Sāyaṇa's fidelity to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Sāyaṇa's work is a very careful study, yet it may be said that Skandasvāmin arguably chooses a more philosophic stance.

When Skandasvāmin affirms that the *mantra*'s obscurity lies in the ignorance of its meaning, he also returns to the defence of the meaningfulness of the *mantras* given by Jaimini quoting Yāska, who already compares the ignorant man to the blind man walking and

32 See SāBh *Upodghāta*. Transl. PETERSON: 170.

33 "One man, complete in his knowledge of the words only, sees Speech in the form of the Veda, but does not see her properly. For, where there has been no consideration given to grammatical questions, such as the difference between the singular and the plural, you cannot have even a correct recitation of the words. [...] A second man, with a view to apprehend the meaning of the Veda, has heard, indeed Grammar and the other Angas, but he too, not having studied the Mimamsa, does not properly hear Speech in her form as Veda". Transl. PETERSON 1890: 190-191).

hitting a post he cannot see in front of him.[34] But he also further develops Yāska's ideas on the *arthavattva* of the *mantras*.

> *evaṃ sarvamantrāṇāṃ karmāṅgatva-siddhyarthaṃ yato boddhavyo 'rthaḥ, ata ṛgvedasyārthabodhārtham asmābhir bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate*[35]
>
> In this way, as the meaning of *all the mantras* must be known for the obtainment of their *karmāṅgatva*, we will thus compose this commentary for the knowledge of the meaning of the *Ṛgveda*.

The introductory exposition could have ended here. But Skandasvāmin is careful to draw his argument to a close, and he adds to the general theory a corollary, where he brings out a surprising implication of his argument:

> *tatrārṣadaivatayor arthāvabodha upayujyamānatvāt te darśayiṣyete na chando 'nupayujyamānavacanatvād iti*
>
> Therefore, both the *ṛṣi* and the *devatā* have to be explicitated for the knowledge of the meaning because of their being connected [to it], and not the *chandas*, of which does not matter here.

34 Nir. I 16: *yatho etad avispaṣṭārthā bhavantīti naiṣa sthāṇor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati* | *puruṣāparādhaḥ sa bhavati*: "As to the objection that their [of the *mantras*] meaning is obscure, (we reply) that it is not the fault of the post if the blind man does not see it; it is the fault of the man himself". Transl. SARUP: 17. The simile becomes a *topos* of the *Mīmāṃsā* literature. It is resumed in the *Upodghāta* of the SāBh: "If they, who are not conversant with that book, do not understand the *mantras*, that implies no blame to the *mantras*. And so they use the common mode of reasoning here, namely, that it is not the fault of the post if the blind man does not see it. It is the fault of the man". Transl. PETERSON 1890: 135. Further developments of the simile are recorded as well in the text. We can read, for example: "'He is a mere post holding up a weight who learns the Veda but does not understand the interpretation thereof' [...] But the man who learn the Veda, and does not understand the interpretation thereof, merely carries a load. 'Like a post' in the text is a simile. Post means the dry branchless stump of a tree. As that is fit only to be burned as fuel, and will never again bear flower and fruits; so he who merely recites the Veda will not, indeed, be outcasted, but that is all. The performance of the sacrifice, and heaven its fruit are not for him". *Ibid.* p. 188-189.

35 *Varia lectio* in M: *ādyārṣeya śruteḥ avidita-daivatasya mantrasya karmaṇy aṅgābhāvāt ajñāyamānārthasya ca mantrasya daivatasya veditum aśakyatvāt japānuvacanādigatānām api boddhavya evārthaḥ* | *evaṃ sarvamantrāṇāṃ karmāṅgatvasiddhyarthaṃ yato boddhavyo 'rthaḥ ata ṛgvedasyāvabodhārthaṃ asmābhir bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate.*

If the knowledge of the *ṛṣi* and *devatā* is necessary for the understanding of the *mantras*, metrical considerations are not; the *chandas* do not in any way enter into his exegesis. This last statement is a unique stand in the history of Ṛgvedic commentary.[36] One can particularly measure on this sentence the distance between Skandasvāmin and Sāyaṇa, who inserts lengthy remarks regarding the *chandas* in his *Ṛgbhāṣya*.[37] Nevertheless, did Skandasvāmin perceive the extremism of this last sentence? His struggle for the *arthavattva* leads him to keep the meaning of the *mantra* apart from everything referring to its sound matter. Skandasvāmin thus seems to anticipate a risk inherent in the traditional Vedic exegesis, from Yāska to the Mīmāṃsakas, that of taking into account the *mantra* essentially for its enunciation during the ritual act, thus running the risk of its becoming a minor element of the performance.[38]

Unsurprisingly, Skandasvāmin, as Sāyaṇa afterwards, does not claim to be in any way autonomous or innovative. On the contrary, he perceives himself as inheriting a tradition, or *āgama*. In this matter, looking at the preface of the SkBh could also give an answer to another question relating to this text. The commentary's title, as it appears in different colophons (e.g. at the end of the *adhyāyas* 1, 2, 5,

36 Before Sāyaṇa, already Mādhava son of Veṅkaṭārya, states in the versified preamble of his *Ṛgarthadīpikā* that the *chandas* are taken into account in the commentary: *arthajñānam ṛṣijñānaṃ bhūyiṣṭham upakārakam* ǀ *vakṣyanta ṛṣayas tasmāt svarūpasthās tu devatāḥ* ǁ *pādāvasānavijñānaṃ chandojñānena sidhyati* ǀ *pārucchepādiṣu jñeyam ataś chandas ca yatrataḥ* ǁ [...] KUNHAN RAJA 1939. Cf. ŚĀSTRĪ 1929.

37 About the *chandas*, Sāyaṇa quotes ŚāBh: "The man who sacrifices or teaches by means of a *mantra* whose *ṛṣi*, metre and *devatā* he does not know, runs up against a post, or falls into a well, or perishes utterly: his guilt is increased. Therefore, for every *mantra* he must know all these". And in the conclusion of his *Upodghāta* he says: "Therefore, we will now explain the Ṛgveda in accordance with its six Aṅgas". Transl. PETERSON 1890: 210, 214.

38 On this point, RENOU observes: «Il en résulte [après les réfutations données par Jaimini aux objections du *pūrvapakṣin* en faveur de l'*ānarthakya* des mantra] que la Mīmāṃsā (comme le Nirukta) se rallie, sans l'énoncer expressément, à la thèse de l'*arthavattva*. Faire autrement eut été, non seulement ruiner le postulat sur l'uniformité du vocabulaire, mais compromettre la dignité du Veda. Mais il est permis de constater que la nature des objections, la manière dont on les réfute, montrent l'intérêt médiocre qu'on prenait, sinon aux mantra, du moins à leur essence profonde; ils expliquent assez le péril qui les menaśait, de l'intérieur même du système le mieux fait pour les protéger». RENOU 1960: 75.

7), is not the general designation of *Ṛgvedabhāṣya*—which is used as a parallel title—but rather *Ṛgarthāgamasamhṛti*. According to SĀMBAŚIVA ŚĀSTRĪ, the first editor of the *bhāṣya* in Trivandrum, this title "seems to imply that only such of the Ṛks as are regarded as Āgamas, and are therefore authoritative are interpreted by him".[39] But, how can one explain that such a title suggests a commentary on a selection of *ṛc*, given that Skandasvāmin follows a continuous order of the *ṛc* and of the *sūkta*s within his work? In a study regarding Skandasvāmin, VENKATASUBBIAH suggests a different interpretation of the title:

> The expression *Ṛgarthāgamasaṃhṛti* is a compound of the words *Ṛgarthāgama* and *saṃhṛti*. The latter words denotes 'collection, epitome, abridgment', and the former, 'teaching (*i.e.* what has been taught) concerning the meaning of the *ṛks*; *i.e.* explanations given by commentators of the *mantra*s of the Ṛk-saṃhitā' [...] The title *Ṛgarthāgamasaṃhṛti* thus means 'epitome of the commentaries on the Ṛk-saṃhitā. These commentaries are, naturally, those that are anterior to Skandasvāmin, and the expression *Ṛgarthāgamasaṃhṛti* can thus be paraphrased as *Pūrvarg-bhāṣya-samuccaya*".[40]

As the colophon of the commentary ends with the clause *yathāsmṛti*, which VENKATASUBBIAH translates as "to the best of his memory", we should understand that "Skandasvāmin thus disavows all claims to originality [...] and says that he is merely compiling an epitome of the commentaries on RV known to him".[41] The expression rather means "according to traditional knowledge (*smṛti*)", as complementary to the revealed literature (*śruti*). The study of the introductory portion of the SkBh demonstrates that the author holds the term *artha* to be fundamental in his work. For Skandasvāmin, it is more than a simple synonym of "gloss" (*dīpikā*), or "explanation" (*vṛtti*); it is rather the indication of a theoretical position. I will thus translate the title

39 ŚĀSTRĪ 1929, *Introduction*: 6

40 VENKATASUBBIAH 1936a: 204-205.

41 *Ibid*. The commentaries referred to here should particularly include, following the demonstration of VENKATASUBBIAH (1936a: 206 *sq*.), a lost *Ṛgvedabhāṣya* by Uvaṭa. By comparison to the commentary on the *Vājasaneyīsaṃhitā* of the same author, VENKATASUBBIAH states that Skandasvāmin borrowed some explanations from Uvaṭa (Cf. *ibid*.: 217-218, n. 1). Throughout this hypothesis, he also fixes a new upper limit date for Skandasvāmin, that is 1060 CE—when king Bhoja was ruling over Malwa (1018-1060 CE). The lowest limit is the date of Sāyaṇa, ca. 1350 CE. Nevertheless, this demonstration cannot be considered a consistent proof to reject the most accepted chronological approach and the hypothesis that Uvaṭa eventually borrowed his explanations from Skandasvāmin, and not the contrary.

of the commentary as: "Compendium of traditional knowledge on *Ṛgveda*'s meaning".

Skandasvāmin defends the idea of a meaningful *mantra*. And we perceive that the conception he had of his own work is far removed from that of Sāyaṇa, who emphasises, so to speak, the opposite pole of the semantic spectrum of the term *artha*. When Sāyaṇa, around seven centuries after Skandasvāmin, composes his eminent commentary, the historical and geographical scenario has changed. We are no more in Saurāṣṭra at the time of the Maitraka sovereigns: Sāyaṇa worked for the Vijayanagar Hindu kingdom, in South India, during the rise of the Islamic sultanates. He provided a different approach to the Vedic texts, answering to new needs: a canonisation of the Veda was in process, and he looked at the Vedic stanzas as a ritualist—which explains, among other things, the priority he assigns to the *Yajurveda*.[42] In the *Upodghāta* of the *Sāyaṇabhāṣya* the term *artha* no longer evokes an experience of memory which justifies the relation between words and actions, provides them a foundation, thus giving a meaning to the ritual performance itself. Removed from the scheme of hermeneutics, the *artha* is now the ritual performance itself, as the ultimate aim of the entire Veda, a general principle of a complex system of interactions—actions and words—to be mastered by qualified priests.

42 About Sāyaṇa as a main player of this process of canonisation, see Galewicz 2004.

Appendix

Skandasvāmi-Ṛgvedabhāṣya ad I 1.1
Introduction

vighneśa! vidhi-mārtaṇḍa-candrendropendra-vandita! ı
namo gaṇapate! tubhyaṃ brahmaṇāṃ brahmaṇaspate! ıı
mantrāṇām avaboddhavyo yato 'rtho 'ṅgatvasiddhaye ı
ṛgvedasyārthabodhārtham ato bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate ıı

te mantrāḥ pañcaprakārāḥ—praiṣāḥ, karaṇāḥ, kriyamāṇānuvādinaḥ, śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatāḥ, japānuvacanādigatā iti ı *praiṣās tāvad 'daivyā śamitāra ārabhadhvam' ity evam ādayaḥ* ı *karaṇāḥ 'idam aham arvāvasoḥ sadane sīdāmi' ity evam ādayaḥ* ı *kriyamāṇānuvādinaḥ 'yuvā suvāsā' ity evam ādayaḥ* ı *śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatā 'ā tvā rathaṃ yathodaye', 'brahma jajñānaṃ' ity evam ādayaḥ* ı *japānuvacanādigatāḥ 'tad adya vācaḥ prathamaṃ masīya', 'āpo revatīḥ' ity evam ādayaḥ* ı *ete sarve prayogakāle svārthān pratipādayantaḥ karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante, noccāraṇamātreṇa* ı *kuta etat* ı *ye tāvat praiṣāḥ karaṇāḥ kriyamāṇānuvadinas teṣāṃ yo 'rthas tasya karmaṇo 'ṅgabhūtatvād aṅgabhūtasya cāsmṛtasyānuṣṭhātum aśakyatvāt smaraṇasya karaṇāpekṣitatvāt praiṣādibhiś ca kartuṃ śakyatvāt* ı *ye tu śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatās teṣāṃ yo 'rthaḥ, sa yady api karmaṇo nāṅgabhūtaḥ, tathāpi te tam eva pratipādayantaḥ karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante, noccāraṇamātreṇa* ı *stutir hi śastram abhiṣṭavanaṃ ca* ı *guṇaiś ca guṇinaḥ sambandhitāpratipādanaṃ stutir ity ucyate, na tad akṣaroccaraṇamātram* ı *na hi grahaṇārtham abhyāsārthaṃ vā stutyarthany apy ṛgakṣarāṇi ślokākṣarāṇi voccārayan loke stautīty ucyate* ı *ataḥ śastrābhiṣṭavanādigatā api svārtham eva pratipādayantaḥ* ı *karmaṇo 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyante, noccāraṇamātreṇa* ı *evam eṣāṃ caturvidhānāṃ mantrāṇām arthapratyāyanena karmāṅgabhāvād anavabuddhāc ca mantrāt tadarthasya pratyetum aśakyatvād boddhavya eṣām arthaḥ* ı *ye 'pi japānuvacanādigatās teṣāṃ yady api japinānuvādinā vā dhānākṣaroccāraṇamātraṃ coditaṃ nārthapratyāyanaṃ, tathāpi 'yo ha vāviditārṣeyac-chando-daivata-brāhmaṇena mantreṇa yājayati vādhyāpayati vā sthāṇuṃ varcchati gartaṃ vāpadyate' iti ādyārṣeyabrāhmaṇe śruter avidita-daivatyasya mantrasya karmaṇy aṅgabhāvābhāvād ajñāyamānārthasya ca mantrasya daivatasya veditum aśakyatvāj japānuvacanādigatānām api boddhavya evārthaḥ* ı *evaṃ sarvamantrāṇāṃ karmāṅgatva-siddhyarthaṃ yato boddhavyo 'rthaḥ, ata ṛgvedasyārthabodhārtham asmābhir bhāṣyaṃ kariṣyate* ı *tatrārṣadaivatayor arthāvabodha upayujyamānatvāt te darśayiṣyete na chando 'nupayujyamānavacanatvād iti* ı

O [Ganeśa] Remover of obstacles! O Vidhi [Brahmā], Mārtaṇḍa, Candra, Indra, and the extolled One [Viṣṇu] who goes along with Indra! ı Honour (to you), o Gaṇapati! To you, o Brahmaṇaspati, (Master) of the formulas!

Since the meaning of the *mantras* has to be known in order to obtain their state of being limbs (*aṅgas*) [of the ritual action], a commentary will be thus composed for the understanding of the meaning of the *Ṛgveda*.

The *mantras* are of five sorts: directions, actions, descriptions of the action, (*mantras*) containing recitations or songs of praise and the likes, (*mantras*) containing silent recitations and the likes.

The *praiṣa* (*mantras*), as for instance: "O divine slayers make ready" [AiB II 6.1], and the others of the sort. The *karaṇa* (*mantras*) [as for instance]: "Here I sit down on the seat of Arvāvasu" [KauB. 6.13], and the others of the sort. The *kriyamāṇānuvādin* (*mantras*) [as for instance]: "Young, well dressed (post)" [RV III 8.4], and the others of the sort. The *śastrābhiṣṭavanādigata* (*mantras*) [as for instance]: "As a chariot (we lead) you" [RV VIII. 68.1]; "*brahman* born (in olden days)" [AiB I 19.1], and the others of the sort. The *japānuvacanādigata* (*mantras*) [as for instance]: "This beginning of speech now I shall utter [...]" [RV X 53. 4]; "O wealthy waters [...]" [RV X 30. 12], and the others of the sort.

All these [*mantras*], in making their own meanings appear, at the time of the performance realise their condition of limbs of the ritual action, and not by mere utterance.

How is this possible? Because for the *praiṣa*-, *karaṇa*-, *kriyamāṇānuvadin-mantras*, their meaning is (evidently) a limb of the ritual action. And it is impossible to accomplish a limb that has been forgotten, as the action depends on the memory, and that can be obtained by the *praiṣa* and the other *mantras*.

But in the case of the (*mantras*) containing recitations or songs of praise and the likes, even if their meaning is not (evidently) a limb of the ritual action, they nevertheless in expressing that meaning become limbs of the ritual action. And not by mere recitation.

For the *śastra* and the *abhiṣṭavana* (recitation of praise and song of praise) constitute (forms of) praise (*stuti*): "The *stuti* resides in the association of the qualities to the bearer of the qualities". There is not just recitation of syllables here. For people in day to day life don't say that a man is praising when he recites the syllables of a *śloka* or of the *Ṛgveda* for some purpose other than praising, that is, for learning them or for practicing them. And therefore, even in the case of *śastra*- and *abhiṣṭavana*-(*mantras*) and the likes, in expressing their own meaning they attain the status of being limbs of the ritual action, and not by the mere recitation. Therefore, since through explaining their meaning, the *mantras* of these four types are limbs of the rite, and because it is not possible to know the meaning of a *mantra* that has not been understood, their meaning has to be known.

But as (for) the *japānuvacanādigata*-(*mantras*), although what is required from the *japin* and the *anuvādin* is the mere recitation of their syllables, and not the explanation of their meaning, nevertheless it is said: "the one who acts as a *ṛtvij* or teaches by a *mantra* or a *brāhmaṇa* whose *ṛṣi*, *chandas*, *devatā* are not known (to him) is actually banging his head on a post or falling down in a well". Because there are passages like this (about posts and wells) in the *Ārṣeya-Brāhmaṇa* which show that a *mantra* whose deity is not known lacks the property of being a limb of the ritual action, and because it is impossible to know the deity of a *mantra* whose meaning is not understood, therefore the meaning even of *japa*- and *anuvacana*-(*mantras*) needs to be known.

In this way, as the meaning of all the *mantras* must be known for the obtainment of their *karmāṅgatva*, we will thus compose this commentary for the knowledge of the meaning of the *Ṛgveda*.

Therefore, both the *ṛṣi* and the *devatā* have to be explicitated for the knowledge of the meaning because of their being connected [to it], and not the *chandas*, of which it is no matter here.

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Philosophical Beginnings in Sanskrit Treatises on Poetics

Gary A. Tubb (Chicago)

Before launching into the perhaps foolhardy task of speaking of Sanskrit poetics as a system of philosophy, I would like to thank Walter Slaje for his broadmindedness in allowing such a topic into a panel on philosophical beginnings, and more generally I am grateful to have been able to talk about the matter in the context of a World Sanskrit Conference in which I had the pleasure of meeting again with some colleagues whom I had not seen since my first trip to India thirty years ago.

It was at the beginning of that year that I had what might be called my own *śāstrārambha,* in the form of my first encounter with a living Sanskrit *śāstrī,* and a very inspiring scholar too, the late Pt. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī in Pune. When he asked me what *śāstra* I was interested in reading, I said poetics—*Alaṅkāraśāstra*—and this he immediately dismissed with the remark "*tat sarvaṃ bālārtham eva.*" At first I took this to mean "all that is just for children," which surprised me, because it seemed to me that much of what I had in mind was both inappropriate for and inaccessible to younger readers. But soon enough it became clear that what he really meant was that poetry and poetics are not for serious-minded people: they are frivolous in their goals, and poetics as a discipline is not philosophically significant.

Of course the question of what is significant in the area of *śāstra* is a matter of subjective judgment. This is clear, for example, in a recent study of the history of *śāstra* that gives much attention to Sanskrit poetics, the Gonda lectures by Sheldon Pollock published under the title *The Ends of Man at the End of Premodernity.* As his title indicates, Pollock's study is organized around the traditional list of the aims of human life, the *puruṣārtha*s, but in laying these out he lists only three of them—*kāma, artha,* and *dharma*—mentioning only in a footnote that some versions of the list include *mokṣa* as a fourth aim.[1]

1 Pollock 2005: p. 12, fn. 8.

From our earliest records of it the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* claims to address the longer version of the list—as we shall see, Bhāmaha specifically mentions all four aims in describing the rewards of poetry—but it is not clear that Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī's denigration of poetics was based primarily on a concern for maintaining a focus on spiritual liberation. The more general antipathy between those who consider themselves connoisseurs of poetry and those who take pride in their scriptural or philosophical expertise is an ancient one, deeply rooted in matters of social style and most famously exemplified by Abhinavagupta's comment that Vedic scholars are incapable of understanding poetry because their hearts have dried up.[2]

Most likely it was considerations of philosophical rigor that underlay Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī's comment, since he eventually allowed that there was in fact one book on poetics that contains respectable philosophical elements and that is well worth reading—the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, a work that Pollock and many others have considered the last major treatise on Sanskrit poetics.[3]

Through the years it has become increasingly clear to me how right it was to single out this text as an example of both poetics and philosophy, and in what follows I shall focus on the *Rasagaṅgādhara* as a preeminently significant treatise in connection with the topic of the philosophical status of the *Alaṅkāraśāstra*. Jagannātha went beyond simply building on previous developments in the execution of the *śāstra,* such as those ushered in by the success of *Navyanyāya* techniques of analytical description. In this he was not fundamentally new, because in the history of the discipline there had been multiple points at which an individual scholar had attempted to inject new rigor and philosophical precision into their enterprise; modern scholars have pointed to so many texts as marking the point at which poetics became a "real *śāstra*" that to catalogue their choices would serve chiefly to illustrate the difficulty of the question. Nor did Jagannātha intend to break with the past history of his discipline on the fundamental categories of their analysis; in fact, he employed his own rigorous approach most energetically when combating what he saw as threats to the traditional approaches of poetics.[4]

2 Ingalls et al. 1990: p. 73, n. 10.

3 Pollock 2001: 15-16.

4 Jagannātha's view of the past is discussed in Tubb–Bronner (forthcoming).

What was new in Jagannātha, beyond his very frequent critical insights on particular points, was his explicitness and clarity in claiming independent status for the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* as a philosophical *śāstra* in its own right, deserving to issue distinctive pronouncements on the major questions of semantics and other areas. He also insisted on grappling directly and candidly with the most problematic aspects of *Alaṅkāraśāstra*—the fuzzy areas that he saw as endangering this claim of philosophical rigor—and much of what he had to say about this came in his treatment of the opening topics of treatises on poetics, to which I now turn.

The list of these opening topics remained fairly stable in comprehensive treatments of poetics, and usually consisted of five items:

1. *Maṅgalācaraṇam:* auspicious beginning
2. *Kāvyaprayojanāni:* uses of poetry
3. *Kāvyakāraṇāni:* causes of poetry
4. *Kāvyalakṣaṇam:* definition of poetry
5. *Kāvyabhedāḥ:* types of poetry

In practice this list is intertwined in some interesting ways with the more general list of pertinent opening topics in any *śāstra,* the four well-known *anubandhas*, and the special features of the handling of these items in poetics are a reflection of important peculiarities of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* as a *śāstra.* Before saying more about the opening topics individually, I must therefore first make some remarks on the things that make the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* peculiar.

The Subject Matter of the Alaṅkāraśāstra

The murkiness of the status of poetics as a *śāstra* is tied in part to the many problems surrounding its subject matter, both in the details of the categories of analysis with which it chooses to occupy itself and in the overall nature of the target literature it seeks to describe. Where the details are concerned, the turbulent history of the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* is pointed to already by the discipline's very name, preserving as it does an apparent reference to one category of analysis, the primacy of which was subject to contestation at many points in the discipline's history.[5] More generally, the perceived status of poetics derives directly from evaluations of the value of poetry itself.

5 See Pollock 2003: 43 for remarks on the "habit of sedimentation" in Sanskrit poetics.

The poetic literature is both linguistic and artistic, and this dual nature raises the danger of a split personality in the *śāstra* as well, given its aim of examing that literature. In its artistic aspects poetics has some affinity not only with artistic disciplines such as dramaturgy and music, but even with practical subjects such as the martial arts. Yet it differs from these in directly addressing a verbal text, and in its linguistic aspects the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* shares many concerns with the disciplines of grammar and hermeneutics. Even so it cannot clearly share with those systems either their prestige in orthodox circles or their magisterial pedigrees, both of which go back to their ancient origins in Vedic contexts. In addition, the poetic literature is a moving target constantly reshaped by the activity of human poets, as compared to the stability of the Vedic texts or the putatively perennial nature of human cognition and the Sanskrit language. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, poetry is liable to be viewed as trivial in itself in terms of its goals and the goals of those who spend time with it, and it is presumably this problem, viewed in contrast to the seriousness of the more reputable systems, that gives rise to warnings such as the one quoted by the commentator Mallinātha at the beginning of many of his commentaries on the great poems: *kāvyālāpāṃś ca varjayet,* "and one should avoid the prattlings of poetry."

It is thus not surprising that, outside the efforts of fairly recent scholars working within the tradition of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* itself (most notably the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava theologians), it is difficult to find instances of poetics being treated straightforwardly as a *darśana* or system of philosophy—a status readily granted to the Pāṇinian system of grammar both in older Sanskrit doxographies (such as the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*) and in modern Western ones (such as Karl Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*). More recently, I have noticed the same trend on the Internet: the very useful GRETIL repository of electronic texts,[6] for example, places the texts on *alaṅkāra* under the heading of poetry rather than of *śāstra.*

Within the discipline, of course, the evaluation of the system tends to differ from these views. Rājaśekhara, for example, devotes the second chapter of his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* precisely to the topic of the status of poetics in relation to the Veda and the works aiming at the study

6 The Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages, which may be found at http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ebene_1/fiindolo/gretil.htm.

of the Veda, and includes the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* in his list of *Vedāṅgas*.[7] But few have agreed with him on this, and while Jagannātha, as I have said, held a high view of the status of his discipline, he does not seem to have based that estimation primarily on its connections with the Veda.

The Authors of the Alaṅkāraśāstra

The murkiness surrounding the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* involves not only its subject matter but also its sources. To begin with there is the problem of identifying what sorts of texts should be considered a part of the system. Although the texts of the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* are originally separate from those of dramaturgy, the two disciplines came to be treated together in some treatises, and alongside these larger treatises there have been many types and levels of works devoted to particularly aspects of poetry, including practical manuals on synonyms and other topics, and far-reaching encyclopedic treatments of poetry with varying degrees of agreement with the principal scholarly treatises.

Underlying these uncertainties is the simple fact that the discipline of poetics, unlike most other important *śāstras*, does not have a single original authority enshrined in a foundational *sūtra* text, as *Mīmāṃsā* has in Jaimini and as grammar has in Pāṇini. This may well be a reflection of the comparatively more recent origins of poetics as a *śāstra*, which may in turn be a reflection of a related chronology in the arising of the *kāvya* poetry itself as a type of literature. In any case, the lack of an authoritative *sūtra* has contributed both to the turbulent history of the discipline in its internal disagreements, and to its readiness to borrow techniques and theoretical stances from surrounding *śāstras*.

This incorporation into the treatises on poetics of ideas associated with grammarians, logicians, or *Mīmāṃsakas* has been a prominent factor in disputes within the system, going back to the frictions seen in the earliest texts between the ideas of Bhāmaha, who refers with respect to the views of logicians (and of Buddhist logicians in particular), and those of Daṇḍin, who aligns himself more with the stances of the grammarians (and with the grammarian philosophy of Brahmanical thinkers such as Bhartṛhari).

7 RĀJAŚEKHARA 1934: 2-5.

These competing stances, often easily connected to well-known disputes between other *śāstra*s, may very well have fed the notion that the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* had little of its own to contribute in terms of serious philosophy. And it was in response to such a situation that Jagannātha tried to take a fresh look at earlier claims to authority, to identify and defend a received tradition of analysis, and to present that system in a way that would appear significant and serious to scholars working within other *śāstra*s.

The Audience of the Alaṅkāraśāstra

One final peculiarity of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* involving considerable murkiness in comparison with other *śāstra*s is that of its intended audience. Clearly the range of active readers of Sanskrit poetry was considerably wider than that of specialists engaging in certain Vedic rituals, for example, and the works on poetics were not only read but sometimes written by kings and others who were interested in poetry, as well as by scholars and students. Beyond that, it is often difficult, as we shall see, to determine whether the texts were meant primarily for poets or for critics.

In contrast, several of the more prestigious *śāstra*s—perhaps grammar is an exception on its lower levels, but not at the more technical ones—could not have been meaningful outside the circle of experts of the sort that produced the texts themselves. The number of royal authors who composed commentaries on the poems of Amaru, to give just one example, and who pack those commentaries with detailed material from the *Alaṅkāraśāstra*, is evidence not just of their interest but of their learning as well. But it also might help to fuel the idea that poetics is somehow less *śāstric* than *Mīmāṃsā* or *Nyāya*, or that the analysis that the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* has to offer is more artistic than logical, and on a level more practical than theoretical.

Opening Topics in Treatises on Poetics

Now to return to the list of the five opening topics dealt with in treatises on poetics. In the interest of time I will say nothing about the *maṅgala* verses with which such works begin, despite the frequency with which they serve to offer preliminary hints to the contents of a treatise, since Christopher Minkowski has already dealt with this topic in his paper in this volume.

It is in the other four topics that the traditional *anubandhas*, or preliminary points of interest concerning the treatise, come into full play, and here the problems begin. As in other *śāstras* the subject matter or *viṣaya*—at least at the preliminary level of simply naming it rather than defining it—and also the *sambandha* or connection between the treatise and its subject are straightforward. But as for the *prayojana* or purpose of the work and also the *adhikārin* or qualified reader, the situation is more problematic, especially because it is not entirely clear whether the treatises on poetics are addressed to the poet or the critic. This is a particularly significant problem given the very wide readership of treatises on poetics just mentioned, and yet the texts themselves are rarely explicit on this point.

Kāvyaprayojanāni

The problem is already clear in the treatment of the topic of the *prayojana*, the purpose or usefulness of the *śāstra*. The main candidates for this are clear from the beginning; Bhāmaha, for example (1.2), gives a list that many later writers would agree with:

> *dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca* ।
> *prītiṃ karoti kīrtiṃ ca sādhukāvyanibandhanam* ॥
>
> The composing of good poetry produces skill in the four aims of life and in the arts, and also produces pleasure and fame.

But who receives these rewards? Bhāmaha's near-contemporary Daṇḍin makes it clear that it is the poet who must rely on the *śāstra*, and other writers such as Bhoja (*Sarasvatīkanthābharaṇa* 1.2cd) are quite explicit in saying that it is the poet who receives the rewards both of fame and of pleasure:

> *nirdoṣaṃ guṇavat kāvyam alaṅkārair alaṅkṛtam* ।
> *rasānvitaṃ kaviḥ kurvan kīrtiṃ prītiṃ ca vindati* ॥
>
> The poet acquires fame and pleasure by composing a faultless poem with good qualities, ornamented with ornaments, and endowed with *rasa*.

In general, it seems clear that the early treatises present themselves as intended for the poet, but there is growing tendency to focus on the reader or audience as well, which becomes a major shift in attention in the work of Abhinavagupta and in all the subsequent

works so heavily influenced by him. As for the reward of pleasure, both Abhinava and his contemporary Kuntaka—both apparently building on Bhaṭṭanāyaka—give long descriptions of the role of poetry in instructing princes, who will have control over people's lives and must be taught right from wrong, but who do not have the attention span required to read *śāstras*. But poetry has the power to penetrate their hearts, and it is through the pleasure that poetry gives them that they are able to be taught.[8]

Notice here not only that the pleasure is spoken of as enjoyed not by the poet but by the readers, but also what it is that produces the pleasure. Regularly in discussions of the *prayojana* of a *śāstra* the focus is not on the direct reward of the *śāstra*, which is normally a knowledge of its subject matter, but rather on the *prayojana* of this *prayojana*—that is, what good does it do us to know about that subject. But here the reward of pleasure enjoyed by the princes is not the result of a knowledge of poetics—we have already been told that they don't read *śāstra*—but rather a result of the mere existence of the poetry, which in turn is a result of the poet's knowledge of poetics. Thus the role of the audience introduces a further level here, and what we have is not simply a *prayojana-prayojana*, but rather a sort of *prayojana-prayojana-prayojana*.

Kāvyakāraṇāni

Much the same ambiguity is involved in the continuing insistence on discussing the next opening topic, that of the *kāvyahetu* or causes of poetry, despite the growing shift of attention to the role of the reader, since these causes are properties belonging to the poet, and in essence involve a description of the prerequisites of the poet as *adhikārin*. The standard list consists of three things—talent or imagination, learning or study, and practice or training—although the relative importance of each is an important question discussed in the texts.[9]

8 Tubb 1985: 160, notes 2 and 3. Abhinavagupta's fullest treatment of the topic is at *Locana* 3.10-14f; see Ingalls et al. 1990: 437.

9 For a discussion of the interest in *śakti* in late works on poetics see Pollock 2005: 19ff.

Kāvyalakṣaṇam

One could argue that the same list of prerequisites applies equally to the qualified reader or connoisseur of poetry, the *sahṛdaya*, who must also be well-trained and experienced and sympathetically imaginative. This is an interesting topic that involves some tricky issues of circularity much like those surrounding the figure of the *śiṣṭa* in grammar, who is recognizable by his good grammar but who is also the person to be appealed to for recognizing what is grammatically good. In a similar way the qualified reader of poetry becomes inescapable in the next of the opening topics of poetics, that of the *kāvyalakṣaṇa* or definition of poetry.

Ultimately each of the features listed in early treatises as defining characteristics of poetry hold good only if they are in fact poetic. Ornaments such as metaphorical identification and functions such as suggestion are at work both in poetic expression and in everyday speech, and in the end what distinguishes poetry is that it is experienced as beautiful by sensitive critics. This is a topic that is danced around elaborately throughout the history of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* because of the fear of being blatantly subjective, and one of the major accomplishments of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja is that he finally bites the bullet and insists on making it the basis of a rigorous definition of *kāvya*. In his hands such a definition can be rigorous not because it avoids subjectivity but because the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* as a philosophical discipline now has the power to operate in subtle areas beyond the grasp of other systems of thought, although like the poetry it analyzes it also depends on a complex of social expectations that must be acknowledged. In one bold move near the opening of his treatise, he thus speaks from a position of strength and finally removes the painful triangulation required in all the attempts to maintain an objective list of defining characteristics of poetry, such as Mammaṭa's skillful but difficult admission that the ornaments are also sometimes not present.

Kāvyabhedāḥ

The question of how to deal philosophically with subtle internal experiences is also at the very heart of the discussions of the last of the opening topics of poetics, that of *kāvyabheda* or the types and varieties of poetry. In the powerfully influential account developed

by Mammaṭa on the shoulders of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the scheme of classification is based on the doctrine of suggestion, presented as a special contribution of the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* to the theory of semantics, and within this scheme that there is a further focus on the theory of *rasa* or aesthetic flavors, originally imported from what Daṇḍin called the other tradition (*āgamāntara*), i.e., dramaturgy, but subjected within the discipline of poetics to a new psychological interpretation put forward by Abhinavagupta and others on the basis of an essentially *Vedāntic* metaphysics. On both suggestion and *rasa* Jagannātha once again speaks powerfully on behalf of poetics as an independent *śāstra*, and both topics figure prominently in the opening passages of his *Rasagaṅgādhara.*

The notion of suggestion had been put forward originally by Ānandavardhana and had been attacked not long after especially by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who maintained that alleged instances of suggestion could be explained simply by inference rather than by proposing a new semantic function. Jagannātha argued strongly in the *kāvyabheda* section of his *Rasagaṅgādhara* against what he viewed as a revival of Mahimabhaṭṭa's stance by Appayya Dīkṣita.[10] But disputes with Nyāya and with other *śāstra*s crop up throughout the later parts of his treatise as well. He explicitly proclaims the independence of the *Ālaṅkārika*s from the *Naiyāyika*s in his remarks in the section on *sāmānya* on how the experts on poetics have a path of their own in their handling of perception and inference, separate from that of the logicians.[11] And he does the same with the grammarians in his bold statement in the section on *utprekṣā* that the *Ālaṅkārika*s are entitled to disagree with the doctrines of the grammarians because their own system is an independent one.[12]

On the question of the nature of *rasa*, which also arises in connection with the *kāvyabheda* section in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, it is the system of *Vedānta* that comes under discussion, and Jagannātha devotes a very lengthy passage to fine points of the aspects of the inner self that he considers important in explaining the *rasa* experience.[13]

10 For a detailed discussion of this see Bronner–Tubb (forthcoming).

11 Jagannātha 1983: 697: "*na hi pramāṇavibhājakānāṃ naiyāyikānām ivālaṅkārikāṇām api saraṇiḥ, yena pratyakṣatvānāliṅgitām anumitiṃ paribhāṣemahi.*"

12 Jagannātha 1983: 396: "*na ca vaiyākaraṇamatavirodho dūṣaṇam iti vācyam, svatantratvenālaṅkārikatantrasya tadvirodhyasyādūṣaṇatvāt.*"

13 Jagannātha 1983: 25ff. For the philosophical component in these passages see Tubb–Bronner (forthcoming).

In his concern for the details of the *rasa* experience as well as in his insistence on recognizing the working of *suggestion* as a kind of internal experience discernibly separate from that of inference, Jagannātha is presenting a system of analysis that draws unabashedly on subjective experience but that hopes to document that experience in some rigorous way. In this endeavor, and in the language he uses to speak about it, he has much in common with the current attempts by experts in disciplined introspection, such as Buddhist Tibetan meditators, to describe inner experiences using what they believe to be a scientific approach, against the objections of physicalist scientists who question the very possibility of a "subjective science." A conflict of much the same sort underlies the complaints in the late Sanskrit works on poetics about what they call *pratītikalaha*[14], in connection with their contention that suggestion feels different from inference and that the rules for certainty of knowledge that are binding in logic do not hold in poetry. The quarrels between the poeticians and the logicians on this and other points go back to the time of Mahimabhaṭṭa and beyond. It fell to Jagannātha to meet the logicians on their own level, by attempting to conduct the pursuit of poetics on a newly rigorous methodological basis.

14 E.g., in Kamalākara's comments on Mammaṭa at the end of the fifth *Ullāsa* of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

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The Incipits of Classical Sargabandhas

Giuliano Boccali (Milan)

This paper deals with the *incipit*s of the Indian Court Poems, focusing in particular on the first examples of the *mahākāvya* genre up to Māgha's poem. However, in order to introduce the subject matter, I will briefly deal with the beginning of the two main Great Epics, then give an overview of what the Indian theoreticians consider the best way to begin a *sargabandha.* As we will see, the way of introducing a *sargabandha* which the theoreticians call *vastunirdeśa* tends to prevail in the *mahākāvya*s which were composed after Kālidāsa's time. However, because the beginnings of the works by Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa and Pravarasena seem to show slightly different features from those recommended by the theoreticians and applied by the later poets, the present contribution will focus especially on these *mahākāvya*s, in order to trace the possible principles of composition and the possible aims which inspired the first *kāvya* poets.

Let me first draw attention to the Indian traditional Great Epics. The frame stories which constitute the beginnings of both the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* would deserve a deeper investigation than I can devote to them here. Some scholars have dealt with this topic, such as J.A.B VAN BUITENEN, R.P. GOLDMAN, M. BIARDEAU, J. BROCKINGTON, D. SHULMAN and A. HILTEBEITEL, but their works are too many and too well known to be quoted in detail here. I attempt only to give a brief account of the Great Epics' beginnings, which represent the precedents of the *sargabandhas*' *incipit*s. Therefore, it is useful to note here only that both the epic poems show very elaborated beginnings and, more importantly, that since the beginning the poets themselves are also among the main characters of the story the poems tell. Furthermore, the importance of the poets' role as characters is very relevant in particular at the outset of the story: more precisely, the author (or perhaps the authors) of both the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* include the poets who are said to have recited or composed the whole poems, as active characters for the development of the plot and for the story to start. In particular, Vyāsa seems to know the story, so to

speak, *a priori*, because he tells it his son Śuka long before the story itself happens, as A. HILTEBEITEL underlines (2001: 278-322). On the other hand, Vālmīki learns of Rāma's deeds from Nārada, and, through a very profound meditation, he sees Brahmā, who promises to relate to him the details which Vālmīki still ignores. The *ṛṣi* Vālmīki's role in shaping the poem is, however, not diminished by the intervention of these divine beings, because it is Vālmīki himself who conceives the *śloka*, the metre in which the whole poem is composed. Furthermore, like Vyāsa, he is able to tell Kuśa and Lava some episodes of the story which are yet to happen.

As far as the *kāvya* movement is concerned, the situation is in a certain way exactly the reverse: the poetic composition does not exist before the author either tells it, or "sees" and actually composes it. It is the poet who works it out and shapes it, though out of a traditional subject matter, as is well known. The poet takes no part in the story, not appearing as a character of the plot, but at the same time the poet's perspective is not that of an historian. In the words of A. BONISOLI ALQUATI, who is a pupil of mine, we might state that the *kāvya* poet becomes "transparent".

After these introductory remarks, we can note that the theoretician Daṇḍin (I, 14) already distinguishes among different possibilities by which a *mahākāvya* can begin:

sargabandho mahākāvyam ucyate tasya lakṣaṇam ।
āśīrnamaskriyā vastunirdeśo vāpi tanmukham ॥

Almost the same distinction appears also in Bhoja's treatise, though this theoretician reworks it more elaborately by adding an example for each category illustrated. We might sum up by saying that Daṇḍin and Bhoja's *āśīs* is quite rare and we can find it in the *Haravilāsa* (I, 1), which is quoted also by BHOJA among others (1963: 472):

om ity etat paraṃ brahma śrutīnāṃ sukham akṣaram ।
prasīdatu satāṃ svānteṣv ekaṃ tripuruṣīmayam ॥

The same kind of *incipit* was employed by Śivasvāmin (9th c.) in his *Kapphiṇābhyudaya* (I, 1) and by Lakṣmīdhara (11th c.) in his *Cakrapāṇivijaya* (I, 1). The *incipit* which BHOJA calls *namaskriyā* or *stuti* is explained by this theoretician (1963: 472) by quoting the first stanza of Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṃśa*, and I will go into this strophe later in this contribution; I will also deal in detail with the beginning of Pravara-

sena's *Setubandha,* which also shows the *namaskriyā incipit* in its canonical form, though more ample and mixed with other elements.

However, the beginning of most *mahākāvyas* is predominantly the *vastunirdeśa*, which directly starts by telling the story, often without giving any account of previous events. BHOJA refers to the first stanza of Meṇṭha's *Hayagrīvavadha* (I, 1) in order to give an example of such an *incipit* (1963: 472, transl. by BOCCALI and WARDER 1977: 95):

āsīd daityo hayagrīvaḥ suhṛdveśmasu yasya tāḥ ।
vadanti sma balaṃ bāhvoḥ sitacchattrasmitāḥ śriyaḥ ॥

"C'era una Daitya, Hayagrīva, nelle dimore dei cui alleati le Fortune proclamavano la forza delle sue braccia con sorrisi come parasoli candidi."

"There was a Daitya [Demon], Hayagrīva, in the dwellings of whose friends Fortunes [or beauties] proclaimed the strength of his arms, with smiles like white parasols."

This distinction between three different kinds of *incipits* as it was made by the theoreticians, however, does not fit in completely with the beginnings of the oldest *mahākāvyas*. Aśvaghoṣa, Kālidāsa and Pravarasena began their poems in different and more varied ways. Therefore, it might be useful to state what I mean when speaking of '*incipit*', in particular when the beginnings are complex and refined. When a poem's *incipit* corresponds to a canonical type described and listed by the theoreticians, it obviously overlaps with the *sargabandha*'s first stanza. But when the beginning does not fit the theoreticians' definitions, then the idea of *incipit* should be widened. An example could make this claim clearer: Kālidāsa's *Kumārasaṃbhava* (I, 1-17) begins with the very famous description of the Himālaya range. Each stanza describes the huge mountains reworking various motives; these stanzas then can be considered as a cluster of equivalent strophes: to consider only the first stanza as the *incipit* of the poem might appear to be logical, but in reality it is a strain of interpretation. In my opinion, the same thing can be argued for the beginning of Pravarasena's *Setubandha*, which begins with four stanzas in praise of Viṣṇu, four in praise of Śiva, which are followed by three stanzas devoted to an evaluation of poetry and, eventually, by one which anticipates the benefits a reader will gain after reading the poem. Also in this case it seems wise not to consider only the first

stanza as the poem's *incipit*, since the structure of such an introduction is clearly very articulated.

It might be useful, then, to give here a brief account of the *incipits* of the poems, which were either certainly or presumably composed before the time of Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*.

Aśvaghoṣa

Buddhacarita (1935: I, 1-9): Description of king Śuddhodana and his wife Mahāmāyā's beauty and happy marriage; the royal couple beget a son, Sarvārthasiddha; the queen's dream; the pregnancy (together with the glory which the birth of a prince grants to the royal dynasty) and the queen willing to go to the forest for deliverance; again the queen's desire of going to the forest and the choice of Lumbinī as a favorable place; the king is astonished, but he cheerfully agrees to go to the forest: he then leaves the royal capital not for a pleasurable outing but out of love for his wife; the moment of the deliverance comes; the painless birth of Sarvārthasiddha.

Saundaranandamahākāvya (1928: I, 1-4): Praise of the hermit Kapila Gautama, who is compared with some of the greatest sages, such as Kāśyapa; (I, 5-13) description of Kapila Gautama's hermitage and (I, 14-17) of its inhabitants, who are involved in practices of penance; (I, 18-21) the arrival of the princes and the list of their numerous qualities.

Kālidāsa

Kumārasaṃbhava (1980: I, 1-17): Description of the Himālaya (*devātmā*); within this description the verses devoted to the erotic theme are relatively many (I, 7; 10-11; 14 which contains a description of Aśvamukhī's beauty); (I, 18) the king of mountains and his wife, the happy life of the couple; (I, 19) Menā's pregnancy; (I, 20) Maināka's birth; (I, 21) Satī enters Menā's womb and then is begotten by the Himālaya in his wife, while the latter is in *samādhi* (!) (I, 22); (I, 23) Pārvatī's birth.

Raghuvaṃśa (2003: I, 1*ab*, quoted by Bhoja as an example of *stuti*): In the first two *pādas* of the opening stanza of the poem the tight union of Śiva and Pārvatī—mentioned at the end of the verse—is compared to the relationship of word and meaning (*vāgarthau*) and the poet expresses his hopes to master both "word" and "sense" in his poetic composition; (I, 1*cd*) eulogy of Śiva and Pārvatī, who are the parents of the world; (I, 2-3) the poet regards himself as incapa-

ble to retell and praise the Raghu dynasty. Let Kālidāsa's usage of the word *vāmana* (I, 3*d*) be noted here, which is placed emphatically at the very end of the verse; (I, 4) the poet cannot but modestly follow the path of the ancient poets: he is willing anyway to sing the deeds of the solar dynasty: only the virtues of the Raghu kings impel him to undertake such a bold task as that of singing the stories of their lives; (I, 5-9) a detailed list of the qualities a king must have follows (among which the fulfillment of the *trivarga* appears).

Meṇṭha

Hayagrīvavadha (I, 1, quoted by BHOJA as an example of *vastunirdeśa*): In this opening verse, which is among the few extant verses from Meṇṭha's poem, Hayagrīva and his court are described.

Pravarasena

Setubandha (1880; I, 1-4): The poet invites the praise of Viṣṇu and his deeds and thereupon (I, 5-8) that of Śiva and his deeds; (I, 9-11) reflections of the poet who claims to be a minor king, about his own poetry and the merits of *kathā kāvya* compositions; Pravarasena also seems to mention the difficulty of producing "a new way for one's subject matter through brilliance of composition" (I, 12, quoted by Bhoja as an example of *vaktavyārthapratijñāna*) invitation to listen to Dasamuhavaha, whose qualities are mentioned and who is marked by and endowed with *anurāga*; (I, 13) the situation of Rāma and his allies is briefly described, possibly because Pravarasena considers it well known; after that a description of the rainy season is introduced (I, 16-24).

Bhāravi

Kirātārjunīya (1954): The envoy previously sent by Yudhiṣṭhira to spy on Duryodhana's behaviour comes back (I, 1) and starts reporting the truth, and this fact causes a general remark on the necessity for the good-hearted of avoiding any lie (I, 2); (I, 3) introduction to the envoy's speech and its qualities; the speech begins; fearing that it could not be pleasant to the audience, the poet underlines again the rarity of speeches which are at the same time pleasant and favorable.

Bhaṭṭi

Rāvaṇavadha (1898; I, 1): Because of his own merits, Daśaratha is chosen by the Eternal one to father himself in bodily form as Rāma; (I, 2-4) description of Daśaratha's qualities and deeds; (I, 5-8) Ayodhyā is

then described; (I, 9) king Daśaratha amuses himself with his three wives; (I, 10-13) Ṛṣyaśṛṅga's intervention in order to grant Daśaratha's dynasty an heir; (I, 14) the birth of the four sons of Daśaratha.

Kumāradāsa

Jānakīharaṇa (1967; I, 1-11): Description of Ayodhyā; (I, 12-25) description of Daśaratha; (I, 26-43) description of Daśaratha's three spouses.

Māgha

Śiśupālavadha (1915; I, 1): Hari sees Nārada descending from the sky.

As it can be seen from these summaries of the beginnings of the *mahākāvyas*, the *vastunirdeśa* tends to become more and more frequent in the course of the development of the Court Poem genre. The poems, from their very first verse, then, begin with an episode which belongs to the poem's plot (the return of the envoy, as in the case of Bhāravi's *sargabandha*), or by describing a character of the story told (Hayagrīva, Daśaratha for instance), or mingling these two things (as in the case of Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha*, where Hari sees Nārada descending from the sky). It might be possible to ask why such a sophisticated literary tradition as that of the *kāvya* movement privileged the brief and simple—if not elementary—*vastunirdeśa* as the ideal *sargabandhas*' *incipit*. As far as I know, neither the Indian authors nor the theoreticians give a clue to it, and scholars do not seem to have focused on this aspect; however, in my opinion, it is worth asking for the reason of such circumstances. Because of the role which imitation plays in Indian literary tradition, prestigious literary works which may have functioned as the *sargabandhas*' literary forerunners and models could provide an answer. In fact, there are possible literary models, and they are indeed numerous: the way in which the *upākhyānas* of the *Mahābhārata* begin represents illustrious forerunners of the beginnings of the *mahākāvyas*. Meṇṭha's poem, for example, starts in the same way (or in a very similar one) as the stories contained in the *Mahābhārata*. In order to give an example of the influence of the beginnings of the *upākhyānas* of the *Mahābhārata* in shaping those of the *mahākāvyas* two of the most famous stories from the *itihāsa* deserve to be quoted: the episode of Śakuntalā and Duḥṣanta and that of Yayāti. These two are the first *upākhyānas* told in the Epic poem and both belong to the *Sambhavaparvan*.

The first story, that of Śakuntalā, is introduced when Janamejaya asks about the origin of the Kaurava dynasty (*Mbh.*, crit. ed., I, 62, 1). Vaiśaṃpāyana then replies directly by introducing Duḥṣanta (*Mbh.*, crit. ed., I, 62, 3):

vaiśaṃpāyana uvāca:
pauravāṇāṃ vaṃśakaro duḥṣanto nāma vīryavān ।
pṛthivyāś caturantāyā goptā bharatasattama ॥

"Vaiśaṃpāyana said:
A dynast of the Pauravas was the hero called Duḥṣanta, herdsman of all the earth to her four horizons. O best of the Bhāratas" (VAN BUITENEN 1973: 156).

Yayāti's episode is directly linked to that of Śakuntalā: Vaiśaṃpāyana presents Bharata's heirs and then the genealogies of Yādava, Paurava and Bharata. When he mentions Yayāti, Janamejaya asks him about the marriage between Yayāti and Devayānī, and Vaiśaṃpāyana answers: after introducing, as before, the main character and briefly summing up the vicissitudes of his life, the epic bard immediately starts telling the whole story (*Mbh.*, crit. ed., I, 71, 3-5):

vaiśaṃpāyana uvāca:
yayātir asīd rājarṣir devarājasamadyutiḥ ।
taṃ śukravṛṣaparvāṇau vavrāte vai yathā purā ॥
tat te 'haṃ saṃpravakṣyāmi pṛcchato janamejaya ।
devayānyāś ca saṃyogaṃ yayāter nāhuṣasya ca ॥
surāṇām asurāṇāṃ ca samajāyata vai mithaḥ ।
aiśvaryaṃ prati saṃgharṣas trailokye sacarācare ॥

"Vaiśaṃpāyana said:
Yayāti was a royal seer who had the majesty of Indra. I shall recall to you at your bidding, Janamejaya, how of yore both Śukra and Vṛṣaparvan chose him for their daughters, and how the union came about of Yayāti Nāhuṣa and Devayānī.
Between the Gods and the Asuras there arose a great feud over the sovereignty of the universe with all its moving and standing creatures" (VAN BUITENEN 1973: 175 f.).

Other episodes of the *Mahābhārata* show the same *incipit*: for example, the story of Tapatī is told by a Gandharva to Arjuna who, addressed by the celestial creature with the epithet of Tāpatya, asks

him for the reason. When Vaiśampāyana starts his answer, the Gandharva announces that he will explain to Arjuna the origin of that epithet and then begins to tell the story (*Mbh.*, crit. ed., I, 160, 6):

ya eṣa divi dhiṣṇyena nākaṃ vyāpnoti tejasā ।
etasya tapatī nāma babhūvāsadṛśī sutā ॥

"The One in the sky who suffuses the vault of heaven with benevolent splendor had an incomparable daughter by the name of Tapatī" (van Buitenen 1973: 325)

Another example, probably the most renowned among the Sanskritists, even beginners often know it by heart, is the episode of Nala and Damayantī (*Mbh.*, crit. ed., III, 50, 1):

bṛhadaśva uvāca:
āsīd rājā nalo nāma vīrasenasuto balī ।
upapanno guṇair iṣṭai rūpavān aśvakovidaḥ ॥

"Bṛhadaśva said:
There was a king by the name of Nala, the mighty son of Vīrasena, endowed with all good virtues, handsome and a connoisseur of horses..." (van Buitenen 1975: 322).

As the above quoted examples show, the way in which the *upākhyāna*s of the *Mahābhārata* begin is set, and the *vastunirdeśa* could have developed from it. However, one should note a difference between the beginnings of the *upākhyāna*s and those of the *sargabandha*s. Such a difference is attributable to the whole structure of the *itihāsa*: in the Epic poem the episodes are framed either by questions which the characters ask or by the vicissitudes, of which they form part; the stories are generally told owing to these two different literary devices. The situation shown by the *sargabandha*s is different, and this can be easily explained: the frame which the *mahākāvya*s virtually refer to is the *Mahābharata* itself, which the audience of the *kavi*s knew very well. The *vastunirdeśa*, then, can be considered a beginning *in medias res* and it does not stand in need of any further introduction. Furthermore, as I will show until Daṇḍin's times, the purest form of *vastunirdeśa* is employed by poets whose *sargabandha*s retell a story taken from the *Mahābhārata*: Meṇṭha's *Hayagrīvavadha,* Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīya, and* Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha.* The Court Poems

inspired by the *Rāmāyaṇa* show different features, and this is probably not casual.

Though an increasing presence of the *vastunirdeśa* in more recent *mahākāvyas* can be observed, the situation is slightly different when we look at the earliest examples of this genre. A poem begun by introducing the parents of a main character reminds one of the rule of the *vastunirdeśa*, but it is anyway different from simply portraying a character, as Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* shows. Beginning a poem with a description of a place, as that of Kapila's hermitage in Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* and that of the Himālaya range in Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava*, differs to an even higher degree. I believe that poets were free to begin their *sargabandhandas* in these ways not only because they felt less bound by strict poetic rules than later *kavis*, but also because they displayed an attitude and pursue an aim, which I would call "iconological". I borrow this term from the terminology used by art historians, and I employ it in order to argue that the literary motives that the poets chose to open their poems signify and evoke the atmosphere of the whole poem, the driving forces behind it and the various and often contrasting situations through which the plot is developed. If one accepts and keeps in mind the perspective suggested by such an "iconological" intention, what the poet deliberately wanted to describe at the beginning of his poem that prefigured the main themes of the *mahākāvya*. This is true not only for the description of the figures, their characteristics and relationships, but also for the depiction of places. By introducing his poem by a description of Kapila's hermitage followed by one of the capital of Kapilavastu, in fact, Aśvaghoṣa aimed at representing the same contrast between renunciation and fulfillment of the *trivarga* (and in particular of *kāma*, passion), the main character, prince Nanda, will experience in the course of the entire story of the *Saundarananda*. In this way, the hermitage standing for the ideal of renunciation, the city of Kapilavastu signifies for the acme of the *trivarga,* as the poet clearly states in verse I, 40:

alaṃ dharmārthakāmānāṃ nikhilānām avāptaye ।
nidhayo naikavidhayo bhūrayas te gatārayaḥ ॥

"These treasures were of many kinds and abundant, ample for the complete attainment of the objects of religion, wealth and pleasure, and not subject to loss at the hands of foes" (Johnston 1928: 4).

The other poem by Aśvaghoṣa, the *Buddhacarita*, though it begins with a description of the parents of the Buddha to be, and so in a way similar to the *vastunirdeśa*, displays on the part of the poet the same intention of prefiguring the main theme of the *mahākāvya*. The description of Śuddhodana and Mahāmāyā and the account of their feelings causes the anticipation that the whole poem contains the same dialectic between royalty and religious asceticism which we already noticed in the *Saundarananda*.

Furthermore, the description of the Himālaya opening Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava* may have the same function of prefiguring what the entire poem is about, quite as in Aśvaghoṣa's poems. The Himālaya is represented as the "king of mountains", an absolute sovereign, as stated through the term *śailādhipatya-* in verse I, 17. This fact foreshadows the future victory and lordship of Kumāra, Śiva's son. Furthermore, as noted by D. SMITH, the poet insists on the beauty and the erotic atmosphere characterizing the mountain range and also enhances this aspect by describing the happy union between the Himālaya and Menā. The only fact that Menā conceives Pārvatī while in *samādhi* (I, 22) seems to contradict this situation of sheer love and pleasure, but it might be seen as an intentional touch of irony on the part of the poet. Furthermore, it could prefigure something which will happen next in the poem: I hold it hints rather at the strong penance, which the goddess Pārvatī undertakes in order to seduce and win her future husband, than to the *samādhi* practised by Śiva himself, impending the seduction.

The intimate union of Śiva (here called Parameśvara) and Pārvatī appears also at the beginning of the *Raghuvaṃśa* (2003; I, 1*d*). In this Epic Court Poem we find the first example of what the theoreticians call *namaskriyā* or *stuti*. Despite its brevity, this *incipit* raises a few questions: first of all, why does Kālidāsa choose to mention these two deities at the beginning of a poem which clearly deals with royalty and the solar dynasty, both of which are traditionally connected with Viṣṇu and his wife Lakṣmī? This choice might have been influenced by Kālidāsa's own *Śaiva* faith, but there is reason to believe that (the concepts) *vāc* and *artha* are the main point in the opening verse of the *Raghuvaṃśa* (I, 1), but not the deities mentioned. The compound *vāgarthau* is in fact placed in emphatic position at the very beginning of the stanza, and it is repeated a second time (*vāgarthapratipattaye*) in the second *pāda*, though repetition is generally considered to be

something that should be avoided by good poets unless it leads to special literary effects, as in this case:

vāgarthāv iva saṃpṛktau vāgarthapratipattaye ।
jagataḥ pitarau vande pārvatīparameśvarau ॥

"Intimately united as Word and Sense, o Pārvatī and Parameśvara, parents of the Universe, I invoke you for mastery over Word and Sense" (Antoine 1972: 1).

First of all, the compound *vāgartha-* can be considered synonymous of *śabdārtha-*. Kālidāsa's simile, then, can be associated with the principle of the inseparability between *śabda* and *artha,* as argued by the Mīmāṃsākas. Jaimini (MS 1.1.5) states: *autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ.* "La relazione fra suono e senso è originaria (*opp.* connaturata)" (transl. Boccali).

Autpattika- is variously interpreted in the commentaries: the *Vṛttikāra,* quoted in the *Śābarabhāṣya,* takes it as for *apauruṣeya-*, while Śabara himself (who is anyway later than Kālidāsa) glosses it with *nitya-*. The meanings of these two different words are difficult to grasp; the usage of the adjective *nitya-* seems to suggest that the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* is continuous and unchangeable. This idea of a permanent relation between *śabda* and *artha* perfectly fits the comparison with the (permanent) relation of Pārvatī and Parameśvara.

Secondly, the worship of the divine couple aims at obtaining mastery over knowledge of poetry. The compound *vāgarthau* not only reminds one of the Mīmāṃsā view-point but also of Bhāmaha's (I, 16) famous definition of *kāvya*: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam.* At the same time, coherently with the inspiration a *kavi* may get, Kālidāsa aims at mastering the art of *kāvya.* As it is well known, the date of Bhāmaha is still uncertain and debated, but it seems almost certain that he knew the *Meghadūta,* because he criticizes the literary device of using inanimate creatures, in particular clouds, as love messengers (I, 42). Therefore, Kālidāsa's expression *vāgarthāv iva saṃpṛktau* may be taken as a kind of anticipation of the later definition by Bhāmaha. Furthermore, this expression might not only serve as a term of comparison for Śiva and Pārvatī's union, but also as a definition of *kāvya.* If this hypothesis is correct, Kālidāsa is addressing poetry as such, paying homage to it by venerating the knowledge poetic art guarantees. Furthermore, on reversing the metaphor, "word" and "sense",

significant for poetry, create the (poetic) universe as the divine couple the world.

It might be worth quoting here a stanza from the *Rāmāyaṇa* (Baroda; I, 4, 25), where Rāma is thus addressing his audience:

> *śrūyatām idam ākhyānam anayor devavarcasoḥ* ।
> *vicitrārthapadaṃ samyag gāyator madhurasvaram* ॥

"Let us listen to this tale, whose words and meaning alike are wonderful, as it is sweetly sung by these two godlike *sūtas*" (Goldman 1984: 133).

Here the expression "word and meaning" seems to refer to the poem, while, previously in the Epic, another, though controversial, *śloka* explicitly enumerates the *rasa*s (Baroda I, 4, 8). The suggested interpretation of the first stanza of the *Raghuvaṃśa* seems to be confirmed by what the poet says in the strophes following (2003; I, 2-3):

> *kva sūryaprabhavo vaṃśaḥ kva cālpaviṣayā matiḥ* ।
> *titīrṣur dustaraṃ mohād uḍupenāsmi sāgaram* ॥
> *mandaḥ kaviyaśaḥprārthī gamiṣyāmy avahāsyatām* ।
> *prāṃśulabhye phale lobhād udbāhur iva vāmanaḥ* ॥

"Where is the dynasty that issued from the Sun? And where is my mind with its limited scope? How illusory my ambition to cross on a raft a sea which cannot be crossed!"
"I am a fool aspiring after a poet's fame, I will cover myself with ridicule. I am like a greedy dwarf stretching out his arms towards a fruit which a giant alone can reach" (Antoine 1972: 1).

Kālidāsa is clearly speaking about poetry here and he complains about his (pretended?) inadequacy of singing the story of the *sūryavaṃśa* (*Raghuvaṃśa* I, 2-3), but, then, the poet significantly closes his statement with the word *vāmanaḥ*. This word immediately reminds one of the story of the homonymous *avatāra* of Viṣṇu: Do these verses represent a true statement of inadequacy or, perhaps, do they celebrate the greatness of the poet's skills and of his poetic work? It is useful here to underline also the similitude with the ancient sages, who are said to open the path as a diamond cuts the precious stones through which the yarn will be threaded. There is the possibility that Kālidāsa, with a pretence of being modest, actually praises his poem.

Pravarasena is considered akin to Kālidāsa, at least according to a late tradition, which is also confirmed by the late commentator Rāmadāsa (16th c.). The beginning of his poem, the *Setubandha*, is similar to that of Kālidāsa's *Raghuvaṃśa,* but it is more ample and sometimes, perhaps, much more difficult. The first four stanzas are a *namaskriyā* (or *stuti*) in praise of Viṣṇu (I, 1-4): the poet first mentions the opposite characteristics of the god's prerogatives, and then highlights his victories over the demons, his fulfilled love, Lakṣmī's chaste behaviour, and finally his victory over Indra. A praise of Śiva follows (I, 5-8): the poet focuses on the god's cosmic epiphanies, in particular his laughter (I, 7, which possibly reworks an image contained in the 58th stanza of the *Meghadūta*); the poet employs only one image of a different kind: the elaborated depiction of the opposite feelings of both passion and shame ascribed to the feminine part of the Ardhanārīśvara manifestation of Śiva.

After this double *namaskriyā*, the *Setubandha* (I, 9) contains a statement of inadequacy similar to that of the *Raghuvaṃśa*. The meaning of the stanzas is, however, quite obscure; Warder does not agree with Goldschmidt, and translates stanza number 9 as follows:

"It is difficult for a *kāvya* story to be completed,
having the chief aesthetic experiences,
When it is begun by a new king,
making good the slips; as a friendship
<Is difficult to be completed
by a well known libertine,
When it is begun with new passion, making good the slips>" (Warder 1977: 156).

The rhetorical figure *śleṣa* makes it difficult to discern the two meanings; however, if one considers that the poet may have nourished the idea of inadequacy, the statement becomes quite plain: a poem which displays all the *rasa*s is a very challenging enterprise for a person who has recently ascended the throne ("durch die Fehler eines Nachlässigen gestört", because the new king is absorbed by his royal commitments), and therefore a literary work can only with difficulties be perfectly shaped and completed. On mentioning the *rasa*s, Pravarasena implies that the second and alternative meaning carried by the pun (*śleṣa*) deals with some sentiments: the feeling of friendship is therefore mentioned, a feeling which can easily be spoilt by carelessness and disregard. The comparison between the

idea of being "begun by a new king" and being "begun with a new passion" seems to me less cogent: the fact that the poem is composed by a newly made king is the reason of his (supposed) failure, while a passionate feeling should strengthen friendship, unless one conceives of it as generically "new, recent". In any case, unlike Kālidāsa, Pravarasena does not seem to hint at any superiority of his skill; the following stanza (I, 10), however, claims the greatness of poetry in general and it mentions the benefits which poetry may give. As far as the benefits of poetry are concerned it is, furthermore, interesting to quote WARDER (1977: 156): "[Pravarasena] seems to imply that any slips in composition may perhaps be forgiven him for the sake of the good effects such an epic should produce".

The beginning of the *Setubandha* goes on (I, 11) with a poet's thought on the difficulty of composing a complete and harmonic poem. Pravarasena focuses here on the distance between his aims and his actual poetic skills on one side, and the accomplishment of his purpose of perfection on the other. WARDER (1977: 156) translates differently from GOLDSCHMIDT:

> "It is difficult to produce |
> a new way for one's subject matter through brilliance of composition..."

WARDER's interpretation seems better to me than that by GOLDSCHMIDT (1884: 198 "... - so geht schwer zusammen ein neuer Stoff mit dem Glanz der Form") because in reality the subject matter (Stoff) dealt with in the *mahākāvya*s is not supposed to be new. However, I do not agree with WARDER's brief remark (1977: 156) that: "we are again reminded that a king is writing": in my opinion, Pravarasena is only underlining the difficulty of creating a new and original poem.

The following stanza of the *Setubandha* (I, 12) completes the long and articulated introductory passage and it is extremely interesting: Pravarasena, inviting his audience to listen to his *Dasamuhavaha*, states that the dramatic vicissitudes of Rāma and Sītā will ease through the propitious events in the course the poem. Although indirectly, then the poet considers poetry capable of either creating the world or to change it, as Kālidāsa had claimed according to my interpretation of *Raghuvaṃśa* I, 1.

BHOJA (1963: 472) quotes Pravarasena's stanza in order to give an example of both the *vaktavyārthapratijñāna* and of the poets' habit of

"signing" (*aṅk-*) their literary works with a particular word, which recurs repeatedly in their poems. According to Bhoja (1963: 474), in Pravarasena's case such a signature would be the word *anurāga*. Furthermore, the use of *utsaha* in the previous stanza reminds one of Sarvasena's usage of the same word in his *Haravijaya*, which has not been preserved. Stanza 12 concludes the introduction and stanza 13 describes quite elaborately, how Sugrīva ascended the throne. It is interesting to note that this stanza immediately comes to the point, and if the poet had placed it at the very beginning, it would have been a proper *vastunirdeśa*. The following stanza (number 14) takes up the beginning of the rainy season, which is depicted in a long passage (stanzas 14-24). A description of autumn follows.

Bhāravi begins his poem, the *Kirātārjunīya*, with a *vastunirdeśa*:

śriyaḥ kurūṇām adhipasya pālanīm prajāsu vṛttiṃ yam ayuṅkta veditum ।
sa vārṇiliṅgī vidinaḥ samāyayau yudhiṣṭhiraṃ dvaitavane vanecaraḥ ॥

"Der Wäldler, den Yudhisthira beauftragt hatte, das Verfahren des Gebieters im Kurulande gegen seine Untertanen, das seine Herrschaft befestigte, zu erkunden, kam, nachdem er in der Verkleidung eines Brahmanenschülers Kenntnis davon genommen, im Dvaitawald wieder mit jenem zusammen" (Cappeller 1912: 1).

The first word is *śriyaḥ*, and this points to the fact that imitation is here at play: the same word in fact ends the first stanza of Meṇṭha's *Hayagrīvavadha*. Furthermore, it appears at the very beginning of the first stanza of Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha*! Because this stanza is moreover a canonical example of *vastunirdeśa*, it deserves to be quoted:

śriyaḥ patiḥ śrīmati śāsituṃ jagaj jagannivāso vasudevasadmani ।
vasan dadarśāvatarantam ambarād dhiraṇyagarbhāṅgabhuvaṃ muniṃ hariḥ ॥

"Als Hari, der Gatte der Srī, um die Welt zu regieren, er selbst die Wohnung der Welt, in dem gesegneten Hause Vasudeva's wohnte, sah er (einst) den Brahmaentsprossenen Seher vom Himmel herabsteigen" (Cappeller 1915: 81).

Between Bhāravi and Māgha's times, the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* and Kumāradāsa's *Jānakīharaṇa* were composed. The first one starts as such:

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Between Bhāravi and Māgha's times, the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* and Kumāradāsa's *Jānakīharaṇa* were composed. The first one starts as such:

abhūn nṛpo vibudhasakhaḥ parantapaḥ śrutānvito daśaratha ity udāhṛtaḥ ।
guṇair varaṃ bhuvanahitacchalena yaṃ sanātanaḥ pitaram upāgamat svayam ॥

"There was a king called Daśaratha, a friend of the Gods, a tormentor of *his* enemies, an expert in the oral tradition, excellent in good qualities, whom Viṣṇu, the Eternal himself, on the pretext of benefiting the world, accepted as his father" (LEONARDI 1972: 1).

The first stanza of the *Jānakīharaṇa* reads as follows:

āsīd avanyām atibhogabhārād divo 'vatīrṇā nagarīva divyā ।
kṣatrānalasthānaśamī samṛddhyā purām ayodhyeti purī parārdhyā ॥

"C'era, come un'urbe celeste discesa dal cielo sulla terra per il peso della troppa felicità, albero della *śamī* ricettacolo del fuoco del potere degli *kṣatra*, la città di nome Ayodhyā per la fortuna fra le città eccelsa" (transl. BOCCALI).

These two last stanzas cannot be considered entirely canonical *vastunirdeśa*s, but they are very close to this kind of *incipit*, because they describe a character (Daśaratha, whose description begins with the traditional formula used since the *Mahābhārata*) and a place (the city of Ayodhyā) respectively.

I have provided a survey of the *incipit*s of the *sargabandha*s which were composed until Daṇḍin's time, when the *vastunirdeśa* prevailed among other possible *incipit*s. Though it is difficult to draw a definitive conclusion, some remarks can be made: in the examples of early *mahākāvya*s, until Pravarasena's *Setubandha*, the *incipit*s of the poems (except for the *Hayagrīvavadha*) do not mirror any of the forms which later had become canonical. Also the *Buddhacarita*, the beginning of which is formally almost a *vastunirdeśa*, does not introduce Sarvārthasiddha directly, but starts with his father Śuddhoddana:

"There was a king of the unconquerable Śākyas, Śuddhodana by name, of the race of Ikṣvāku and the peer of Ikṣvāku in might. Pure he was in conduct and beloved of his people as the moon in autumn" (JOHNSTON 1936: 1).

Both Aśvaghoṣa's *mahākāvya*s and Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava* start by foreshadowing their subject matter in its entirety and also the dialectic forces behind their developments.

The *Raghuvaṃśa* and the *Setubandha* begin with a combination of different canonical forms of an *incipit*. Their peculiarity lies also in the fact that they contain the poets' notion of poetry and their role. It is possible to note here, furthermore, that a similar and very famous reflection on poetry appears not in the beginning, but at the end of Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda*. The final stanzas (XVIII, 63-64) of this Court Poem deal with a difficult and controversial topic: the relationship between art and religion, between poetry and liberation. All these examples suggest that poetry was very lively discussed and that the *kavi*s were keen on voicing their opinion, often giving their reflections a prominent position in their poems. Also Hāla, himself a poet and traditionally considered the compiler of the *Sattasaī*, which is of course an anthology and does not belong to the *mahākāvya* genre, devotes stanzas number 2 and 3 to the discussion of topics, such as the role of Prakrit *kāvya*s, the importance of the *alaṃkāra*s and, perhaps, the relationship between *kāvya* and *kāmaśāstra*. Stanza number 2 of the *Sattasaī* underlines also the friendly terms on which Hāla was with other poets.

As W. SLAJE's contribution to this volume exhaustively shows, once the different canonical forms of *incipit*s had become fixed, the interest in debating poetry was still present, but poets preferred to deal with this topic in the course of their poems, not exactly at their beginning.

APPENDIX

Pravarasena, *Setubandha*, I, 1-14

ṇamaha avaḍḍhia-tuṅgaṃ avasāria-vitthaaṃ aṇoṇaa-gahiraṃ ı
appalahua-parisaṇhaṃ aṇāa-paramattha-pāaḍaṃ mahumahaṇam ॥ 1 ॥

daṇuinda-ruhira-lagge jassa phurante ṇaha-ppahā-vicchaḍḍe ı
guppantī vivalāā galia vva thaṇaṃsue mahāsura-lacchī ॥ 2 ॥

pīṇattaṇa-duggejjhaṃ jassa bhuā-anta-ṇiṭṭhura-pariggahiaṃ ı
riṭṭhassa visama-valiaṃ kaṇṭhaṃ dukkheṇa jīviaṃ bolīṇaṃ ॥ 3 ॥

oāhia-mahi-veḍho jeṇa parūḍha-guṇa-mūla-laddha-tthāmo ı
ummūlanteṇa dumaṃ pāroho vva khuḍio mahendassa jaso ॥ 4 ॥

ṇamaha a jassa phuḍa-ravaṃ kaṇṭha-cchāā-ghaḍanta-ṇaaṇaggi-sihaṃ ı
phurai phuriaṭṭahāsaṃ uddha-paḍitta-timiraṃ miva disā-akkaṃ ॥ 5 ॥

vevai jassa saviḍiaṃ valiuṃ mahai pulaāia-tthaṇa-alasaṃ ı
pemma-sahāva-vimuhiaṃ bīovāsa-gamaṇūsuaṃ vāmaddhaṃ ॥ 6 ॥

jassa vilagganti ṇahaṃ phuḍa-paḍisaddā disā-ala-paḍikkhaliā ı
joṇhā-kallolā via sasi-dhavalāsu raaṇīsu hasia-ccheā ॥ 7 ॥

naṭṭārambha-kkhuhiā jassa bhaubbhanta-maccha-pahaa-jala-raā ı
honti saliluddhumāia-dhūmāanta-vaḍavā-muhā maaraharā ॥ 8 ॥

ahiṇava-rāāraddhā cukka-kkhaliesu vihaḍia-pariṭṭhaviā ı
metti vva pamuha-rasiā ṇivvoḍhuṃ hoi dukkaraṃ kavva-kahā ॥ 9 ॥

S. Goldschmidt's translation:

Ehret ihn, der hoch ist, ohne erhöht — weit, ohne ausgebreitet — tief, ohne gesenkt worden zu sein, fein und doch nicht leicht, offenbar, obgleich sein Wesen unerkannt bleibt, den Madhutöter (1);

vor der Glanzfülle von dessen Klaue, als sie (erst) hell leuchtete (und dann) in das Blut des Dânavafürsten (Hiraṇyakaçipu) sich tauchte, des grossen Asura Lakshmî, scheu als wäre ihr das Busentuch abgeglitten, floh (2);

von dessen Armklammern der ob seiner Dicke schwer zu fassende Hals des Arishṭa derb gepackt und herumgedreht wurde, sodass nur mühsam das Leben hindurch konnte (3);

von dem, indem er den Baum (Pârijâta) entwurzelte, des grossen Indra Ruhm, der den Erdkreiss durchdrungen und durch die reichlichen Vorzüge als Wurzeln Bestand gewonnen hatte, abgeschnitten wurde wie ein (den Boden durchdringender, mit seinen vorspriessenden Faserwurzeln sich befestigender) Wurzeltrieb (4).

Und ihn ehret, von dessen mit dem Glanze seines Halses verbundenen Augenfeuer-Flammen der Horizont, erfüllt von hellem Gelächter und lautem Ton, erstralt, gleich als wäre sein Dunkel oben in Flammen gesetzt (den Çiva) (5);

dessen linke (weibliche) Hälfte, schamvoll und den Busen-Krug von Harsträuben bedeckt, voll Sehnsucht zur andern Seite zu gelangen und vom Gefühl der Liebe verwirrt, bebt und zugleich strebt sich hinüber zu biegen (6);

von dessen Gelächter in den mondhellen Nächten Stücke, mit deutlichem Widerhall vom Horizont zurückgeworfen, wie Wellen von Mondlicht am Himmel hangen (7);

durch dessen Tanzbeginn erschüttert, die Meere in einen solchen Zustand kommen, dass ihre Strömungen von den furchtverwirrten Fischen aufgehalten werden, und dass ihr Höllenfeuer, vom Wasser ausgelöscht, raucht (8).

Wie eine auf einen Edeln gerichtete Freundschaft, mit frischer Liebe begonnen aber durch die Fehler eines Nachlässigen gestört und wieder hergestellt, schwer durchzuführen ist — so auch die von einem neuen König begonnene, durch die Fehler eines nachlässigen (Dichters) gestörte und wieder hergestellte, mit den hauptsächlichen Rasas ausgestattete Abfassung eines Gedichtes (9).

parivaḍḍhai viṇṇāṇaṃ saṃbhāvijjai jaso viḍhappanti guṇā ।
suvvai suurisa-cariaṃ kiṃ taṃ jeṇa ṇa haranti kavvālāvā ॥ 10 ॥

icchāi va dhaṇa-riddhī jovvaṇa-laddha vva āhiāīa sirī ।
dukkhaṃ saṃbhāvijjai bandha-cchāāi ahiṇavā attha-gaī ॥ 11 ॥

taṃ tiasa-bandi-mokkhaṃ samattha-tellokka-hiaa-salluddharaṇaṃ ।
suṇaha aṇurāa-iṇhaṃ sīā-dukkha-kkhaaṃ dahamuhassa vahaṃ ॥ 12 ॥

aha paḍivaṇṇa-virohe rāhava-vammaha-sareṇa māṇabbhahie ।
viddhāi vāli-hiae rāa-siria ahisārie suggīve ॥ 13 ॥

vavasāa-rai-paoso rosa-gainda-diḍha-siṅkhalā paḍivandho ।
kaha kaha vi dāsarahiṇo jaa-kesari-pañjaro gao ghaṇa-samao ॥ 14 ॥

Es wächst das Wissen, Ruhm wird zu Stande gebracht, Vorzüge werden erworben, man erfährt das Schicksal der Helden — durch was ergetzen nicht die Gedichte (10)?

Wie nur schwer die Zunahme des Reichtums gleichen Schritt hält mit dem Wunsche, und die Schönheit der Jugend nur schwer sich verträgt mit guter Zucht — so geht schwer zusammen ein neuer Stoff mit dem Glanz der Form (11).

So höret denn den die gefangenen Götterfrauen erlösenden, aus dem Herzen der ganzen Dreiwelt den Pfeil herausziehenden, 'Liebe' zum Kennzeichen habenden, Sîtâ's Leiden beendenden 'Tod des Zehnköpfigen' (12).

Nachdem nun Sugrîva von der Çrî des Königs (Vâli), welche von dem Pfeil des Râghava als Liebesgottes in ihrem streiterfüllten, von Übermut geblähten Herzen—nämlich dem Vāli—getroffen war, zum Stelldichein geladen war (13),

gieng mühsam dem Dâçarathi dahin die Regenzeit — die Verfinsterung für die Sonne seines Entschlusses, die starke Fessel für den Elefanten seines Zornes, der Käfig für den Löwen seines Sieges.

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'In the Guise of Poetry' – Kalhaṇa Reconsidered*

Walter Slaje (Halle)

Many, I believe, would consent to defining a book in one of the following manners (collected at random from various sources):

A book is

–"A physical object consisting of a number of *printed pages bound together.*"

–"A *published work of literature or scholarship*; a *non-periodical printed* publication of *at least 49 pages* excluding covers."

–"A collection of leaves of paper, parchment or other material, *bound together along one edge within covers.* A book is also a literary work or a main division of such a work."

If we are to accept any of these contemporary definitions as universally valid and use them as our point of reference, it would follow by necessity that there were *no books* in pre-modern India, as nothing would have corresponded to the aforementioned physical descriptions. In consequence of this logic, there would be no books in ancient India, and likewise no literature or scholarship.

It can hardly be denied that a similarly suspect pattern of argumentation occurs in modern and post-modern approaches to historiography in pre-modern India, as these are invariably based on western predetermined frameworks.

(Post)modern historians have typically and justifiably criticized the naivety of earlier historians in their approach to Indian historiography. Indeed, into the latter half of the twentieth century, (Western) historians anticipated the discovery of systematic literary differentiations characteristic of 19th century Europe in the pre-modern civilization of India. Such expectations produced disappointment: A clear distinction between the categories of 'literature' and of 'historiography' had obviously never been drawn in India. In the absence

* Read to the 13th WSC on Vyāsa Pūrṇimā 2006 (10th July). I feel indebted to E. Gerow and D. Mellins for the interest they have shown in the present paper. It owes much to their criticism, in terms of style as well as of contents.

of this dichotomy, the more or less joint verdict of Indologists determined that a serious historical sensibility was absent in pre-modern India.[1] The only exemption to this diagnosis seemed to be Kalhaṇa, who was instead awarded the comparatively high rank of 'pure historiographer'. Indeed, on the surface, he best met the expectations of contemporary researchers.[2]

Today, post-modern scholars claim to have achieved substantial progress over their predecessors in the profession.[3] The degree to which their claim may be justified set aside, they have certainly arrived at one true insight, long overdue, that earlier historians had applied double standards in their evaluation of the pre-modern historical writing in different civilizations. History writing in Classical Antiquity,[4] in the Middle Ages,[5] as also Mogul historiography,[6] were – and still are – accepted, even though these were composed with the narrativity and style characteristic of literary fiction. None of this was actually expected to fulfil the criteria of 20th century standards of historical reflexivity of history writing'.[7] Yet this was precisely what was demanded of historical writing of pre-modern India.

1 Cp., e.g., the summary given by SCHNELLENBACH (1995: 8ff): Notably WEBER, OLDENBERG, DASGUPTA and QUECKE took such a stand, but also KEITH and SCHNEIDER belonged to this party. The views of BÜHLER, WINTERNITZ, PARGITER, GOETZ, WARDER, PATHAK were more balanced. The pan-Indian conspiracy theory of BURTON STEIN about a 'controlled transmission of tradition', according to which the Brahmins had purposely fancied existing genealogies in support of their own position and with a view to controlling the ruling nobility, may be considered an exhibit in the Indological gallery of curios.

2 Kalhaṇa's Kashmiri successors were denied the honorary title of 'true historiographers' – quite undeservedly, if only measured against the same standards of reliability as Kalhaṇa. Cp. SLAJE 2004; 2005a.

3 It was HEINZ BECHERT, who first doubted the universal validity of judgements pronounced from a limited European viewpoint. Cp. SCHNELLENBACH (1995: 19) and the general outline given by KULKE (2005: 97ff; 112).

4 Ancient Greek historiography widely recognized as the beginning of the subject as such, was, contrary to the opinion prevailing today, conceived *at their time* as *literature*. There was nothing, which would have fallen into an indigenous category of 'pure historiography', independently of 'literature'. I am grateful to my colleague MICHAEL HILLGRUBER from the Halle Classicists' Department for the clarification of this matter and for referring me to SCHADEWALDT 1970. See, however, already STEIN 1900 (I): 22.

5 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 23; 41ff; 64.

6 See CONERMANN 2002a: 1-17; 2002b: 15-87.

7 A criticism of judgements characteristic of exactly that has been summarized in SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 62ff.

The WSC panel on Sanskrit Introductions offered a welcome opportunity to empirically test the viability of one post-modern theory. Recently in 2005, HERMANN KULKE elicited an original interpretation of Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī, relying on principles of German post-modern historians.[8] In her PhD thesis, the author CHRISTIANE SCHNELLENBACH relies on the work of the medievalist JÖRN RÜSEN, who devised a fourfold typology of historiography superseding HAYDEN WHITE's model, which focussed exclusively on the literary *structures* within historiographic 'texts'.[9] SCHNELLENBACH, taking HAYDEN WHITE's historical 'meta-theory' as her starting point and assuming this to be universally valid,[10] comes full circle: In the end, she succeeds in situating Kalhaṇa's magnum opus precisely within the theoretical schema used to launch her investigation – 'without major complications', as KULKE underlines in his summary. Here, he commends her work for having successfully localized Indian historical texts within the discourse of post-modern historiography for the first time.[11] Earlier Indologists, among them B. KÖLVER (1971), he continues, were on the wrong track when assigning the Rājataraṅgiṇī to the genre of Kāvya.[12] Such classification, Kulke contends, was justified only

8 SCHNELLENBACH 1995.

9 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 36f. Note her generalized usage of 'texts'. It suggests universal applicability, concealing the fact that the 'texts' selected for their investigations by SCHNELLENBACH's authorities were taken from only the European cultural area.

10 "Ausgehend u. a. von den Theorien, die H. WHITE 1973 in seiner 'Metahistory' vorlegte, zeigt sie, daß Kalhaṇas Kaschmir-Chronik entgegen indologisch-historischer Deutung [u.a. KÖLVER 1971: 123] allenfalls nominell der Kategorie der Kāvya-Kunstdichtung zuzuordnen ist. Durch seine Kritik an den konventionellen Werken und die kritisch-distanzierte Darstellung seiner eigenen Gegenwartsgeschichte stelle Kalhaṇas Werk stattdessen geradezu eine narrative 'Gegengeschichte' dar, ein Ausdruck, den SCHNELLENBACH J. RÜSENS Typologie der historischen Sinnbildung entnahm. (KULKE 2005: 112).

11 "So gelang es ihr ohne größere Komplikationen, das opus magnum der indischen Geschichtsschreibung in den HAYDEN WHITE'schen narrativen Historiographiediskurs einzubringen." (KULKE 2005: 112).

12 Some thirty years ago, BERNHARD KÖLVER had brought out the self-image of Kalhaṇa as clearly a poet and characterised the Rājataraṅgiṇī as a *kāvya*. KÖLVER 1971: 8ff; 123f. Earlier, STEIN (1900 (I): 10; 22f) and WINTERNITZ (1963: 96). LIENHARD 1984: doubted its character as a *kāvya* (1984: 218). For what it is worth, let it be noted that the colophon of the Rājataraṅgiṇī calls Kalhaṇa a Mahākavi. This was also the opinion of his successors (cp. fn 29) and of Maṅkha (see also below fn 46).

technically, if at all. Actually, Kalhaṇa's intention had been to *criticize 'conventional poetry'*.[13] He had tried to *distance his work from established forms of Kāvya by writing it in the form of a contemporary history*. Kalhaṇa's achievement came to be classified as a narrative *'counter-history'*,[14] the third of RÜSEN's four types of historiography.[15] This had the aim of dispossessing *traditional*, contemporary *modes* of historical interpretations *in order to create space for original historical perspectives*. It was adopted – and adapted to the medieval Indian context – in the following manner: Until Kalhaṇa, Indian poetry corresponded to the traditional model of 'conventional *kāvya*'. Conventional *kāvya* was characterised by the affirmation of life and kings. Kalhaṇa, in contrast, was negative and critical.[16] In the end, SCHNELLENBACH's adoption of this and related ideas lead to strained conclusions to the effect that Kalhaṇa *taught his audience a 'lesson'*, *conveyed an unpleasant teaching*, made his readers *turn away from history*, or *cured disruptions in traditions*.[17]

That is to say, post-modernist critiques concerning the double standards applied by earlier historians in evaluating Indian historical writing resulted in situating Indian historiography differently, by

13 I. e., what SCHNELLENBACH had predefined as such, see below.

14 Or, 'alternative history', – whatever translates German 'Gegen-Geschichte' best.

15 RÜSEN's four types of 'historical narration' were derived from function, not from literary structures: "Die vier Formen historischen Erzählens – die traditionelle, die exemplarische, die kritische und die genetische Form – wurden von Rüsen in einem erweiterten Rahmen für die Systematisierung 'historischer Sinnbildung' verwendet." (SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 36f; cp. KULKE 2005: 112).

16 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 54. It would be utterly unfair to cover up the commendable endeavours of SCHNELLENBACH and the evident merits of her work. This is a meticulous secondary study, carefully considering every issue of possible relevance. However, in the absence of sufficient philological command over her primary sources, all of her interpretations had to be based on published translations, presuming any of them necessarily to be correct. In the case of conflicting translations, she presented them in juxtaposition and analysed them eclectically, guided by the exigencies of her post-modern theories. An interpretation, however, which takes only translations as its starting-point, in fact interprets the translators' conceptual apparatus, but not that of the original author. This is another reason, why SCHNELLENBACH's attempt was bound to fail.

17 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 93 (G. MELVILLE); 129 (J. RÜSEN); 218; 290. Cp. also KULKE 1998.

applying post-modern interpretations of medieval *European* historiography to medieval *Indian* historiography. Disregarding their different cultural contexts, the latter now suffers from its interpretive submission to European models, which are considered to be universally valid patterns.

Such interpretations, however, are exacted only at a price: reducing the scope of Kāvya to the narrow confines of archaic formal definitions, i.e., 'conventional' *kāvya.* A brief outline given by LIENHARD in his 'History of Classical Poetry'[18]sufficed for SCHNELLENBACH's purpose. She measured Kalhaṇa's writing against LIENHARD's statement. Disregarding the theory of *dhvani* as a comprehensive poetic principle and *rasa* as a distinctive feature *of literature,*[19] the Rājataraṅgiṇī was arbitrarily excluded from the genre of *kāvya* and was assigned a different classification.[20] Without such an artificially restricted redefinition of Sanskrit *kāvya,* SCHNELLENBACH's theoretical constructions, based on premises derived from outside the Indian intellectual context, would have collapsed under the weight of empirical ambiguities.[21] Her 'understanding of medieval literature' was predetermined by JAUSS' and RÜSEN's theories concerning medieval European literature.[22] Neither of these authors had any first-hand knowledge of Indian literature and its typology. They were no experts in this field. Overall, this procedure of interpreting Indian historical writing along the lines of theories propounded by taking European

18 LIENHARD (1984: 2ff) begins his 'History' with a general outline, referring also to, e.g., Kṣemendra's Suvṛttatilaka (*śāstrakāvya,* etc.) as examples for indigenous classificatory attempts. On these introductory pages, it is true, LIENHARD neither mentions *rasa,* nor *rasa-kāvya.* On p. 218, he holds that the RT "contains many poetic passages, but can hardly be regarded as a *kāvya.*" This is echoed by the introductory statement of SCHNELLENBACH (1995: 2), according to which there would indeed be features in the Rājataraṅgiṇī typical of *kāvya* (metre, *alaṅkāras*), but that the conventional systematic of Sanskrit literature would offer *no alternative in terms of category* for this work.

19 On which see GEROW 1977: 238ff (Rudraṭa); 245 ff.

20 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 2. See, however, TUBB's (1991: 172f) exposition of an indigenous, for many centuries widely accepted classification dividing works into the three categories of *śāstra, ākhyāna,* and *kāvya,* of their characteristics.

21 Cp., e.g., Bhāmaha's (c. 700-750 [GEROW 1977: 228]) and Daṇḍin's (c. 7./9. Jh. [DIMITROV 2002: 24]; 690-725 [ONIANS 2005: 24f]) definitions of *sargabandha* and the relation they establish with historical accounts (*itihāsa, ākhyāyikā, kathā*) and human goals (*Kāvyālaṅkāra* I 18ff*;* *Kāvyādarśa* I 14ff).

22 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 7.

conditions as their starting point does not substantially differ from the interpretative patterns of earlier historians that were made the subject of criticism by post-modernists. The appellation '*anti-poetry*' attributed to the Rājataraṅgiṇī and the idea of a '*counter-historian*' attributed to Kalhaṇa are typical of purely western, and in the present case, post-modern, constructions imposed on pre-modern India. This I call imagining India.[23] Not much has changed, it would seem.

Authors of the Indian past should in the first place be seen and judged against their own intellectual and contemporary cultural background, not against that of a European past. It is only through tracing ideas back to the context they developed from that we might approach a balanced understanding. This is particularly true if we set ourselves to investigating ideas not yet fully understood. It is essential to start from unfailing suppositions, and hence we must assume that what is searched for might indeed be unknown, possibly even lacking any known parallels in European thought. Therefore, a method is called for, which proceeds empirically, without anticipating the results. It must neither be preoccupied with, nor impaired by pre-fabricated ideas, lest they control our interpretation of the evidence. In this respect philology has proven to be the most efficient and appropriate method. Let us then modestly dig in the Rājataraṅgiṇī to see what comes to light and examine the finds.

The author of this brilliant work was fully aware of his undertaking. He accounts for his achievement by a *Praefatio* of altogether 47 stanzas. It is a fact that not a few poets felt compelled to begin their works with introductory reflections when they addressed historical matters.[24] Among those the names of, e.g., Bāṇa (VII^{1}), Bilhaṇa (XI^{2}), Maṅkha (XII^{1}), Kalhaṇa (XII^{1}), Jayānaka (XII^{2}), Jonarāja (XV^{1}), Śrīvara (XV^{2}), and (XV^{2}-XVI^{1}) immediately come to mind. We may also add that – exceptionally – Kālidāsa (IV/V.?) wrote a preface of ten stanzas to his Raghuvaṃśa (Rv I 1-10), and furthermore draw

23 On this issue, see David Smith's delightful 2003 paper.

24 Contents and nature of their reflections would deserve a comparative investigation. Incidentally, Soḍḍhala (XI) has left us a very interesting instance of a comprehensive epilogue, in which he exposes in great detail the prehistory and the surrounding circumstances of his composition *Udayasundarīkathā*, referring also to earlier master poets and why they merit esteem (USK VIII). I am grateful to Professor Oskar von Hinüber for having drawn my attention to this author and his work.

attention to Padmagupta (X/XI) for Malwa [*Navasāhasāṅkacarita*], to Someśvaradeva (XIII) for Gujarat [*Kīrtikaumudī*], and to Nayacandrasūri (XIV?) for Rājasthān [*Hammīramahākāvya*].[25]

I don't think there is a ready answer to the question of just why exactly a historical subject would have prompted those poets to account for their undertaking. Anyway, it is a fact.

A learned man, Kalhaṇa addresses his audience as equals, sharing a common intellectual background. His introductory remarks testify to this. They are scholarly in character and refined in style. Kalhaṇa clearly regards his work to be a coherent one and declares his intentions in a systematic and reflective manner. Most revealingly, he begins and concludes his prologue with reflections on the *writer* of *historical* poetry.[26]

Rough Structure of Kalhaṇa's Preamble:[27]

(1-2) Invocations (*maṅgalācaraṇa*)[28]
- (1) Invocation (*namaskaraṇa*) of Śiva
- (2) Benediction (*āśīrvāda*) (Invoked deity: Ardhanārīśvara)

(3-47) Contents (*vastunirdeśa*) and Purpose (*prayojana*)
- (3-5) Precondition: The Able Poet and his Qualities
- (6-10) The Present Work, Subject Matter, Author, and Purpose
- (11-20) Excursus: Source Criticism
- (21-24) Character (*Rasa-Kāvya*), Beneficial Effects
- (25-43) Scene of the Action: Kaśmīr
  - (25-31) Mythic Prehistory of the Country
  - (32-37) The Territory: Frontier Tīrthas
  - (38-43) Characteristic Features of the Country
- (44-47) Praise of the Court Poet as a History Writer

25 The references to the latter three were kindly provided by Dr SOMADEVA VASUDEVA.

26 See also PATHAK 1966. To be sure, the absence of commentaries on Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī does not facilitate the understanding of the true purport of his work, as expounded by himself in this introductory part. Therefore, by recalling WILLEM CALAND's empiricist principle – which I have failed in retracing – that "parallel passages are superior to any commentary," I have consulted also the subsequent Rājataraṅgiṇīs as guides, as their authors had written in succession of, and dependence on, Kalhaṇa.

27 Cp. also KÖLVER's analysis (1971: 113-124).

28 According to KÖLVER (1971: 113), the first *maṅgala* would refer to the complete Rājataraṅgiṇī, whereas the second concerns its first Taraṅga only.

In their prefatory statements, the authors of all subsequent Rājataraṅgiṇīs unanimously praise the *kavi* in a manner certifying beyond doubt that they considered their Rājataraṅgiṇīs to pertain to the *genre of poetry, kāvya*. So also did Kalhaṇa. His successors each praised their immediate predecessor as being a better *writer* than themselves, thus indicating that each of their predecessors was poet, and suggesting, in accordance with convention, their own incrementally diminished capacity.[29]

Good literature presupposes an able poet, and a good poet is characterised by special qualities:

> *vandyaḥ ko 'pi sudhāsyandāskandī sa sukaver guṇaḥ* ।
> *yena yāti*[30] *yaśaḥkāyaḥ sthairyaṃ svasya parasya ca* ॥ RT I 3 ॥[31]

"There is a distinctive, admirable quality[32] of a brilliant poet surpassing [even] streaming ambrosia [and] deserving praise indeed:[33] It makes his own body of fame permanent as well as that of the other.[34] [Thus,] it surpasses [even] the stream of ambrosia."

29 Cp. the following quotations: *kva cuṇṭījalavan madvāk, kva ca kāvyaṃ taraṅgitam* । JRT 13ab । *kva kāvyaṃ madguros tasya, kva ca mandamater mama* । ŚRT I 1, 8ab । *kva pūrvakavivaktṛtvaṃ, kvedaṃ mandadhiyo mama* । ŚuRT I 12ab । Kalhaṇa's work is expressly called a *kāvya* by Jonarāja in JRT 26. Jonarāja is called a *kavi* by Śrīvara in ŚRT I 1, 5. Śuka speaks of his immediate predecessor Prājyabhaṭṭa as of a *kavi* (ŚuRT I 7) and leaves no doubt that composing royal chronicles was considered the task of a *kavi* (ŚuRT I 9).

30 *yena yāti* VISHVA BANDHU (text), STEIN (apparatus)] *yenāyāti* STEIN (text, adopting A_1).

31 Cp. *vandyās te rājakavayaḥ* ॥ ŚRT I 1, 3a ॥ *vandyo … kaviḥ* ॥ ŚRT III 2d ॥ *vandyaṃ* [...] *vākyaṃ … sukavīnāṃ …* ॥ ŚuRT I 4 ॥. Dr S. VASUDEVA considers an intentional allusion to DhĀ I 6 likely: *sarasvatī svādu tad arthavastu niḥṣyandamānā mahatāṃ kavīnām* । *alokasāmānyam abhivyanakti pratisphurantaṃ pratibhāviśeṣam* ॥ "Sarasvatī, [working] within great poets, in pouring forth this sweet matter (*arthavastu*) [viz. the emotions and flavors] reveals a special, vibrant, genius (*pratibhā*), which is superhuman" (INGALLS 1990: 119) – "Indem die Muse (Sarasvatī) diesen süssen Stoff den Klassikern spendet, fördert sie zu Tage solche leuchtende Conceptionen, welche nichts mit der gemeinen Wirklichkeit zu thun haben." (JACOBI 1969: 28).]

32 Referred to again (in I 7a) by *guṇavān*.

33 Emphasis by position (*vandyaḥ* ...).

34 The subject(s) treated by the poet, which, in the case of the Rājataraṅgiṇī, are the kings (and their stories).

This quality characteristic of an able poet only[35] consists in the capacity to make fame eternal by means of literature. Such immortalized fame not only extends to the (historical) figures treated by the poet, but also to the writer himself. As he is in a position of bestowing immortality, his words bear comparison with ambrosia (*sudhā*, *rasa*).[36] At the same time, the latter term of course alludes to the notion of *rasa* as connoted in poetics. "The term '*rasa*' is", as stated by Gerow, "deeply imbued with overtones of 'liquidity', inasmuch as both the sap, the 'essence' of plants, etc., is liquid, and the capacity to taste takes that peculiar form of 'liquidity' as its object [...]".[37] It is exactly this notion, which dominates Kalhaṇa's introduction from the very beginning to its culmination in I 24.

Kalhaṇa concludes his preamble with another set of statements (I 45-47) stressing the court poets' important function of recording historical facts. It had always been the province of the poets to hand down the names and glory of past rulers. To be sure, kings were not supposed to take examinations in history at school. They learned about their predecessors on the throne from the mouths of their court poets,[38] whose poetry made the past survive into the present. Only excellent poets would guarantee their rulers the everlasting glorification sought by them. With considerations of that sort, Kal-

35 A *kavi-guṇa* (the special quality of the author) is something entirely different from the linguistic qualities (*kāvya-guṇas*) and figures of speech (*alaṅkāras*) that characterize his work. On the latter, as constituting the externals of poetry according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, see Masson 1969: 14; 17f.

36 Cp. also the drinking metaphor used with respect to the 'river', which should be 'drunk with the ears' (RT I 24; JRT 26). These terms also carry allusions to alchemical immortality and physical stability (Dr Vasudeva).

37 Gerow 1977: 245. Cp. DhĀL 27, 8ff (*ad* DhĀ I 5) with reference to Rāmāyaṇa I 2, 14: "[...] Then, like the spilling over of a jar filled with liquid, like the pouring forth of one's emotion into a cry of lament, this [grief now transformed into the *rasa* of compassion] found its final form in a verse cast into fixed form of meter and into appropriate words, for cries of lament and the like are suggestive of a state of mind without the need of semantic convention; [...]" (Ingalls 1990: 115).

38 The Mokṣopāya (/'Yogavāsiṣṭha'), a Kashmiri work from about the middle of the 10th century [Hanneder 2006: 35-55], in depicting a court scene refers to a history book read out in the presence of the king of the 'Uttara Pāṇḍavas': *itihāsamaye puṇye vācyamāne ca pustake* (YV 3.104.25ab).

haṇa rounds off his introduction, possibly along the lines of his fellow countryman Bilhaṇa:[39]

tasmin kāle dhruvaṃ teṣāṃ kukṛtaiḥ kāśyapībhujām ।
kartāraḥ kīrtikāyasya nābhuvan kavivedhasaḥ ॥ RT I 45 ॥[40]

"Certainly, it was due to the evil deeds of those kings of Kaśmīr that at their time there were no poets present, [who], as creators, [would have] created a body of fame [for them]."

bhujataruvanacchāyāṃ[41] *yeṣāṃ niṣevya mahaujasāṃ*
jaladhiraśanā mediny āsīd asāv akutobhayā ।
smṛtim api na te yānti kṣmāpā vinā yadanugrahaṃ
prakṛtimahate kurmas tasmai namaḥ kavikarmaṇe ॥ RT I 46 ॥

"We venerate the poet,[42] [who is] distinguished by his nature.[43] Without whose favour the mighty rulers would not even be re-

39 VC I 26: *pṛthvīpateḥ santi na yasya pārśve kavīśvarās tasya kuto yaśāṃsi* । *bhūpāḥ kiyanto na babhūvur urvyāṃ, jānāti nāmāpi na ko 'pi teṣām* ॥ "Can there be fame for a king, if he has no master poets by his side? Were there not a great many of rulers in the world, of whom not even the names are known by anybody?"

40 Cp. *śrīgonandamukhair dharmasaṃmukhair ā kaleḥ kila* । *kaśmīrakāśyapībhūpair apāli guṇaśālibhiḥ* ॥ JRT 3 ॥ [...] *rājñāṃ teṣām ayaṃ* [...] *kīrtimayaṃ śarīram* । *ākalpavarti kurute kim itīva roṣād dhātāharad dhruvam ataḥ kavijonarājam* ॥ ŚRT 5 ॥ *śrīkalhaṇadvijaproktaśrīmadrājataraṅgiṇīm* । *ālokya*[...] *svaṃ vapuḥ kartum akhaṇḍitam* ॥ ŚuRT 5 ॥.

41 *bhujataruvanacchāyāṃ* STEIN (A); O_3] *bhujavanatarucchāyāṃ* STEIN & VISHVA BANDHU (Text).

42 In meaning, *kavikarman* equals '*kāvya*' (~ the 'profession, product, work of a writer, a poet' – Pāṇ. 5.1.124). When used as a bahuvrīhi compound, it would come to mean ~ "someone, who produces literature, a writer, a poet". Cp. also Mammaṭa (KPr Ullāsa I, 10, 2): ... *kāvyaṃ* ... °*nipuṇakavikarma* ... For *kavikarman* cp. furthermore RT I 13b (with reference to Kṣemendra's Nṛpāvalī), as well as °*kavikṛtya* in the following stanza 47d. See also USK VIII 233a.

43 A theoretically possible, alternative translation of *prakṛti-mahate* by "among the [king's] body of ministers" seems to be untenable here. According to the AŚ (III: 127; 133f), the *amātya* was among the body of a king's counsellors (*prakṛtis*). A poet laureate or Rājānaka could well have occupied the rank of a 'minister' or 'adviser' and would thus have belonged to the *prakṛtis*. In Kalhaṇa's time, the minister of defence to king Jayadeva was Alaṅkāra, brother of Maṅkha. He was a poet and grammarian (ŚKC XXV 36-47; 61ff). The same applies to Alakadatta, according to Jonarāja's commentary *ad* ŚKC XXV 78: *kaviṣv analpaḥ* ... *sāndhivigrahako 'lakadatto brāhmaṇāgraṇīr* ...). However, Kalhaṇa's enumeration of the seven *prakṛtis* (RT I 119: *dharma-*, *dhana-*,

membered, in the shade of whose forest tree-like arms the earth here rested fearlessly, girded with the ocean."

ye 'py āsann ibhakumbhaśāyitapadā ye 'pi śriyaṃ lebhire
yeṣām apy avasan purā yuvatayo geheṣv ahaścandrikāḥ ।
tāṃl loko 'yam avaiti lokatilakān svapne 'py ajātān iva
bhrātaḥ satkavikṛtya, kiṃ stutiśatair, andhaṃ jagat tvāṃ vinā ॥ RT I 47 ॥[44]

"O brother, you skilled poet! What is the use of a hundred praises? Without you, the world is blind. [Thanks to you], people here know indeed all those ornaments of the world, who [otherwise] would not have existed even in [their] dreams, as it were, [despite that], in previous times, they had rested their feet on the temples of elephants, had obtained wealth, and had young girls living in [their] palaces [whose lovely faces] afforded moonlight [even] during the day."

Kalhaṇa's opening statement itself, however, brings up the concept of the poet as a creator (*kavi-prajāpati*):

ko 'nyaḥ kālam atikrāntaṃ netuṃ pratyakṣatāṃ kṣamaḥ ।
kaviprajāpatīṃs tyaktvā ramyanirmāṇaśālinaḥ ॥ RT I 4 ॥

"Who else would be able to make the past visible, if not the creators, as are the poets? They are distinguished for their charming creations [of literature]."

His repeated references to the poet historian as a creator (*kavi-prajāpati, kavi-vedhas*)[45] suggest that Kalhaṇa had followed up the threads left by Bāṇa, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Among Kalhaṇa's attested predecessors in the field of historical writing, Bāṇa (VII[1]) was the first to compare the poet, in his case Vyāsa, to a crea-

kośa-adhyakṣa, camūpati, dūta, purodhas, daivajña) lacks the figure of *amātya*, who would have been a likely candidate.

44 Vallabhadeva has incorporated stanzas 46-47 in his Subhāṣitāvali (SĀ, *kavikāvyapraśaṃsā*, no 187-188).

45 Reference should also be made to Ratnākara's Haravijaya (*druhiṇasya kāvyam iva sargagocaraṃ sphuṭacitravṛttikam avadbhir adbhutam* । *viśadaṃ bhavadbhir abhitanyatetarām abhitaḥ purāṇakavinā kṛtam yaśaḥ* ॥ HV VI 8 ॥), on the *śleṣas* of which Alaka remarks: ... *kaviḥ prajāpatir api.*

tor (*kavi-vedhas*),[46] in which comparison he was followed by Ānandavardhana:

namaḥ sarvavide tasmai vyāsāya kavivedhase I HC I 3ab I
... *kavivedhasā kṛṣṇadvaipāyanena* ... (DhĀ 239, 1f)

The estimation of a *kavi-vedhas* was shared by Ānandavardhana (IX^2)[47] and Abhinavagupta (X^2/XI^1)[48]:

apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ I

"In the shoreless world of poetry, the poet is the unique creator."[49]

A number of scholars contend that Kalhaṇa's use of the terms *kavi-prajāpati* and *kavi-vedhas* points to the capacity for 'creative' writing. This is untenable. The history writer, as described by Kalhaṇa, was not supposed to *fabricate* a story. Kalhaṇa had neither the creativity of a fiction writer nor the invention of stories in mind when equating the poet with a creator. He was thinking of someone able of giving past events vivid literary form.

46 Bāṇa's Harṣacarita was well known and widely read in Kashmir at Kalhaṇa's time. STEIN has shown Kalhaṇa's acquaintance with Bāṇa's Harṣacarita (1900 (1): 11; 133). His appreciation becomes also clear from Maṅkha's Ṭīkā on his own Kośa, which contains abundant quotes from the HC (ZACHARIAE 1899: 51ff). Maṅkha and Kalhaṇa were contemporaries, who were acquainted with each other, as can be seen from the cross-references they made in their works (ŚKC XXV 78-80: *śrīmān alakadatto yam analpaḥ kāvyaśilpiṣu* I *svapariśramasarvasvanyāsasabhyam amanyata* II *tathopacaskare yena nijavāṅmayadarpaṇaḥ* I *bilhaṇaprauḍhisaṃkrāntau yathā yogyatvam agrahīt* II *tattadbahukathākeliparikramaniraṅkuśam* I *taṃ praśrayaprayatnena kalyāṇaṃ samamīmanat* I (78b *analpaḥ* Jonarāja] *analpaṃ* Ed.; 78c *svapariśrama*° Jonarāja] *svaparaśrama*° Ed.; 80b °*parikrama*° Jonarāja] °*pariśrama*° Ed.) – RT VIII 3354: *sāndhivigrahiko maṅkhakākhyo 'laṅkārasodaraḥ* I *samaṭhasyābhavat praṣṭhaḥ śrīkaṇṭhasya pratiṣṭhayā* II). See also STEIN 1900 (1): 12ff; KREYENBORG 1930: 15ff. The Dhvanyāloka quotes from the Harṣacarita, and Ruyyaka, the literary critic and teacher of Maṅkha, wrote a commentary (*Vārttika*) on it, which is no longer extant (KANE 1971: 279).

47 See INGALLS 1990: 692. According to Kalhaṇa, Ānandavardhana was as a poet at the court of Avantivarman (AD 855/56-883), Cp. RT V 34 (see also fn 102).

48 C. AD 950-1020 (KANE 1971: 243).

49 DhĀ 222, 4. Translation according to MASSON 1969: 12, and n. 1 (Cp. INGALLS 1990: 639). Abhinavagupta echoes this equation, which corresponds to Kuntaka's *Vakroktijīvita* 3.11ab [reference owed to S. VASUDEVA], in his Abhinavabhāratī (*kaver ... prajāpater iva* ... Abh 4, 13ff), see MASSON 1969: 13, and n. 1.

Kalhaṇa and his successors frequently emphasize the fact that they cast light on the past *corresponding to the facts* (*yathābhūta*).[50] Their stock of themes (*vastu*) was particular in the sense that they were drawing on past events, which were brought to life for the audience or readership through poetic art. Making the past *mentally perceptible* was conceived as *creative* – not inventive – capacity:

> *bhūtaṃ yad rājyavṛttāntaṃ vartamānaṃ karoty alam* । ... *kaviḥ* ॥ ŚRT III 2 ॥[51]
>
> "The poet brings the history of prior kingdoms into the present ..."

50 Cp. RT I 47 (quoted above). Śrīvara uses *bhūtavastuprakāśaka*, the meaning of which could approach our notion of a 'historian': *kāvyadīpaṃ vinā, kaḥ syād bhūtavastuprakāśakaḥ* ॥ ŚRT I 1, 4 ॥. Its literal meaning, 'illuminator of past affairs' can best be explained from the main metaphor the chroniclers were using for 'the past', namely night or darkness, as under such circumstances perception is impeded. To darkness, brightness was opposed and put on a level with poetry, as the past was made visible by its light.

51 Cp. Ānandavardhana: *bhāvān acetanān api cetanavac, cetanān acetanavat* । *vyavahārayati yatheṣṭaṃ sukaviḥ* ... ॥ DhĀ 222, 8f ॥ (Ingalls 1990: 639). Abhinavagupta, however, speaks of the poet's "power to create wondrous and unheard of things" (*vicitrāpūrvārthanirmāṇaśakti*) and defines his *pratibhā* as "able to create new things" (*apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣama*), cp. Masson 1969: 191; Lienhard 1984: 21; 30f; 45. It remains to be clarified whether *apūrva-vastu* (/ °*artha*) was really meant as a *new subject matter*, and not rather as a new literary representation of a given subject. There may even be a relationship to Bāṇa's demand of '*nava artha*' and '*sphuṭa rasa*' (*navo 'rtho, jātir agrāmyā, śleṣo 'kliṣṭaḥ, sphuṭo rasaḥ* । *vikaṭākṣarabandhaś ca, kṛtsnam ekatra duṣkaram* ॥ HC I 8 ॥). With reference to 'creating', Bāṇa complains that poor poets, loquaciously resounding in honeyed tones, were present in every house, as numberless as mongrels. Creative (*utpādaka*) poets, however, were as rare as eight legged fabulous creatures (*prāyaḥ kukavayo loke rāgādhiṣṭhitadṛṣṭayaḥ* । *kokilā iva jāyante vācālāḥ kāmakāriṇaḥ* ॥ *santi śvāna ivāsaṃkhyā jātibhājo gṛhe gṛhe* । *utpādakā na bahavaḥ kavayaḥ śarabhā iva* ॥ HC I 4-5 ॥). It is not unlikely that by creativity he refers to the creation of *rasa*. Unless we accept the 'new *vastu*' in the sense of *rasa* – on which cp. NŚ VI 31/32: *na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate* (Srinivasan 1980: 32) –, Ānandavardhana's opinion would be different, since according to him it was a given subject matter, which should *appear as if new* (see fn 53 below). David Mellins considers this passage an interesting modification of the '*bhāvika*'-*alaṅkāra* according to Mammaṭa's definition, although it refers to inventive as well as to factual constructions: *pratyakṣā iva yad bhāvāḥ kriyante bhūtabhāvinaḥ* । *tad bhāvikam* ॥ – "That by which past and present events are fashioned as if they are directly perceived in the present, is *bhāvika*." (Letter dt. November 6, 2006).

In a sense, and not as far-fetched as it might seem at first sight, GOETHE would have held a comparable opinion. On 18 September 1823, he communicated to JOHANN PETER ECKERMANN his view on the relationship between *reality, given themes, and literary form*:

> "[...] *reality must give both impulse and material. A particular event becomes* universal and *poetic* by the very circumstance that it is *treated by a poet.* All *my poems are* occasioned poems, *suggested by real life,* and having therein a firm foundation. I attach no value to poems snatched out of the air. [...] Reality must give the motive, [...] the kernel; but to work out of it a beautiful animated whole, belongs to the poet. [...] I especially *warn you against great inventions of your own;* [...] With a *given* material, on the other hand, all goes easier and better. *Facts and characters are provided,* the poet has only the task of *animating the whole.* [...] Indeed, *I advise the choice of subjects that have been worked before.* How many Iphigenias have been written! yet they are all different, *each writer considers and arranges the subject after his own fashion.*"[52]

The last statement of GOETHE deserves attention also from a universal comparative viewpoint, as it has a striking counterpart in the famous passage of Ānandavardhana:

52 Conversations of Goethe with Johann Peter Eckermann. Translated by JOHN OXENFORD. Ed. by J. K. MOORHEAD. Introd. by HAVELOCK ELLIS. Reprint [of the edition London 1930]. New York 1998: 8f (Jena, Thursday, September 18, 1823). This is the text of the German original: "[...] die Wirklichkeit muß die Veranlassung und den Stoff dazu hergeben. Allgemein und poetisch wird ein spezieller Fall eben dadurch, daß ihn der Dichter behandelt. Alle meine Gedichte sind durch die Wirklichkeit angeregt [...]. Von Gedichten, aus der Luft gegriffen, halte ich nichts. [...] Die Wirklichkeit soll die Motive hergeben, [...] den eigentlichen Kern; aber ein schönes belebtes Ganzes daraus zu bilden ist Sache des Dichters. [...] Besonders warne ich vor eigenen großen Erfindungen; [...] Bei einem gegebenen Stoffe hingegen ist alles anders und leichter. Da werden Facta und Charaktere überliefert und der Dichter hat nur die Belebung des Ganzen. [...] Ja ich rate sogar zu schon bearbeiteten Gegenständen. Wie oft ist nicht die Iphigenie gemacht, und doch sind alle verschieden; denn jeder sieht und stellt die Sachen anders, eben nach seiner Weise." JOHANN PETER ECKERMANN, Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens. Hrsg. v. HEINZ SCHLAFFER. [Sämtliche Werke. 19]. München 1986: 44,27-45,8.

"Even though *the subjects have been seen before*, the sentiments (*rasa*) used in a poem make them all *appear new, as it were*, as if they were trees [blossoming] in spring."[53]

Consequently, Kalhaṇa turns to the poet's inspiration (*pratibhā*), or divine eye (*divyadṛṣṭi*), as an indispensable precondition for bringing forth an illustrative depiction of the past in the form of a literary composition.[54]

The poet has a divine eye. He sees what is real by his powers of imagination (*pratibhā*): [55]

na paśyet sarvasaṃvedyān bhāvān pratibhayā yadi ।
tad anyad divyadṛṣṭitve kim iva jñāpakaṃ kaveḥ ॥ RT I 5 ॥

"If he did not see the entities (*bhāva*) [he wants] to convey [as transformed into emotions (*bhāva*)] to all [of his audience] by [his] powers of imagination, what else would then indicate, as it were, that the poet's eye is divine?"[56]

53 *dṛṣṭapūrvā api hy arthāḥ kāvye rasaparigrahāt* । *sarve navā ivābhānti madhumāsa iva drumāḥ* ॥ (Masson 1969: 13, n. 3) cp. above, fn 51. See also Tubb 1991: 175.

54 Among all Kashmiri chroniclers, only Kalhaṇa makes this the subject of a statement. Although Jonarāja, too, speaks of *pratibhā*, he does so from an entirely different angle. He refers to the genesis of his work as not of his own accord, by the wish of earning himself the name of a poet, but – like 'inspiration' – as caused from 'from above', i. e. by Sulṭān Zayn. Ultimately, by *pratibhā-sama*, Jonarāja alludes to Zayn, who had commissioned the continuation of Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī, see JRT 10-12: ... *pratibhāsamaḥ* । *kavināmābhilāṣeṇa na tu svasmān mamodyamaḥ* ॥ JRT 12 ॥

55 Since the times of Daṇḍin (cp. above, fn 21), *pratibhā* has been considered one among three prerequisites (*pratibhā, vyutpatti, abhyāsa*) of good poetry (*kāvya-hetu*). Some, as e.g. Rājaśekhara, took *pratibhā* as the sole factor (Kane 1971: 348f). From his reference to only *pratibhā*, it seems that Kalhaṇa would have shared the opinion of the latter. The term has seen different translations. Masson renders it as 'poetic imagination' (13; 16ff), similarly Lienhard ('poetic or creative imagination', 1984: 21). Kane rejects 'imagination' and proposes '(inborn) creative faculty' instead (348f). "Einfallsreichtum" [imaginativeness] (Dimitrov 2002: 227). For an exposition of *pratibhā* in Jagannātha's analysis, see Cahill 1995: 71-82.

56 I assume a pun on *bhāva* here. It may mean real entities, and in this sense would point to historical figures and events of the past. As emotion, it would emerge from the poetic treatment of the subject, by which the poet lends a specific sentiment (*rasa*) to his work, which stimulates the readers' emotional response. Thus, a *bhāva*, which is *saṃvedya*, would come close to *bhāvaya- / bhāvanā*. On the notion of *bhāvanā* in a *rasa*-context, see Gerow

Poetic imagination, or inspiration, is apparently a universal concept, on which poets agree. It is certainly interesting to recall another famous German writer, of the modern age, THOMAS MANN, and his estimation of FRIEDRICH SCHILLER's poetical approach to history. SCHILLER (1759-1805), one of Germany's greatest classical *poets*, held a *chair in history* at the University of Jena. His representations of history were always in the form of literature. Although his historical plays had been composed as factually reliable as possible, they have become masterpieces of German literature. Refined style and historicity were not yet considered mutually exclusive in the 18th and 19th centuries. Concerning SCHILLER's play Wilhelm Tell, THOMAS MANN, writing in the 20th century, ascribes SCHILLER's *amazingly faithful representation of a country he had never visited and the inhabitants he had never seen, expressly to his 'powers of imagination'.*[57]

Still, in the 21st century, enthusiasm about such skilful blend of history and poetry has not fully waned in Europe.[58] Is one not reminded here of history writing in the ancient and medieval world, recognised at the time as literature in terms of style? Therefore, one feels compelled to ask just why the situation should have been alto-

1972: 86. According to Nāṭyaśāstra VI 38, "*rasas* are the root, and from them are all *bhāvas* derived." See MASSON 1969: 52.

57 "Das Bedürfnis nach Autopsie, nach Studien an Ort und Stelle lag diesem Dichter fern. *Er wollte nichts sehen* und brauchte nichts zu sehen; er dachte gar nicht daran, selbst die Schweiz zu besuchen, [...]; aber sein Gedicht ist ein Gemälde der Schweiz, wie sie leibt und lebt. Aus der Intuition, der inneren Anschauung, die nur leichter Stützen von außen bedurfte, leibt und lebt sie darin, mit Land und Leuten [...] unzweifelhaft, unverkennbar – und *nur zu verwundern, wie so ein Dichter das ohne Anschauung trifft* [...]." (THOMAS MANN, Versuch über Schiller. Berlin 1955: 45ff.). An English translation of MANN's original speech, unfortunately not of the revised published version, is: *Friedrich Schiller.* An oration pronounced at Stuttgart on May 8th, 1955, to mark the 150th Anniversary of the Poet's Death. By THOMAS MANN. Transl. by ELIZABETH M. WILKINSON. *German Life and Letters.* N.S. 9,1 (October 1955): 1-14. The Scottish essayist, historian and Rector magnificus of the University of Edinburgh THOMAS CARLYLE (1795-1881), also a lover, translator and biographer of GOETHE und SCHILLER, will perhaps be closer to the English readership when the appreciation of literature-clad history is concerned. I am grateful to E. GEROW for having drawn my attention to CARLYLE's mastership in English historical prose (letter dt. 07.08.07).

58 „Mit solcher literarischer Meisterschaft ist in Deutschland vor Schiller über Geschichte noch nie geschrieben worden." (SAFRANSKI 2004: 272). „It is part of my creed that the only Poetry is History, could we tell it right". Letter of T. CARLYLE to RALPH W. EMERSON, 12 Aug. 1834. (Reference by D. MELLINS, 10.01.07).

gether that different with pre-modern *Indian writers* of history. The feature Kashmiri historiographers have in common with their European fellows, all genii in the same field, is exactly that essential blend of *writing* history by lending it vivid poetic expression.

Yet, by the mere existence of one such common feature we should not blind ourselves to considerably different traits, which emerge when we set ourselves to dig below the surface and investigate the possible purposes and aims of Kashmiri historical composition.

The emphatic praise of the *kavi* infusing Kalhaṇa's introduction certifies his intention that his work be known as *kāvya*. At the same time, he was aware that the *subject matter* (*vastu*) of his *kāvya* was of a special nature. *On the surface*, he indeed sets himself to give a literary account (*kathā*) of *past matters* (*bhūtārthakathana*). *Below the surface*, however, his work will actuate one dominant *rasa* throughout, an idea, which can be traced back to the Nāṭyaśāstra.[59] In line with the Dhvani school, Kalhaṇa's poetic expression of the plot is connected with enjoyment (*prīti*) as a purpose of poetry,[60] which, below the surface, as will soon be made clear, unfolds in the form of one predominant *rasa*:

> *kathādairghyānurodhena vaicitrye 'py aprapañcite* ।
> *tad atra kiṃcid asty eva vastu yat prītaye satām* ॥ RT I 6 ॥

> "Considering the extent of [my present] account (*kathā*),[61] [its] details have not been worked out at length. Nevertheless there is in fact a particular subject matter contained in here, which provides delight to connoisseurs."

This statement relates Kalhaṇa's poetry in the first place to the secular sphere of fine arts, where aesthetic satisfaction is sought. Bhā-

59 *na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate* । NŚ VI 31/32 (Srinivasan 1980: 32). "[...] meaning by *artha* the subject, or *vastu* of the drama – its congeries of elements – for the *rasa* is their end, in composite." (Gerow 1977: 24). On the absence of *śāntarasa* from the Nāṭyaśāstra and the subsequent discussion of this issue by Alaṅkāra authors, see Tubb 1991: 177ff.

60 Causing 'delight' or aesthetic pleasure was, according to Ālaṅkārikas, the main purpose of poetry (*kāvyaprayojana*). See Kane 1971: 346ff. According to the Dhvani school, the *contents* of a work, its suggested meaning, would cause such delight. See also Jacobi 1969: 9, n. 1.

61 It is perhaps worthy of note that Kalhaṇa characterises his work as a *kathā*. He uses a similar expression in 8a by forming the compound *kathāvastu*, and refers to his work again by *iyaṃ* °*kathā* in 21.

maha, and later Abhinavagupta, too, had extended the purpose of poetry further, to the achievement of also religious aims, without abandoning its pleasant side effects.[62] We shall soon see that Kalhaṇa must have shared quite a similar opinion.

Read in context, stanza 6 and the following stanza 7 make the *comprehensive account of past things*, where the tragic fates of a great number of rulers unfold themselves in full, the *special subject matter* of the Rājataraṅgiṇī. This requires that the poet possesses the extraordinary quality (*guṇavān*) referred to at the outset.

ślāghyaḥ sa eva guṇavān rāgadveṣabahiṣkṛtā ।
bhūtārthakathane yasya stheyasyeva sarasvatī ॥ RT I 7 ॥

"Disposing of [this] good quality the [brilliant poet][63] alone deserves indeed praise, whose speech, on giving an account of past matters, refrains from affection and dislike, as [would that] of an impartial [person]."

Stanza number 7 has become particularly famous in the West, perhaps because the possible purport of historical 'objectivity' struck a chord with western scholars. It is still willingly produced as evidence of a 'true historical sense' in India. Given the position of this passage, we, for contextual reasons, must assume that Kalhaṇa is referring to himself. It remains to be settled whether a pre-modern Indian notion of 'emotional detachment' voiced in the context of his-

62 *dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca* । *prītiṃ karoti kīrtiṃ ca sādhukāvyanibandhanam* ॥ Kāvyālaṅkāra I 2 ॥ (Reference supplied by D. Mellins). "Study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure, as well as skill in *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*, and skill, too, in the fine arts. Nevertheless, pleasure is the main thing." (Masson 1969: 54f; see also 77, n.4). Abhinavagupta preferred the religiously connoted term *ānanda* to *prīti* (Masson 1969: XVII, seen in relative terms by Gerow 1972: 83, n.10). Cp. also the account Abhinavagupta has left us of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's stance: *bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogaḥ.* [...] °*nijacitsvabhāvanivṛttiviśrāntilakṣaṇaḥ parabrahmāsvādasacivaḥ* (DhĀL 68, 16-18). "Once a *rasa* has been thus realized, its enjoyment (*bhoga*) [is possible]. [...] like the bliss that comes from realizing [one's identity] with the highest *brahman*, for it consists of repose in emotional detachment (*nivṛtti*) which is the true nature of one's own self [...]." (Following Ingalls 1990: 222 and Jacobi 1969: 170f, n. 5). Note that Abhinavagupta's views on *śānta* "were modelled on those of two of his predecessors, Bhaṭṭa-tauta and Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka. [...] Abhinava's originality in this particular respect is at least open to question." (Gerow 1972: 81). Cp. also fn 100.

63 *guṇavān* is to be understood in accordance with '*sukaver guṇaḥ*' in stanza 3.

torical poetry could be considered identical with the concept of 'historical objectivity' in the modern age.[64] It is not at all implausible that Kalhaṇa might have borne something in mind which differed essentially from what aroused the enthusiasm of European scholars: For them, Kalhaṇa's attempt at impartial writing would make him a 'true', or trustworthy, historian. For Kalhaṇa, only *true events*, couched in the language of literature, could exercise the intended effects on his readers. Furthermore, the alleged 'objectivity' eagerly read into this passage forms part of the comparison only: *stheyasya iva*. More precisely, it refers to the 'impartiality' of an uninvolved person (*stheya*), whose mental state implies emotional distance, or calmness, in the sense of *detachment*. Such concepts are alternatively spoken of as *vairāgya* or *śānta* in numerous intellectual Indian traditions. For the Dhvani theorists, disenchantment with the world (*vairāgya*) was the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of the sentiment of equanimity (*śāntarasa*).[65] The West has acknowledged Kalhaṇa's statement with much applause, celebrating him as an 'objective *historian*'. Notwithstanding, Kalhaṇa demanded such 'impartiality' from the brilliant *poet*. This does make a difference, as moreover, Kalhaṇa has had some prominent predecessors in this regard. Earlier, Bāṇa, in the context of introducing his Harṣacarita, the *subject* of which is *historical* and the *language* of which is *poetical*, characterised the *poor poet* as one with a view *obscured by affections* (*rāgādhiṣṭhitadṛṣṭi*).[66] This is all the more important as Ānandavardhana, too, had unambiguously expressed the opinion that *the sentiment* (*rasa*) *of a literary piece reflects the mood of its originator, who is the poet*.[67] The relationship expressed here is clearly that of a detached poet and his product, which is im-

64 Cp. also SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 83f: „Von 'Objektivität' – sicher ein im vormodernen Kontext problematischer Begriff – ist Kalhaṇas Geschichtsbericht wohl recht weit entfernt: eine 'wertfreie' Geschichte ist für ihn ebenso wie für seine europäischen Zeitgenossen 'unvorstellbar'".

65 INGALLS 1990: 479.

66 *prāyaḥ kukavayo loke rāgādhiṣṭhitadṛṣṭayaḥ* | HC I 4ab |

67 *yathāsmai rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate* || *śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvye jātaṃ rasamayaṃ jagat* | *sa eva vītarāgaś cen nīrasaṃ sarvam eva tat* || DhĀ 222, 5ff || "Everything becomes transformed into the way [the poet creator] envisions it. If the poet is emotionally moved (lit. 'in love') in his poems, then the whole world is infused with *rasa*. But if he be without an interest in the senses (*vītarāga*), then everything will become dry (*nīrasa*)." (MASSON 1969: 12, n. 1; INGALLS 1990: 639).

bued with the sentiment of its cause, the author – almost the transformation of a *satkāryavāda* idea into a poetic process.

There is more and still earlier evidence than Ānandavardhana, which casts light on Kalhaṇa's probable understanding of a 'detached poet'. It differs entirely from our conventional notion of an 'objective' historian. A Nāṭyaśāstra passage defines the calm state of *śānta* exactly in the context of *rasa*:

> *na yatra duḥkhaṃ na sukhaṃ na dveṣo nāpi matsaraḥ* ।
> *samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu sa śāntaḥ prathito rasaḥ* ॥ NŚ VI ॥[68]

> "The sentiment (*rasa*) known as calm (*śānta*) is impartial towards all beings. In it, there is no pain, no pleasure, no hate, nor even envy."

From this it would follow that the creation of equanimity (*śānta*) as the leading sentiment (*rasa*) of a work was feasible only on the precondition that its author – or, in the words of Kalhaṇa: creator – had previously experienced himself, or actually was in, the very mood of detachment (*vairāgya*). It would be difficult to create something beyond one's own experience. Therefore, Kalhaṇa proudly labels his composition the culmination (*mūrdhābhiṣeka*)[69] of the sentiment of equanimity (*śāntarasa*):

> *kṣaṇabhaṅgini jantūnāṃ sphurite paricintite* ।
> *mūrdhābhiṣekaḥ śāntasya rasasyātra vicāryatām* ॥ RT I 23 ॥

> "Recalling the sudden appearance of living beings lasting for a moment only, [the reader] is invited to examine *in this* [*work of mine the poetical*] *coronation of the calm sentiment*."

68 Although the authenticity of this passage is doubtful in terms of the 'original' Nāṭyaśāstra, the quoted passage corresponds to the Nāṭyaśāstra as known to Abhinavagupta (quoted from SRINIVASAN 1980: 51, see there for details). Discussed by MASSON 1969: 91ff; KÖLVER 1991: 46. "The state of *śānti*, as the goal of the *virāgin*, involves renunciation of emotional attachment." (GEROW 1972: 82). It is interesting that the equanimity expressed here (*samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu*) has a parallel in the Mahābhārata (Bhagavadgītā 18.54c), as pointed out by SRINIVASAN 1980: 54.

69 The figurative application of *mūrdhābhiṣikta* on *rasa* is also attested with Abhinavagupta (MASSON 1969: 62, 17; 77).

It is worthy of note that in concluding his work, Kalhaṇa again alludes to the *śāntarasa* through usage of '*viśrāntaye*'[70].

We are drawing nearer to Kalhaṇa's purpose when taking a look at his composition in the context of contemporary local poetical theory. In this regard, the following statements of Ānandavardhana are important:

> "And so it is that in such works as the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata the battle scenes, etc., although they occur repeatedly, always appear new. Furthermore, one primary *rasa*, being woven into a work, gives it special meaning and extra beauty."[71]

Moreover,

> "Again, in the Mahābhārata [...] the great sage (Vyāsa) shows that the primary aim of his work has been to produce a disenchantment with the world and that he has intended his primary subject to be liberation from worldly life and the *rasa* of peace."[72]

Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana emphasized the predominance of *śāntarasa* in the Mahābhārata, a work, which, for them, no less than for Bāṇa, stood on the front rank of poetry (*kāvya*).[73] In their

70 *viśrāntaye ... rājataraṅgiṇīyam* ॥ RT VIII 3449d ॥. On the semantics of *viśrānti* in the context of poetry (e.g., 'enjoyment received from a poem', 'the point at which the mind comes to rest', etc.), see INGALLS 1990: 833 (s.v.) and GEROW 1972: 81, n. 4 ('mental repose', a state which "all the dramatic *rasas* aim at").

71 *tathā ca rāmāyaṇamahābhāratādiṣu saṃgrāmādayaḥ punaḥ punar abhihitā api navanavāḥ prakāśante* । *prabandhe cāṅgī rasa eka evopanibadhyamāno 'rthaviśeṣalābhaṃ chāyātiśayaṃ ca puṣṇāti* ॥ DhĀ 237, 17-20 ॥ (INGALLS 1990: 690), cp. also TUBB 1991: 175. So, according to Ānandavardhana, also long works (*prabandha*) can be made the subject of *rasa*-poetry (LIENHARD 1984: 69, n. 11). As to the *prabandha* character of Kalhaṇa's work, see below, fn 96.

72 *mahābhārate 'pi* [...] *mahāmuninā vairāgyajananatātparyaṃ prādhānyena svaprabandhasya darśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣārthaḥ śānto rasaś ca mukhyatayā vivakṣāviṣayatvena sūcitaḥ* ॥ DhĀ 237, 23-238,3 ॥ (INGALLS 1990: 690f).

73 "[...] Ānanda and following him, Abhinava, insist on the overwhelming experience that reading the *Mahābhārata* provides. As unhappiness and doom succeed one another in seemingly endless display of the vanity of this world; [...] the reader is invaded by a sense of doom, [...] and he is eventually instilled with a craving for tranquillity [...] *śāntarasa*. The *Mahābhārata* remains for Sanskrit literary critics the supreme example of this mood, this imaginative creation." (MASSON 1969: X). "But the *Mahābhārata* [...] cannot be considered a *kāvya* in the strict definition of the term. Yet both Ānanda and Abhinava give it the careful literary attention it deserves. The claim was

eyes, reading the Mahābhārata would inevitably lead to world-weariness (*vairāgya*), the ultimate cause for equanimity (*śānta*), which was recognized a precondition for attaining release (*mokṣa*).[74] In his Locana, Abhinavagupta remarks,

> "Suffice it to say that as the *rasa* of peace leads to *mokṣa*, which is the highest aim of man, it is the most important of all the *rasas*."[75]

The Rājataraṅgiṇī, too, is a war book with considerable recourse to the Mahābhārata.[76] Moreover, Kalhaṇa emphasized that his Rājataraṅgiṇī was characterized by a dominant sentiment (*rasa*), establishing a theoretical concordance with both Dhvani theorists and his contemporary Maṅkha. The latter – supported by his commentator Jonarāja, Kalhaṇa's successor in the profession of *writing* history – held that a composition lacking its consecration (*abhiṣeka*) by a dominant

made by Kalhaṇa at the beginning of his *Rājataraṅgiṇī* that his work on history contains *śāntarasa*." (Masson 1969: XIII). Interestingly, such exclusion of the Mahābhārata from *kāvya* works would come in conflict with the indigenous tradition. Cp., however, Gerow 1972 for a thorough review of Masson 1969, putting the claims of the latter into perspective. Apart from the positive assessment of the theorists just cited, a remarkable obsession with the Mahābhārata can also be observed with other outstanding poets such as Bāṇa. He paid homage to Vyāsa in the first place and praised him, as a creative poet, for having composed the Mahābhārata: *namaḥ sarvavide tasmai vyāsāya kavivedhase* । *cakre puṇyaṃ sarasvatyā yo varṣam iva bhāratam* ॥ HC I 3 ॥

74 Cp. also the following quotation from the Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa: *śāntasya tu samutpatttir nṛpa vairāgyataḥ smṛtā* । "O King, they say that *śānta* arises from *vairāgya*." (Masson 1969: 36; 93). On *śānta, vairāgya* and *mokṣaśāstracintā* as standing in the relationship of *sthāyibhāva, vibhāva* and *anubhāva* respectively according to Abhinavagupta, see Masson 1969: 108; 139 and Kane 1971: 361f; 367. The same idea of *śāntarasa* as an indirect means for liberation can also be found in Ravicandra's Commentary on the Amaruśataka. Here, the author expressly establishes its relationship with Kashmir through relocating a legendary event concerning Śaṅkara to the region Kashmir (Bronner 1998: 233f).

75 *mokṣaphalatvena cāyaṃ paramapuruṣārthaniṣṭhatvāt sarvarasebhyaḥ pradhānatamaḥ* । DhĀL 178, 22f । (Ingalls 1990: 525; cp. Masson 1969: 97; 102f.)

76 Kölver had also voiced the opinion that Kalhaṇa would have modelled his Rājataratataraṅgiṇī after the Mahābhārata under the influence of Ānandavardhana's *śāntarasa* interpretation (Kölver 1971: 9). In the absence of any other historical evidence, Kalhaṇa was forced to reconstruct 'pre-history' largely from the Mahābhārata. To him, and to his successors in this discipline, the Mahābhārata was a textual *source for knowledge of the remote past*. See Slaje 2007: 332 and Stein 1900 (I): 11 (Introduction).

sentiment (*rasa*) would deserve no supremacy over other poetical works.[77] Both the Mahābhārata and the Rājataraṅgiṇī share as their common subject the transitoriness (*kṣaṇabhaṅgin*) of the life, luck and moral deprecation of even mighty kings. Another of Kalhaṇa's successors, Śrīvara, expresses exactly this view in saying:

svadṛgdṛṣṭasmṛtakṣmābhṛdvipadvibhavavaikṛtaiḥ ।
seyaṃ kasya na vairāgyaṃ sūte rājataraṅgiṇī ॥ ŚRT III 4 ॥[78]

"Will there be anybody in whom the present 'River of Kings' would not engender disillusionment by the vicissitudes [of the] rise and fall of the rulers, witnessed [by me] with my own eyes and [so] remembered?"

77 *nūnaṃ vinā ghanarasaprasarābhiṣekaṃ kāvyādhirājapadam arhati na prabandhaḥ* ॥ ŚKC II 32cd ॥ "A large composition lacking [its] coronation by the flow of a dominant sentiment does not deserve the rank of supremacy over poetical works." *sarasam eva kāvyaṃ mahākāvyam* (Jonarāja *ad* ŚKC II 32, p. 22, 3); [*kāvyaṃ*] *rasaṃ vinā niṣphalam* । *rasa eva kāvye pradhānam* (Jonarāja *ad* ŚKC II 30, p. 21, 18). I took the risk of an overinterpretation of *ghana-rasa* as "dominant *rasa*" in light of the preceding stanza (ŚKC II 31b), where Maṅkha had used *asama rasa* (in connection with a work of poetry). There, Jonarāja explains it as *asadṛśa rasa* (p. 21, 24). I consider an extension of meaning from "unique, unrivalled, incomparable" (*asadṛśa*) to "dominant, predominant" (*pradhāna*) a possibility. In the absence, however, of an unambiguous precedent for *ghana* in the meaning of *pradhāna*, it cannot be precluded that *ghana* simply expresses "thick, unctuous" *rasa* (D. Mellins).

78 Cp. also *svadṛgdṛṣṭamṛtānekavipadvibhavasaṃsmṛteḥ* । *sūte kasya na vairāgyaṃ nāma jainataraṅgiṇī* ॥ ŚRT I 1, 18 ॥ "Will there be anybody in whom [my] 'River of Zayn' would possibly not engender disillusionment on account of the full recollection [of the] rise and fall of the many, the dying of whom I have witnessed with my own eyes?" – °*mṛta-aneka-vipad*° can be analysed also differently: °*mṛtānām aneka-vipad*° " … the rise and fall in endless number of those I have seen dying …". The uniform transmission by all manuscripts of the reading °*mṛta*° and the likewise uniform transmission of °*smṛta*° in the similar verse occurring in the second introduction (*svadṛgdṛṣṭasmṛta*°, III 4, as quoted above), should warn us against rashly emending the text. In particular so, as between Śrīvara's first and second introduction a time of more than one decade must have elapsed, which would account for such a modification, speaking of "calling to memory" after many years had elapsed. See Slaje 2005b: 382.

Finally, all of Kalhaṇa's successors, Jonarāja, Śrīvara and Śuka, explicitly or implicitly characterised their own compositions as *rasa-kāvyas*.[79]

Recalling that Ānandavardhana's view that the narration of the adventures of the Pāṇḍavas is intended to generate "a disenchantment with the world – disenchantment being the cause of liberation (*mokṣa*)"[80] – it becomes clear from Kalhaṇa's own words that he, too, must have pursued a similar aim by composing a work in line with the principles of *śānta-rasa*. Indeed, he did create a literary piece, and more specifically, he composed it *deliberately* as suggestive (*dhvani*) of the mood of disenchantment, or equanimity (*śāntarasa*).[81] Kalhaṇa, certainly also under the influence of contemporary literary critics such as Ruyyaka, a committed advocate of the *rasa-dhvani*, and whose ac-

79 Jonarāja, no doubt, considered his work a *rasa-kāvya*: *madvāk kalhaṇakāvyāntaḥpraveśād etu carvaṇam* ı *naḍvalāmbu sarittoye patitaṃ pīyate na kiṃ* ıı JRT 26 ıı. Jonarāja not only calls Kalhaṇa's work a '*kāvya*', but indicates the *rasa* character of his own work by using *carvaṇa* ('tasting'), which relates to '*rasa*'. Śrīvara: *vandyās te rājakavayaḥ padanyāsamanoharāḥ* ı *khyātā ye sarasaiḥ śabdaiḥ kṣīranīravivekinaḥ* ıı ŚRT I 1, 3 ıı. Śuka, too, is in line with his predecessors: *madvākyasudhā°* ıı ŚuRT I 13dıı. Reference should also be made to the Mokṣopāya (Kashmir, X¹), which refers to its own character as that of a *rasa-kāvya* with a dominant (*ghana*) *rasa* and of a *śāstra* at the same time: *śāstraṃ subodham evedaṃ nānālaṅkārabhūṣitam* ı *kāvyaṃ rasaghanaṃ cāru dṛṣṭāntaiḥ pratipādakam* ıı MṬ II 18, 33 ıı; Cp. also MṬ II 13,12f; 50; 17,33; 19,8f. MASSON (1969: 29ff; 112, n. 2) assumed that there was "[...] some likelihood that the author of the YV [~ *Mokṣopāya*, W.S.] knew the Dhvanyāloka [...] Abhinava [and] the author of the YV] are closely related." Cp. also RAGHAVAN (1975: 36ff) for an enumeration of 'Śānta Rasa Kāvyas', among which those just mentioned above, however, do not figure. Jagannātha (XVII), too, ascribed the *śāntarasa* to a Prabandha such as the 'Yogavāsiṣṭha', the title by which the Mokṣopāya had gained its great pan-Indian renown: *prabandhasya tu yogavāsiṣṭha-rāmāyaṇe śānta-karuṇayoḥ* (RG 134, 5). I am grateful to Professor ALBRECHT WEZLER for having alerted me to this passage in the Rasagaṅgādhara.

80 Ingalls 1990: 692.

81 "[T]hat subject matter which *dhvani* is suited to express par excellence, is *rasa*." (GEROW 1977: 252; cp. also GEROW 1972: 85, n. 13: "Note that every *rasa* is realized through suggestion only [...]"). "The expressive goal (or "sense") of verbal art is often not the same thing as the expressive content of the words and sentences employed. [...] the mind grasps [an understanding] as a result of the word heard or read, but not directly by means of it." (GEROW 1977: 251). Jonarāja makes explicit that: *rasamayyā girā vṛddhāṃ nityatāruṇyam āpipat* ı *atha śrījayasiṃhāntaṃ tatkīrtiṃ kalhaṇadvijaḥ* ıı JRT 5 ıı *kavivāksudhayā kaścin nājijīvat parān nṛpān* ıı JRT 6cd ıı *sudhā°* is another expression for *rasa*, cp., e.g., the use of *°rasa-syanda°* in RT I 24a.

quaintance he had made in about the year 1140,[82] alludes to his own composition as a *rasa-kāvya,* the magnificence of which derives from equanimity (*śānta*) as the leading sentiment. [83] The following stanza with its varying expressions of 'liquidity' virtually reaches a crescendo of *rasa*. Even the name given to his work, a 'current, flow, stream' (*taraṅgiṇī*), ties in nicely with this culmination of *rasa*ic allusions:

tadamandarasasyandasundarīyaṃ[84] *nipīyatām* ।
śrotraśuktipuṭaiḥ spaṣṭam aṅga rājataraṅgiṇī ॥ RT I 24 ॥

"Now let this *Stream* of Kings *be drunk in* (/*experienced*) distinctly through your shell-shaped ears, where the unimpeded *flow* of the dominant *sap* (/*sentiment*) of[85] [equanimity lends it its] beauty."

Is this not exactly the way one would expect a Dhvani author to suggest the true character of his work to his fellow poets?

What aim may Kalhaṇa have envisaged by writing 'true' history? What was his ultimate purpose? Shall we indeed assume pure, objective knowledge of the past as his intrinsic motivation? There are good reasons to render such an assumption most unlikely. First, if

82 On the occasion of a gathering of literati in minister Alaṅkāra's, Maṅkha's brother's, residence, during the reign of Jayasiṃha, see also Pollock 2001: 395f. – Ruyyaka, Kalhaṇa's contemporary and acquaintance, nourished exactly the same idea in the introduction to his Alaṅkārasarvasva, cp. Jacobi 1969: 173.

83 *Śānta* is expressly referred to in stanza 23. Seen from Ānandavardhana's theoretical background, Kalhaṇa's entire narrative plot could even be classified as that variety of suggested meaning, "where the literal sense is intended but only as leading on to something further" (*vivakṣitānyaparavācya* – Ingalls 1990: 15). Ruyyaka, in his 'historical' introduction refers explicitly to the Dhvanikāra's subdivision of the two ways suggested meaning is realized, and of which the second is of particular interest in the present connection (AS 13, 2f): *asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgyo 'rthaśaktimūlo rasādidhvaniḥ*. Here, "the suggested meaning arises without apparent interval [of time from the expressed meaning], is based on the power of meaning, and is a suggestion of *rasa*."

84 °*sundarīyaṃ* Hultzsch] °*sundareyaṃ* Vishva Bandhu, Stein.

85 *Rasa* has a double entendre: current and aesthetic sentiment. *rasa-syanda* would thus come to mean something like "the flow of a stream"; "undercurrent" (Stein); "full flow" (Salomon, 153). I follow Salomon (loc. cit.) in compounding *tad* (as a referent to the preceding verse) with *amanda*, so we get the meaning of abounding in exactly *this*, namely the *śānta*-sentiment. Cp. also the similar compound *sudhā-syanda*° in 3a.

Kalhaṇa had solely been interested in the factual truth about past rulers he could have left it at his preliminary work of collecting an updated and corrected prose inventory of the relevant data, and thus would probably have ended up with something corresponding to the genre of the Vaṃśāvalīs, some of which he has used, too.[86] He would not have needed to compose a gigantic work of poetry, which is a quite different task extending far beyond the mere recording of a list of names and data. However, Kalhaṇa pursued more specific aims by writing history. One decisive precondition for achieving them was historicity (*bhūta-vastu*), since, as demonstrated earlier, mere fiction or entirely fabricated stories are not likely to affect the reader emotionally as authentic events must do. In his striving for historical facticity, he took great pains to ensure the reliability of his data. He reports at some length on the sources consulted by him, their nature, accuracy, or inaccuracy, as the case may be, and on his troublesome efforts to rectify his predecessors' errors by carefully checking their data against auxiliary source materials such as inscriptions and royal grants.

Apart from the aesthetic purposes evinced (*prīti*), through the intricacies of plot – and the delight of a single predominant *rasa*[87] –, there are indeed meta-purposes in Kalhaṇa's historical poetry, aiming toward political and soteriological benefits. First, his work may serve as a guideline for balanced rulership:[88]

iyaṃ nṛpāṇām ullāse hrāse vā deśakālayoḥ ।
bhaiṣajyabhūtasaṃvādikathā yuktopayujyate ॥ RT I 21 ॥

"The present account [of mine, which] in correspondence (*yuktā*) to time and place fully agrees (*saṃvādin*) with what has happened

86 Cp. Witzel 1990: 30ff.

87 Cp. Ingalls 1990: 35ff. On *śāntarasa* as the predominant flavour of a work, cp. Tubb 1991: 179ff.

88 This passage has seen various translations, which differ essentially from each other. Bühler's was criticized by Stein, Stein's by Pandit, Stein's and Pandit's by Salomon. Kölver's translation (1971: 116) is less convincing. My present proposal differs only to some extent from Salomon's and his opinion on this passage: "This medicine-like tale is fit to be prescribed when kings grow (too) great, or when their reigns or realms are shrinking. – That is to say, kings who read the RT should heed the lessons about excessive pride and ambition on the one hand, and resignation and acceptance on the other, which are repeated over and over in the text. It will thus serve them as 'medicine' to cure the illness of pride, depression, etc." (153).

[in the past] (*bhūta*), is a *remedy*, prescribed (*upayujyate*) for presumptuousness or timidity of kings."[89]

According to this statement, Kalhaṇa considered his Rājataraṅgiṇī to function as a remedy for kings in times of presumption (/height) or despair (/decline). He literally speaks of prescribing (*upa-yuj*) it, which, if we carry the metaphor inherent in *rāja-taraṅgiṇī* further, would refer to its water, to be drunk as medicine (*bhaiṣajya*). The notion of liquidity is, as has been pointed out above, inherent also in the concept of *rasa* ('juice, taste, flavour'), alluded to by Kalhaṇa in his first stanza. The Rājataraṅgiṇī would thus exercise a beneficial, curing effect. Awareness of the fates of their predecessors on the throne should serve the kings as medication, antidoting the disease of extremes.

At the same time, the appalling lives and dreadful fates in this line of rulers, which constitute the realistic plot of the Rājataraṅgiṇī, would inspire aversion and detachment (*vairāgya*) in readers, thus evoking the sentiment of equanimity (*śānta*). The *authentic account of the lives of actual kings* would touch the readers' hearts with greater profundity than mere fiction. In this respect, the beneficial effects acquire a soteriological nature:

saṃkrāntaprāktanānantavyavahāraḥ sacetasaḥ[90] ।
kasyedṛśo na saṃdarbho yadi vā hṛdayaṃgamaḥ ॥ RT I 22 ॥

"Such a work coursing through endless incidents of the past – is there a conscious being whose heart it would not touch?"

Such an employment of poetry as a pretext for achieving transcendental aims as, e.g., liberation, was by no means novel. Kalhaṇa may well have been influenced by the strong Buddhist atmosphere prevailing in Kashmir during his era and that of the Dhvani theorists,

89 Construction: *bhaiṣajya*[-*bhūta*]+*bhūta-saṃvādi-kathā*. *yuktā* + Loc.: *deśa-kāla-yoḥ*. *upa*-√*yuj* (prescribe for + Loc.: *ullāse*, *hrāse*). Or, according to the translation of SALOMON quoted in the preceding footnote, *ullāsa* and *hrāsa* may point to the height and decline of their power.

90 *sacetasaḥ* HULTZSCH; VISHVA BANDHU & STEIN (app.)] *sucetasaḥ* VISHVA BANDHU & STEIN (text). Being 'clever' or 'benevolent' (*sucetas*) is no necessary precondition for becoming emotionally touched. Receptivity to emotions is characteristic of any sentient or conscious being (*sacetas*).

as pointed out by Ingalls.[91] Aśvaghoṣa, centuries back in about 100 AD, had explicitly envisaged higher ends for the world under the guise of poetry, presenting *śānta* as the principal aim:[92]

> *ity eṣā vyupaśāntaye na rataye mokṣārthagarbhā kṛtiḥ*
> *śrotṝṇāṃ grahaṇārtham anyamanasāṃ kāvyopacārāt kṛtā* ׀ (SN 18. 63 ab) ׀
> *prāyeṇālokya lokaṃ viṣayaratiparaṃ mokṣāt pratihataṃ*
> *kāvyavyājena tattvaṃ kathitam iha mayā mokṣaḥ param iti* ׀ (SN 18. 64ab)

> "Thus, I composed the present work with release as its deepest subject under the pretext of poetry – not for pleasure,[93] [but] for the attainment of calmness. My intention was to capture listeners with interest in other subjects. [...] Having realized that people are mainly intent on sensual pleasures, fully averse to liberation, I here have told in the guise of poetry what is true – that liberation is supreme."

In the context of Kalhaṇa's and the subsequent Rājataraṅgiṇīs, the term 'history' is properly used only with reference to its depiction of *biographies of rulers* and the *circumstances surrounding* them. None of these chroniclers claims to go beyond *depicting the lives and fates of the kings of Kashmir* as they really were. They assert perfect correspondence to the true events (*yathābhūta*). Such a characteristic is congruent with the title of their works, if we understand '*taraṅgiṇī*' to be suggestive of '*emotional flow*'.[94] The primary meaning of Rāja-Taraṅgiṇī is 'a stream of rulers'. The sense of emotional flow, however, alludes to a '*taste of kings*', which the sensitive reader is invited to experience himself as a '*taste of the flow of kings*'. The continuity inherent in the notion of a 'stream' extends of course also to the compositions

91 According to Abhinavagupta, Ānandavardhana wrote a commentary (Dharmottarīvivṛtī) on Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Ingalls 1990: 4; 11; cp. also Steinkellner 1995: XVI). Among his fellow poets at Avantivarman's court was Śivasvāmin, the author of the Buddhist Kāvya Kapphiṇābhyudaya (ed. Hahn 2007), see RT V 34.

92 Aśvaghoṣa, Saundarananda 18.63-64. See Raghavan (1975: 23ff), who voiced the opinion that the introduction of *śānta* as a ninth *rasa* was probably caused by Buddhist influence. Kane 347f; Masson 1969: 3-6. Summarized in Schnellenbach 1995: 221ff.

93 Contrary to Aśvaghoṣa, Kalhaṇa aimed also at *prīti*, see above.

94 Cp. RT I 24 above.

as such, insofar as they represent a coherent account of events and interrelationships of those people in power. Without exception the composers of Rājataraṅgiṇīs emphasize the reliability and adequacy of their accounts. They had the explicit intention of *making true events and rulers' actual lives the subject of their literature.*

Kalhaṇa presents us with a *corrective history* of successive Kashmiri kings, giving his work a meta-historical structure by *providing each single ruler with a context.* To be sure, he shows no reluctance in showing awareness of his accomplished purpose:

pūrvair baddhaṃ kathāvastu mayi bhūyo nibadhnati ।
prayojanam anākarṇya vaimukhyaṃ nocitaṃ satām ॥ RT I 8 ॥
dṛṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ nṛpodantaṃ baddhvā pramayam īyuṣām
arvākkālabhavair vārtā yat prabandheṣu pūryate ॥ RT I 9 ॥
dākṣyaṃ kiyad idaṃ? tasmād asmin bhūtārthavarṇane ।
sarvaprakāraṃ skhalite yojanāya mamodyamaḥ ॥ RT I 10 ॥

"It is not suitable for connoisseurs to avert their faces until they have lent their ears to [my] purpose[95] [and learnt why] I compose[96] again a subject matter [my] predecessors had treated [earlier, and which] consists of accounts [of the past]. What skill would that be, if writers of a later generation [merely] added [another] event to [their] works, noted down earlier by those who now have passed away as news about kings as witnessed? Therefore, my effort in the present delineation of facts of the past is towards rectifying in every respect what is erroneous (/towards improving ... on what is defective/imperfect).[97]"

95 Although Kalhaṇa was primarily concerned with *literature*, his discussion of the 'purpose' lends his introduction a somewhat *śāstric* character. Indicating the purpose (*prayojana*) is a requirement, which is traditionally enumerated as one among numerous formal components of Śāstras, the so-called *tantrayukti*s. See TPSI (II), s.v. *tantrayukti* (111). On some indigenous observations on the differences between *śāstra, kāvya* and historical texts (*ākhyāna, itihāsa*), cp. the quotations in Masson 1969: 80, 9-11; 86 and n. 2.

96 The usage of *bandh* (two times) seems to refer to the notion of 'Sargabandha'. *Prabandha* is used in the immediately following stanza (I 9d). See also above, fn. 71, on Ānandavardhana.

97 Kölver's translation (1971: 3) of these verses is untenable. Salomon has suggested construing the agent of *baddhvā* differently, "as *arvākkālabhavair*, rather than *pramayam īyuṣām*. The verse would then mean, 'What skill does it show if men of later times supplement in their compositions the report(s) of deceased (predecessors), by adding on the various deeds of kings which

This is not the place to detail Kalhaṇa's criticism of his forerunners and his sources. Let it be noted, however, that the above clearly contradicts SCHNELLENBACH's opinion that Kalhaṇa had "immense faith in everything written". Such credibility would have discouraged him from correcting earlier accounts and resolving contradictions between these.[98]

On the surface, the subject matter of the Rājataraṅgiṇī is the ongoing struggle for power and mundane happiness, bywords, so to speak, for independently ruling kings. The other side of the coin is the transitoriness of the success striven after by those rulers. As a poet,[99] Kalhaṇa transformed real and – in the majority of cases

they have seen?'" (152). The first line *dṛṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ nṛpodantaṃ baddhvā pramayam īyuṣām*, is a clear recourse to pāda a *pūrvair baddhaṃ kathāvastu* of the preceding verse 8. Furthermore, in 9d, Kalhaṇa uses the noun *prabandha*, which has its counterpart in the root *bandh*, twice in use again in verse 8. I think that on the grounds of such narrow context we are entitled to accept a different grammatical agent of *baddhvā* and *pūryate*: *īyuṣām* as the logical subject of *baddhvā*, and °*bhavaiḥ* as the agent of *pūryate*. A similar construction can be found elsewhere in Kalhaṇa's introduction (RT I 46ab, translated above): a genitive subject (*yeṣāṃ mahaujasāṃ*, the kings) of a gerund (*niṣevya*), and a subject in the nominative (*medinī*) for the verb of the main clause (*āsīt*). On this, cp. SPEIJER (1886: 298, § 380): "The subject of the gerund is comparatively often a genitive [...] For the rest, it is only from the context that the subject of a given gerund is to be known." – *asmin* could also mean: "*for such an* (account) ...". – *skhalite* could be construed as an attribute qualifying *bhūtārthavarṇane*. *sarvaprakāraṃ* would as well allow a construction with *yojanāya*. In dealing with *skhalite yojanāya*, I have followed the proposal of A. SANDERSON, who pointed out the possibility of a semantic relation of *yojana* to derivations from *yuj* such as *yukta*, in the meaning of 'correct', particularly so, if *yojanā* be derived from a causative stem (written communication of August 26, 2005). So, it would come to express the meaning of 'correcting, improving'. Kashmiri authors seem to have frequently used like expressions. Cp., e.g., Devaśarman's conclusion of his Samanvayapradīpa,: *vibudhair atra kāryā skhalitayojanā* (SLAJE 1992: 125). Maṅkha, in his introductory chapters, uses (*a*)*skhalita* several times (ŚKC I 34b; II 9b; 15d), *skhalita* explained by Jonarāja as a *kāvyadoṣa* (p. 16, 25f *ad* ŚKC II 9d). Furthermore, Jonarāja himself, in introducing to the first stanza of Maṅkha's ŚKC, says: *paropakāriṇaḥ santo yaśaḥpuṇyavivṛddhaye* । *sāvadhānā bhavantv atra mama skhalitayojane* ॥ (p. 1, 14f). On the basis of Jonarāja's glossing (*skhalita* = *kāvyadoṣa*) I take Kalhaṇa's statement as one on *also* the inferior quality of his sources, which he claims to have excelled by poetic standards.

98 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 115.

99 I am grateful to E. GEROW for permission to quote from a letter of his (December 3, 2006): "The mistakes of interpretation you allude to in part derive

– tragic events of the past into words of touching poetry. He tried to make bygone events comprehensible for the sensitive reader as if these were happening in his immediate presence.[100] The pivotal point thus is the *ensured authenticity*, on the basis of which alone the Rājataraṅgiṇī unfolds its effects and exercises its liberating effect. The actual course of the rulers' fates, their characters and actions, provide the ideal basis for suitable emotional responses on the part of the audience. The *actual circumstances* (*yathābhūta*) of the lives of these maniacal rulers constitute suitable plots in themselves – ones, in which Shakespeare, I trust, would have indeed rejoiced. The main point, however, is that Kalhaṇa, in depicting their fates and deeds, employs suitable suggestive expression (*dhvani*) productive of the sentiment (*rasa*) of equanimity (*śānta*). This is in accordance with the model established by the Mahābhārata and the *dhvani* theory formulated by the local literary critics. Kalhaṇa, then, cannot be isolated from the tradition of *rasa*-poetry that was his intimate acquaintance and the status of which he claims for his own work by employing the type of literary suggestion that is its precise cause. There is a difference between theorising about *rasa* and successfully arousing this mood in his readers with the result of their utmost pleasure (*prīti*).

from the translation 'poet' which itself is misleading (in a modern context). The Vedic *ṛṣis* were also '*kavayaḥ*' and their business (as interpreted by subsequent generations) was certainly not to 'invent' or imaginatively embroider anything – but to report just what they heard! [...] And of course, our 'poet' [scil. Kalhaṇa, W.S.] is no more than a 'maker' in words – a usage that Aristotle probably standardized, with his distinction (still current) of the 'fine' and the 'useful' arts. (Please note that *this* is also a very 'Western' distinction!)."

100 In this regard it should be pointed out that Bhaṭṭa Tauta, whose views on *śānta* served as a model for Abhinavagupta (cp. above, fn 62), stated "that a literary piece must not lack vividness of description – that a literary piece must aim at recreating the original experience in the reader [...]." (Gerow 1972: 85). No less interesting is Ānandavardhana's usage of *śānta* (*rasa*), which, according to Gerow (1972: 83) "refers to an intense experience [...] of detachment that comes from reading or witnessing a work of art depicting ruin, impermanence, the transitory character of wor[l]dly existence, and the futility of ambition." This usage conforms to Abhinavagupta's "on a lower level", who, on a higher level, takes *śānta* (*rasa*) also differently, namely as referring "to the experience of absorption or serenity that comes about as a result of reading or witnessing [...] a good piece of literature depicting any emotion." (Gerow, loc. cit.).

This is the art of a *kavi* alone, who in this sense may rightly be called a creator.

Rājataraṅgiṇīs are *not*, and cannot be, *eulogies*, which do not intend to create a calm sentiment and therefore are in no way bound to represent the real lives of the rulers faithfully, and, in the context of the Rājataraṅgiṇī, tragically. Incredibility is unlikely to provoke the intended effect of *śāntarasa*.

In order to prove certain Western theories valid also for pre-modern India, SCHNELLENBACH was compelled to divest *kāvya* of the criteria of *rasa* and consequently separates Kalhaṇa's *rasa* poetry from what she herself had predetermined to be 'conventional' poetry. Such imposed categorical separation is clearly untenable. On the contrary, *rasa* was regarded the "very chief element of poetry" by the Dhvani theorists,[101] and no less a critic than Mammaṭa determined *dhvani*-poetry where literary suggestion, the manifesting force behind *rasa*, is predominant – to be the *highest form of literature.*[102] Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī cannot be classified apart from a poetic tradition he had claimed for himself and his work.

The speculative idea of a 'counter-history' is certainly no workable category in the given Kashmiri context. There is no way to meaningfully apply J. RÜSEN's theory that an *alternative to history* can take the form of ordinary *kāvya*[103] to Kalhaṇa's art of *writing history*. First, the Rājataraṅgiṇī *is* a *kāvya*, in fact a *rasa-kāvya*, and second, it operates very differently, with means and ends entirely unrelated to

101 INGALLS 1990: 598. GEROW has clearly stated that Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, among other things, "links the notions of *rasa* and *alaṃkāra* in a single coherent, if synthetic, theory of literary aesthetics. (1977: 253). Even LIENHARD, SCHNELLENBACH's major authority on Indian literary matters, concedes that in "later times [...] the implied (*dhvani*), sentiment (*rasa*) and feeling (*bhāva*) came to be recognized *as central to poetry* [...]" [emphasis mine] (1984: 41; 69).

102 Let it be emphasized that Kalhaṇa († 1149/50) was a younger contemporary of Rājānaka Mammaṭa (between 1050 and 1135 – GEROW 1977: 272). There is at least a certain probability that Kalhaṇa had been taught poetics by Alaka (/Allaṭa, see above fn 47), who, on his part, seems to have been involved in the composition of Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (KANE 1971: 273). Mammaṭa advocated Ānandavardhana's thesis that bare *alaṅkāra*-poetry, the expressive capacity of which was merely verbal, ranked lowest, whereas suggestive poetry (*dhvani*) deserved the highest classification (KPr Sū 2-4).

103 SCHNELLENBACH 1995: 96f.

those developed in Europe. In fact, it is difficult to ascertain equivalents of *rasa* and *dhvani* in western literature.[104]

In this sense, the potential of post-modern theories for cross-cultural investigations has intrinsic limitations, which, in fact, *are* the theories themselves as long as they are formed from European concepts only.[105] None of the theories SCHNELLENBACH imposes on Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī proves tenable, as their western fathers lacked a background in Indian literary criticism and the underlying concepts of *rasa* and *dhvani*. The extent of their premises was limited to a preset intellectual horizon, which was Europe, and for which they may possibly hold valid.

From this, we may now draw the final conclusion that although pre-modern India had indeed seen the development of 'true' history writing, the intrinsic motivation and the concomitant incentives were not always exactly the same as in Europe, as naively presumed by historians. As we have seen, reliable historiography may even come guised in poetry,[106] inspired by soteriological purposes.

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104 "There is nothing in our Western *classical* (*Greek and Latin*) *tradition* of criticism that corresponds to *rasa* and nothing that corresponds to *dhvani* [...]." (INGALLS 1990: 38). E. GEROW points out that, however, there is nothing that unusual about the *rasa* theory (apart from its terminology and context) and that several *modern Western aesthetic theories* show remarkable parallels with it. See GEROW 1993: 243-254 (= "*Rasa* in modern Indian criticism").

105 „The 'history' that forms the yardstick of India's inadequacy, then, may not be an altogether useful measure, no better than the stories that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries dreamed to be history. Upon reflection we might find ourselves [...] looking vainly in ancient India for a category constructed in modern Europe, and a self-deluding category at that." (POLLOCK 1989: 605).

106 „Poetry instructs us in the most effective way, after the fashion of a beloved woman, by so delighting us that we are scarcely aware of an underlying purpose " (TUBB 1991: 172 with reference to Abhinavagupta, who had used this analogy several times in his Dhvanyālokalocana).

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Index

Compiled by *Andreas Pohlus* (*Halle*)

abhāva 91
Abhidharmakośa 63
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh) 9, 63
abhijalpa 91, 92
Abhinavabhāratī (Abh)
 4.13ff.: 218
Abhinavagupta 178, 180, 218, 219,
 224, 228, 234, 237
Abhyankar, Vasudev Shastri 98
abhyāsa 221
abhyudaya 133
ācaraṇa 4
ācārya 32, 56
action, meritorious 17. *See also puṇya*.
action, ritual 23, 132, 133, 152
adhikārin ix, 177, 178
adhyāsa 135, 136, 137, 140. *See also* superimposition.
Advaita 131
advaita 134
advitīya 133
āgama 163
Āgāśe, Kāśīnātha Śāstrī 98
ahaṃkāra 144
ajñāta 88, 89
Akalaṅka 42, 66, 69, 70
Aklujkar, Ashok 113
Alaka 238
Alakadatta 216
alaṃkāra-s 199
Alaṃkārasarvasva (AS; TSS ed.)
 S. 13,2f.: 231
Alaṃkāraśāstra 7, 171, 172, 173
Alaṅkāra 216, 231
Allaṭa 238
Amarasiṃha 9
Amaru 176
amātya 216
Amṛtanādopaniṣad 111
anādi 135
anādyavidyā 144
analysis, cladistic 105
ānanda 224
Ānandavardhana 180, 218, 227, 234
Ananta 112, 113
ananta 135
anapavāda 86
anekāntavāda 51
aṅga 152
aṅgatva 153
antaḥkaraṇa 144
anubandha x, 173, 177
anubhava 142
anubhūti 142
anuṣṭhāna 133. *See also* action, ritual.
anyāpoha 91, 92, 94
apauruṣeya 193
apavāda 86
apohavāda 59
Appayya Dīkṣita 180
āpta 54, 56
Āptamīmāṃsā (ĀMī) 52, 53, 55, 56,
 59, 60, 66
apūrva 88
apūrvārtha 219
apūrvavastu 219
ārambha v, 2, 131, 132, 135, 139
ārambhaśloka 110, 111, 112, 113, 114
arhaṃ 25
arhant 32, 37

Aristotle 237
artha 154, 161, 165, 171, 192, 193
arthakriyā 67, 70
Arthaśāstra 5, 6
arthavacanā 152
arthavattva 162
Āryabhaṭa 7
Āryabhaṭīya 7
asadṛśa 229
āśīrvāda vii, 5, 213
Aṣṭādhyāyī 6, 8, 90
astrology 7
astronomy 7
Aśvaghoṣa 185, 186, 191, 199, 234
atha xi, 12, 13, 110, 111, 132
ātman 141
auspicious 12, 20. *See also* word, auspicious.
autpattika 193
avabodha 133
avaktavya 92
Avantivarman 218, 234
āvassaya, āvaśyaka 32
avidyā 132, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141
avidyānivṛtti 143, 144
avikalpa 89
awareness, immediate 142. *See also anubhūti, anubhava.*

Bāṇa 16, 212, 217, 218, 225, 228
bandha 140, 144. *See also* bondage.
Bhagavadgītā
  18.54c: 226
bhaiṣajya: 233
bhakti 54
Bhāmaha 7, 172, 175, 177, 193, 211, 223
bhaṅga 86
Bhāravi 187, 197
Bhartṛhari 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 128, 175
Bhāṣyaṭīkā 91
Bhaṭṭanāyaka 178
Bhaṭṭa Tauta 237
Bhaṭṭi 187
Bhaṭṭikāvya
  1.1: 198
bhāva 89, 91, 221
bhāvanā 221
bhāvavāda 89
bhāvika 219
bhāvikālaṃkāra 219
Bhoja 177, 184, 185, 187, 197
Bhūtabali 31
bhūtārthakathana 223
bhūtavastu 232. *See also* historicity.
bhūtavastuprakāśaka 219
Bilhaṇa 212, 216
biology, evolutionary 105, 106
bondage 140. *See also bandha.*
brahma-world 111
brahmacodanā 133
brahman 132, 133, 134, 138, 142, 143, 144, 157
brahmānubhava 146
Brahmasūtra 13, 123, 124, 128, 131
  1.1.1: 124, 132, 136
  1.1.4: 123, 124
  3.3.53: 121, 125, 126
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (BSūbh) 121, 123, 124, 134, 135, 136
Bṛhaddevatā 6
Bṛhaspati 157
Buddha 5, 9, 21, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 192
Buddhacarita 192
  1.1: 198
  1.1-9: 186
buddhavacana 63, 64
Buddhist 88
buddhistha 93

caityavandana 32
Cakrapāṇivijaya
  1.1: 184
Candragomin 9
canon, Jaina 56
Caraka 6
Carakasaṃhitā 108
Carlyle, Thomas 222
Chakkhaṃḍāgame, Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama (ṢKhĀ) 31
Chandaḥsūtra 6
chandas 163
characters 106

Citrākṣepavāda 127
cladistics 105
Classical Text Editor (CTE) 102
cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) 53, 55, 56, 61, 62, 67
cognitive faculties 46. *See also upayoga.*
commentaries 6, 12, 14, 72, 151, 152, 153, 164, 174, 176, 193, 213
commentators 12, 15
concomitance, invariable 50, 54. *See also vyāpti.*
connoisseur of poetry 179. *See also sahṛdaya.*
constructions, post-modern 212
contamination 99, 100, 103, 105, 107
conventions, textual 12
copyists 10, 11, 12, 20, 109
court poem 188, 190
creativity 219
criticism, textual 99, 106, 111
critics 176
culture, courtly 19

dakṣiṇāmūrti 111
Damayantī 190
Daṇḍin 7, 175, 177, 180, 184, 190, 211, 221
darśana 174
darśana, *darśana*-s vii, 6, 8
Darwin, Charles 106
Dasamuhavaha 196
deity 3, 5, 14, 17, 21, 28, 88, 113, 159, 160, 213
deity, personal 18
design to teach 47, 62, 69
detached poet 226
detachment 225
Devanāgarī 98, 100, 103
devapūja 32
Devarddhigaṇin 35
Devaśarman 236
devatā 88
devotion 49
dharma 133, 155, 171
Dharmakīrti 9, 52, 63, 67, 68, 70, 72
Dharmottarī vivṛtī 234
Dhātupāṭha 90
Dhruvasena II 150
dhvani 230, 237, 239
dhvani-poetry 238
Dhvani school 223
Dhvanyāloka (DhĀ; KM ed.)
1.6: 214
S. 222,4: 218
S. 222,5ff.: 225
S. 222,8f.: 219
S. 237,17-20: 227
S. 239,1f.: 218
Dhvanyālokalocana (DhĀL; KM ed.)
S. 27,8ff. (ad DhĀ 1.5): 215
S. 68,16-18: 224
S. 178,22f.: 228
Digambara 42, 44
Diṅnāga 46, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 72, 85, 88, 91
discourse, Sanskrit 21
divination 18
divyadhvani 44
divyadṛṣṭi 221
Dixit, K.K. 86, 91
doctrine, Buddhist 62, 67
doctrine, Jaina 49, 50, 70, 86
dogmatics, Buddhist 69
dogmatics, Jaina 47, 51
doubt 45, 50, 54, 62
doxographies, Sanskrit 174
dramaturgy 174, 175, 180
dravya 89
dravyārthikanaya 51
dravyāstikanaya 87
Duḥṣanta 189
Dumont, Louis 23
Dvādaśāranayacakra (DNC/DN) 47, 48, 51, 59, 60, 66, 83, 84, 85, 87, 94
dvisandhāna 3

ekānta 55
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 222
epics, great 183
errors, indicative 99
evaṃbhūtanaya 87
exegesis (Ṛgveda) 151
experience, internal 181

falsification 55, 64
fame 215
flavors, aesthetic 180. *See also rasa.*
Frauwallner, Erich 84, 86, 126

gaṇadhara 41, 46, 56
Gaṇeśa 111, 112
Gaṅgeśa 15, 16
ghanarasa 229, 230
god 90
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 220
grammar 91, 174
grammarian 84, 87, 90, 94, 175, 180
Grantha 103, 105
GRETIL 174
guru 111

Hāla 199
Halbfass, Wilhelm 98
Hammīramahākāvya 213
Haradatta 8, 10, 14
Haravijaya (HV)
  6.8: 217
Haravilāsa
  1.1: 184
Haribhadra, Haribhadrasūri Yākinīputra 39
Haribhadra-sūri Virahāṅka 39
Haribhadrasūri III 39
Harimoto, Kengo 98
Harisvāmin 149
Harṣacarita (HC) 218
  1.3ab: 218
  1.3: 228
  1.4ab: 225
  1.4-5: 219
  1.8: 219
Hayagrīvavadha
  1.1: 185, 187, 197
Helārāja 89
Hemacandra 25, 32, 70, 71
hermeneutics 174
Hetucakraḍamaru 65
Himālaya 192
historian, objective 225, 226
historical writing, Indian 208, 239. *See also* historiography.
historicity 232. *See also bhūtavastu.*
historiography 207, 208, 210, 211, 239
history xi, 234
history and poetry 222
history book 215
history writing 222
hyparchetype 100

ignorance 132, 143. *See also avidyā.*
imagination, poetic 222
India, pre-modern 207, 239
inference 16, 180. *See also anumāna.*
injunction, Vedic 16. *See also vidhi.*
innate energy 46, 70. *See also vīrya.*
inscriptions 20
inspiration, poetic 222
introspection 181
Isibhāsiyāiṃ (Ṛṣibhāṣitāni) 25
iṣṭadevatā 18
Iṣṭasiddhi (IS) 141
īśvaravāda 90
itihāsa 188, 190

Jacobi, Hermann 122
Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja x, 172, 176, 179, 180, 181, 230
Jaina 26, 93, 94
Jainism 25, 45, 51
Jambuvijaya, Muni 86, 94
Jānakīharaṇa
  1.1: 198
  1.1-43: 188
Jauss, H.R. 211
Jayānaka 212
Jayasiṃha 231
Jina 29, 47, 55
jinaśāsana 39, 56
jinavacana 39
Jinendrabuddhi 64
Jonarāja 212, 214, 228, 230, 236
  ad ŚKC 2.30: 229
  ad ŚKC 2.32: 229
Jong, J.W. de 86
Jyotiḥśāstra 7
Jyotiṣavedāṅga 7

Kādambarī 16

kāla 89
Kalhaṇa 210, 212, 213, 218, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238
Kālidāsa 185, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 212
kalpanamātra 93
kalpanāpoḍha 60
kalyāṇaśaṃba 111
kāma 171
Kāmaśāstra 199
Kāmasūtra 5, 6
Kapphiṇābhyudaya
 1.1: 184
Kārikāvalī 16
karmakleśa 39
karman 28, 30, 39, 44, 152
kaṣāya 39
Kāśikā 8
Kaṭandī 91
kathā 223
kathāvastu 223
kavi 193, 199, 214, 223, 237, 238
kaviguṇa 215
kavikarman 216
kaviprajāpati 217, 218
kavivedhas 217, 218
kāvya xi, 179, 183, 184, 188, 193, 199, 209, 210, 211, 214, 216, 223, 227, 238
kāvya, definition 193
kāvyabheda 179
Kāvyādarśa
 1.14: 184
kāvyadoṣa 236
kāvyahetu 178, 221
kāvyakāraṇa 178
kāvyalakṣaṇa 179
Kāvyālaṃkāra
 1.2: 224
 1.16: 193
Kāvyamīmāṃsā 174
Kāvyaprakāśa (KPr) 238
 1.10.2: 216
kāvyaprayojana 177, 223
kevalin 29
Kirātārjunīya
 1.1: 197
 1.1-3: 187
Kīrtikaumudī 213
kleśa 114
Kölver, Bernhard 209
kṣaṇabhaṅgin 229
Kṣemendra 216
Kulke, Hermann 209
Kumāradāsa 188, 198
Kumārasambhava
 1.1-23: 186
 1.17: 192
 1.22: 192
Kumārila 8, 83, 122, 127
Kundakunda 9, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 41, 52
Kuntaka 178, 218
Kuśa 184

Laghīyastraya (LT) 66, 69
Lakṣmīdhara 184
laudable qualities 28, 42, 47, 49, 54, 62
laukika-view 86
Lava 184
liberation 28, 30, 33, 37, 38, 43, 45, 52, 142, 199. *See also mokṣa.*
literature 207
literature, Indian 211
literature, sacred 16. *See also śruti.*
logicians 180, 181
Lord, supreme 111, 112

Maas, Paul 107
Maas, Philipp 11
Mādhava 114, 149, 153
Māgha 188, 197
Mahābhārata 11, 183, 188, 190, 227, 237
 1.62.1-3: 189
 1.71.3-5: 189
 1.160.6: 190
 3.50.1: 190
Mahābhāṣya 22, 83, 90, 113
Mahābhāṣyadīpikā 90
mahākāvya 183, 184, 185, 188, 191
Mahāvīra Vardhamāna 28, 40, 44
Mahimabhaṭṭa 180, 181
Mallavādin 83, 85, 91, 93, 94
Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa 47, 49,

51, 57
Mallinātha 174
Mammaṭa 179, 180, 216, 219, 238
Maṇḍana Miśra 128
maṅgala, *maṅgala*-s 3, 4, 13, 15, 16, 22, 36, 110, 111, 112, 113
maṅgalācaraṇa 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 37, 38, 42, 45, 51, 54, 56, 68, 213
maṅgala verse 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 21, 31, 32, 151, 176
Maṇikaṇṭha 113
Maṅkha 212, 216, 218, 228, 231, 236
Mann, Thomas 222
mantra 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165
manuscript contamination 107
manuscripts 10, 11, 20, 98, 100, 150
manuscript studies 107
Manusmṛti 6
martial arts 174
mathematics 7
Māyā 141
Meghadūta
 1.42: 193
Mellins, David 219
memory 158, 160
Meṇṭha 185, 187, 197
metaphor 179, 193
metaphysics, Vedāntic 180
Mīmāṃsā 23, 86, 88, 121, 122, 132, 154, 161, 175, 193
Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6, 8, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128
 1.1.1-5: 126
 1.1.5: 123, 193
 1.2.31 sq.: 154
Mīnarāja 7
mode 29, 50. *See also paryāya*.
mokṣa 28, 37, 45, 47, 51, 132, 171, 228, 230. *See also* liberation.
Mokṣopāya 215, 230. *See also* Yogavāsiṣṭha (YV).
Mokṣopāya-Ṭīkā (MṬ)
 2.18.33: 230
momentariness 93
muhūrta 19
mukti 144
mūlagrantha 7, 12
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 9
mumukṣu 132
mūrdhābhiṣeka 226
music 174

Nāgārjuna 9
naigamanaya 87
naisargika 135
Nala 190
namaskaraṇa 213
namaskriyā vii, 5, 184, 185, 192, 195
Nārada 184
Nāṭyaśāstra (NŚ) 7, 226
 6 (Srinivasan): 226
 6.31-32: 219, 223
 6.38: 222
Navasāhāsāṅkacarita 213
Navya Nyāya 172
naya 48, 51, 86
Nayacandrasūri 213
nayavāda 51
Nemināhacariya 39
Nighaṇṭu 6
niḥśreyasa 133
niraṃśa 134
Nirukta 6, 150, 152, 153, 162, 163
nirviśeṣa 134
nitya 193
nityamukta 144
niyama 84, 85
Niyamasāra (NSā) 26, 27, 29
niyati 89
Nokār Mantra 31
Nṛpāvalī 216
Nyāya 180
Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh) 50
Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī (NĀA) 48, 84
Nyāyakumudacandra (NKC) 68
Nyāyamukha 61
Nyāyasiddhāñjana (NySiddh) 142, 143
Nyāyasūtra (NS) 6, 35, 50
Nyāyāvatāra (NA) 55
Nyāyāvatāravivṛti (NAV) 38

O'Hara, Robert 105

objectivity, historical 224
object of salutation 47, 49, 54, 62
obligatory rites (*āvassaya / āvaśyaka*) 32
om 13, 112
omniscience 44
omniscient 29. *See also sarvajña, kevalin.*
ornaments 179

Padārthadharmasaṃgraha 6, 14
Padmagupta 213
Padmapāda 13, 132, 136, 137, 138, 140
Paesi 25
Paesikahāṇayaṃ 25
pajjuvāsaṇa / paryupāsana 46
Paṃcatthiyasaṃgaha (Pañcāstikāya-samayasāra, PSSā) 29
Pañcapādikā 140
Pañcapādikā (PañcP) 136, 137, 138
Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa (PañPV) 139
Pañcaparameṣṭhistuti 31, 37, 41
Pāṇini 85, 90, 175
parābhāsin 55
paramāstika 14
paramātman 112
parameṣṭhin 31
Parpola, Asko 123
Pārvatī 192, 193
paryāya 50. *See also* mode.
paryāyārthikanaya 51
paryāyāstikanaya 87
past 219
Pātañjalayogaśāstra (PYŚ) 97, 98, 100
Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa (YVi) 98, 104, 112
Patañjali 22, 85, 90, 111, 113, 114
Pavayaṇasāra (Pravacanasāra, PSā) 30
perception 180
perfected being (*siddha*) 31
philology 212
philosophy, Indian 94, 114
Piṅgala 6
poet 236, 237
poet, poets 176, 177, 178
poetics x, 171, 174, 178, 180. *See also* Alaṃkāraśāstra.
poetry 178, 194, 196, 199, 214
poetry, definition 179. *See also* *kāvyalakṣaṇa.*
poetry, historical 213, 232
poetry, purpose of 223
poetry, Sanskrit 20, 176
poetry, types of 179. *See also* *kāvyabheda.*
polarity 106
Pollock, Sheldon 171
post-modernists 212, 239
prabandha 227, 235
Prabhācandra 68
pradhāna 229
praiṣa 155, 156
Prājyabhaṭṭa 214
Prakāśātman 132, 139, 140
Prakrit 199
prakṛti 216
pramāṇa 55, 60, 67, 135. *See also* cognitive criterion.
pramāṇabhūta 60
Pramāṇamīmāṃsā (PMī) 32, 70
pramāṇaphala 60
Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) 59, 61, 62, 64, 66, 92
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 92
Pramāṇavārttika (PV) 9, 69
pramātṛ 55
praṇava 111
Praśamaratiprakaraṇa (PRP) 38, 39, 40, 41
pratibhā 91, 219, 221
Prātiśākhya-s 6
pratītikalaha 181
pratyakṣa 60
Pravarasena 185, 187, 195
prayoga 49, 54, 58, 63, 64
prayojana vii, ix, 136, 137, 177, 213, 235
prīti 223, 232, 234
proof formula (*prayoga*) 47, 49, 57, 63
pṛthakśāstra 124
pūjā 28, 37
Pūjyapāda Devanandin 42, 45
puṇya 17
puruṣa 89
puruṣārtha 171
Puruṣottamadeva 113
Puṣpadanta 31

Raghuvaṃśa
1.1: 192, 196
1.1-9 186
1.1-10: 212
1.2-3: 194
rājānaka 216
Rājaśekhara 174
rājataraṅgiṇī 233
Rājataraṅgiṇī (JRT, Jonarāja)
3: 216
5: 230
6cd: 230
10-12: 221
13ab: 214
26: 214, 215, 230
Rājataraṅgiṇī (RT, Kalhaṇa) 209, 238
1.3: 214
1.4: 217
1.5: 221
1.6: 223
1.7: 224
1.8: 235
1.9: 235
1.10: 235
1.13b: 216
1.21: 232
1.22: 233
1.23: 226
1.24a: 230
1.24: 215, 231
1.45: 216
1.46: 216
1.47: 217
1.119: 216
5.34: 218
8.3354: 218
8.3449d: 227
Rājataraṅgiṇī (ŚRT, Śrīvara)
1.1.3a: 214
1.1.3: 230
1.1.4: 219
1.1.5: 214, 216
1.1.8ab: 214
1.1.18: 229
3.2: 219
3.2d: 214
3.4: 229
Rājataraṅgiṇī (ŚuRT, Śuka)
1.4 214
1.5 216
1.7 214
1.9 214
1.12ab 214
1.13d 230
Rājataraṅgiṇī-s 214, 228, 234, 238
Rāmadāsa 195
Rāmānuja 112, 131, 132, 136
Rāmāyaṇa 11, 183, 191, 227
1.2.14: 215
1.4.8: 194
1.4.25: 194
rasa 180, 194, 195, 215, 219, 221, 223, 225, 226, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 237, 238, 239
rasa-poetry 237
rasadhvani 230
Rasagaṅgādhara (RG; KM ed.) 172, 180
S. 134,5: 230
rasakāvya 230, 231, 238
rasasyanda 231
rasa theory 239
Ratnākara 217
ratnatraya 33
Rāvaṇavadha
1.1-14: 187
Rāyapaseṇiya (RP) 25
reliability 56, 63, 67
reliable teacher (*āpta*) 56
Ṛgveda 23, 155
ritual
Jaina 31
Vedic 23, 156
ṛjusūtranaya 87
Robinson, Peter 105
Ṛṣabha 40, 44, 66
ṛṣi, Vedic 237
Rüsen, Jörn 209, 210, 211, 238
Ruyyaka 218, 230, 231

Śabara, Śabarasvāmin 122, 126, 127, 128, 154, 193
Śābarabhāṣya (ŚāBh) 124, 126, 154, 155, 160, 193

śabda 193
śabdanaya 87, 91
Śabdānuśāsana (ŚA) 25
śabdārtha 91, 193
Sadānanda ix
sadātmaprakāśa 141
Ṣaḍdarśanīsiddhāntasaṃgraha 83
sādhu 32
sahṛdaya 179
śakti 178
Śakuntalā 189
Salemans, Benedictus Johannes Paulus 107
salutation 49, 62
samabhirūḍhanaya 87
Samantabhadra 52, 55, 56, 59
sāmānya 92, 180
samavasaraṇa, *samosaraṇa* 44
Samayasāra (SSā) 27, 29
sambandha 177
sambandhakārikā 35
saṃgrahanaya 87
Sāṃkhya 88, 90
Sāṃkhyakārikā 6
Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (STP) 46, 51
saṅghāta 92
Śaṅkara 13, 113, 121, 128, 132, 133, 136
Sanskrit 21
Sanskrit cosmopolis 21
śānta 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 233, 234, 237
śāntarasa 223, 225, 226, 227, 230, 238
Sarasvatīkanthābharaṇa 177
sargabandha 183, 185, 190
Śārīraka 122, 128
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 83, 114, 174
Sarvārthasiddhi (SSi) 42, 44
sarvasarvātmakatva 86
Sarvāstivāda 92
śāstra, *śāstra*-s vii, ix, x, 1, 2, 7, 8, 12, 21, 22, 40, 97, 108, 111, 113, 121, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 157, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 211, 230, 235
śāstrapramukha 121
śāstrārambha ix, xii, 1, 2, 83, 84, 85, 87, 94, 121, 123, 128, 131, 132, 134, 138, 139, 142, 143, 171
Śāstrī, Śrīnivāsa 171, 172
śāstric texts 5, 9, 11, 12, 18
śāstrin 2, 18, 171
śāstrin, Buddhist 17
Śatadūṣaṇī (ŚDū) 132, 144, 145, 146
Sattasaī
  2-3: 199
Saundarananda (SN)
  1.1-21: 186
  1.40: 191
  18.63ab: 234
  18.63-64: 199
  18.64ab: 234
Sautrāntika 92
Sāyaṇa 149, 151, 152, 161, 163, 165
Sāyaṇabhāṣya (SāBh) 151
Schiller, Friedrich 222
Schnellenbach, Christiane 209, 211, 238, 239
scholars 5, 10, 149, 176
scholars, Vedic 172
scribes 5, 10, 11, 12, 20, 113
scripts, local 98, 103
scriptures, authority of the 56
semantics 180
sentence, meaning 88
Setubandha
  1.1-8: 195
  1.1-24: 187
  1.9: 195
  1.10-12: 196
  1.12-24: 197
siddha 32
Siddhasena Divākara 46
Siddhasenagaṇin 35
Siddhasena Mahāmati 55
Siṃhasūri 84, 85, 87, 89, 91, 92
similes 193
śiṣṭa 16, 179
śiṣṭācāra 17
Śiśupālavadha
  1.1: 188, 197
Śiva 192, 193
Śivasvāmin 184, 234
Skandasvāmibhāṣya (SkBh) 149, 150, 154

Skandasvāmin 149, 151, 152, 154, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165
skhalita 236. *See also kāvyadoṣa.*
śleṣa 195
śloka 184
Ślokavārttika 8, 83
smaraṇa 159
smṛti 164
Soḍḍhala 212
Someśvaradeva 213
source of teaching 30
Śrī 112
Śrīdhara 14
Śrīkaṇṭhacarita (ŚKC)
1.34b; 2.9b; 2.15d: 236
2.31b: 229
2.32cd: 229
15.36-47; 61ff.: 216
15.78: 216
15.78-80: 218
Śrīnamaskāramantra 31
Śrīvara 212, 214, 219, 229, 230
śrutakevalin 27
śruti 16
stemma 100, 101
stemmatics 106
sthāyibhāva 225
stheya 225
stotra 157
stuti 160, 184, 192, 195
Subhāṣitāvali (SĀ)
kavikāvyapraśaṃsā 187-188: 217
suggestion 179, 180, 181
Śuka 212, 214, 230
sūkṣma 111
sūkta 152
summary verses (*sambandhakārikā*) 35
śūnyavāda 93
superimposition 135, 136, 137, 140. *See also adhyāsa.*
sūryavaṃśa 194
Suśruta 6
sūtra, *sūtra*-s 6, 7, 12, 14, 22, 35, 175
svābhāsin 55
svabhāva 89
svabhāvavāda 89
Svayambhūstotra (SvSt) 48, 55, 56, 60
svayaṃsiddha 134
Śvetāmbara 35, 38, 42, 44, 47
Svipdagsmál 105, 107
syādvāda 91, 94
system of philosophy 174. *See also darśana.*

table, statistical 101
tantrayukti 235
Tapatī 189
taraṅgiṇī 231, 234
Tattvabindu 8
Tattvacintāmaṇi 15
Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (TBh) 35, 38, 39
Tattvārthādhigamaṭīkā (TṬ) 35
Tattvārthasūtra (TS) 33, 35
Tattvārthavārttika (RVār) 42, 68, 69
Tattvārthavṛtti (TV) 42
Tattvavaiśaradī (TVś) 103, 112
texts, Vedic 174
Textual Criticism Challenge 1991 105
theology 113
theory, literary 7. *See also* Alaṃkāra-śāstra.
tīrthaṃkāra 28, 29, 34, 54, 56
transmission, textual 11, 99, 105, 107, 108
tree, ancestral 106

Udayasundarīkathā (USK) 212
8.233a: 216
Umāsvāmin 33, 35
Umāsvāti 35, 38, 41
upādhyāya 32
upākhyāna 188, 190
Upavarṣa 122, 128
upayoga 46
upayuj 233
Upodghāta 151, 161, 165
utpādaka 219
utprekṣā 180
utsarga 86
Uttarajjhayaṇasutta (Uttar) 25

vāc 192
Vācaspatimiśra 6, 8, 13, 103, 112, 128
vāgartha 192, 193

vairāgya 38, 225, 228, 233
Vaiśeṣika 88, 90, 91
Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS(C)) 38, 90, 92
Vakroktijīvita
3.11ab: 218
vaktavyārthapratijñāna 197
Vākya 91
Vākyapadīya 8, 85
Valabhī, Vallabhī 149
Vallabhadeva 217
Vālmīki 184
vaṃśāvalī-s 232
vandana 5
Varāhamihira 7
variant readings 101, 105, 106, 108
vastu 219, 223
vastunirdeśa vii, 5, 183, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 197, 198, 213
Vasubandhu 9, 17, 63
Vasurāta 91
Veda 127, 132, 155, 161, 174
vedāṅga 175
Vedānta 136, 180
Vedānta, schools of 132
Vedāntasāra ix
Vedavyāsa 114
Veṅkaṭanātha 132, 142, 144, 146
verification 55, 64
vidhi 16, 48, 84, 85, 88
Vidyāraṇya 114
viewpoint 48, 86. *See also naya.*
viewpoint, mode-expressive 48, 51. *See also paryāyārthikanaya.*
viewpoint, substance-expressive 46, 48, 51. *See also dravyārthikanaya.*
Vijayanagara 165
vijñāna 93
Vijñānabhikṣu 112
Vikramāṅkadevacarita (VC)
1.26 216
Vimānasthāna 108
Vimuktātman 132, 141, 143
vīrya 46. *See also* innate energy.
viṣaya ix, 136, 137, 177
viśeṣa 92
Viśiṣṭādvaita 131
Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa 228
viśrānti 227
Viśvanātha Tarkapañcānana 16
vivaraṇa 110
Vṛddhayavanajātaka 7
Vṛttikāra 126, 193
Vṛttikāragrantha 126, 127, 128
vulgate 100, 103
vyākaraṇa 84
vyāpti 50
Vyāsa 114, 183
vyavahāranaya 86
vyutpatti 221

West, Martin L. 101
Wezler, Albrecht 85, 86, 98
Wilhelm Tell 222
word, auspicious 12, 20, 22
word, meaning 88
writer of historical poetry 213
writing, history of 20

Yāska 161
yathābhūta 219, 234, 237
yathāsmṛti 164
Yayāti 189
Yogabhāṣya 97, 103, 114
Yogasūtra 6, 10, 11, 97, 103, 114, 118
Yogavārttika 112
Yogavāsiṣṭha (YV) 215, 230. *See also* Mokṣopāya
3.104.25ab: 215
yojanā 236
Yuktyanuśāsana (YA) 55, 56, 57, 60

Zayn, Sulṭān 221